Interesting. Which of the famous idealists are dualists? Isn't the notion that 'all which exists is mentation' eg, Schopenhauer, a monist claim? Number 2 is Kantian, right? I heard Kastrup say he doesn't consider this to be idealism as such. What's the distribution of 1's and 2's? — Tom Storm

As far as I know, most of the famous Idealists are dualist, Plato, Hegel, Kant, even Berkeley. Notice in the the quote I produced from Stanford, that the #1 type of Idealist says the mental is ultimate foundation of reality. Only an extreme case of #1 Idealist would say |all is mental). And even those who argue "all is mental" impose a separation between human and divine, hence dualism.

Indeed, the greatest problem with discussions about idealism is to induce idealists to express their view clearly. — Banno

The real problem is in in this type of categorizing, imposing these names of "ism". Understanding a great philosopher\s philosophy, requires an enormous effort, a great amount of study, and not only study of that philosopher, but of who has influenced that philosopher as well, to understand one's use of words. The trend of the 'lazy man', arm chair philosopher, is to accept such a categorization, and say "that philosopher is idealist, therefore like such and such', without taking the time to understand the idiosyncrasies of the individual, which would constitute a true understanding of the person

Metaphysician Undercover missed the next section of that quote which explained that 1 is ontological idealism and 2 is epistemological idealism. An epistemological idealist can be an ontological dualist/pluralist (e.g. Kant). — Michael

Number 1 idealists are dualist as well. Notice they say that the mental is the ultimate foundation of reality, like Plato, Neo-Platonists, Aristotle, and Christian theologians. This is reflected in Cartesian dualism. Only an extreme case of #1 says "all is mental", like Berkeley argues. But Berkeley still falls into the category of dualist, by maintaining a separation between the divine and the human. What Berkeley denies, is that the separation between the two is properly described by "matter".

There is a problem with this type of discussion, displayed at the beginning of the thread, and this is that people will not take " the divine", or "God" seriously, and so the discussion cannot go there. Without taking the divine seriously, we cannot understand the #1 idealism, as the mental constituting the foundation of reality. Then "the mental" becomes human thought, and idealism appears to be monist.

Thanks. :up:

Empiricism taken literally. Formal construction of an umwelt from sense data. — bongo fury

:up:

Without taking the divine seriously, we cannot understand the #1 idealism, as the mental constituting the foundation of reality. Then "the mental" becomes human thought, and idealism appears to be monist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Doesn't Schopenhauer qualify as a #1 without a divine foundation? His notion of a blind, striving, instinctive Will, which is not metacognitive, isn't really a god analogue, is it?

Philosophy is not exegesis.

Philosophy is not exegesis. — Banno

Aren't exegetical work ups sometimes needed to contextualize or clarify positions? Or am I missing something? :wink:

Doesn't Schopenhauer qualify as a #1 without a divine foundation? His notion of a blind, striving, instinctive Will, which is not metacognitive, isn't really a god analogue, is it? — Tom Storm

I must admit that I haven't read Schopenhauer, only secondary sources, so I'm sorry but I'm really not in a position to comment on this.

Philosophy is not exegesis. — Banno

I don't see how that's true. If you studied philosophy in school, I think you would have found that exegesis is a very significant part of what philosophy is. I don't think I had any philosophy courses which did not consist of some exegesis.

But true or false, I don't see how it's relevant. You really need to at least attempt to explain yourself Banno, or else you're nothing but a lost soul making sounds. Exegesis of philosophical texts is good advice to a lost soul.

As I've said, I'm "being" a solopsist for the sake of proving there's no way out of it, logically, with a solid sound argument.

Fun fact - I'm actually an eliminative materialist. I guess that falls into the "we have to behave as if there's a real world, and other people" category.

The "contrast" Pie is looking for is, I think you're saying, is the contrast between the "outside" world we believe we see, with other minds and material objects, and the idea that there's is no exterior world including no other people, and therefore no communication with them via language of any kind

Pie why is that incoherent? I know it's counterintuitive but so is much of philosophy. That's one thing I love about it. The concept of no knowable reality was considered incoherent and even RADICAL at one time. Also atheism, correct?

"Solipsism is very often in invisible scare quotes, and called methodological - as opposed to metaphysical.

As such it was the method of the earliest efforts in theoretical AI, e.g. Carnap's Aufbau.

Empiricism taken literally. Formal construction of an umwelt from sense data.

So that's one difference. Methodological idealism not a thing"

Sorry but can you dumb that down just a tiny bit? A couple of readings, maybe a real world analogy? Sorry to display my ignorance, but...I only have a philosophy degree from a smaller mid-western university....

Solipsism isn't incoherent unless there's a setting in which it is but Pie hasn't been forthcoming on that score.

Eliminative materialism, if I understand it correctly, is the position that there's no such thing as a mind substance or that, in the simplest sense, the mind = the brain. Note that neuorscience hasn't yet explained consciousness in physical terms i.e. the jury's still out.

Pie why is that incoherent? — GLEN willows

There's got to be a world with other people in it for concepts like 'true' and 'false' and 'incoherent' to make any sense. The non-self is that about which the self can be wrong.

'Prove to me that there is something that we can be right or wrong about.' Do you see the problem ?

Is 'there is something we can be right or wrong about'...something we can be right or wrong about ?

To ask the question is to answer it.

But true or false, I don't see how it's relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nor I. Not sure why you raised the issue.

External reality' means (roughly) that about which one might be deceived. The possibility of deception on this matter is also its impossibility. — Pie

With all due deference to your obvious superiority to me, in terms of study and mental capacity, I would put forward the "out of the mouth of babes" position? :wink:

It seems to me you're assuming outside minds in your attempt to prove they exist. Is this not a flawed thesis? What I'm arguing is how can you prove they exist in the first place, BEFORE we even get to social settings and language?

Oh I know - consciousness hasn't been explained by any theory or any kind of scientific proof. It's just my belief science WILL explain it, and that yes mind=brain (or to put it another way - consciousness will be an emergent property of the brain). But let's leave that - I already got trashed for that on a previous thread. Actually I had two discussions and the first ended with "You have a lot to learn my friend. We eat materialists for breakfast here." Wow. On the second I had a few materialist allies.

Off road...sorry.

It seems to me you're assuming outside minds in your attempt to prove they exist. Is this not a flawed thesis? What I'm arguing is how can you prove they exist in the first place, BEFORE we even get to social settings and language? — GLEN willows

I'm trying to point out that the very notion of proof already drags in a social setting and a language and a world that one can be right or wrong about.

'Maybe it's wrong to think it's possible to be wrong.' That's one way to rephrase solipsism.

Yes - you're right, I talk to people all the time about right and wrong, Descartes, Wittgenstein, The Real Wives of Philosophy Professors, recipes for Keto. Of course it's all in my brain.

Why would I believe those images I see and (because they hate being ignored) pretend as if they're like me, really are like me? Because my brain can imagine high level concepts?

Sorry - THAT sounds incoherent to me.

I'm trying to point out that the very notion of proof already drags in a social setting and a language and a world that one can be right or wrong about. — Pie

Yep. It can't be proofs all the way down; at some stage there must be an acceptance.

Eventually solipsism becomes a parlour game. One's engagement with others puts the lie to the pretence.

see my above comment to Pie. Sorry to be a "devil's advocate" but I feel it's the best way to argue this. It's all an illusion anyway right? Kidding.

I know it's counterintuitive but so is much of philosophy. — GLEN willows

:up:

I don't object to far out ideas. Solipsism is implicit, I guess, in Hume and Kant. Any philosopher that tries to construct the world from sensation and organizing concepts is going to tempt us to consider the next step, that there's nothing 'behind' appearance. But there's a plot hole, and it's basically that the theory quietly depends on the same ordinary view of the world it seems to challenge. Sense organs and brains locked in skulls and voices which are 'minds' are taken for granted , but they are supposed to be mere illusions....

Yep. It can't be proofs all the way down; at some stage there must be an acceptance. — Banno

Right. Popper's idea of basic statements is the best version of this I've seen. The 'foundation' lots of claims that are taken relatively for granted, but with none of them sacred, only trustworthy so far. Inferences never involve sensation directly but only reports of sensation, for the boring reason that the grammar of 'sensation' is nothing like the grammar of 'premise' or 'claim.'

Hume and Kant imply it, yet it's far out? That's one of my points. These massive figures in the philosophical canon, Hume, Kant and I would add Descartes, all have theories that diffuse reality, and can logically lead to solipsism. And yet it is still considered a "far out" option.

I could never figure that out, frankly. And again - I ask you to go further back, rewind our awareness to the most undeniable point. The mind. Not even "Sense organs and brains locked in skulls" - those could be mere sense-impressions too.

Eventually solipsism becomes a parlour game. One's engagement with others puts the lie to the pretence. — Banno

I agree. For all the but the mentally ill, it's just a game. I'd probably not bother discussing it at this point were it not adjacent to some themes that fascinate me. My views (and I think yours) tend in the opposite direction, toward the radical sociality of reason. The self we can talk about is largely a product of that talk. 'The subject is constituted by the rules of discourse in the same way in which the pawn is constituted by the rules of chess.' Or something like that...

Oh I know - consciousness hasn't been explained by any theory or any kind of scientific proof. It's just my belief science WILL explain it, and that yes mind=brain (or to put it another way - consciousness will be an emergent property of the brain). But let's leave that - I already got trashed for that on a previous thread. Actually I had two discussions and the first ended with "You have a lot to learn my friend. We eat materialists for breakfast here." Wow. On the second I had a few materialist allies.

Off road...sorry. — GLEN willows

Please proceed. Bonam fortunam homo viator!

Not even "Sense organs and brains locked in skulls" - those could be mere sense-impressions too. — GLEN willows

So the sense-organs are maybe sense-impressions too? Do you see the issue ?

"I agree. For all the but the mentally ill, it's just a game. I'd probably not bother discussing it at this point were it not adjacent to some themes that fascinate me. My views (and I think yours) tend in the opposite direction, toward the radical sociality of reason. The self we can talk about is largely a product of that talk. 'The subject is constituted by the rules of discourse in the same way in which the pawn is constituted by the rules of chess.' Or something like that..."

Yes I think we can end here. Sorry that you'd usually "not bother discussing it" but that seems to be the prevailing attitude. Thanks for engaging me and providing good reading and videos.

Hume and Kant imply it, yet it's far out? That's one of my points. These massive figures in the philosophical canon, Hume, Kant and I would add Descartes, all have theories that diffuse reality, and can logically lead to solipsism. And yet it is still considered a "far out" option. — GLEN willows

These great philosophers are a mixture of genius and absurdity. We can still learn from them, but absurd implications are evidence against their system. They were great despite the problems they either did not notice at the time or could not fix. It makes sense to consider the sense organs as important contributors to knowledge, but it no longer makes sense to make them their own product.

My views are strongly influenced by Sellars and Brandom, thinkers who tried to save what was good and fix what was bad in the greats. Philosophy has made progress.

Yes I think we can end here. Sorry that you'd usually "not bother discussing it" but that seems to be the prevailing attitude. Thanks for engaging me and providing good reading and videos. — GLEN willows

Oh I wasn't complaining. I was just explaining my motives for playing the parlor game.

How do you know there are sense organs? We could be some mysterious mist on another planet? The toy of an alien child. Ok I went full Twilight Zone there :smile: Of course I don't live solipsistically, but neither did Hume live like a good empiricist, by his own admission, right?