Opening line of the OP. Read it

Opening line of the OP. Read it — Bartricks

It contains no stipulation of uniqueness

I do not think I am God — Bartricks

You mean this? You were intending that as part of the definition? If so, that's not clear, and uniqueness is implied not explicit.

I doubt anyone can give some logic which rules out the possibility that you are God.

Isn't the default that a proposition is innocent of impossibility until proven impossible?

Why not instead ask the opposite? Is it possible I am not God?

I do not think I am God. (By 'God' I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). — Bartricks

That means that possession of those properties makes one God and failure to have any means one is not God. That is, it means that omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence are necessary and sufficient for qualification as God.

So either you did not read that opening line or you read it and did not understand its implications.

Now, engage with the substance of my case and stop telling me about how you misuse the word God.

Uniqueness follows from omnipotence - you can't have more than one omnipotent person.

Now, engage with the substance of my case and stop telling me about how you misuse the word God. — Bartricks

You're not my real dad

Uniqueness follows from omnipotence - you can't have more than one omnipotent person. — Bartricks

OK, but that's still not part of the definition you gave.

It's entailed by omnipotence!! The definition of God that I gave - and that you completely ignored - is that God is omnipotent (among other things). That entails that there is only one God. If X denotes someone who has 3 + 1 apples, then it denotes someone who has 4 apples. That you can't see that doesn't mean it wasn't there in the definition.

Why not instead ask the opposite? Is it possible I am not God? — Yohan

Because that one is philosophically uninteresting. It's obviously possible that I am not God. What's interesting is that it is genuinely metaphysically possible that I am God. Highly unlikely, of course. But nevertheless, entirely possible.

↪bert1 It's entailed by omnipotence!! The definition of God that I gave - and that you completely ignored - is that God is omnipotent (among other things). That entails that there is only one God. If X denotes someone who has 3 + 1 apples, then it denotes someone who has 4 apples. That you can't see that doesn't mean it wasn't there in the definition. — Bartricks

Sorry I'm so stupid

I too am drinking a glass of wine, although it started out as a glass of water.

I have moved on to lemon squash now. No more alcohol for me, especially in the hot weather. If I drink too much I often get lost going home or in great big metaphysical knots and in need of philosophical resuscitation, on this site or going through my cluttered piles of books. Enjoy your drink!

Why not instead ask the opposite? Is it possible I am not God?
— Yohan
Because that one is philosophically uninteresting. It's obviously possible that I am not God. What's interesting is that it is genuinely metaphysically possible that I am God. Highly unlikely, of course. But nevertheless, entirely possible. — Bartricks

I am basically taking your question deeper.
Hypothetically might you be God? Sure, why not? Anything is possible.

Might you ACTUALLY, REALLY be God???

Isn't that more interesting? If you are ACTUALLY God, then it would mean you are God by NECESSITY, which would mean you couldn't possibly NOT be God.

So I'm saying lets try to prove you are God, rather than just asking if its possible to be God...because anything "could be" possible, which is not that interesting.
Although the possibility of being God is more interesting than the impossibility.

You are not taking my question deeper, but changing it for another one.

It also does not follow from my actually being God that I am God of necessity. God is not God of necessity, for then there would be something he could not do, namely cease to be God

Uniqueness follows from omnipotence - you can't have more than one omnipotent person. — Bartricks

It's not clear to me why this is the case. Are you viewing it like there are two omnipotent beings having an arm wrestle and one of them has to win?

One omnipotent person would have the power to stop the other one doing things, and vice versa

Might I be God?

No, you may not.

What paradox arises from two omnipotent beings existing that doesn't with just one? For example, how do you personally justify the "Can God make a boulder that he can't lift?" or whatever?

I literally just told you.
If there are two omnipotent beings neither will be able to do all things as the other will place a limit on those abilities

As for boulders - of course an omnipotent being can make a boulder to heavy for him to lift - why not? The point is he'd be able to make one the other one can't lift.

Omni is latin for 'all' and scientia is latin for 'knowledge'. So historically it has meant 'all knowledge'.

If one wants one can define omniscience as 'in possession of a potato'. Hell, one can define 'God' as a potato and then insist that you just dug God up in the vegetable patch.

I have also justified this use of the term: if you define it differently, you'll get an incoherent collection of attributes, for it does not seem possible for a person to be omnipotent, and omnibenevolent and in possession of all truths. — Bartricks

The standard understanding of omniscience is alethic: if you're to go ahead and suppose that the way the term is standardly used is inaccurate on etymological grounds, then your charge is in the class of linguistic prescriptivism

I'll simply repeat what I said: to be in possession of all trees does not require being in possession of all potential trees. LIkewise, to be in possession of all knowledge dose not require being in possession of all potential knowledge. We're all potential murderers - should we all be locked up for actual murder? — Bartricks

This makes a conflation of the dispositionalism about propositions being in principle knowable versus propositions that are actually known with its generalized notion. If being 'omniscient' requires you to just know all that which you actually know, then it's trivially true.

Consider a child who only knows his 123's and ABC's. It's true for that child that he knows all what he actually knows, and not the wide array of what is potentially there to know, like the fact that his humans procreated to conceive of him, a true fact which is potentially knowable that he is completely clueless of with respect to his actual knowledge. Your analysis entails this child be omniscient, since he knows all his actual knowledge, which makes the term largely moot and absolutely useless. This is not uncharitable, this is quite literally your view: I initially took on a far more reasonable interpretation which you so kindly corrected me on by clarifying that it was not your view by asserting this ridiculous view that confines knowledge to just actual knowledge (and thus defining omniscience in terms of actual knowledge, which is as trivial as it gets).

I've told you what omniscience means and there is really nothing more to say on that.

As for the second part, no nothing I have said implies the child is omniscient.

You could be all-knowing and not know that you were...?

I think you missed my point, not that it was entirely clear. I mean to claim that there are paradoxes that arise in a single omnipotent being, so if those can't be resolved, what does it matter that there are paradoxes with two? But also, if those paradoxes can be resolved, what makes them resolvable in a way we might not resolve the paradoxes of two.

For example, the boulder. If the omnipotent being can make a boulder he couldn't lift, surely that means there's something he can't do, i.e. lift the Boulder. I'm not claiming that it's unresolvable, just that if it is, I'm sure two omnipotent beings can be resolved similarly.

The precise opposite is true. Positing two generates contradictions. Positing one does not.

If I have the power to create a boulder too heavy for me to lift, then that's a power I have. If someone else can create a stone to heavy for me to lift, then that's a restriction. For it is now not up to me whether there are any stones I can't lift. And if someone creates such a stone, then there is something I can't lift, which is incompatible with omnipotence. Whereas if I create the stone myself, then although I will have given up my omnipotence, I will have some so by exercising one of my powers.
So your claim is demonstrably false. I have already pointed this out. And all you have done is repeat your belief that there are problems with omnipotence for one person (there are not) and no reason to think these would not arise with two (whereas there are contradictions with two, and none with one).

Yes. The true proposition 'I am omniscient' could be one that lacks justification. If that is the case, then it is not an item of knowledge and thus my not knowing it would be consistent with my being all knowing

It could just be that I do not know how to do those things. That is, I have the ability, I just do not know how to exercise it. — Bartricks

Yes that might be true

But as I have argued before, being in possession of all knowledge is consistent with being ignorant of any number of truths. For knowledge involves justified true belief, and so an omniscient person is in possession of all justified true beliefs. But that does not mean they are in possession of all truths - or at least, it does not necessarily entail that - for it could be that there are true beliefs that are not justified. And in fact, if I am God then I will be the arbiter of justifications. But what that means is that those true beliefs of mine that I approve of myself believing will be the sum total of knowledge at that time. And thus eve — Bartricks

This is reminiscent of my personal thought that I shouldn't be bothered with things I don't know. There is no evidence there is a problem of something contradicting my knowledge until I discover a problem myself. This gives me certainty about my beliefs. But I know there is more knowledge to be gained

What about omnibenevolence? Can I be absolutely certain that I am not morally perfect? Well, as with knowledge, if I am omnipotent then I will be the arbiter of right and wrong, good and bad. That is, my own attitudes towards things will constitutively determine what is right, wrong, good and bad. And assuming that whatever I do on any particular occasion is something I approve of myself doing - at least at that very moment - then everything I do will be right. And if I disapprove of some character trait, then I nevertheless approve of myself disapproving of it, and so it seems that if I am omnipotent, then I will be morally perfect as well. — Bartricks

Well I think this paragraphed shows you are off the true path. We have moral obligations which we bind ourselves to but the "we" who binds them is God. God is the source of it all but your identity is not God. You lose your identity if you follow the right path and become One again. But as long as you are you you must do what is correct otherwise you will never find yourself at home with yourself again

I fail to see a logical progression in your threads

I fail to see any in yours. I could not make head nor tail of what you said.

Whereas if I create the stone myself, then although I will have given up my omnipotence, I will have some so by exercising one of my powers. — Bartricks

So then it seems an omnipotent being can cause themselves to lose their omnipotence, and that doesn't contradict their nature of being omnipotent? In which case, an omnipotent being need not necessarily always be omnipotent? Perhaps you're saying that an omnipotent being has the potential to do anything, but need not actually do it for they would lose their omnipotence? It's all very confusing, so I'd like to go back to basics.

What is an omnipotent being? I think a useful definition would be a being that can make anything possible, actual. That is to say, an omnipotent being can't make a square circle, but could mold a unicorn into reality, perhaps. Some additional properties I'd think such a being would have—in virtue of it being "a being"—are identity (has a sense of self), persistence (that self doesn't go away or lose its identity), and will (the ability to conceive and make changes to reality).

Under this conception, I'd probably say an omnipotent being couldn't make a boulder that they couldn't lift, because that would be an impossible state of affairs. However, the being would still be omnipotent, because the thing it couldn't do was impossible, and couldn't become actual. Also, it seems to me under this definition there could be any number of omnipotent beings, simply because any contradictions that would arise don't entail something they couldn't do, but an impossibility that can't be made actual.

This is all under my definition of course. I don't know how you understand omnipotence. How would you describe it, and however you do, I'd like to refer you back to my initial questions of whether an omnipotent being has to always be omnipotent or if they can be omnipotent without actual doing actions that make them lose their omnipotence.