As complexity increases, it may be better to start discussing self-deception or, more neutrally, better or worse frameworks for editing beliefs. — Pie
Cool example, which touches on the coherence norms of the 'I think' or 'I believe' that attaches implicitly to individuals' claims. We can see in this example why that norm is so important. We'd think the speaker did not know English or was radically illogical."I believe that p is true and p is not true" is, in a sense, consistent and possibly true, but in another sense an absurd thing to say. — Michael
I was half-joking, trying to get you to see that your theory includes the 'ineffable' implicitly. — Pie
The issue is whether a theory including truthmakers, built on the ocular metaphor of representation, is ultimately more trouble than it's worth. — Pie
We reason with/in sentences. — Pie
In short, knowledge requires concepts ... — link
To know something as simple as that the patch is red requires an ability to classify that patch ... — link
... Hegel... — Pie
There's probably lots of wiggle room on the issue of pragmatics, which I'm admittedly ignoring to focus on what I take to be the essence of the issue. I claim that it's better to not think of truth as a property. — Pie
If the deflationary theory takes truth for granted, then it leaves unexplained what makes a sentence true. Is it correspondence, coherence, something else or nothing at all? — Luke
If the deflationary theory takes truth for granted, then it leaves unexplained what makes a sentence true. — Luke
I must be able to see that the patch is red in order to classify it as red. Other animals can see and respond to colors without naming or classifying them. Do they "know" it is red or green? — Fooloso4
While knowledge is, for human beings, a part of being in the world, that is not the whole of it. — Fooloso4
https://core100.columbia.edu/article/excerpt-don-quixote"Just then, they discovered thirty or forty windmills in that plain. And as soon as don Quixote saw them, he said to his squire: “Fortune is guiding our affairs better than we could have ever hoped. Look over there, Sancho Panza, my friend, where there are thirty or more monstrous giants with whom I plan to do battle and take all their lives, and with their spoils we’ll start to get rich. This is righteous warfare, and it’s a great service to God to rid the earth of such a wicked seed.”
“What giants?” said Sancho Panza.
“Those that you see over there,” responded his master, “with the long arms—some of them almost two leagues long.”
“Look, your grace,” responded Sancho, “what you see over there aren’t giants—they’re windmills; and what seems to be arms are the sails that rotate the millstone when they’re turned by the wind.”
You may buy into Hegel's metaphysics, with everything wrapped in a nice teleological bundle with not only man but Hegel himself playing a key role in the unfolding of reality, but I don't. — Fooloso4
For all its cosmopolitanism it is more than a bit provincial. — Fooloso4
No, all statements are true, including this one. — Luke
I currently take it as the honest theory...one that would rather not spout nonsense, bewitched by old metaphors... — Pie
Does a thermostat know when it's hotter than 68 degrees ? — Pie
I didn't peg you for a panpsychist, but ? — Pie
Thank you, Polonius ! — Pie
“Look, your grace,” responded Sancho, “what you see over there aren’t giants—they’re windmills; and what seems to be arms are the sails that rotate the millstone when they’re turned by the wind.”
That begs the question. You're assuming anything does. — Isaac
For all its cosmopolitanism it is more than a bit provincial.
— Fooloso4
Oh dear. — Pie
Hegel's historical and geographical provinciality likewise seems remarkable, if we consider that he was the great exponent of a universal "Absolute Spirit." In the Philosophy of History, Hegel not only "writes off China as being outside history but refuses to give any serious attention to Russia or the other Slavic countries because they contributed nothing important to (European) history. And even Hegel's empathy with western European nations was severely limited, as is shown by his disagreement with Kant about the possibility of anything like a league of nations (PR, §333, Zusatz).
Hegel, like Kant, seemed to think of Negroes as a definitely inferior race. He theorised that although they were stronger and more educable than American Indians (PH, 109), Negroes represented the inharmonious state of "natural man," before humans' attainment of consciousness of God and their own individuality (PH, 123); and that, in general, white skin was the most perfect harbinger of both physical health and conscious receptivity!" In line with these sentiments, he of course eliminated the whole continent of Africa from explicit historical consideration, except insofar as certain Africans were influenced by European Mediterranean culture. He offered a left-handed compliment to "the Negroes," in that he ascribed natural talent to them, whereas the American Indians, he opined, had no such natural endowments (PH, 82). [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/kainz7.htm]
The correspondence and coherence theories of truth both theorise about what does.
It seems to me that the deflationary theory is not inconsistent with either of these and that either could be tacked on to the deflationary theory for an account of what makes statements true. — Luke
I do believe there is a reason why we say that some statements are true and some are false, though. Don’t you? — Luke
Yes, I've written about it on this thread. I think there are numerous reasons to do with wanting to get others to believe us, wanting to show faith in others, wanting to give an indication of confidence... — Isaac
Your drawing gives me some insight, but it'd help to hear more about how you conceive or deal with truthmakers. — Pie
Not that we have to acknowledge truth-makers corresponding to truth-bearers. — bongo fury
If we jettison apparent nonsense like the world-in-itself...the world is just that which is the case. To me this is not correspondence. There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie
Correspondence. “There are plums in the icebox” is false because I looked in there and found none - is a better reason imo than wanting something for/from others. — Luke
So your go to expression to communicate the lack of plums in the fridge is “"There are plums in the icebox” is false"? Not "there aren't any plums in the fridge"? — Isaac
So what's your preferred understanding of truth ? — Pie
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