Fine, but it’s not much of a theory of truth if it doesn’t offer an account of what makes a statement true. — Luke
Because yours don’t seem like the sort of reasons we would use to decide whether “there are plums in the icebox” is true or false. — Luke
for our saying e.g. that “snow is white” is true, or that “there are plums in the icebox” is false. — Luke
Why the insult? — Fooloso4
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/This much is agreed: “x makes it true that p” is a construction that signifies, if it signifies anything at all, a relation borne to a truth-bearer by something else, a truth-maker. But it isn’t generally agreed what that something else might be, or what truth-bearers are, or what the character might be of the relationship that holds, if it does, between them, or even whether such a relationship ever does hold.
The broader idea is that we can say much more about warrant than truth. We know that warranted statements can be false and that unwarranted statements can be true. The utility of 'true' may depend on the absoluteness of its grammar. — Pie
I'm hoping the picture will help us agree whether your P is truth bearer or truth maker or both or neither? — bongo fury
What are the odds, I wonder... — bongo fury
An important question for AI, but I would say that the ability of an animal to distinguish between two colors is a form of knowledge, even though it may be excluded by a favored theory of knowledge. — Fooloso4
I don’t recall that being a reason you gave… — Luke
“There are plums in the icebox” is false because I looked in there and found none — Luke
Is this in reference to Gettier examples? — Luke
There is still some reason why we would ultimately say that the statements are true or false, and it still looks correspondence-y to me. — Luke
You could also check the icebox for plums. I later started speaking about ‘our’ reasons for saying that a statement is true or false. — Luke
To be sure, (non-human) animal cognition is worth looking into, but I hardly think it's strange for a philosopher to focus on human (linguistic) claims. — Pie
Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. [Wittgenstein, Zettel, 352]
She showed him that what he said about the contents of the fridge did not correspond to the contents of the fridge. In her doing so, she shows us that we need not be able to use the terms so often used in philosophical and normal everyday discourse in order to intuitively know that 1.)some meaningful statements are false, 2.)what makes them so, 3.)how to check and see for ourselves, or 4.)how to show someone else. — creativesoul
I would argue that a self-driving car knows how to drive. It is evident from the fact that it can drive. — Fooloso4
I think it is a mistake to think that we have fixed concepts of such things as knowledge and awareness — Fooloso4
You are of course free to develop a theory in that direction, but it doesn't seem relevant to the thread. — Pie
Does a thermostat know when it's hotter than 68 degrees ? — Pie
Clearly this hinges on how we understand what it is to know.
Hegel's idealism is not antirealism. Hegel's absolute idealism holds that the real is the ideal and the ideal is the real. All differences and distinctions are understood within the unity of the whole of Absolute Spirit, which plays out dialectically in time as history. This includes the inorganic as well as the organic, thinking and being, realism and idealism. — Fooloso4
So long, and thanks for all the fish. — Pie
I don't see how. If I say "Rory Gallagher is the best guitarist ever, it's true" do you really think the meaning of 'it's true' there relies on any kind of logic? I'm just emphasising my belief. — Isaac
You're assuming we're all playing a certain type of game, but I don't see any reason why we must be, and most times seems to me we aren't. — Isaac
"p" is true iff p
Is it sufficient to say that it is true that a car knows how to drive itself iff a car can drive itself? Or can we dispense with this and simply say that there are cars that drive themselves? — Fooloso4
That tells me nothing about Hegel's attitude towards the truth value of "there is a teapot in orbit around Jupiter". — Banno
5. The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of that truth.
6. ... truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts.
18. Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.
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