But you claimed that one cannot associate a truth value with a proposition unless there is a relationship between the saying and seeing/imagining... an apparently antirealist view. — Banno
We care about beliefs because they are the things we take to be true. — Banno
hat you don't know that it is true does not make it not true... — Banno
So you have beliefs you think are not true? — Banno
This ‘world for us', from one to the other to the other, is constituted within MY(the primal me) subjective process as MY privileged apperception of ‘from one to the other to the other'. — Joshs
Whatever. You appear to be returning to point that have already been addressed rather than progressing the discussion.
You moved back from what is true to what is understood, relevant, known, believed. — Banno
According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, a definite description or a quote-name) is joined to the truth predicate, the resulting statement contains no more content than the sentence(s) picked out by the referring expression. To assert that a sentence is true is simply to assert or reassert that sentence; it is not to ascribe the property of truth to that sentence. The prosentential theory is one kind of deflationary theory of truth.
If you know there are plums in the icebox then you've seen them, and in telling me about them when the icebox is closed, you are remembering them being there, which amounts to imagining them. — Janus
:up:Belief is one thing, actuality another; which means our beliefs can be wrong. — Janus
:up:My point is only that our being wrong is irrelevant if there is no possibility of seeing that we were wrong. — Janus
I guess I side with Heidegger against Husserl here. The 'one' has priority. — Pie
I could be trusting the word of another. Knowledge is about warranted assertion. If I turn out to be wrong, I can make a case for my right to have made the incorrect claim. For instance, I trusted a trustworthy person.
The path you seem to be going down is too subjective in my view. You are going 'first-person' and invoking uncheckable private experience. — Pie
But I don't think certain pragmatist versions of truth were successful. — Pie
'It is true that plums are in the ice box' does basically what 'there are plums in the icebox' does. — Pie
If you are trusting the word of another then I would say you believe there are plums in the icebox, not that you know it. — Janus
If you trust another you trust both their word and their memory. — Janus
That is one of the problems I have with knowledge as JTB; how do we know when our beliefs are justified? What are the criteria that must be satisfied for a belief to be counted as justified? It cannot be a precise science, and it would seem there must be degrees. Why do we need to speak in terms of "knowing" at all rather than in terms of more or less certainty or doubt? — Janus
However, if it is used as a conjecture instead, then it could be either true or false and we would need to investigate whether the truth conditions for "there are plums in the icebox" are met or not. — Luke
he Peircean idea that the metaphysics arrived at by the "community of enquirers" at the end of enquiry would be the truth is absurd in my view. This seems to be a kind of scientistic hubris to me. — Janus
They could all be wrong, or metaphysical perspectives in general may be "not even wrong" in that they are inadequate to life itself. — Janus
Critics get that impression based on quotes like these in which Heidegger denigrates the ‘one’ for being an ungenuine, obscuring, closed off mode of discourse. — Joshs
The prejudicial character of understanding means that, whenever we understand, we are involved in a dialogue that encompasses both our own self-understanding and our understanding of the matter at issue. In the dialogue of understanding our prejudices come to the fore, both inasmuch as they play a crucial role in opening up what is to be understood, and inasmuch as they themselves become evident in that process. As our prejudices thereby become apparent to us, so they can also become the focus of questioning in their own turn.
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nasmuch as understanding always occurs against the background of our prior involvement, so it always occurs on the basis of our history. Understanding, for Gadamer, is thus always an ‘effect’ of history, while hermeneutical ‘consciousness’ is itself that mode of being that is conscious of its own historical ‘being effected’—it is ‘historically-effected consciousness’ (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein). Awareness of the historically effected character of understanding is, according to Gadamer, identical with an awareness of the hermeneutical situation and he also refers to that situation by means of the phenomenological concept of ‘horizon’ (Horizont)—understanding and interpretation thus always occurs from within a particular ‘horizon’ that is determined by our historically-determined situatedness. Understanding is not, however, imprisoned within the horizon of its situation—indeed, the horizon of understanding is neither static nor unchanging (it is, after all, always subject to the effects of history). Just as our prejudices are themselves brought into question in the process of understanding, so, in the encounter with another, is the horizon of our own understanding susceptible to change.
https://iep.utm.edu/gadamer/#SH3bAccepting the fact that one can never entirely reflect oneself out of tradition does not mean that one cannot change and question one’s tradition. His point is that in as much as tradition serves as the condition of one’s knowledge, the background that instigates all inquiry, one can never start from a tradition-free place. A tradition is what gives one a question or interest to begin with. Second, all successful efforts to enliven a tradition require changing it so as to make it relevant for the current context. To embrace a tradition is to make it one’s own by altering it. A passive acknowledgment of a tradition does not allow one to live within it. One must apply the tradition as one’s own. In other words, the importance of the terms, “prejudice” and “tradition,” for Gadamer’s hermeneutics lies in the way they indicate the active nature of understanding that produces something new. Tradition hands down certain interests, prejudices, questions, and problems, that incite knowledge. Tradition is less a conserving force than a provocative one. Even a revolution, Gadamer notes, is a response to the tradition that nonetheless makes use of that very same tradition. Here we can also perceive the Hegelian influences on Gadamer to the extent that even a rejection of some elements of the tradition relies on the preservation of other elements, which are then understood (that is, taken up) in new ways. Gadamer desires not to affirm a blind and passive imitation of tradition, but to show how making tradition our own means a critical and creative application of it.
Similarly, true authority always requires an active acknowledgment by others. Without such an acknowledgment, one finds not true authority but passive submission resulting in tyranny. For, acknowledgment requires an active implementation of and reflection on the meaning of that authority for oneself—one based in knowledge not ignorance. Hence, understanding always has a built-in possibility for critique as we strive to make something our own and do not simply passively mimic it. Memorizing a text, for example, is no indication that one understands it; one has understood only when one can put the text into one’s own words, enlivening the text and allowing it to speak in new ways.
Then it’s not about our use of the word “true”? — Luke
The T-schema ... formulates the logic of correspondence — Janus
Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value. — Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters
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