Our reason represents our minds to be indivisible things. — Bartricks
That's prima facie evidence that's precisely what they are. — Bartricks
As far as I can tell, you are leaping from 'mind' being a singular noun to some dusty ontological thesis. Do you think boats have ovaries? Can rivers smoke cigars ? — Pie
This is depressingly sloppy reasoning. ' — Pie
just answer the question. Fuck according to whom. Are we dependent on the authority of authorities? Maybe so, what does the pope say? — Merkwurdichliebe
What's the end game, if we were to grant you the indivisibility of mind ? Do you turn the crank on your logic machine until God pops out? — Pie
it is quite simple. From mind perspective it is divisible. From sense perspective it is indivisible. The two perspectives impose upon each other within a singular organism, causing major confusion amongst philosophers on TPF. — Merkwurdichliebe
What's the end game, if we were to grant you the indivisibility of mind ? Do you turn the crank on your logic machine until God pops out? — Pie
I'm not sure if I follow. Speaking for myself, if the mind is divisible in any way at all, and you claim it is from a "mind perspective", then that's it, the debate comes to an end then and there. — Agent Smith
What's the end game, if we were to grant you the indivisibility of mind ? Do you turn the crank on your logic machine until God pops out? — Pie
I think you follow fine. I'm not trying to be clever. If I get you, you are saying that mind trumps sense in all cases. Correct? — Merkwurdichliebe
What exactly do you mean when you say the mind is divisible and also indivisible? I get that in one way it is and in another way it isn't. How exactly? Danke in advance. — Agent Smith
My contention is quite simple: My mind is distinct from yours but that means there are at least 2 minds which shouldn't be possible if mind is indivisible. — Agent Smith
You seem like a very nice interlocutor, would you be so kind as to recapitulate the debate for us late comers? Pretty please. — Merkwurdichliebe
My contention is quite simple: My mind is distinct from yours but that means there are at least 2 minds which shouldn't be possible if mind is indivisible. — Agent Smith
Sure. Since I've been here, it's pretty much Bartricks insisting the mind is indivisible and ignoring all criticisms of his arguments, all the while insisting that others don't actually read books, etc. It's a sit-com where watching any episode prepares you for all the others. Variations on a theme. — Pie
I am only saying that from one point of view it appears indivisible, and from another it appears divisible. I am only saying that this is how it appears from differing perspectives, and I suspect that where they intersect, we may find a better depiction of the truth of it all Perhaps, if we could adquately define a third perspective, we could triangulate the reality of the mind's singularity. Any thoughts, you're very intelligent? — Merkwurdichliebe
But how do you know it is not identical. — Merkwurdichliebe
Lol. Let me take up the mantle and argue on behalf of an indivisible mind. — Merkwurdichliebe
“The practical activity one is obliging oneself to engage in by judging and acting is integrating those new commitments into a unified whole comprising all the other commitments one acknowledges…. Engaging in those integrative activities is synthesizing a self or subject, which shows up as what is responsible for the component commitments” (ibid).
A self or subject in this usage is not something that just exists. It is a guiding aim that is itself subject to development. “[T]he synthetic-integrative process, with its aspects of critical and ampliative activity [rejecting incompatibilities and developing consequences] provides the basis for understanding both the subjective and the objective poles of the intentional nexus. Subjects are what repel incompatible commitments in that they ought not to endorse them, and objects are what repel incompatible properties in that they cannot exhibit them” (p. 53).
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Upstream from all of this, according to Brandom, is “Kant’s normative understanding of mental activity” (ibid). This is closely bound up with what he calls Kant’s “radically original conception of freedom” (ibid). In the Latin medieval and early modern traditions, questions about freedom were considered to be in a broad sense questions of fact about our power. For Kant, all such questions of fact apply only to the domain of represented objects. On the other hand, “Practical freedom is an aspect of the spontaneity of discursive activity on the subjective side” (pp. 58-59).
“The positive freedom exhibited by exercises of our spontaneity is just this normative ability: the ability to commit ourselves, to become responsible. It can be thought of as a kind of authority: the authority to bind oneself by conceptual norms” (p. 59). Brandom recalls Kant’s example of a young person reaching legal adulthood. “Suddenly, she has the authority to bind herself legally, for instance by entering into contracts. That gives her a host of new abilities: to borrow money, take out a mortgage, start a business. The new authority to bind oneself normatively… involves a huge increase in positive freedom” (ibid).
Rationality for Kant does not consist in having good reasons. “It consists rather just in being in the space of reasons” (p. 60), in being liable to specific kinds of normative assessment.
So, shall we start with Parmenides and then Zeno of Elea. How many more do you want? What'll do the trick, Isaac?
Or do you want to know why they thought that any region of space can be infinitely divided? — Bartricks
Do explain to me, isaac, how it could be that an extended thing might not be divisible. — Bartricks
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