The meanings of true assertions just are the world. — Pie
Why wouldn't 'snow' refer that way ? Isn't what you say about snow true ? — Pie
Why? To me all it entails or suggests is that for every actuality a true corresponding proposition can be formulated. — Janus
according to the deflationary theory, the content of a truth bearer is unrelated to truth conditions; that is, the left hand side of a T sentence is unrelated to the right hand side. Or, in other words, the meaning of a sentence is unrelated to the facts of the world. — Luke
The meanings of true assertions just are the world. — Pie
...deflationists cannot really hold a truth-conditional view of content at all. If they do, then they inter alia have a non-deflationary theory of truth, simply by linking truth value to truth conditions through the above biconditional. — SEP article on Truth
For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
The facts in logical space are the world.
Beliefs articulate the world's possibilities.
True beliefs are the world's actuality.
Much of our language has developed so that we can talk about things like beliefs and logic and truth — Pie
I'm not sure for what reason a deflationist would say that "snow is white" is true; it's not because of any facts of the matter. — Luke
The deflationist cannot have statements/beliefs on one side as distinct from the world on the other side without committing themselves to a non-deflationary theory of truth. — Luke
If "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" for a large class of cases, then the same or similar can probably be said for the meaning of a sentence. — Luke
If there are no independent facts of the world to fix our concepts to, them concepts liken pragmatic relevance, consistency, anticipatory compatibility and coherence replace true and false belief as expressions of how we cope with our world. This is self-creation rather than a fitting of language with fact. — Joshs
the general categories that would be called ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ are not themselves stably fixed by their relation to the facts of an empirical world. — Joshs
If there are no independent facts of the world to fix our concepts to, them concepts liken pragmatic relevance, consistency, anticipatory compatibility and coherence replace true and false belief as expressions of how we cope with our world. This is self-creation rather than a fitting of language with fact. — Joshs
366. I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different, people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). Rather: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize - then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him.
(352) Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree.
558. We say we know that water boils and does not freeze under such-and-such circumstances. Is it conceivable that we are wrong? Wouldn't a mistake topple all judgment with it? More: what could stand if that were to fall? Might someone discover something that made us say "It was a mistake"?
Whatever may happen in the future, however water may behave in the future, - we know that up to now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances.
This fact is fused into the foundations of our language-game.
Does it make sense to take as a fact that there are no independent facts of the world to fix our concepts to ? Seemingly not, right ? And this approach itself would have to be established and defended in terms of the very pragmatic relevance it would institute as a replacement for truth. — Pie
I doubt humans will stop needing 'seems', 'believe', 'supposed', and synonyms to make sense of one another. — Pie
If instead of a formal fact , we were to take ‘no independent facts of the world’ as a performative act arising from within the midst of contextual sense-making, obliged to re-validate itself the same differently in each new contextual instantiation of its use, then we would have a way of thinking and talking about what happens to notions like truth and belief when they are examined from a radically contextual vantage. — Joshs
Husserl argued that there is no veil between subject and world. What appears to us, in the mode that it appears to us, is not a proxy or representation of something independent of what directly appears, but is the thing in itself ( whether imagined, perceived, remembered). — Joshs
Why? To me all it entails or suggests is that for every actuality a true corresponding proposition can be formulated. — Janus
It's all 'just' speech acts, suggestions, co-creation rather than co-discovery. The only deep problem with this that I can make out is its utter lack of authority. As soon as one wants to bind others in terms of what they ought to believe, one is in a normative space. From a structuralist perspective, something is going to play the role of [what's-better-to-believe] and something else is going to name [the-reason-why-it's-better.] — Pie
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34580/34580-h/34580-h.htm#Page_3You have spirit, for you have thoughts. What are your thoughts? "Spiritual entities." Not things, then? "No, but the spirit of things, the main point in all things, the inmost in them, their—idea." Consequently what you think is not only your thought?[Pg 45] "On the contrary, it is that in the world which is most real, that which is properly to be called true; it is the truth itself; if I only think truly, I think the truth. I may, to be sure, err with regard to the truth, and fail to recognize it; but, if I recognize truly, the object of my cognition is the truth." — Stirner
Sacred, then, is the highest essence and everything in which this highest essence reveals or will reveal itself; but hallowed are they who recognize this highest essence together with its own, i. e. together with its revelations. The sacred hallows in turn its reverer, who by his worship becomes himself a saint, as likewise what he does is saintly, a saintly walk, saintly thoughts and actions, imaginations and aspirations, etc.
It is easily understood that the conflict over what is revered as the highest essence can be significant only so long as even the most embittered opponents concede to each other the main point,—that there is a highest essence to which worship or service is due. If one should smile compassionately at the whole struggle over a highest essence, as a Christian might at the war of words between a Shiite and a Sunnite or between a Brahman and a Buddhist, then the hypothesis of a highest essence would be null in his eyes, and the conflict on this basis an idle play. Whether then the one God or the three in one, whether the Lutheran God or the être suprême or not God at all, but "Man," may[Pg 50] represent the highest essence, that makes no difference at all for him who denies the highest essence itself, for in his eyes those servants of a highest essence are one and all—pious people, the most raging atheist not less than the most faith-filled Christian.
In the foremost place of the sacred,[26] then, stands the highest essence and the faith in this essence, our "holy[27] faith."
We co-inhabit the partially shared construction we call a space of reasons, within which we invent, discover, agree and disagree. — Joshs
Husserl has its virtues, but my non-Husserl-expert impression is that he's too Cartesian.
--God is real. He talked to me last night.
--No, he didn't. Take these pills, sir. — Pie
Is it not safely taken for granted that individual humans have incompatible beliefs? So that not all of them can be right ? — Pie
So do you believe in a thing-in-itself (atoms and void) or just a relatively 'material' side of a continuum ? — Pie
Is Heidegger also too Cartesian? He rejected truth as correctness in favor of truth as whatever discloses itself to Dasein. — Joshs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LifeworldIn whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-man" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together.' We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world... Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning... The we-subjectivity... is constantly functioning. — Husserl
That actuality in its 'nudity' is hard to make sense of. The actuality of the cat being on the mat is that the cat is on the mat. Redundant, it seems to me.
Folks might use their visual imagination and 'see' the cat on the mat as the 'real thing.' But this makes the truthmaker inaccesibly private and implicitly visual. — Pie
Is Heidegger also too Cartesian? He rejected truth as correctness in favor of truth as whatever discloses itself to Dasein. — Joshs
The actuality that corresponds to "the cat is on the mat" is the cat being on the mat. This is exactly the logic of the T-sentence. Or Aristotle's formulation: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”.
Both express the logic of correspondence, the logic of common usage; it is basic, what more do we need? There is no need to complicate matters, when it comes to something even children easily understand, it seems to me. — Janus
Tarski is not a deflationist — Luke
As I understand it, nothing in the deflationist's theory of truth "hits the bitumen of the world". — Luke
I take this to mean that, according to the deflationary theory, the content of a truth bearer is unrelated to truth conditions; that is, the left hand side of a T sentence is unrelated to the right hand side. Or, in other words, the meaning of a sentence is unrelated to the facts of the world. — Luke
Much of the progress of science consists not in correcting ‘wrong’ theories from the past , but in producing concepts in areas where they were no concept
at all . — Joshs
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