Insofar as "self" is a binary concept: if there are not any others for the solipsist, then there isn't even a/the/"him" self to talk to. — 180 Proof

One finger cannot point at itself.

One finger cannot point at itself. — creativesoul

:point: :up:

a proof is supposed to bind everyone, not just oneself. — Banno

:up:

My solipsistic world is bright and sunny today. Must go for a walk. Great chatting with you. — GLEN willows

Odd, then, that the conversation continues in your absence...?

Only odd to you....I don't exist.

Ok sorry I said you could have the last word.

And what public norm determines the meaning of "true" and "false" which distinguishes them from "warranted" and "unwarranted"? — Michael

The grammar or norm for truth is pretty weird and might deserve its own thread. The difference seems like that between a 'real' person and arbitrarily convincing p-zombie. It's as if all we can productively talk about is warrant.

The exact kind of realism that you seem to argue for requires that there is more to meaning and reference than just what is publicly given to us in experience. The world isn't just what we see or hear or believe. — Michael

I'm maybe more anti-metaphysics than arguing for realism. I don't, for instance, think 'atoms and the void' are truth-makers. The grammar of truth is even leaner than that, because we can always debate physical and metaphysical theories (debate the existence of any particular truth-maker candidate.)

I will say that our social situation is logically primary, simply because saying otherwise is incoherent. If we aren't in some underspecified sense in the same word with the same concepts, then rational conversation is impossible.

We debate claims about our world. Any beginning 'less' than that seems to be nonsense, though we can and do endlessly explicate what we mean by these keywords. Someone might, for instance, try to understand the world simply as the set of true claims.

'Tell me about the world that no one can tell me about. See, it's impossible ! Henceforth idealism...' — Pie

:lol:

Yup.

I like the simulations involving rain you linked to. It's a bit like the p-zombie thing, with the truth-making thing-in-itself revealed as a kind of X that plays no role.

FWIW, I reject bivalence. We can easily make statements that don't cohere. 'This statement is false.' And I think solipsism is incoherent, not really true or false.

It seems that both 'truth' and 'consciousness' are used (metaphysically) in elusively minimal ways.

Yup. — creativesoul

It's nice to not be alone in recognizing the language trap. Once seen, the whole thing is weird.

Broadly, I'm trying to show that the metaphysical version of the private mind is broken (or at least useless), despite its initial plausibility. — Pie

There is nothing public that can be pointed to, but from that it does not follow that there is no private mind. We all have our mental privacy, so we all naturally recognize that there is a private dimension to the mind.

There is nothing public that can be pointed to, but from that it does not follow that there is no private mind. We all have our mental privacy, so we all naturally recognize that there is a private dimension to the mind. — Janus

Just to be clear, and as mentioned before, I see no need to deny raw feels. I can speak with the vulgar, insist that I too have a soul. I'm just making the by-now traditional and even tautological point that they play no role in inferences, that the X which, when added to a p-zombie, makes him a real boy,...is suspiciously elusive conceptually. Any concept that defies all public criteria for its application starts to sound more like a grunt.

It'd be great to get your reaction on the Ryle quotes above. Because that's where I'm coming from here. The mind that matters, the mind that figures in reasoning and explanation, is not and cannot be radically private.

The mind that matters, the mind that figures in reasoning and explanation, is not and cannot be radically private. — Pie

Hear, hear!!!

Hear, hear!!! — creativesoul

<salutes>

Be great to get you in my new thread....

:up:

.

The Other can be manufactured. Happens all the time. — Tate

To me the point is roughly that the self and the other are comanufactured, like the North and South. Why didn't Descartes problematize the first person pronoun ? Why doesn't the solipsist?
In other words, WTF is a self anyway ? I suggest that following this lead, going into detail about what a self is, will lead one to others and a shared world and language.

Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. — W

I think you had best start a thread on Ryle.

I think you had best start a thread on Ryle. — Banno

Instead of asking people to read, I'm trying a more direct approach. Let them try and refute my proposed minimal foundation without performative contradiction. If they must have Descartes, I'll see if I can fix him up some.

— Pie

The mind that matters, the mind that figures in reasoning and explanation, is not and cannot be radically private. — Pie

Just to clear I'm not referring to "raw feels", The mind that matters, the mind that experiences life as an endless succession of rich and unique imagery, is radically private, while also being shared.

Just to clear I'm not referring to "raw feels", The mind that matters, the mind that experiences life as an endless succession of rich and unique imagery is radically private. — Janus

I understand what you are trying to defend, and I'm not trying to deny the soul. I'm saying there's a way of talking about it that's nonobviously confused.

We can't rationally discuss concepts that aren't public. I think you and Micheal are trying to use both sides of the coin at once, the 'pure' ghost and the more ordinary mind that is indeed part of the usual causal/explanatory nexus. It's almost tautological that there's nothing to be said about the radically private mind (even saying that there is one such mind or kind of mind is arguably nonsense, except metaphysicians have created a mystified X that rides on the back of ordinary mind.) (I'm just leaning on Ryle here, and you might want to refer above to the quote to see where I'm coming from.)

I understand what you are trying to defend, and I'm not trying to deny the soul. I'm saying there's a way of talking about it that's nonobviously confused.

We can't rationally discuss concepts that aren't public. I think you and Micheal are trying to use both sides of the coin at once, the 'pure' ghost and the more ordinary mind that is indeed part of the usual causal/explanatory nexus. It's almost tautological that there's nothing to be said about the radically private mind (even saying that there is one such mind or kind of mind is arguably nonsense, except metaphysicians have created a mystified X that rides on the back of ordinary mind.) (I'm just leaning on Ryle here, and you might want to refer above to the quote to see where I'm coming from.) — Pie

I'm not trying to "defend" anything; I just give priority to the poetic mind over the intellectual or discursive mind. And even though the rich imagery of the poetic mind cannot be spoken about, other than to signal its existence and importance, it can be spoken from and we can also speak about the fact that it can be spoken from, so there is actually much to be said, just not so much in dry propositional terms.

I think the challenge is to disprove it to oneself.
— Tate

As Pie pointed out earlier, a proof is supposed to bind everyone, not just oneself. A proof that only you accept is perhaps a faith... — Banno

You're free to share your proof with others once you prove it to yourself. Point is, if you proved to your own satisfaction that the world goes beyond your mind, you didn't understand the challenge.

Yes, the other is constructed, by juxtaposing it to the self; As the old song goes, This I tell you, brother...

If all there is, is self, then there is no other, and hence no self. — Banno

They might have been born at the same time, or maybe they were eternal; the truth (the self) and the lie (the Other). All it takes is a little imagination.

Odd, then, that the conversation continues in your absence...? — Banno

:up: The only choice for a solipsist then is to say he wasn't really absent. :scream:

I'm always there for you. — YHWH

:grimace:

To me the point is roughly that the self and the other are comanufactured — Pie

I believe that too. It seems logical. I need the Other because without it, I'll lose definition and fade into everything.

If you recall, I brought this up earlier. It doesn't disprove solipsism, though. It just explains why I would call the universe "mine".

Point is, if you proved to your own satisfaction that the world goes beyond your mind, you didn't understand the challenge. — Tate

So here we are in agreement?

So here we are in agreement? — Banno

Probably. :grin:

If all there is, is self, then there is no other, and hence no self. — Banno

This is not true, and it is a very common mistake. A thing, be it a self or any other thing, is described by referring to its properties, not by referring to "the other". So a thing (such as a self), may be in complete isolation, with all of its properties, with no other.

The idea that a thing requires an other seems to have been derived from a Hegelian idealism. Ideals, such as "the best", "the biggest", "positive", "hottest", etc., are defined in relation to their opposite term, because there is no empirical quality which represents them, being simply ideals. They are ideals which form the basis for a quantitative scale. But it is a mistake (category) to confuse ideals with things such as selves, saying that a self requires an other.

This is not true, and it is a very common mistake. A thing, be it a self or any other thing, is described by referring to its properties, not by referring to "the other". So a thing (such as a self), may be in complete isolation, with all of its properties, with no other. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never understood duality. Sorry Heraclitus.

It's this from the Tractacus:

5.63 I am my world.

This is more thoroughly explained by Schopenhauer, but Wittgenstein shows how it's nonsense (not to be confused with false, it's not false).

This is more thoroughly explained by Schopenhauer, but Wittgenstein shows how it's nonsense (not to be confused with false, it's not false). — Tate

I agree. It's better to say confused than false.

The solipsist claims that it's wrong to think there's something we can be wrong about.
.

And even though the rich imagery of the poetic mind cannot be spoken about, other than to signal its existence and importance, — Janus

But people can and do talk about their dreams and fantasies, and not only about the importance thereof. "I thought I saw a putty cat" is a great example of how the explanatory nexus includes the imagination (as well as sensation in emotion.) It might explain flight or approach. 'I thought the light was green, officer.' Or colorblindness might be used to explain failing a certain test.