Let's just say that there is no external world and continue to live our lives as if there is one. Then this silly debate would finally come to an end, and we'll do what we do in any case. — Ciceronianus

57 58 and still going...

I understood the first time. I agree, but that is a trivial point to make. We all know that much. Do you object to either claim in the quote at the top of this post? — creativesoul

Sure I agree, but I see those claims as being more obvious, more trivial, than the point that there is no fact of the matter concerning whether experience is internal, a combination of internal and external or neither internal nor external, and that these are just different ways of talking about perceptual experience; different understandings that all make sense in their various contexts, and that pitting them against one another doesn't mean much..

There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about. — creativesoul

True enough, but is it not therefore logical, and rational, to claim that thinking about anything except words, would not need them? While it is true every thought must have its object, it does not follow that ever object must be a word.

We're considering whether or not any thought needs words...... — creativesoul

It’s been established that some thoughts need words....thoughts with wordsk as their object.

......any and all meaningful coherent answers to that particular question are based completely upon what counts as thought that needs words, as well as what counts as thought that does not. — creativesoul

Ok....the kind of thought that has words as its object counts as the kind of thought that needs words. The kind of thought that has anything but words as its object.....why does that kind of thought need them?

It seems to me that the difference between thought that needs words and thought that does not is one of existential dependency. The former is existentially dependent upon words, and the latter is not. — creativesoul

Ok, fine. A thought that needs words to exist is impossible without the words that are its object. This is true for particular thoughts of a certain kind, but does not hold for thought in general. It follows that the existence of thought in general is not necessarily existentially dependent on words. Which is exactly where we began this dialectic.

Here we face a 'problem' though. If we claim that simple thought existed prior to the first words...... — creativesoul

That’s not the claim, which is simple thought doesn’t require words. Simple thoughts occur whether or not words exist, and regardless of their temporality relative to thought in general.

......and we aim to set out that kind of thought, then we are taking account of that which existed in its entirety prior to our taking it into account. — creativesoul

Yes, we can do that. Aim to set out, and, take account, are just about the same thing, so when we do either we are describing something. So we are describing an antecedent. Can’t account for that which hasn’t occurred, I wouldn’t think.

Thus, we can get it wrong! — creativesoul

This carries the implication that the occurrence and the account of the occurrence can be incompatible. I submit this only possible from a distinction in chronological reference frames. I have often taken account of an existant thought and found it wanting, but only from the perspective of a successive, and conceptually differentiated, thought. Commonly called instruction if from external source, or introspection if from the same internal source.
———-

if we're using the term as a means to take account of that which exists in its entirety prior to our taking it into account...... — creativesoul

I understand this as....if we use thought to take account of thought, to which I agree wholeheartedly...

......then whatever we say about such thought must not only be consistent with the ability to exist in its entirety prior to words, but our account must set out how it can/does. — creativesoul

.....but now it is that what we say that takes account. So what we say must be consistent with our thoughts...yes, it should, in order to be productive. The account sets out the consistency between the thought and the account we take of it, by relegating words to the representations of the conceptions that are the content of our thoughts. In this theory, the consistency in the account is given, under the assumption of an otherwise rationally operative intelligence.

You’re a tough nut to crack, mon ami, and hopefully I did some justice.

True enough, but is it not therefore logical, and rational, to claim that thinking about anything except words, would not need them? While it is true every thought must have its object, it does not follow that ever object must be a word. — Mww

Symbolic thought requires symbols, and symbols are mostly words. It's true that things like love or hate or anger can be symbolized by images, but how could non-verbal images be used to symbolize abstract notions like generality, specificity, pattern, from, form, about, content, exception, logic, rationality, fundamental, absolute and countless others?

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them..

Do you object to either claim..? — creativesoul

Sure I agree, but I see those claims as being more obvious, more trivial,.. — Janus

Perfect. Do you object to what's directly below?

Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both.

symbolic thought requires symbols, and symbols are mostly words. It's true that things like love or hate or anger can be symbolized by images, but how could non-verbal images be used to symbolize abstract notions like generality, specificity, pattern, from, form, about, content, exception, logic, rationality, fundamental, absolute and countless others? — Janus

All thought and perception is symbolic in the sense of signifying something. Complexes of sound , image and sensation signify recognizable things. Music signifies complex ideas and feelings. Words are just specialized forms of signification. Many abstract ideas can be signified better by feelings( which are forms of conceptual meaning) than by words.

Perfect. Do you object to what's directly below?

Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both. — creativesoul

No, I've already said that, in the context of thinking about experience as being comprised of both internal and external elements, which is one of the possible ways to think about it, it's a sensible statement.

...there is no fact of the matter concerning whether experience is internal, a combination of internal and external or neither internal nor external... — Janus

Never claimed otherwise. Red herring. Strawman. Non sequitur. Readers' choice.

There are better approaches.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them. Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both. — creativesoul

So, ...

You've agreed to all of what's in the above quote.

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?

:brow:

All thought and perception is symbolic in the sense of signifying something. Complexes of sound , image and sensation signify recognizable things. Music signifies complex ideas and feelings. Words are just specialized forms of signification. Many abstract ideas can be signified better by feelings( which are forms of conceptual meaning) than by words. — Joshs

The way I think about signs has been influenced by Peirce. To give a basic account: according to Peirce a symbol is something that signifies something else but does not resemble it. An ikon is something that signifies something else by resemblance or representation. And a basic sign, such as smoke being a sign of fire for example, signifies by material association acquired by inference or expectation from the experience of constant conjunctions of things.

Words are symbols in this sense that they do not resemble or have any material associations, but do have conventional associations, with the things they represent. So not all signs are symbols in this understanding.

Now my claim has just been that a complex argument or train of thought involving abstract concepts cannot be followed except in symbolic language terms. That said, I don't totally rule out the possibility, but I know I can't do it, and I cannot imagine how others could. But even if it were possible, how could it be shown to be such in any case?

Now my claim has just been that a complex argument or train of thought involving abstract concepts cannot be followed except in symbolic language terms — Janus

Yup.

Never claimed otherwise. — creativesoul

Good, then we've nothing to argue about.

There are better approaches. — creativesoul

Better according to who?

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well? — creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more. If experience is defined as the sensing, feeling and thinking processes of an individual, which are obviously not open to public scrutiny, then on that definition experience is internal. So, it is up to us how we choose to think about it.

Yup. — creativesoul

:cool: Cool, we agree on that it seems.

There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about.
— creativesoul

True enough, but is it not therefore logical, and rational, to claim that thinking about anything except words, would not need them? — Mww

Well, no. Some things we think about are themselves existentially dependent upon words. If A is existentially dependent upon words, and thinking about A is existentially dependent upon A, then thinking about A is existentially dependent upon words.

I think we agree upon much, actually.

If some thought needs words, and some does not, then claiming that thought does not need words is false. — creativesoul

If some thought does not need words, then the proposition "thought does not need words" is true. This is true, regardless of the fact that some thought needs words. That's the way inductive reasoning works.

Here's some more examples. Some living beings need to breathe oxygen, some do not. We can conclude that living beings do not need to breathe oxygen. Some plants need UV light, some do not. We can conclude that plants do not need UV light.

When we have a class, "thought" for example, and some of the members of that class require a specified property. and other members do not require that specific property, we can conclude, as a general principle, that the specified property is not a requirement to be a member of the class. This makes the property accidental rather than essential. You could however, start a subclass, where that accidental property is stipulated as essential, and say that the property is a requirement for that subclass. So, a special type of complex thought needs words, but in general, complex thought does not need words..

I think that's true. I think the main areas we might disagree on concern different emphases; on differences regarding what might be thought to be the best approaches. And I see those as matters for the individual, as matters that are hard to gain normative purchase on.

If some thought does not need words, then the proposition "thought does not need words" is true. This is true, regardless of the fact that some thought needs words. That's the way inductive reasoning works. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, if some thought does not need words then the proposition "some thought does not need words" is true. "Thought does not need words" is a blanket statement which is equivalent to "all thought does not need words".

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more. — Janus

What - exactly - is a matter of definition, and nothing more?

Whether or not a tree is inside or outside my head?

If experience is defined as the sensing, feeling and thinking processes of an individual, which are obviously not open to public scrutiny, then on that definition experience is internal. So, it is up to us how we choose to think about it. — Janus

emphasis mine

Again, what - exactly - is up to us how we choose to think about it? The elemental constitution of all human experience? As if that changes depending upon how we choose to define the term "experience"?

Do you think that we can be mistaken about what experience consists of?

So, I'm imagining a one-year-old human, playing contently in a crib with some toy. Happy slobber. The family dog is lying close by fast asleep... legs and facial muscles twitching. There's a sudden loud knock on the door. The dog barks incessantly. The toddler is startled.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".

That cannot be right.

What - exactly - is a matter of definition, and nothing more?

Whether or not a tree is inside or outside my head? — creativesoul

No, whether or not your experience of a tree is internal or both internal and external. As I said both can be coherently said, depending on context or definition of 'experience'.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience". — creativesoul

You're putting words in my mouth. I haven't said anything about content. If experience is thought of as being something that goes on inside the body/ brain, then experience is rightly thought of as internal; that is inside the skin/ external world boundary.

If experience is thought of as the whole process consisting in stimulation of the senses by light, sound or whatever that is external to the skin/ external world boundary as well as the neural affects that go on inside the body/ brain, then experience is rightly thought of as both external and internal or neither (exclusively) external or internal; that is both outside and inside the skin/ external world boundary etc.

These are simply different ways we can think about these things; it is not a case of one being right and the other wrong. One or the other way of thinking might be more or less useful depending on what it is we want to do.

When dichotomies are used as a means to divide everything up into stuff that fits into one or the other, then the inevitable result is a failure to be able to properly account for that which is both — creativesoul

Fortunate then that the account of active inference does not seek to deicide "everything" up into one or other camp, but merely some things. Otherwise it would indeed fall foul of your concerns.

There are no such things in those accounts. — creativesoul

Perception.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".

That cannot be right. — creativesoul

Of course it can. The contents of my house depend on how I define 'house' (does it include the porch, the outhouse, the shed...?). It seems quite normal to say that our definitions determine the content of those defined concepts.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".
— creativesoul

You're putting words in my mouth. I haven't said anything about content. — Janus

Fair enough.

According to you, the toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".

Not exactly; I'd say that what we count as the toddler's experience depends on how we define the word "experience". The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.

...It seems quite normal to say that our definitions determine the content of those defined concepts. — Isaac

Being normal doesn't equate to being accurate, correct, and/or true. Our definitions determine what else we can say without self-contradiction. They do not determine whether or not they are true. They do not determine what something consists of when the candidate is the sort of thing that exists in its entirety prior to our attempts at taking it into account. Some human experience is exactly that sort of thing. So...

The toddler was a deliberate choice. The toddler's individual experience is not at all influenced and/or determined by how we define the term "experience". It consists of external things, internal things, as well as things that are neither(associations/correlations drawn between external and internal things).

Toddlers have experience. I think we agree there.

The point here is simple really. Those and many other experiences existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. All definitions of "experience" are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. Thus, it only follows that some human experience can and does exist prior to any definition of the term "experience". If the notion/conception of experience cannot take those kinds of experience into account, then it is found sorely lacking.

Let's just say that there is no external world and continue to live our lives as if there is one. Then this silly debate would finally come to an end, and we'll do what we do in any case. — Ciceronianus

"Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." ― Charles Sanders Peirce

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it. — Janus

I would concur. It only follow then that we can get such things wrong.

Our definitions regarding all such things(all that exists in its entirety prior to our ability to talk about it) can be mistaken.

...It seems quite normal to say that our definitions determine the content of those defined concepts... — Isaac

The toddler's experience is not a defined concept

Those and many other experiences existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. — creativesoul

No. Something existed prior to our naming practices. Our naming practices determined which of the possible boundaries we are going to make significant.

It's like saying a cell exists prior to our naming it. It doesn't. A collection of proteins, lipids and carbohydrates exists, all moving around in a constant state of flux. What constitutes 'the cell' is determined entirely by convention, by the naming practice. We say 'the cell' includes the vacuole, but excludes the interior of the protein channel. It includes the mitochondrial DNA, but excludes viral RNA. We decided all this in naming 'the cell'. All the stuff existed prior to our naming, but the fact about what was 'the cell' and what wasn't 'the cell' didn't exist prior to our naming it.