For example, beliefs can be true or false, like the belief that "the sky is blue", and their truth value is dependent upon whether the content of the belief is an actual pattern in reality. — Jerry
I guess this is just a roundabout way of accepting the correspondence theory of truth, but I think the key idea is that truth isn't a fundamental "thing", like an abstract object that we discover. It simply describes whether our mental models correctly describe reality. — Jerry
T(q) ↔ p is the same as “p” is true iff p which is the T-schema which you have previously said is the correct account of truth. — Michael
q ≔ the proposition that p
— Michael
is the same as
"p" is true ↔ p
And if so, how, and if not, why? — Banno
Seems to me the problem stems from treating propositions as individuals. — Banno
truth bearer — Tate
and the disquoted part is a truth maker. — Tate
Seems to me the problem stems from treating propositions as individuals.
— Banno
Why is that problematic? — Tate
Tarski offers this example:
The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white. — Michael
and the disquoted part is a truth maker.
— Tate
Not so fast. The sentence in the second part is a truth maker? Or it picks out a truth maker? — bongo fury
Seems to me the problem stems from treating propositions as individuals.
— Banno
Why is that problematic?
— Tate
How is it clear? Is such an individual: truth-bearing sentence, truth-making event, or something in between, or (as so often carelessly insinuated) all at once. — bongo fury
Tarski offers this example:
The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white.
— Michael
Quite. "Sentence" is fine. Drop "proposition". If not why not? — bongo fury
Tarski doesn't deal in propositions. It's just sentences from two different languages, one that has a truth predicate and one that doesn't. It's not a definition of truth. — Tate
Hence we arrive at a definition of truth and falsehood simply by saying that a sentence is true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false otherwise.
He does provide a definition of truth in The Semantic Conception of Truth:
Hence we arrive at a definition of truth and falsehood simply by saying that a sentence is true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false otherwise. — Michael
propositions are in fact a class of sentences. — Olivier5
Non-linguistic? Abstract? Timeless? — bongo fury
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