...unless he has universal agreement, then it sets out how Tarski thinks it functions in logic — Isaac
We all know full well when it's not true
— creativesoul
Nonsense. This would imply that there's never disagreement. — Isaac
it's simply not how the word is used.
On what authority do you define words for a language community which clearly uses them in defiance of your edict? — Isaac
Which one of these are you proposing? Which is true? — Banno
Take a true T-sentence, where "p" is some proposition and q gives its truth conditions, — Banno
Take a T-sentence and hold meaning constant by putting the very same expression on both sides...
"p" is true IFF p
...and you have an account of truth.
Take a true T-sentence, where "p" is some proposition and q gives its truth conditions,
"p" is true IFF q
and you have in q exactly what is needed to set out the meaning of p.
Between the two you have an account of the relation between meaning and truth.
It is sublimely trivial. — Banno
Is there any theory or explanation as to how truth conditions make a sentence true, or as to how truth conditions are met?
— Luke
What is "make" doing here? You said it's not causal. — Banno
We have the logical relation of the IFF in the T-sentence- what more do you want? — Banno
This would imply that there's never disagreement. — Isaac
Why? — Banno
The point is that we all know full well what it takes in order for the statement to be true. — creativesoul
Not all senses of "truth" are on equal footing. Many nowadays use it when they're talking about what they and/or others believe. That's what's going on when someone utters "my truth", "your truth", "his truth", "her truth", "our truth", and/or "their truth". They are referring to belief. — creativesoul
No, they are referring to truth. If they are understood, then that's what the word means. There's no god-given dictionary, and if there were it's certainly not the one you happen to have in your head. They may not be referring to truth in the sense you mean it, but you are not the authority on what the word 'truth' ought to mean. — Isaac
It's a category error to say that people in their ordinary conversations are speaking wrongly because they don't use a word in accordance with the rules set down for it's use in some given mental practice. — Isaac
Possibly the same thing it's doing in your quote from Davidson, where he refers to "the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false". — Luke
So you are not talking of any of the accepted truthmaker theories.None of these — Luke
And again, as in the discussion on this thread with @Isaac, how we know it's true is a very different question to what it means for it to be true. It's the difference between the cat being on the mat and our knowing that the cat is on the mat. Thy are not the same question.I'm asking how we know when truth conditions are met. — Luke
Davidson makes use of correspondence in various places, but in relation to belief rather than truth. T-sentences do not set out a correspondence theory of truth.I'm also asking how this differs from the correspondence theory. — Luke
See Truthmakers in the Sep article on truth. I(t makes it clear that the theory of truthmakers is what you are rejecting, that "there must be a thing that makes each truth true". As that short section makes clear, the rejection of truthmakers amounts to the rejection of correspondence. Riffing on that, the attempt to introduce truthmakers into the discussion was a fraught attempt to reinvigorate correspondence theories of truth.As far as I can tell, the problem with the truthmaker theory (given in the SEP article) is that it's all about existence; the existence of things, which makes a sentence true. — Luke
The alien conceptual scheme can only be recognised as a conceptual scheme if there is an interpretation for in in our conceptual scheme. — Banno
As written we can't 'all know' full well when it's not true otherwise there'd be no disagreements about that. There are. There are relativists, there are idealists, there are solipsists. — Isaac
Someone might, for example, take the position that "the cat on the mat" is true if and only if a reasonable number of their community agreed. I think they'd be wrong. Or that it can be "true for them". Again, wrong. But what are we to make of the fact that there are people who make such arguments. It seems rather indecorous of us to assume they're lying, or being stubborn. So it seems we've no choice but to concede that some people do not know when "the cat is on the mat" is true. — Isaac
It seems rather indecorous of us to assume they're lying — Isaac
How would one recognise that one was looking at an alien's conceptual scheme, unless one has at least partially interpreted it? To recognise it as a conceptual scheme is give it an interpretation — Banno
Suppose p⊃q. One might phrase this as "p makes q true". No causality is implied.
That's how I read the bit from Davidson you cite. — Banno
So you are not talking of any of the accepted truthmaker theories. — Banno
See Truthmakers in the Sep article on truth. I(t makes it clear that the theory of truthmakers is what you are rejecting, that "there must be a thing that makes each truth true". As that short section makes clear, the rejection of truthmakers amounts to the rejection of correspondence. Riffing on that, the attempt to introduce truthmakers into the discussion was a fraught attempt to reinvigorate correspondence theories of truth. — Banno
As we explained Convention T in section 2.2, the primary role of a Tarski biconditional of the form ┌┌ϕ┐ is true if and only if ϕ┐ is to fix whether ϕ is in the extension of ‘is true’ or not. But it can also be seen as stating the truth conditions of ϕ. Both rely on the fact that the unquoted occurrence of ϕ is an occurrence of an interpreted sentence, which has a truth value, but also provides its truth conditions upon occasions of use.
...
For instance, for a simple sentence like ‘Snow is white’, the theory tells us that the sentence is true if the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies ‘white’. This can be understood as telling us that the truth conditions of ‘Snow is white’ are those conditions in which the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’.
As we saw in sections 3 and 4, the Tarskian apparatus is often seen as needing some kind of supplementation to provide a full theory of truth. A full theory of truth conditions will likewise rest on how the Tarskian apparatus is put to use. In particular, just what kinds of conditions those in which the referent of ‘snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’ are will depend on whether we opt for realist or anti-realist theories. The realist option will simply look for the conditions under which the stuff snow bears the property of whiteness; the anti-realist option will look to the conditions under which it can be verified, or asserted with warrant, that snow is white.
...
...deflationists cannot really hold a truth-conditional view of content at all. If they do, then they inter alia have a non-deflationary theory of truth, simply by linking truth value to truth conditions through the above biconditional. It is typical of thoroughgoing deflationist theories to present a non-truth-conditional theory of the contents of sentences: a non-truth-conditional account of what makes truth-bearers meaningful. We take it this is what is offered, for instance, by the use theory of propositions in Horwich (1990). It is certainly one of the leading ideas of Field (1986; 1994), which explore how a conceptual role account of content would ground a deflationist view of truth. Once one has a non-truth-conditional account of content, it is then possible to add a deflationist truth predicate, and use this to give purely deflationist statements of truth conditions. But the starting point must be a non-truth-conditional view of what makes truth-bearers meaningful.
Both deflationists and anti-realists start with something other than correspondence truth conditions. But whereas an anti-realist will propose a different theory of truth conditions, a deflationists will start with an account of content which is not a theory of truth conditions at all. The deflationist will then propose that the truth predicate, given by the Tarski biconditionals, is an additional device, not for understanding content, but for disquotation. It is a useful device, as we discussed in section 5.3, but it has nothing to do with content. To a deflationist, the meaningfulness of truth-bearers has nothing to do with truth. — SEP article on Truth
I'm a bit surprised to find myself explaining this. I would not have thought is contentious.
Belief and truth are different. — Banno
I find it quite telling that a twenty-seven-month-old child knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false — creativesoul
There's no god-given dictionary, and if there were it's certainly not the one you happen to have in your head. They may not be referring to truth in the sense you mean it, but you are not the authority on what the word 'truth' ought to mean. — Isaac
For Ramsey, "p is true" means the same thing as "p". — Banno
For unenlightened, "p is true" means "p is false, but I want you to believe p." — unenlightened
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