Pretty good tour of Sellars on the given for those who might prefer videos to books:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bwyc6QCl9Is

This is more bite-sized and casual: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3uUYeZu1DIQ


Here's a different, linguistic point that seems relevant.

We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my "immediate experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in order for the phrase 'a realm beyond my experience' to have any meaning. ... The assertion 'There is realm beyond my experience' is true if it is meaningful, and that is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so." This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a substantive assertion.
...
The methodology of this essay requires special comment. Because we are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. The only possible approach for this essay is an internal critique of common sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to aspects of themselves.

As an example of the application of our initial result to specific questions of belief, consider the question of whether the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced Empire State Building does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it depends on the very assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a definitional trick. — Flynt

http://www.henryflynt.org/philosophy/flawbelief.html

Solipsism basically boils down to cogito ergo sum (re René Descrates). The only truth that we're absolutely sure of is our own existence as minds. The rest of what we experience, the so-called material world, including but not limited to other minds, could be a hallucination/illusion.

How do you respond? — Agent Smith

This is semantically confused or incoherent. As I've mentioned several times, the concepts of the truth and certainty have no function or significance outside of a plurality of members who make, criticize, defend, and justify claims. Consider how concepts like 'illusion' could have purchase in the first place. The illusory depends on contrast with the real. In our shared world, maybe you just dreamed that you returned that library book, but in fact you didn't, and that's why you are fined. That you at least dreamed returning it might be used to explain your behavior as you pay the fine, to contrast what happened with the possibility that you were just careless about others' needs.

We could also talk about the dependence of the concept of the self on the concept of the non-self (of the world for which I am not directly accountable in the way that I am for what my body does) and of other human beings to which I owe certain considerations, expecting them reciprocated.

Allow me to emphasize that I understand you to be saying : but what if all this is an illusion ? I answer: if this all this is an illusion, then 'illusion' doesn't make sense anymore, and the claim falls apart.

In my view, I'm actually trying to salvage what's good in cogito ergo sum, offer an indubitable starting point. I suggest that it makes no sense for philosophers to doubt the basic philosophical situation of the norms of reason governing claim-discussing individuals in a shared world. To be clear, the details of these norms and this world are very much up for debate. It's almost tautological that one can't (rationally) argue against the minimal framework of rationality. "I will now prove that logic is an illusion."

Interesting. Which of the famous idealists are dualists? Isn't the notion that 'all which exists is mentation' eg, Schopenhauer, a monist claim? Number 2 is Kantian, right? I heard Kastrup say he doesn't consider this to be idealism as such. What's the distribution of 1's and 2's? — Tom Storm

@Metaphysician Undercover missed the next section of that quote which explained that 1 is ontological idealism and 2 is epistemological idealism. An epistemological idealist can be an ontological dualist/pluralist (e.g. Kant).

Here's a summary. The concepts of logic and certainty (and concepts themselves! ) are inherently social. Claims and arguments to the contrary are performative contradictions. If you debate this with me, that implies acknowledgent of norms that both of us ought to respect, along with a share world that we can be right or wrong about.... — Pie

Do you reject the notion of the philosophical zombie? Do you not think it possible that the exact same public behaviours that we associate with other people can occur in the absence of other minds? Others have brought up Wittgenstein's private language argument to support the claim that there are other minds, which honestly seems quite misguided as the point of the argument was that only what is publicly accessible is relevant to language, and so a community of philosophical zombies can have a language.

:up:

Do you reject the notion of the philosophical zombie?

Do you not think it possible that the exact same public behaviours that we associate with other people can occur in the absence of other minds? — Michael

I don't see why it's impossible in principle for humans to eventually build an android that would be adopted by us as a member of the community.

The problem with your second question, as I see it, is that you are (accidentally) playing on two senses of 'mind' at once, the ghost-story and the everyday concept. If minds are radically private somethings, then I can have no idea what you refer to by 'mind.' So I can't know what it is either to deny or attribute a mind to an android.

As I see it, the privacy/immateriality of the mind, understood in a certain way, leads to a semantic and epistemological disaster. But it's hard to see and point out where the logic breaks down (perhaps because the logical disaster is so large.)

Do you reject the notion of the philosophical zombie? — Michael

Of course. Besides, even in a linguistic community of p-zombies, there are 'other mindless ones'.

If minds are radically private somethings, then I can have no idea what you refer to by 'mind.' — Pie

Really? I think this is where some take too much faith in Wittgenstein's private language argument. I, personally, have no trouble understanding what words like "mind", "self", "will", "thoughts", "private sensations", etc. mean and refer to, and I also don't think that these are things that can be reduced to any public, physical thing, e.g. brain activity.

But if you honestly don't understand them then I don't know what I can say to have you understand them as I do.

I, personally, have no trouble understanding what words like "mind", "self", "will", "thoughts", "private sensations", etc. mean and refer to — Michael

I think we both understand them fine, and for me that's a point against what I call the ghost story.

To be clear, I don't deny 'raw feels' and the rest. I'm just trying to point out their epistemological uselessness. If we want to establish something rationally, they can play no direct role.

I also don't think that these are things that can be reduced to any public, physical thing, e.g. brain activity. — Michael

I see no need for reduction. It's just concepts can't and don't mean whatever we think they mean individually. Their are norms that govern their application, which is not to say that these norms cover all cases. So an android might be an edge case. In 1995, it's stupid sci to treat them as people. In 2095, it's like racism to not treat them like people. Who knows?

To be clear, I don't deny 'raw feels' and the rest. I'm just trying to point out their epistemological uselessness. If we want to establish something rationally, they can play no direct role. — Pie

No direct role in what? Public behaviour? That's exactly why seeing other "people" is no indication that these "people" have a mind, a self, a will, thoughts, private sensations, etc. We see things, we hear things, but that any of these things have a mind is only ever an assumption -- unless it can be argued that either 1) a mind is causally efficacious, and uniquely so, such that only a mind can cause certain behaviours, or 2) a mind will necessarily "emerge" from anything complex enough to behave a certain way.

And if either 1 or 2 then the idealist has his means of arguing for other minds without having to admit to anything like mind-independent "matter".

too much faith in Wittgenstein's private language argument. — Michael

It's not just Wittgenstein. It's Sellars and Popper and Brandom and Hegel and Feuerbach and surely many others. Thinking is essentially public. The temptation to think otherwise is probably connected to the role the self plays in our community as a locus of reputation and responsibility. As Kant noted, the 'I think' can accompany all of my thoughts. And I can say 'it seems to me.' What is the social function of such operators ?

That's exactly why seeing other "people" is no indication that these "people" have a mind, a self, a will, thoughts, private sensations, etc. — Michael

My objection is that you seem to imply that 'mind' somehow has a public meaning while simultaneously rejecting every public criterion for its detection.

My counter is that we both know well enough (but forever imperfectly or fallibly) what 'mind' means by the usual criteria.

We need not insist that mind is somehow behind all the things that tempt us to ascribe it.

Where is the forest itself among the trees ?

My objection is that you seem to imply that 'mind' somehow has a public meaning while simultaneously rejecting every public criterion for its detection. — Pie

Yes, what's wrong with that? There are plenty of words and phrases that work this way. The soul, God, the afterlife, counterfactuals, claims about the future, claims about distant events, fictions, private sensations, parallel worlds, etc.

The notion that words can only refer to things that are publicly accessible seems evidently false.

Yes, what's wrong with that? There are plenty of words and phrases that work this way. — Michael

I think we are making progress. I disagree with that conception of meaning. If there were really no public criteria, rationality would be impossible. It's also not clear how the hypothesized ghost who experiences equally ghost-like meanings could ever be trained. That I can't tell whether you're a p-zombie by any test whatsoever should tell us something about meaning, about the ghost story.

'In order to find the real artichoke, we divested it of its leaves.'

Thinking is essentially public. — Pie

:fire:

The notion that words can only refer to things that are publicly accessible seems evidently false. — Michael

I don't think we need to embrace that thesis. I do find it plausible that languages start with public objects and evolve by means of metaphors and other tropes to include a zoo of metacognitive and political entiies that rights and souls and hopes and sensations and promises.

Have you read about the genius Jones ? Imagine a tribe without the concept of thoughts. But Jones comes along with a wild theory that silent people are 'thinking,' and (key point!) this theory has explanatory power. So it's like the atomic theory when Mach could still doubt it as useful but not to be taken for truth.

What behavior, then, is Jones seeking to explain by the postulation of something he calls, “thoughts” and “thinking”? Namely that people sometimes engage in purposive, intelligent behavior when silent. Sometimes, that is, people engage in what we call, “thinking out loud,” where they speak about the intelligent behavior they are engaged in. But sometimes the behavior itself is present, with no accompanying verbal commentary, as it were. (Imagine someone changing the faucet in their kitchen, with instructions before them, sometimes reading aloud the instructions, sometimes declaring an intention to do something next, followed by periods of silence). What exactly, Jones wonders, is going on when people engage in such intelligent behavior when they are completely silent?

According to his theory, during all these occasions of intelligent behavior there is something going on “inside” people, in their heads if you like, some of which gets verbalized, some of which doesn’t. The way to explain such intelligent behavior is to see it as the culmination of a silent, inner type of reasoning, an “inner speaking” going on inside of people. Jones reasons that this intelligent behavior involves the occurrence of hidden episodes which are similar to the activity of talking. Jones says, in essence, “Let’s call it ‘thinking,’ and though it is like talking, it is silent, or covert inner speech. Thinking is what is going on in us, which lies behind and explains our intelligent behavior and our intelligent talking.”
...
Returning to this myth, we note that at the culmination of this first stage, Jones has only postulated the existence of these inner episodes—“inner” in being under the skin. In the second stage, Jones teaches his peers to use the theory to explain people’s behavior, in the absence of their “thinking out-loud.” Finally, and here is the crucial transition, Jones teaches people to apply the theory to themselves.

Having mastered the theory for third-person use, that is, people begin making inferences about themselves: “I just uttered such and such, so I must have been thinking such and such, (though I was not aware of it).” Eventually, by training and reinforcement from the community, people come to be able to actually report not just that they are thinking, but also what they are thinking, in a direct, non-inferential manner. Just as people can be trained to make immediate, non-inferential judgments about the nature of public objects, Jones’ pupils come to be able to issue non-inferential reports of their own thoughts, what is going on inside them, in a way that others aren’t. They can report directly about what is happening in their own minds, though according to Sellars, this has proceeded entirely within the constraints of Psychological Nominalism. Jones’ peers developed awareness of their own thoughts only after, or at least concurrently with, mastery of the public concepts (i.e. words) of “thinking”, “believing”, “wishing”, and so on, that comes with the learning of Jones’ theory itself.

https://iep.utm.edu/sellars/#H4

Ok!

Why would "if all this is an illusion?" make no sense. Can you explain, please? Note here that as per Descartes' cogito, he/I/you (when you copy Decartes's argument) can't be an illusion i.e. the duality of real-unreal remains unmolested.

That out of the way, I'd like to emphasize the point that if illusions can't be distinguished from the real McCoy, it is, sadly/not, a distinction without a difference [re Leibniz's (controversial) identity of indiscernibles).

I'll paraphrase your own words from here: if everything is public then nothing is.

Your own arguments seem to entail that if some things are public then some things are private.

Your own arguments seem to entail that if some things are public then some things are private. — Michael

I don't deny the value or coherence of the distinction in ordinary value. I imagine we both know pretty well how to use it, like when it'd be shady to make a private phonecall (at company expense) or to cruelly make something public (a friend's secret.)

I don't deny the value or coherence of the distinction in ordinary value. I imagine we both know pretty well how to use it, like when it'd be shady to make a private phonecall (at company expense) or to cruelly make something public (a friend's secret.) — Pie

But that's not the sense of "public" (or "private") that we're using in this discussion.

But that's not the sense of "public" that you're using in this discussion. — Michael

My view is that we are bound by common, public norms in the application of concepts (these seem to be caught up in rules that license inferences). I don't pretend that these norms are exact or exhaustive or inflexible.

But one such concept is 'private.' Another is 'sensation.'

Why would "if all this is an illusion?" make no sense. — Agent Smith

Why would a blob of everything call itself a me and not a Tuesday or a trombone ? What could such a blob of everything mean by true or false, reality or illusion? There's no 'outside' or 'other' to account for, worry about, get right, conform to. In short, there's no contrast. The night in which all cows are black.

Arguing that the self is an obvious and safe starting point is to implicitly depend on the actual starting point, the norms of rationality and concept application.

Why would a blob of everything call itself a me and not a Tuesday or a trombone ? What could such a blob of everything mean by true or false, reality or illusion? There's no 'outside' or 'other' to be account for, worry about, get right, conform to. In short, there's no contrast. The night in which all cows are black. — Pie

Quote out of context, mon ami, quote out of context.

Quote out of context, mon ami, quote out of context. — Agent Smith

?

I'm sincerely trying to show you why I think the claim is incoherent, experimenting with different approaches and metaphors.

I'm sincerely trying to show you why I think the claim is incoherent, experimenting with different approaches and metaphors. — Pie

How is it incoherent? I'm here, thinking, and I know that I'm thinking and that, ergo, I exist (re Descartes). I also realize that there could be a(n) (omnipotent) deus deceptor out to deceive me in every possible way, but even if he/she/it fools me in every sense and way possible, I havta exist to be thus taken for a ride. One of the many possible ways to be deceived is to make me think there's an external reality, that there are other minds, that I'm not alone when in fact sum.

One of the many possible ways to be deceived is to make me think there's an external reality, — Agent Smith

'External reality' means (roughly) that about which one might be deceived. The possibility of deception on this matter is also its impossibility.

'External reality' means (roughly) that about which one might be deceived. The possibility of deception on this matter is also its impossibility. — Pie

Ok! Gracias.

How is idealism different from solipsism? — GLEN willows

Solipsism is very often in invisible scare quotes, and called methodological - as opposed to metaphysical.

As such it was the method of the earliest efforts in theoretical AI, e.g. Carnap's Aufbau.

Empiricism taken literally. Formal construction of an umwelt from sense data.

So that's one difference. Methodological idealism not a thing.