Apparently it's only your "reason" that "tells" you all these things; I've never heard any such nonsense from anyone else. — Janus

Is there a big literature on the harmfulness of death, Hugh?

Shouldn't you not be surprised that I'm supposedly having difficulty understanding you? — Noble Dust

No, on the contrary, I am now very much with you, or at least earlier you. You seem to have changed sides and now have no trouble with a dictionary making representations and it is I who finds this hard to comprehend given that the dictionary lacks a mouth.

Maybe this new you should go back and read afresh my argument and engage with it properly.

:rofl: You are a gaslighting queen, major props.

No, it's just you seem to understand how a dictionary can make representations but not how our reason can.
I suggest understanding our reason to be a kind of dictionary. That may help. And now you can understand what I mean when I say that our reason represents death to be a harm to us.

:rofl: You are a gaslighting queen, major props.

Are you meaning "life" in a strictly biological sense, or could disembodied consciousness work? — TiredThinker

I'm referring to the problematic concept of personal identity over time. For the presentist, a tensed A series, such as [yesterday, now, tomorrow] doesn't move, (or rather, is unrelated to the notion of change), because those terms are understood to be indexicals that are used to point at and order present information e.g "the paper over there on the kitchen table is yesterday's newspaper"

This is in line with McTaggart, who argued that the A series can't be treated as moving, for otherwise temporal logic becomes inconsistent in allowing propositions such as "now isn't now" and "yesterday is tomorrow".

Once the A series is held fixed, such that yesterday is always yesterday, now is always now, tomorrow is always tomorrow etc, one can continue to speak of the passing of a train, but one can no longer speak of the passing of subjective time. Relative to this grammar, one can speculate about what happens in one's future, but one cannot speculate about the existence of one's future.

I prefer to not think they’re merely dreams because people consider them far more profound and in a way that changes their perspective basically for life. No everyday dream I might have does that. And certainly none have informed me of anything. — TiredThinker

Descartes had a dream in which someone gave him a melon and then he had another one about a big book. He decided that it was a message from God that he had knowledge inside him that needed to give to the world and thus that he needed to give up being a soldier and devote himself to philosophy.

People are inspired by dreams all the time. And perhaps they can sometimes be a source of information. I mean, Descartes' dream gave him accurate beliefs about himself.

But that does not alter the fact that these near death experiences seem, on any sober assessment, to be dreams. That's the more reasonable thesis.

You have not answered my question about the bleach. The bottle says "danger! Do not drink" What conclusion should I draw - that drinking it will benefit me or harm me?

@TiredThinker my advice is to ingnore @Bartricks.

My advice is that you should stick to buttering thoughts and stop dispensing advice to people who can make their own minds up about what to do with their time.

Cheers, thanks for the kind words, ND...

Is there a big literature on the harmfulness of death, Hugh? — Bartricks

I don't know, is there? You tell me...

My advice is to not disparage your interlocutors.

Yes Hugh. There's a vast literature on the topic. Books and books and books.

It's all to do with a puzzle presented to us by Epicurus.

He thought death could not be a harm to us, for we do not exist and yet we would need to exist in order to be harmed by it. As he put, where death is, we are not, and where we are, death is not.

The puzzle is that he's obviously wrong. Virtually no philosopher accepts his conclusion. Why? Because our reason represents our deaths to be extremely harmful to us.

The puzzle is why they'd be harmful to us if they end our existence.

Cheers, thanks for the kind words, ND... — Janus

Cheers; apologies for not being around much. I should change that.

My advice is to not disparage your interlocutors. — Noble Dust

Is that a kind of condiment?

My advice is to not disparage your interlocutors.

And my advice to you is not to give advice, but to engage with arguments in good faith and not, as you did, by simply asking inane questions that you had no interest in the answer to. That's my advice to you: stop advising people.

My advice is to not disparage your interlocutors.

And my advice to you is to stop giving advice and engage with the arguments. Which you've yet to do.

My advice is to not disparage your interlocutors.

If you exist yet your body does not, then you are not your body, yes[/s[? — Bartricks

I say no one exists without the living body. I may be wrong and you may be right. So refute my contention if you can – make the case:

(A) How do "you" exist when the living body no longer exists?

(B) Without a living body distinct from every other living body, what differentiates "you" from not-you?

Simple enough. Not scared, are you? Also, if you can't make the case and this substance dualism is merely an article of faith (i.e. metaphysical first principle), then just say so. However, if you're as smart as you think you are, Dr. Bartricks, you will make the fucking case. :smile:

And my advice to you is to engage with the arguments and stop giving advice.

Now, tell me, what do you make of the advice on my bleach? It says "do not drink'. Does that imply it'll harm me or benefit me.

Engage with the argument

My advice is to not disparage your interlocutors.

Yes Hugh. There's a vast literature on the topic. Books and books and books.

It's all to do with a puzzle presented to us by Epicurus.

He thought death could not be a harm to us, for we do not exist and yet we would need to exist in order to be harmed by it. As he put, where death is, we are not, and where we are, death is not. — Bartricks

I'm familiar with Epicurus' idea that we cannot be harmed by death if we are nothing when dead. We can certainly be harmed by dying though, which alone is enough to explain peoples' fears. Perhaps you could cite some works from that "vast literature" which agrees with your wacky, unreasonable views on the subject, Turdricks.

Cheers; apologies for not being around much. I should change that. — Noble Dust

I often wonder whether being around here is worthwhile; it's certainly made more worthwhile by interlocutors who are serious, open-minded and of good faith such as yourself.

I don't want evidence, I want proof, of postmortem persistence of my/our consciousness! — Agent Smith

Is Agent Smith talking outta his/her hat or is s/he onto something really important?

Dr. Bartricks, you will make the fucking case. — 180 Proof

This is one argument:

1. If the annihilation of my body will be harmful to me, then I will exist when it happens

2. If I exist at the same time as my body is annihilated, then I am not my body

3. Therefore, if the annihilation of my body will be harmful to me, I am not my body

4. The annihilation of my body is harmful to me

5. Therefore, I am not my body.

Here is another:

1. My mind is indivisible
2. My body is divisible
3. If something is divisible it is not also indivisible
4. Therefore my mind is not my body

I often wonder whether being around here is worthwhile; it's certainly made more worthwhile by interlocutors who are serious, open-minded and of good faith such as yourself. — Janus

Thanks man. The same to you.

I'm familiar with Epicurus' idea that we cannot be harmed by death if we are nothing when dead. We can certainly be harmed by dying though, which alone is enough to explain peoples' fears — Janus

Eh? It's not about fear. If Tom - who has no fear of dying for he's just watching a bird eat a fly and isn't thinking about anything in particular - is shot in the back of the head, he's harmed by that.

Epicurus thought he wouldn't be harmed.

Most philosophers - including this one - think that's nuts, for it is about as clear to our reason as anything that death is harmful.

Indeed, it is more evident to reason that death is harmful than that being harmed requires existence, so if the two really are in conflict then it is the existence condition that should be rejected, not the harmfulness of death.

Yet the existence condition is very plausible - it seems self-evident to reason (not 'as' self evident as the harmfulness of death, but still powerfullly self-evident).

Hence the puzzle. Hence the vast literature.

3 does not follow from 1 or 2 because both are nonsense (i.e. circular definitions, not valid premises). I guess you're really really not as "smart" as you believe you are, Kid D-k. :lol:

More nonsense. :sparkle: