No, this is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
A "true" statement is one which expresses an honest judgement. So "p is true" means the statement "p" is what the person making that statement honestly believes. — Metaphysician Undercover
"p is true" means that the person making that statement is presenting themselves as making an honest judgement. which only an habitual liar needs to do. The rest of us always present our honest judgement and the truth of it it 'goes without saying'. — unenlightened
It goes nicely with my suspicion of those who divide the world into the "habitual liar" and the "rest of us" who "always present our honest judgement". — Isaac
"true" and "false" are attributed to judgements. Ignoring this simple feature of truth leads to endless discussion getting nowhere. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I say, A false statement is one that expresses a dishonest judgement. So "p is true" means that the person making that statement is presenting themselves as making an honest judgement. which only an habitual liar needs to do. The rest of us always present our honest judgement and the truth of it it 'goes without saying'. That is the redundancy of truth (amongst honest speakers). — unenlightened
What would you say if “truth” and “false” weren’t so much attributed to judgements, but ARE themselves judgements? — Mww
I find it quite telling that a twenty-seven-month-old child knows when "there's nothing in the fridge" is false
— creativesoul
Yet you've not demonstrated that to be the case within the context of this discussion... — Isaac
This discussion is about what 'false' means. — Isaac
1. "p" is true iff p
2. "'p' is true" means "p" — Michael
The issue with the first is that it entails that all propositions exist: — Michael
This is problematic because it suggests that propositions exist as abstract entities (à la Platonism) which may be unacceptable to some. — Michael
Well, I'm glad for you, despite still not grasping what it is you were asking...:wink: — Banno
In other words, for any proposition p, p is true if and only if p corresponds to a fact." But is it not cleaner to just understand p as a fact, iff it is true ? — Pie
To a deflationist, the meaningfulness of truth-bearers has nothing to do with truth. — SEP article on Truth
In the example, "p" is what is said to be true, so "p" represents a judgement which is judged as a true judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
where p is a set of truth conditions and a is the "actual world", what ever that is.p is true IFF a ∈ p
So, for example, if "snow is white" is true, then the linguistic proposition somehow becomes the worldly fact that snow is white. — Luke
I'm not sure I'm versed well enough to speak on these conceptual schemes of Davidson. I'm not sure what Banno means here by: — Jerry
Didn't notice that, but clearly it is wrong. If an entire island decides that the way to survive a famine is to erect giant statues... — Banno
Redundancy suggests this: If an entire community passionate believes P, then P functions as a truth for them, as an automatically allowed premise, so long as that shared, strong belief persists. — Pie
I won’t agree “p” represents a judgement, but even without that, “p is true”, does, so the feature of truth residing in judgement, holds. — Mww
The meanings of true assertions just are the world.
To imagine a true statement becoming false is to imagine a different world. — Pie
Is there a ‘same’ empirical world that different languages link up to, placing a barrier to conceptual relativism by assuring translatability?( Davidson’s argument as I understand it). — Joshs
The world is all that is the case.
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
The facts in logical space are the world.
— Wittgenstein
re you tempted to say that we all live in different worlds ? But, if you were to say that, wouldn't you somehow talking about my world, while claiming to be stuck in your own ? — Pie
we all live differently in the one world. — Janus
The salient point is, that common world is not something we ever experience, but is a formal stipulation based on resemblance and memory. — Janus
we never perceive a whole object, we only perceive impressions or images, the continuity and resemblance of which lead the rational intellect to posit the object as the (transcendent) origin of the impressions, — Janus
It's only when we theorize and slow down that we infer that we must be 'automatically' synthesizing objects from light hitting our retina, but surely our sense organs, along with the rest of us, take their own unique tours through this world. — Pie
Consider the claim that the common world is 'a formal stipulation based on resemblance and memory.' Isn't this claim itself, according to itself,a part of 'a formal stipulation based on resemblance and memory' ? — Pie
My hunch is that the visual imagination is what makes the correspondence theory of truth attractive. — Pie
In opposition to this, the right hand side of A T-sentence is being used, it's where the spinning wheel of the T-sentence hits the bitumen of the world. — Banno
Tarski considered (T) to provide a criterion of adequacy for any theory of truth, thereby allowing that there could be more to say about truth than what the instances of the schema cover. Given that, together with the fact that he took the instances of (T) to be contingent, his theory does not qualify as deflationary. — SEP article on Deflationism About Truth
Candidates (for truth bearers) typically include beliefs, propositions, sentences, and utterances...
Consider the role of truth-bearers in the correspondence theory, for instance... It is in virtue of being meaningful that truth-bearers are able to enter into correspondence relations. Truth-bearers are things which meaningfully make claims about what the world is like, and are true or false depending on whether the facts in the world are as described.
Exactly the same point can be made for the anti-realist theories of truth we saw in section 4.2, though with different accounts of how truth-bearers are meaningful, and what the world contributes...
Though Tarski works with sentences, the same can be said of his theory. The sentences to which Tarski’s theory applies are fully interpreted, and so also are meaningful. They characterize the world as being some way or another, and this in turn determines whether they are true or false. Indeed, Tarski needs there to be a fact of the matter about whether each sentence is true or false (abstracting away from context dependence), to ensure that the Tarski biconditionals do their job of fixing the extension of ‘is true’. (But note that just what this fact of the matter consists in is left open by the Tarskian apparatus.)
We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth.
To a deflationist, the meaningfulness of truth-bearers has nothing to do with truth. — SEP article on Truth
...deflationists cannot really hold a truth-conditional view of content at all.
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.