I tried to read it, but it was too hard. The sentences seemed to flow without clear transitions. Can you put it more simply?

Can you be more specific? The paper addresses many things.

That seems like an awful lot to try to cover in just over nine pages.

I didn't read through it yet, but from your abstract, I disagree with taking existence and logical consistency to be identical. I'm fine with saying that existents are logically consistent with respect to how you're defining logical consistency, but I don't agree that the two are identical.

I didn't read through it yet, but from your abstract, I disagree with taking existence and logical consistency to be identical. I'm fine with saying that existents are logically consistent with respect to how you're defining logical consistency, but I don't agree that the two are identical. — Terrapin Station

And what is the difference between a logically consistent thing that exists and a logically consistent thing that doesn't exist?

A logically consistent thing that doesn't exist would have to be something you're imagining, but where you're imagining it as something not just imagined.

For example, you might be imagining a real (extramental) unicorn.

Logically consistent things that exist can obtain beyond the imagining of them.

In other words, the only way that "non-existent things" even makes sense is in talking about things that we're imagining but that do not obtain beyond our imagination of them.

What we imagine, exists in our minds, as thoughts or mental images. But if we imagine that some thing exists in some place in external reality where it doesn't exist, then this thing is not consistent. It may seem consistent to us because we don't know all the details of that thing or of its environment. But the thing is inconsistent, because we attribute it existence where it doesn't exist.

You might say that it would be consistent for the thing to exist under different conditions, but then you can't argue that the nonexistence of the thing under present conditions is a proof that a consistent thing can be nonexistent. Under present conditions, the thing is inconsistent - and that's why it doesn't exist.

What we imagine, exists in our minds, as thoughts or mental images. But if we imagine that some thing exists in some place in external reality where it doesn't exist, then this thing is not consistent. It may seem consistent to us because we don't know all the details of that thing or of its environment. But the thing is inconsistent, because we attribute it existence where it doesn't exist. — litewave

If I can offer up a simple, yet effective way of compartmentalize what reality is (for me) and maybe you can entertain my idea.
Reality is made up of our perceptions. If we want to change our reality, we need to first change our own perceptions. Once we change our perceptions, we change our reality.

Reality is made up of our perceptions. If we want to change our reality, we need to first change our own perceptions. Once we change our perceptions, we change our reality. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

But our perceptions are created from information that comes to our senses from external reality, no? So there is also an external reality that is the source of our perceptions.

Do abstract objects (the form of square) exist?

Do unicorns, in some ontologically relevant sense, exist?

Existence in its most general sense is identified with the principle of logical consistency: to exist means to be logically consistent. — litewave

I am lost with this whole "existence = logical consistency" thing. In what sense is a billiard ball logically consistent? How can a physical object be logically anything? Logic applies to statements, not things. Can you give an example of any logical operation, process, or statement that applies to the peanut butter sandwich I am (rhetorically) holding in my hand.

The essence of the principle of logical consistency is that every thing is what it is and is not what it is not. — litewave

I don't know what that means. Is a four-sided triangle not what it is or is it what it's not? I think of an old Popeye cartoon - "I yam what I yam and that's all what I yam," which I guess is fairly close to "cogito ergo sum." What would it mean for the moon not to be what it is?

It almost sounds like you're saying that existence is dependent on consciousness, but I don't think that's what you mean.

Do abstract objects (the form of square) exist? — Chany

They are difficult to imagine/visualize and cannot be interacted with, so they are ontologically controversial. But they seem to be a necessary part of logic, and especially in mathematics they can be clearly and consistently defined, so I regard them as real entities. In my paper I regard the instantiation relation as one of the three fundamental, logically necessary relations in reality.

Do unicorns, in some ontologically relevant sense, exist? — Chany

If they are consistent, they exist. Apparently not on our planet.

How can a physical object be logically anything? Logic applies to statements, not things. — T Clark

An object is logically consistent iff it is identical to itself and different from other objects.

I don't know what that means. Is a four-sided triangle not what it is or is it what it's not? — T Clark

A four-sided triangle is a triangle that is not a triangle (because a triangle has three sides). In this sense it is inconsistent.

What would it mean for the moon not to be what it is? — T Clark

It would mean for the moon not to be a moon. Of course, that's an absurdity and that's why such inconsistent "things" cannot exist.

It almost sounds like you're saying that existence is dependent on consciousness, but I don't think that's what you mean. — T Clark

Right, existence is about things, their identities.

What we imagine, exists in our minds, as thoughts or mental images. But if we imagine that some thing exists in some place in external reality where it doesn't exist, then this thing is not consistent. It may seem consistent to us because we don't know all the details of that thing or of its environment. But the thing is inconsistent, because we attribute it existence where it doesn't exist. — litewave

You're using "it" there as if the thing in question exists and has properties. It doesn't beyond something we're imagining. So it doesn't have an inconsistent set of properties a la "it exists and it doesn't." And "I believe this exists (externally)" isn't inconsistent with "(externally) it doesn't exist."

In any event, you're getting way off topic re arguing for logical consistency being identical to existing.

If they are consistent, they exist. Apparently not on our planet. — litewave

The concept of unicorns is logically coherent. It is not like the concept of a square circle and does not automatically self-contradict itself, thus making it impossible. Therefore, unicorns are logically possible, and belong with all things that are logically possible. But there is no reason to believe unicorns actually exist beyond the mental. At the very least, they require a different ontological status, one I am not sure we would call "existence."

If we say that something being logically possible is enough to mean it exists, then we run into a problem, as it means anything that could possible be a concrete (non-abstract) object must exist as a concrete object in some way. This would mean that unicorns must exist in this world, as well as every counterfactual possibilities tied to our current existence. You would have to embrace multiverse theory and say that every single possible world is a real world, as real and concrete as the actual world. This leads to a contradiction, as it is also logically coherent (possible) that only the actual world exists and that the other possible worlds do not exist (or if they do exist, as mental objects only).

As such, we would have to maintain that multiverse theory is both true and false, as both possibilities are logically possible.

You're using "it" there as if the thing in question exists and has properties. It doesn't beyond something we're imagining. So it doesn't have an inconsistent set of properties a la "it exists and it doesn't." — Terrapin Station

You define the thing as "existing where it doesn't exist"; such a definition is contradictory, it defines an inconsistent thing and that's why such a thing doesn't exist. It is not that there exists a thing that has an inconsistent set of properties, it is just you attributing an inconsistent set of properties to a thing.

The concept of unicorns is logically coherent. — Chany

But if you suppose that the unicorns exist in a place, for example on our planet, where the conditions are inconsistent with their existence (the requisite genes have not evolved here), then the concept of unicorns existing on our planet is inconsistent.

If the conditions on our planet were consistent with both the existence and nonexistence of unicorns then both scenarios would exist - but in different worlds, because it would be inconsistent for these scenarios to exist in the same world.

You would have to embrace multiverse theory and say that every single possible world is a real world, as real and concrete as the actual world. — Chany

Indeed, that's what I am doing.

This leads to a contradiction, as it is also logically coherent (possible) that only the actual world exists and that the other possible worlds do not exist (or if they do exist, as mental objects only). — Chany

If the other worlds are consistent then they exist, and it is not possible that they do not exist. In the second part of my paper I elaborate that the principle of logical consistency entails the existence of relations between things and that there are three logically necessary relations: similarity, composition and instantiation. With these relations you can consistently define many worlds and their copies.

First sentence is an assertion. Why should I accept that to be is the same thing as logical conherence?

First sentence is an assertion. Why should I accept that to be is the same thing as logical conherence? — Chany

Because there seems to be no fundamental difference between logical possibility and existence. All logical possibilities exist in the sense that they have an identity and therefore they are not nothing. To deny existence to selected logical possibilities would be arbitrary, without a fundamental reason. Instead we can talk about various kinds of existence - spatio-temporal, abstract, mental etc.

You define the thing as "existing where it doesn't exist"; — litewave

Where do I define anything that way?

You defined the unicorn as existing in external reality (according to an imagination) and at the same time you said that it doesn't exist in external reality.

You defined the unicorn as existing in external reality (according to an imagination) — litewave

No, I didn't. I said "you might be imagining a real (extramental) unicorn." That's precisely saying the opposite of what you're claiming there. It's positing the unicorn as only existing as something imagined. It's not "defining" it as existing in an external reality. One can believe that it does, but that doesn't somehow "define it to."

So you made no claim about a unicorn existing in external reality? Then there exists just a picture of a unicorn in your mind. It is consistent and exists as a mental thing.

So you made no claim about a unicorn existing in external reality? Then there exists just a picture of a unicorn in your mind. It is consistent and exists as a mental thing. — litewave

What doesn't exist is the extramental/objective unicorn.The idea of the unicorn is logically consistent insofar as it goes though.

What doesn't exist is the extramental/objective unicorn.The idea of the unicorn is logically consistent insofar as it goes though. — Terrapin Station

If the idea requires environmental conditions that are inconsistent with the existence of a unicorn then the idea is inconsistent.

If the idea requires environmental conditions that are inconsistent with the existence of a unicorn then the idea is inconsistent. — litewave

Only if you're conflating an objective unicorn with a subjective idea of a unicorn.

Only if you're conflating an objective unicorn with a subjective idea of a unicorn. — Terrapin Station

An inconsistent idea is a collection of thoughts/qualia that doesn't refer to anything in reality. The collection of thoughts/qualia itself is consistent and exists as a mental thing.

An inconsistent idea is a collection of thoughts/qualia that doesn't refer to anything in reality. — litewave

What would be inconsistent about that? You must be defining "inconsistent" in some unusual way.

What would be inconsistent about that? You must be defining "inconsistent" in some unusual way. — Terrapin Station

An inconsistent idea defines something as not being what it is. For example the idea of an apple that is not an apple. That's why it has no referent in reality.

No one said anything about anything "defining anything as not being what it is" though. I don't know where you're getting that from.

Whether someone has an idea of a unicorn that they take to only be an idea, or whether they believe that it's something that exists extramentally, neither case is someone "defining it as not being what it is."

Whenever you have an idea of a thing, you define that thing. You define what that thing looks like, its properties, its parts, its environment etc.