But he’s touching it, destroying it, consuming it. At no point are the interactions indirect, so we need not say the experience is indirect. — NOS4A2
from what I understand it’s just Clark’s/Friston’s/Wilkinson’s theory and not something that has been scientifically demonstrated? — Michael
It’s not about what people prefer but about what they find the evidence and reasoning shows. — Michael
the visual and auditory imagery is causally covariant with
— Michael
Yes that's much better than
the thing that we hear is causally covariant with
— Michael
But then what's indirect about it? — bongo fury
this visual and auditory imagery is isomorphic with — Michael
the thing that we hear is isomorphic with — Michael
Someone contesting indirect realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from the rock to the person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background.
Someone contesting direct realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from rock to TV screen to person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background. — bongo fury
The problem here is that Witt failed to apply his own arguement to the rules of language use, which would end up pulling the rug out from under his own arguement.Wittgenstein says the following "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? — Richard B
Wittgenstein says the following "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing is the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." — Richard B
And seeing someone pick up and eat an apple shows nothing that supports Direct Realist Presentation.
It shows that he is directly interacting with an apple. — NOS4A2
The contact between him and the apple is direct, therefor the experience is direct. — NOS4A2
If a schizophrenic says he is hearing voices, yet others do not, we can confirm that he is in fact not hearing voices — NOS4A2
Bodily interaction is not phenomenological experience. The former being direct says nothing about the latter being direct. A blind man can pick up and eat an apple, therefore picking up and eating an apple is not evidence that someone has a direct visual perception of the apple.
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