Idealism: Other minds exist! — Agent Smith
Solipsism: Other minds don't exist! — Agent Smith
A direct & succinct answer to the OP.Idealism: Other minds exist!
Solipsism: Other minds don't exist! — Agent Smith
By idealism I understand 'only minds and ideas (or what we is known) are real.' Ontology reduced to epistemology. (Related to 'antirealism', 'essentialism' (e.g. universals), immaterialism / nonphysicalism / supernaturalism, 'social constructionism', 'common sensism', 'moral subjectivism / relativism / nihilism', ''finalism', 'existentialism', metaphysical libertarianism, etc.)
By solipsism I understand 'only my mind and my ideas (or what I know) are real.' Ontology without epistemology. (Reductio ad absurdum of idealism)
A direct & succinct answer to the OP.
However, both are unprovable inferences from Descartes' intuitive introspective "I am" argument. From that axiom, we can a> optimistically reason that similar minds exist in the bodies of our fellow philosophers. Or, we can b> pessimistically conclude that nothing exists apart from my own inner world model.
Both can be argued for or against, but not proven empirically. Yet, according to b>, even empirical evidence could be a product of my own world-modeling mind. We know both possibilities, only by reading our own minds.
From personal experience though, my own intuition is not smart enough to make-up all the observed complexities of reality. So, I have to assume that those counter-intuitive ideas & opinions are coming from external minds with different life experiences. :cool: — Gnomon
Idealism and solipsism are derived from the simple fact that a world external to mind or self respectively can't be known to exist. As you can see, these philosophical stances are predicated on possibility (metaphysics) and agnoiological (epistemological) concerns. — Agent Smith
Prove it. — praxis
They are representations. My mind models a representation of you, for instance. — praxis
If you were a figment of my imagination I would know more about you then you do. — praxis
I get that - except isn't idealism a la berkeley predicated on the idea that all things disappear when we're not experiencing them first hand.
The tree in the forest - and me - and you? — GLEN willows
If you were a figment of my imagination I would know more about you then you do. Do you think that I know more about you then you do? I don’t know the color of the shirt you’re currently wearing, assuming you’re wearing one. You most likely do. — praxis
I get that - except isn't idealism a la berkeley predicated on the idea that all things disappear when we're not experiencing them first hand.
The tree in the forest - and me - and you?
In other words, the entire sense-excperience I'm having is in my head. Only my head. That's solipsism no? — GLEN willows
So what's a skeptical atheist to do? I agree with Agent Smith that solipsism is impossible to disprove, but I notice it gets short shrift in philosophical circles. It seems like the "dead end" everyone is trying to avoid (Descartes only proved one mind / thinking thing....then ran to God for the rest.).
My point is - Solipsism is never treated as a legitimate theory compared to Empiricism or Idealism... — GLEN willows
As far as I can tell, idealism is either difficult or impossible to disprove. The same goes for solipsism. — Agent Smith
...Idealism often has to make use of some kind of 'big mind' to prevent solipsism...
...
From Kastrup's blog:
...
I also do not deny that reality exists independent of personal psyches, like the human psyche. I maintain that empirical reality is an experience of an impersonal mind, which I like to call 'mind-at-large' in honor of Aldous Huxley. — Tom Storm
"Skeptical" of what? (Atheism?)So what's a skeptical atheist to do? — GLEN willows
:up:All solipsism is a form of idealism, idealism need not be solipsist at all. — Manuel
:fire:Idealism holds that for a statement to be true it must stand in some relation to mind - observed, known, believed, or whatever. So is "There are other minds" true for idealism? If it is true, then it stands in some relation to mind... but which one? If it stands in a relation to a mind other than one's own, then that is profoundly problematic for idealism. Hence the need for god to hold things together.
Idealism's relation to truth is... incoherent. — Banno
For context, I don't feel strongly about 'matter' and the 'physical' either when used metaphysically or 'transpractically.' Perhaps I'm missing out. Too late now. — Pie
A perfect illusion of a material world which can't really be transcended except perhaps via glimmers during meditation, or perhaps at 'death', is functionally no different to an actual material world. — Tom Storm
Nothing is fully imagined or understood in dreams, let along in a potential solipsistic universe. — Tom Storm
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.