In defence of weak naturalism

jorndoe

I'm the opposite. — Harry Hindu

Apropos, it seems we spoke past each other. :D (Too few definitions?)

Here's another expression of my inquiry regarding existential claims:

Is x something you can show us first (without having to define it), or is x something you have to define for us first (without having shown existence)?

The former is easily exemplified, e.g. the Sun. The depreciation I expressed was towards the latter.

Whatever is real, does not require our definitions to exist. Rather the opposite, we try to converge on quiddity of whatever is real by means of discovery, something like that. Oftentimes this involves predication. — jorndoe

Perhaps I can turn it into a thesis:

x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions

I'm not sure that holds, though.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Srap Tasmaner

↪Terrapin Station

↪Michael

Regarding 'an effect cannot be greater than its cause(s)'. You've all asked what it means and how to back it up. Here goes.
'Greater' here means that the effect cannot possess a property that was not present in its cause(s). This follows from the self-evident principle that 'nothing can come from nothing', or 'nothing can bring itself into existence'. Therefore, whatever property the effect has (be it physical or not) must come from its cause(s). Now if we assume that a single first cause exists, then it must possess all properties that its effects possess, because the effects' properties must have been received by the first cause.

Srap Tasmaner

'Greater' here means that the effect cannot possess a property that was not present in its cause(s). — Samuel Lacrampe

You could use this as a definition, something like:

We define a "greater cause" to be a cause which possesses all the properties that its correlated effects possess.
I'm not sure what use this is, but okay.

On the other hand, you could be making the following claim:

No effect has a property not possessed by its cause.
This is patently false, as a moment's reflection would show.

A Christian Philosophy

Premise 1 is a claim about language use among I don't know what community of speakers, which doesn't seem like it would suit what seems to be a metaphysical argument. There's also something there about this community's imaginative capacity, and I don't know what to do with that that either. I don't know how to verify any of those claims, or what I would have if I did. Even if Premise 1 is true in some specified sense, what good is it? — Srap Tasmaner

That's okay if you have not heard of God being defined in that way before. You just need to 'buy' into the definition for us to have a meaningful argument; because we cannot argue if we are not on a common ground when it comes to the terms used. We could technically replace the word 'God', with the word 'X', and this would not change the validity of the syllogism, as long as we agree on the meaning of the terms.

A Christian Philosophy

We define a "greater cause" to be a cause which possesses all the properties that its correlated effects possess. — Srap Tasmaner

Just nitpicking: Your definition makes the cause 'equal', not necessarily 'greater'.

No effect has a property not possessed by its cause.
This is patently false, as a moment's reflection would show. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you show me why?

Srap Tasmaner

You could use this as a definition, something like:

We define a "greater cause" to be a cause which possesses all the properties that its correlated effects possess. — Srap Tasmaner

Just nitpicking: Your definition makes the cause 'equal', not necessarily 'greater'. — Samuel Lacrampe

That would be true if I said "all and only," which I didn't.

On the other hand, you could be making the following claim:

No effect has a property not possessed by its cause.

This is patently false, as a moment's reflection would show. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you show me why? — Samuel Lacrampe

If A caused B, whatever that amounts to and whatever you take as A and B, then B has the property of "being caused by A," but A doesn't.

If that seems too clever, here's another: striking the nail with a hammer causes the nail to enter the board. The nail entering the board has the property of wood being displaced by steel; the hammer striking the nail does not. (That's awkward, but I don't really know how to talk about cause and effect perspicuously.)

[As an aside: I did some googling, and it looks like a lot of your ideas come from apologetics. I just want to commend you for coming here to test them out among people with different backgrounds and commitments.]

Srap Tasmaner

That's okay if you have not heard of God being defined in that way before. You just need to 'buy' into the definition for us to have a meaningful argument; because we cannot argue if we are not on a common ground when it comes to the terms used. We could technically replace the word 'God', with the word 'X', and this would not change the validity of the syllogism, as long as we agree on the meaning of the terms. — Samuel Lacrampe

Cool. I'm glad you see the distinction. What's important is (a) not to assume that what carries the authority of common usage is true, and (b) not to assume every definition, however clear, has some object answering to it.

A Christian Philosophy

Begging the question by assuming that there is a God and that the Bible is his words. — Michael

I agree. But my intent was not to prove God's existence, merely to answer the question of 'how do people go from the first cause to God?' This is my answer for believers.

And thirdly, it wouldn't follow that the first cause is that which nothing greater can exist, only that the first cause is that which nothing greater does exist. — Michael

Mmm... You may have a point here... But I'll attempt to refute it anyways.
Can we agree that 'anything that can exist' is 'anything that can be conceived' without contradiction? Now I summon Hume's principle that there are no innate ideas, that all conceptions must come from experience; and thus anything that we can conceive must exist at some point. This does not mean that just because I can imagine a unicorn, that unicorns exist, but that the basic components of the unicorn (colours, shapes, sounds, ...) must exist.

Now if 'all that can exist' is 'anything that we can conceive', and 'anything that we can conceive' is 'anything that must exist', then 'all that can exist' is 'anything that must exist'. (wow that was hard).

Srap Tasmaner

Now if 'all that can exist' is 'anything that we can conceive', and 'anything that we can conceive' is 'anything that must exist', then 'all that can exist' is 'anything that must exist'. (wow that was hard). — Samuel Lacrampe

You're on the verge of reinventing S5.

There is a lot of prior art here, and a lot of disagreement, even controversy, among philosophers on the interpretation of modal logics.

SophistiCat

'Greater' here means that the effect cannot possess a property that was not present in its cause(s). This follows from the self-evident principle that 'nothing can come from nothing', or 'nothing can bring itself into existence'. Therefore, whatever property the effect has (be it physical or not) must come from its cause(s). — Samuel Lacrampe

Your premise is that everything has a cause. It is very much debatable that this is a self-evident truth or that we have no choice but adopt this a metaphysical axiom. In any case, your conclusion (that the cause must possess all properties of its effects) obviously does not follow.

Indeed, it is hard to even think of a single example, while counterexamples are easy to come up with (especially since "cause" and "effect" are such vague concepts).

Srap Tasmaner

If A caused B, whatever that amounts to and whatever you take as A and B, then B has the property of "being caused by A," but A doesn't. — Srap Tasmaner

Almost forgot--as soon as I wrote that, it occurred to me that anything qualifying as a "greater cause" in the defined sense, would have to be self-caused. Coincidence?

SophistiCat

↪Samuel Lacrampe

Wow, what a mess! You really need to be careful with quantifiers and modal operators.

A Christian Philosophy

If that seems too clever, here's another: striking the nail with a hammer causes the nail to enter the board. The nail entering the board has the property of wood being displaced by steel; the hammer striking the nail does not. — Srap Tasmaner

This is not the causal relationship between the hammer and the nail. The only effect to the nail caused by the hammer is the energy from the hammer received to the nail. And we know that the energy received is not greater than the original energy due to the second law of thermodynamics, which states that no energy can be created.

A Christian Philosophy

What's important is (a) not to assume that what carries the authority of common usage is true — Srap Tasmaner

Agreed. Common usage or common sense determines the prima facie or default position, but is not a proof.

Srap Tasmaner

This is not the causal relationship between the hammer and the nail. — Samuel Lacrampe

I haven't spent a lot of time thinking about causation, but it seemed most natural to me to describe it as a relation that held between events rather than objects, so there you have me trying to describe a property of an event, which, as I said, is awkward, for me at least.

I still think it makes sense though.

A Christian Philosophy

Your premise is that everything has a cause. — SophistiCat

Actually, I don't think that 'everything has a cause'. Only that 'everything in the natural universe has a cause'. There is no need to extend the principle further than the data set that we can observe, which is only the natural universe.

It is very much debatable that this is a self-evident truth or that we have no choice but adopt this a metaphysical axiom. — SophistiCat

Logically, either a thing has a cause or else it is an eternal being which has always existed, because everything that begins to exist requires a cause for its existence. It could be that eternal things exist in the natural universe but I cannot think of one off the top of my head.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Srap Tasmaner

↪SophistiCat

Now if 'all that can exist' is 'anything that we can conceive', and 'anything that we can conceive' is 'anything that must exist', then 'all that can exist' is 'anything that must exist'. — Samuel Lacrampe

While it may be hard to pronounce, the argument is really a simple syllogism in the form:
If A is B, and B is C, then A is C.
- Replace A with 'all that can exist'
- Replace B with 'anything that we can conceive'
- Replace C with 'anything that must exist'

Srap Tasmaner

Actually, I don't think that 'everything has a cause'. Only that 'everything in the natural universe has a cause'. There is no need to extend the principle further than the data set that we can observe, which is only the natural universe. — Samuel Lacrampe

You know you just emptied the predicate "has a cause" of all content by extending it to everything, right?

Logically, either a thing has a cause or else it is an eternal being which has always existed, — Samuel Lacrampe

Some of us are going to balk at extending the principle of bivalence to propositions that, as you just told us, are in principle unverifiable. I might.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Srap Tasmaner

Sure, but the event without the object is only the movement of the objects, that is, the movement of the hammer causing the movement of the nail. And movements are quantified by energy (kinetic), which brings me back to my first point, that there can be no greater energy in the effect than in the cause.

A Christian Philosophy

You know you just emptied the predicate "has a cause" of all content by extending it to everything, right? — Srap Tasmaner

Maybe I am misunderstanding what you are saying, or you are misunderstanding me, because I am with you, that we cannot say that 'everything has a cause', only that 'everything that we can observe (the natural universe) has a cause'.

Some of us are going to balk at extending the principle of bivalence to propositions that, as you just told us, are in principle unverifiable. I might. — Srap Tasmaner

But the law of non-contradiction is an absolute. "A is B" and "A is not B" are mutually exclusive. And this is true regardless of what A and B are.

A Christian Philosophy

As an aside: I did some googling, and it looks like a lot of your ideas come from apologetics. I just want to commend you for coming here to test them out among people with different backgrounds and commitments. — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks bro. I hope this will not be seen as a fight between theists vs non-theists, but merely philosophers looking for truth.

Srap Tasmaner

we cannot say that 'everything has a cause', only that 'everything that we can observe (the natural universe) has a cause'. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sure, so long as you understand that now you're not saying anything about what's in the natural universe--your predicate is coextensive with it.

But the law of non-contradiction is an absolute. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not what I'm talking about. Bivalence is different. We do not have to accept that "has a cause" is either true or false of entities that are in principle unobservable.

Srap Tasmaner

↪Samuel Lacrampe

I don't know what to say about the event vs. object stuff. Causation between objects--or all this talk about objects having or not having a cause, which even I fell into--it doesn't make any sense to me. I'll stick with events.

Srap Tasmaner

While it may be hard to pronounce, the argument is really a simple syllogism in the form:
If A is B, and B is C, then A is C.
- Replace A with 'all that can exist'
- Replace B with 'anything that we can conceive'
- Replace C with 'anything that must exist' — Samuel Lacrampe

We can clean this up, even without resorting to quantified modal logic, into an actual Barbara like so:

Everything that can exist can be conceived of.
Everything that can be conceived of must exist.
$\therefore$ Everything that can exist must exist.

Remember universals are really conditionals:

If something can exist, then it can be conceived of.
If something can be conceived of, then it must exist.
$\therefore$ If something can exist, then it must exist.

See how the second premise is not what you were trying to use Hume for?

Even S5 only says that anything that is possible is necessarily possible (IIRC), not that anything possible is necessary.

(I think someone, maybe Alvin Plantinga, has argued that if God is possible then he must exist--that his existence in some possible world would be necessary in that world, and that if he's necessary in that possible world then he's necessary in all of them, and therefore he exists. It was something like that.)

SophistiCat

Logically, either a thing has a cause or else it is an eternal being which has always existed, because everything that begins to exist requires a cause for its existence. — Samuel Lacrampe

"Everything that begins to exist requires a cause for its existence" is just a variation on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which I don't think we are obligated to accept as a dogma.

But that was just an aside. Even if we provisionally accept the PSR, it still doesn't logically follow that a cause must have all the properties of its effects (whatever that might even mean). The most that PSR entails in this case is that there must be a cause for any property, which is a plausible (though not necessary) principle if by that we mean that the property is either entailed or made more probable by a prior state of the world combined with dynamical laws. But conservation of properties does not follow from this.

Harry Hindu

Is x something you can show us first (without having to define it), or is x something you have to define for us first (without having shown existence)? — jorndoe

It depends on whether or not you's seen x before. If you have never seen x, then it requires that I define x for you, so that you may picture x in your mind. Of course, in defining something, one has the capacity to indulge or leave things out. One also has the capacity to project their own likes and dislikes in the definition. To acquire a more direct definition requires that you observe x for yourself. But you can project your own feelings onto what you observe as well. This requires that we have as many observe x as possible (scientists who test another scientist's theory) and be more aware of how we project ourselves onto our observations and limit that (being more objective).

jorndoe

Sure, @Harry Hindu, well, you could just hand me a dictionary/encyclopedia, those have plenty good definitions.
But, there are no running elephants in dictionaries, for example. You might, however, show evidence of a stampede or whatever, and that's "real" in this sense at least:

x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions — jorndoe

(may or may not be a worthwhile thesis, don't know)

On the other hand, dictionaries excel at context-building, e.g. may state where elephants live or something. You won't find flying pink elephants in dictionaries either, by the way, but that didn't stop me from just mentioning them. :)

Anyway, I've just noticed there are some relations among ...

Invention   Discovery
Definition  Evidence
Quiddity    Existence

... when it comes to epistemic claims.
Definitions are fine; my depreciation is just when some such x is defined only (possibly invented).

jorndoe

Even if we provisionally accept the PSR, it still doesn't logically follow that a cause must have all the properties of its effects (whatever that might even mean). The most that PSR entails in this case is that there must be a cause for any property, which is a plausible (though not necessary) principle if by that we mean that the property is either entailed or made more probable by a prior state of the world combined with dynamical laws. But conservation of properties does not follow from this. — SophistiCat

Sufficient reason can't apply to existence, the lot, everything, without circularity (e.g. existence is self-explanatory).
Thus, if you want to apply sufficient reason to the universe, then you'd have to show that the universe isn't everything first (which could make the principle kind of redundant in this respect, who knows).
At least that's how it seems to me.
Otherwise you just get the usual structure of "everything and then some".

A Christian Philosophy

Not what I'm talking about. Bivalence is different. We do not have to accept that "has a cause" is either true or false of entities that are in principle unobservable. — Srap Tasmaner

I disagree. I will explain my same point (original here) in smaller steps: Using the law of noncontradiction, either a thing has a cause or not. This is true regardless if the thing is observable or not, because the law of noncontradiction is an absolute. If it does not have a cause, then it does not have a cause for its existence. But everything that begins to exist requires an external cause for its existence, and cannot cause itself into existence, because to cause something, one must first exist. Therefore if a thing has no cause, then it cannot begin to exist, therefore it must possess eternal existence.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Srap Tasmaner

Kool! I will accept either the first or second correction. And so if we buy into the assumption that a first cause exists, then this first cause is 'that which nothing greater can exist or be conceived'. I'll recap:

- An effect cannot be greater than its cause(s) (I defend this here)
- A first cause exists (we assume this)
∴ The first cause it that which nothing greater exists

- If something can exist, then it can be conceived of, because we can conceive all logical possibilities.
- If something can be conceived of, then it must exist. (as defended by Hume)
∴ If something can exist, then it must exist.

∴ The first cause is that which nothing greater can exist.
Side note: this is what christians mean by 'God'.

In defence of weak naturalism

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