At the moment, I think it's just the (grammatical) gap between a warranted belief and true belief. In other words, it expresses our caution, our finitude, our willingness to edit our governing beliefs. — Pie

It goes deeper than that. A painting of a pipe will never be a pipe. There is an epistemic jump, a radical alterity between a thing and its representation.

The word 'horse' is not a real horse and will never be a real horse.

The word 'horse' is not a real horse and will never be a real horse. — Olivier5

In this analogy, you have two objects, but what is the territory corresponding to scientific maps like ? If all we ever have of it is maps ? To me, electrons are part of the map, for example. At least within the map/territory as you seem to understand it ?

In this analogy, you have two objects, but what is the territory corresponding to scientific maps like ? — Pie

It's simply the world, or the part of the world that science deals with. It's subject matter.

It's simply the world. — Olivier5

Presumably, but that's ambiguous. Are electrons part of the map of tuna fish sandwiches and promises and itches ? Are electrons real and promises not ? Or the reverse ? Or ?

part of the world that science deals with. — Olivier5

That doesn't exclude much. I count the social sciences, etc.

Are electrons part of the map of tuna fish sandwiches and promises? — Pie

A map, in this way of talking, is a view, a representation, done by someone for someone. It is a product of and tool for human activity.

So if there is someone out there who thinks that mapping a tuna sandwich down to electronic-level precision can be of some utility, I see no logical impossibility for him to draw it. (it might be practically impossible to do of course)

So in theory, electrons can be part of a tuna sandwich map. If someone draws it.

(or just speaks of it, as we are doing)

Promises are of a non-electronic nature though. They are not material. You can eat a tuna sandwich and all its electrons will be yours, but you can't eat a promise of a tuna sandwich.

So what is the territory made of ? Is there a deepest layer ?

I'm not trying to be difficult. I genuinely don't think we can cash the check of 'territory' very easily here. What do electrons and fields represent ? Keep in mind that I'm skeptical about the representation metaphor, so I'm just challenging it, seeing if it can be defended.

I currently prefer to say that there are electrons and promises and itches and noses...all of them caught up in the same causal nexus. I willing to revise beliefs about these things and their relationships.

Scientific knowledge, in this view, would be sets of beliefs about such entities that were established as warranted through objective, critical discussions and experiments. The hope of course is that they are true, but it seems the most we can manage is to make sure they are warranted.

So what is the territory made of ? Is there a deepest layer ? — Pie

Why would there be a bottom layer? It could be that

Matter has no “bottom”, no “foundation”. It’s turtles all the way down. — Olivier5

Why would there be a bottom layer? — Olivier5

Personally I don't think there needs to be one, nor must we even think of stacked layers. But where then is the territory ? Is it maps all the way down ? If so, does not the metaphor fail or become misleading ?

Matter has no “bottom”, no “foundation”. It’s turtles all the way down. — Olivier5

I like this idea, by the way. We could keep finding tinier, more and more quasifundamental things.

But where then is the territory ? Is it maps all the way down ? If so, does not the metaphor fail or become misleading ? — Pie

Are you talking of the thing in itself?

Are you talking of the thing in itself? — Olivier5

Yes, I had that in mind as a possible answer, except I think Kant was wrong to go there.

Go where?

I like this idea, by the way. We could keep finding tinier, more and more fundamental things. — Pie

In my mind, the idea implies that smaller is just a different scale than larger, not a more 'fundamental' level. Atoms are not the foundations of reality (as they are conceptualized in atomism) but simply how reality may look like at this level of detail.

Go where? — Olivier5

Noumena. Of course people still debate the best interpretation, and I understand why the concept was tempting (as the territory), but I suspect the the true/warranted distinction does the same work with less confusion.

n my mind, the idea implies that smaller is just a different scale than larger, not a more 'fundamental' level. — Olivier5

:up:

I also don't know what it is you are objecting against? — Christoffer

I'm not. I'm trying to put your ideas together coherently.

I agree that physical reality is in an important way and that the physical world is not purely a mental construction; that idealism is muddled. We agree that logic sets out the structure of language. But I do think language, and hence logic, is constructed by us.

But I baulk at saying that "we merely experience (reality) in a limited way compared to how reality really is". The phenomenological notion of a divide between what we perceive and how things are is fraught with problems. Physics gives us a detailed story about how things are. To suppose that somehow behind physics is a world beyond our understanding, "as it really is", strikes me as a mere word game. If it is beyond out understanding then it can have no place in our stories, and so is irrelevant. If it has a place in our philosophy, then it is not beyond our understanding.

The objective/subjective picture is unhelpful, as is the notion of private/public concepts. Science takes what we see (not "What I see") and develops generalisations that are true for everyone. Talk of subjective personal experiences clouds this picture of science.

~~

'The map is not the territory.' — Pie

This phrase comes from Count Alfred Korzybski, and the null-A movement, "General Semantics", a pseudo-science from early in the last century. I had a strong interest in it at about the age of fourteen.

But of course in order to understand that the map is not the territory, one must have access to both the map and the territory.

It remains an error to suppose that one has no access to the world as it is.


I don;t think you will disagree with this. But @Olivier5 might.

Noumena. Of course people still debate the best interpretation, and I understand why the concept was tempting (as the territory), but I suspect the the true/warranted distinction does the same work with less confusion. — Pie

So then, why do you keep asking "where is the territory ?"

The territory is where the map says it is, if it's a good map.

In map / territory parlance, Kant is simply saying that there must be a medium between us and the territory, which maps provide.

But of course in order to understand that the map is not the territory, one must have access to both the map and the territory. — Banno

:up:

Or (to save the metaphor) we can let the territory be all that is the case and the map be what we are warrant to claim is the case (our set of rationally settled beliefs.)

So then, why do you keep asking "where is the territory ?" — Olivier5

Because you haven't explicitly adopted my suggested understanding of it, I was trying to figure out yours. How do you cash out 'representation' ?

I was trying to figure out yours. — Pie

As I said, the territory is where the map says it is, if the map is any good.

How do you cash out 'representation' ?

It's like Hotel California: you can check out any time you want, but you can never leave representation.

It's like Hotel California: you can check out any time you want, but you can never leave representation. — Olivier5

So all we ever have is map map map ?

But why the representation metaphor then ?

So all we ever have is map map map ?

But why the representation metaphor then ? — Pie

Maps have to represent something... What's the use of a map about nothing?

Maps have to represent something... What's the use of a map about nothing? — Olivier5

Exactly. That's the point I've been making. What does the map represent ?

Let me repeat my theory. The world is something like the set of true claims. If we try to jam the map metaphor into this new context, we might say that the 'map' is our set of warranted but defeasible claims. But we can also just drop the representation metaphor (maps, lenses, mirrors).

What does the map represent ? — Pie

It usually represents a certain part of the world, at a certain scale / level of detail, and focusing on certain particular features.

As an aside, a map cannot represent everything that might potentially be representable. The map maker must make choices about what features are the most important to depict, based on the map's intended use.

Eg a geologic map of New Hampshire will differ quite a lot from a road map of New Hampshire. Of course both maps are about the same territory and thus they could be superposed / combined into one, if only in the mind of a person looking at both maps, and thus one may argue that we could arrive progressively at a richer and richer map of New Hampshire by adding more and more layers (topography, land cover, etc.) But the point is that no map can exhaust reality. This is another aspect of the map / territory metaphor: any territory will always be vastly richer in information than any map of it. (including New Hampshire)

Our human maps are gross simplifications of their territory, always. That's why they are useful to us, feeble humans. There is such a thing as "too much information".

Let me repeat my theory. The world is something like the set of true claims. If we try to jam the map metaphor into this new context, we might say that the 'map' is our set of warranted but defeasible claims. But we can also just drop the representation metaphor (maps, lenses, mirrors). — Pie

A claim is a representation. It's akin to a map or some stuff drawn on a map. So I think you are right to see maps as sets of warranted claims. But it also follows that "the set of all true claims" is also a representation, a "map". It would be the map of an omniscient, supernatural entity.

But the world is still not a map; not even the map of an omniscient entity. The world is not a representation of something else. It is not a show, nor a claim. The world is the real thing, the ground of being. It is.

At most, when you pay attention, it is present.

'Present' <> 'represented'.

But it also follows that "the set of all true claims" is also a representation, a "map". It would be the map of an omniscient, supernatural entity. — Olivier5

OK, but He wouldn't need the map ? For Him, I believe P would also just be P.

Our human maps are gross simplifications of their territory, always. That's why they are useful to us, feeble humans. There is such a thing as "too much information". — Olivier5

I totally agree that actual maps strip away confusing complexity.

I can imagine a least squares regression line serving metaphorically as a map. I don't want to study 20,000 data points. Give me the gist.

The world is the real thing, the ground of being. It is. — Olivier5

In my opinion, 'it is' is...on to something. That's what I like about 'the world is all that is case.' It's tempting to say more, but it seems to me that one always says too much. It's also hard to define truth. Its grammar is so brutally simple and absolute, that we always say too much. Because a warranted statement can be false, and an unwarranted statement can be true. It's as if all we can productively talk about is warrant.

'the world is all that is case.' — Pie

I'm fine with that, because it does not imply an observer. Presumably, there was once a world -- like soon after the big bang -- without any claim being made about it by any claimant. Without any representation of itself.

I'm fine with that, because it does not imply an observer. — Olivier5

I like Sellars and Popper for trying to figure out how to talk about the world without having to talk about anything mystical or hidden like sensation or experience. These concepts are fine for everyday use, but they've led philosophers to strange, questionable positions.