Calling on @Tobias @Maw @apokrisis ...

I think the work of Jacob Gorender: Colonial Slavery, does an excellent job of challenging Hegel's view while recognizing the importance of it. It is ironic that many challengers are doing the anti-thesis process being discussed.

Apart from that work, there are interesting takes from a range of political inclinations on the role of the 'overseers' in particular forms of administration, that is to say, the role of the slave replicating the condition of the master in their own existence. As an example of contrast, one can read of the dynamic in Ralph Ellison and in György Lukács without claiming they ultimately agree about what is happening.

As others have noted, one of the most readable paths into Hegel is his writing on history.

Two things must be distinguished in consciousness, first, that I know and, secondly, what I know. In self-consciousness the two coincide, for Spirit knows itself. It is the judgment of its own nature and, at the same time, the operation of coming to itself, to produce itself, to make itself (actually) into that, which it is in itself (potentially). Following this abstract definition it may be said that world history is the exhibition of spirit striving to attain knowledge of its own nature. As the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, the taste and shape of its fruit, so also the first traces of Spirit virtually contain the whole of history. Orientals do not yet know that Spirit – Man as such – is free. And because they do not know it, they are not free. They only know that one is free; but for this very reason such freedom is mere caprice, ferocity, dullness of passion, or, perhaps, softness and tameness of desire – which again is nothing but an accident of nature and thus, again, caprice. This one is therefore only a despot, not a free man. The consciousness of freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free. But they, and the Romans likewise, only knew that some are free not man as such. This not even Plato and Aristotle knew. For this reason the Greeks not only had slavery, upon which was based their whole life and the maintenance of their splendid liberty, but their freedom itself was partly an accidental, transient, and limited flowering and partly a severe thralldom of human nature. Only the Germanic peoples came, through Christianity, to realize that man as man is free and that freedom of Spirit is the very essence of man’s nature. This realization first arose in religion, in the innermost region of spirit; but to introduce it in the secular world was a further task which could only be solved and fulfilled by a long and severe effort of civilization. Thus slavery did not cease immediately with the acceptance of the Christian religion. Liberty did not suddenly predominate in states nor reason in governments and constitutions. The application of the principle to secular conditions, the thorough molding and interpenetration of the secular world by it, is precisely the long process of history. I have already drawn attention to this distinction between a principle as such and its application, its introduction and execution in the actuality of life and spirit. This is a fundamental fact in our science and must be kept constantly in mind. Just as we noted it in the Christian principle of self-consciousness and freedom, so it shows itself in the principle of freedom in general. World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom – a progress whose necessity we have to investigate.


We have established Spirit’s consciousness of its freedom, and thereby the actualization of this Freedom as the final purpose of the world. For the spiritual world is the substance of reality, and the physical world remains subordinate to it, or, in terms of speculative philosophy, has no truth compared with the former. But the term “freedom,” without further qualification, is indefinite and infinitely ambiguous. Being the highest concept, it is liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions, and errors and may give rise to all possible kinds of extravagances. All this has never been more clearly known and experienced than today. Yet for the time being we must content ourselves with this general, as yet undefined term. Attention was also drawn to the importance of the infinite difference between the principle, as that which so far is only in itself, and that which is real. At the same time, it is Freedom in itself that comprises within itself the infinite necessity of bringing itself to consciousness and thereby, since knowledge about itself is its very nature, to reality. Freedom is itself its own object of attainment and the sole purpose of Spirit. It is the ultimate purpose toward which all world history has continually aimed. To this end all the sacrifices have been offered on the vast altar of the earth throughout the long lapse of ages. Freedom alone is the purpose which realizes and fulfills itself, the only enduring pole in the change of events and conditions, the only truly efficient principle that pervades the whole. This final aim is God’s purpose with the world. But God is the absolutely perfect Being and can, therefore, will nothing but Himself, His own will. The nature of His own will, His own nature, is what we here call the Idea of freedom. Thus we translate the language of religion into that of philosophy. Our next question then is: what are the means the Idea uses for its realization? This is the second point that we have to consider.
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Although Freedom as such is primarily an internal idea, the means it uses are the external phenomena which in history present themselves directly before our eyes. The first glance at history convinces us that the actions of men spring from their needs, their passions, their interests, their characters, and their talents. Indeed, it appears as if in this drama of activities these needs, passions, and interests are the sole springs of action and the main efficient cause. It is true that this drama involves also universal purposes, benevolence, or noble patriotism But such virtues and aims are insignificant on the broad canvas of history. We may, perhaps, see the ideal of Reason actualized in those who adopt such aims and in the spheres of their influence; but their number is small in proportion to the mass of the human race and their influence accordingly limited. Passions, private aims, and the satisfaction of selfish desires are, on the contrary, tremendous springs of action. Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which law and morality would impose on them; and that these natural impulses are closer to the core of human nature than the artificial and troublesome discipline that tends toward order, self-restraint, law, and morality.

When we contemplate this display of passions and the consequences of their violence, the unreason which is associated not only with them, but even – rather we might say specially – with good designs and righteous aims; when we see arising therefrom the evil, the vice, the ruin that has befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the mind of man ever created, we can hardly avoid being filled with sorrow this universal taint of corruption. And since this decay is not the work of mere nature, but of human will, our reflections may well lead us to a moral sadness, a revolt of the good will (spirit) – if indeed it has a place within us. Without rhetorical exaggeration, a simple, truthful account of the miseries that have overwhelmed the noblest of nations and polities and the finest exemplars of private virtue forms a most fearful picture and excites emotions of the profoundest and most hopeless sadness, counter-balanced by no consoling result. We can endure it and strengthen ourselves against it only by thinking that this is the way it had to be – it is fate; nothing can be done. And at last, out of the boredom with which this sorrowful reflection threatens us, we draw back into the vitality of the present, into our aims and interests of the moment; we retreat, in short, into the selfishness that stands on the quiet shore and thence enjoys in safety the distant spectacle of wreckage and confusion.

But in contemplating history as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed, a question necessarily arises: To what principle, to what final purpose, have these monstrous sacrifices been offered?

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From this comment on the second essential element in the historical embodiment of an aim, we infer – considering for a moment the institution of the state – that a state is then well constituted and internally vigorous when the private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the state, and the one finds gratification and realization in the other – a most important proposition. But in a state many institutions are necessary – inventions, appropriate arrangements, accompanied by long intellectual struggles in order to find out what is really appropriate, as well as struggles with private interests and passions, which must be harmonized in difficult and tedious discipline. When a state reaches this harmony, it has reached the period of its bloom, its excellence, its power and prosperity. But world history does not begin with any conscious aim, as do the particular circles of men. Already the simple instinct of living together contains the conscious purpose of securing life and property; once this primal society has been established, the purpose expands. But world history begins its general aim – to realize the idea of Spirit – only in an implicit form (an sich), namely, as Nature – as an innermost, unconscious instinct. And the whole business of history, as already observed, is to bring it into consciousness. Thus, appearing in the form of nature, of natural will, what we have called the subjective side is immediate, – actual existence (für sich): need, instinct, passion, private interest, even opinion and subjective representation. These vast congeries of volitions, interests, and activities constitute the tools and means of the World Spirit for attaining its purpose, bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it. And this purpose is none other than finding itself – coming to itself – and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. But one may indeed question whether those manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals and peoples in which they seek and satisfy their own purposes are, at the same time, the means and tools of a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing, which they realize unconsciously. This purpose has been questioned, and in every variety of form denied, decried, and denounced as mere dreaming and “philosophy.” On this point, however, I announced my view at the very outset, and asserted our hypothesis – which eventually will appear as the result of our investigation – namely, that Reason governs the world and has consequently governed its history. In relation to this Reason, which is universal and substantial, in and for itself, all else is subordinate, subservient, and the means for its actualization. Moreover, this Reason is immanent in historical existence and reaches its own perfection in and through this existence.
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As was said earlier, nothing is now more common than the complaint that the ideals which imagination sets up are not actualized, that these glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality. These ideals, which in the voyage of life founder on the rocks of hard reality, may be merely subjective to begin with and belong to the peculiarity of an individual who regards himself as supremely wise. Such ideals do not belong here. For what an individual fancies for himself in his isolation cannot be the norm for universal reality. The universal law is not designed for individuals, as such, who indeed may find themselves very much the losers. But by the term “ideal” we also understand the ideal of Reason, of the good and true. Poets, like Schiller, have painted such ideals touchingly and with strong emotion, and with the deeply melancholy conviction that they could never be actualized. In affirming, on the contrary, that the universal Reason does actualize itself, we have nothing to do with the empirical detail. For this can be better or worse; here chance and particularity have received authority to exercise their tremendous power. Much fault, therefore, might be found in phenomenal details. This subjective fault-finding is easy, particularly since it keeps in view only the detail and its deficiency, without understanding the universal Reason in it. In asserting good intentions for the welfare of the whole and exhibiting a semblance of goodheartedness, it can swagger about with great airs. It is easier to discover the deficiency in individuals, in states, and in Providence, than to see their real meaning. For in negative fault-finding one stands nobly and with proud mien above the matter, without penetrating into it and without comprehending its positive aspects. Age generally makes people more tolerant; youth is always discontented. For older people have a more mature judgment, which accepts even the bad, not out of mere indifference but because it has been more deeply taught by the grave experience of life. It has thus been led to the essence, the intrinsic value of the matter in question.

The insight then to which – in opposition to these ideals philosophy should lead us is that the actual world is as it ought to be, that the truly good, the universal divine Reason is the power capable of actualizing itself. This good, this Reason, in its most concrete representation, is God. God governs the world. The actual working of His government, the carrying out of His plan is the history of the world. Philosophy strives to comprehend this plan, for only that which has been carried out according to it has reality; whatever does not accord with it is but worthless existence. Before the pure light of this divine Idea, which is no mere ideal, the illusion disappears as though the world were a crazy, inane process. Philosophy wishes to recognize the content, the reality of the divine Idea, and to justify the spurned actuality; for Reason is the comprehension of the divine work. — Hegel

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13290/historical-examples-of-hegels-dialectic

I am hesitant to endorse Hegels writing on history. It is purely speculative in the sense that with Hegel's dialectic in hand I could write a completely different 'history', for instance the awakening of spirit as only currently upon us by the realization of minorities and marginalized communities how they have been subjugated and demanding their place in history... That such is possible though shows something about the nature of dialectic, something that is more idealistic than realistic.

Dialectic is a kind of logic, though not a logic in the traditional sense, but a logic nonetheless. It is a 'logic' because it is a formalization of the way we think about the world and therefore the only way the world can 'be'. That is why Hegel is according to me an idealist. We cannot escape to think of the world dialectically.

Dialectic is a dynamic way of thinking and therefore prone to become historicized. The articulation of the dialectic also emerges historically in the history of philosophy. History was always dialectical, but in history its abstract articulation emerged. I though Hegel over emphasized this historicity and cut out or did not know earlier examples of dialectical thinking, such as the Tao te Ching. It would laos have upset his neatly organized dialectical world history, but I digress.

Dialectic is a way in which we conceive of the world, the way in which we make sense of it. Hegel did not use the thesis anti thesis and synthesis scheme. He describes it as thesis, negation and negation of the negation. It is important because synthesis alludes to some kind of unity, but Hegel is reluctant to speak of unities. Rather fault lines remain within the new position that can accommodate both the original position as its negation. The synthesis is itself not at rest, it is a continuous thread of negations, because the new position is not as such a new position, but something that engenders its own negation yet again albeit on a higher level. It is a kind of spiral of negations.

Now because it is a logic, an inescapable way of thinking about the world, we see the dialectic at work in every theory we conceive. Take for instance the theory of evolution. A species emerges, but finds itself in hostile conditions, (negation) it adapts to those conditions, negating the negation, but in so doing encounters other problems, negations and adapts again and so on. It develops and diversifies, increasing its complexity through this constant flow of negations. It develops into species, but also eco systems in which both hunter and prey need to coexist even though they feed on each other.

Also look inside yourself and tell the story of your own life. You came into this world, accepted what your parents told you, but learned thinks were different through opposition by other and you adopted a different opinion and different behavior, but that itself became subject to challenges when you grew up, you fell in love, learned about the other, broke up, it enriched your understanding of who you are without reaching any definite end point, or said differently, the end point is yourself as you are now, the product of all these encounters. Everything can be analyzed dialectically. It is fruitless to try to find empirical evidence for the dialectic, as fruitless as it is to ask for empirical proof of the law of identity.

I am hesitant to endorse Hegels writing on history. It is purely speculative in the sense that with Hegel's dialectic in hand I could write a completely different 'history', for instance the awakening of spirit as only currently upon us by the realization of minorities and marginalized communities how they have been subjugated and demanding their place in history... That such is possible though shows something about the nature of dialectic, something that is more idealistic than realistic. — Tobias

I understand your hesitation. These days Hegel seems a bit Panglossian. It's plausible that it'll end in a mushroom cloud or a boot stamping a human face forever. That said, I like Brandom's recent updated and filtered Hegel. There's also Kojève's, weird but great. And I personally find it easy to work the transcendence of racism and sexism (to name just two) into the Hegelian narrative. US history is like a miniature version that moves (ideally) from 'some are free and completely human' to all being so.

As Brandom might put it, how are we autonomous humans, who now live beyond God, supposed to have binding norms which we ourselves reserve the right to change ?

I think of us as having a second order tradition of stories, some of them about physics and biology and others about rights and beauty. Then there are philosophical stories that are largely about stories themselves and second order traditions and the dominant role they play for creatures like us. This tradition is second order to the degree that no story is sacred or final, excepting perhaps the meta-story or attitude toward stories that we might call Enlightenment rationality.

As others have noted, one of the most readable paths into Hegel is his writing on history. — Pie

Thanks for the interesting passage, to refresh my memory. Hegel places "the Idea" as the fundamental principle, the basis or foundation of human existence in the social setting. In its actualization, as knowing itself, the Idea produces a state, which provides for it, giving it freedom which is what it desires, the actualization is described as knowing itself. So what the Idea desires is freedom, and it produces this by universalizing good will, through what he calls universal Reason. This is all very idealistic

As describes, Hegel later explains this entire process as a process of negations. If we provide a definition of "freedom" for example, it will inevitably be negated, and we will move on to the new definition. This is the process whereby the Idea comes to know itself, it is a form of becoming, an evolution, which gives the Idea the freedom it desires.

Notice that Karl Marx went on to practise this form of dialectic, by negating Hegel's fundamental principle. Marx negated Hegel's proposal of "the Idea" as the basis of human existence in the social setting, and replaced it with "matter" as the kernel, or foundation of human existence in the social setting. From this perspective, the purpose of the state is to provide for the material needs of the individuals, rather than the Hegelian perspective, which places the purpose of the state as to provide for the Idea to know itself. From Marx's perspective, the Hegelian proposal for freedom, the Idea knowing itself, is just an illusion, or delusion.

As Brandom might put, how are autonomous humans, who now live beyond God, supposed to have binding norms which we ourselves reserve the right to change ? To what degree does this require or imply a story or stories of progress? — Pie

This is a very good question, central to the philosophy of law. I do think that indeed we must have something of a shared story a like mindedness when it comes to justice. However, I wonder if Hegel's is not too much of a good thing, too thick. Well, perhaps not, but subscribing to it means having to bite the bullet: contra sophisticated thinkers about human rights such as Makau Mutua you would have to hold that the western inddividualistic tradition in which freedom means individual freedom, is in fact universal and more collectivistic accounts inherently despotic. I am not wishing to bite that bullet yet.

I think of us as having a second order tradition of stories, some of them about physics and biology and others about rights and rationality. Then there are philosophical stories that are largely about stories themselves and the dominant role they play for creatures like us. This tradition is second order to the degree that no story is sacred or final, excepting perhaps the meta-story or attitude toward stories that we might call Enlightenment rationality. — Pie

I agree with you but indeed you would have to place your bets on 'enlightenment rationality' which brings you into conflict with post colonial and feminist scholars who argue that enlightenment rationality is steeped in colonial history and its accomplice.

Notice that Karl Marx went on to practise this form of dialectic, by negating Hegel's fundamental principle. Marx negated Hegel's proposal of "the Idea" as the basis of human existence in the social setting, and replaced it with "matter" as the kernel, or foundation of human existence in the social setting. From this perspective, the purpose of the state is to provide for the material needs of the individuals, rather than the Hegelian perspective, which places the purpose of the state as to provide for the Idea to know itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed and that, comically enough, Marx shares with neo-liberal exconomists. Through Marx on the one hand and Adam Smith on the other, matter and material became the dominant idea and replaced it. Leading to our current anti-metaphysical times....
We are all material girls now... (It is a very clever song by the way, a very good description of the 1980's containing some biting irony)

I agree with you but indeed you would have to place your bets on 'enlightenment rationality' which brings you into conflict with post colonial and feminist scholars who argue that enlightenment rationality is steeped in colonial history and its accomplice. — Tobias

No doubt there's entanglement, but I'm unaware of any replacement. To me we should distinguish carefully between calling out hypocrisy and attacking rationality and science itself (presumably in the name of something tribal or esoteric?).

you would have to hold that the western inddividualistic tradition in which freedom means individual freedom, is in fact universal and more collectivistic accounts inherently despotic. — Tobias

In my view, there's no need to cling to the sacredness of private property, for instance, if we want to maintain individual freedom. No particular, frozen understanding of freedom is sacred. I understand our current notions of freedom ( and of rationality) to allow for an internal critique that allows for their modification. We inherit the norms that govern our modification of them, and we pass those modified norms on, so our children can do the same. Note that this means 'Enlightenment rationality' is not static, and I refer to it as a handy starting point, a point of self-consciousness (Kant's definition, for instance.)

Thanks for the interesting passage, to refresh my memory. Hegel places "the Idea" as the fundamental principle, the basis or foundation of human existence in the social setting. — Metaphysician Undercover

That sounds right, and I think of him as emphasizing that we are fundamentally, profoundly social beings...that the self is unthinkable apart from the other, that we create and manifest ourselves as we modify our environment together.

No doubt there's entanglement, but I'm unaware of any replacement. To me we should distinguish carefully between calling out hypocrisy and attacking rationality and science itself (presumably in the name of something tribal or esoteric?). — Pie

Well, here you make the assumption that law is a science. To the German mind it is, to the British it is not... the rule "water cooks at 100 degrees celsius" is ddifferent from "rivers ought to hold to the right side of the road".

In my view, there's no need to cling to the sacredness of private property, for instance, if we want to maintain individual freedom. No particular, frozen understanding of freedom is sacred. I understand our current notions of freedom ( and of rationality) to allow for an internal critique that allows for their modification. We inherit the norms that govern their modification, and we pass those modified norms on. Repeat. Note that this means Enlightenment rationality is not static, and I refer to it as a handy starting point, though one could also go back to Socrates and Democritus. — Pie

I am not necessarily disagreeing, but currently this whole philosophical tradition is under attack. If I do take a marxist tack, the division of property rights is crucial to the way we think. So for a materialist this idealist tradition is an accomplice to a tradition of oppression. I am not saying they are necessarily right, but they are more en vogue than Hegelian idealism.

I am not necessarily disagreeing, but currently this whole philosophical tradition is under attack. If I do take a marxist tack, the division of property rights is crucial to the way we think. So for a materialist this idealist tradition is an accomplice to a tradition of oppression. I am not saying they are necessarily right, but they are more en vogue than Hegelian idealism. — Tobias

OK. I can relate to that. Just to be clear, I see how dated Hegel is, and I like those who criticize or update him from a materialist perspective. Kojève happened to be the secondary source that got me excited about Hegel in the first place, so I was reading Hegel's original texts from a pragmatist/materialistic position from the beginning, looking for gold in the creek.

FWIW, I think the tradition is 'essentially' self-eating (second order) and that Hegel saw that. I doubt there's some definite source of the idea, but it's easy to credit Hegel as a popularizer of the notion of philosophy as a conversation that spans centuries, with finite individuals coming and going, downloading the progress so far on the way in and sometimes leaving a few new bricks behind on the way out. (Man is the 'time-binding animal,' etc.)

Bumped into this on Wiki:

Roger Scruton calls Kojève "a life-hating Russian at heart, a self-declared Stalinist, and a civil servant who played a leading behind-the-scenes role in establishing both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the European Economic Community" and states his opinion that Kojève was "a dangerous psychopath".