'True' has a use like the twelve on a traditional clockface or North on a compass. Or like the knight on a chessboard. A justified belief may be false. An unjustified belief may be true. We could, no matter how careful and clever, still be wrong.

What is the grammar of being right or wrong ? True or false ? To me it seems absolute. It is not reducible or exchangeable for warrant.

We can always be wrong about the world, because it doesn't make sense to say we could be wrong about being able to be wrong about it. The minimal specification of the world seems to be as that which we can be wrong about. The negation is incoherent. "It is wrong to claim we can we be wrong." — Pie

I agree that "true" has a conventional use(s). I believe that, according to the deflationary view, the word "true" is typically used to demonstrate assent to a truth bearer.

I find what you say here to be inconsistent with the deflationary view. According to you, the meaning of "true" is independent of anyone's beliefs or judgments. This is not the deflationary use/meaning of "true" as I understand it. Your use of the word "true" here seems more closely aligned with the correspondence theory.

I don't see that. for me, the words on the right of "iff" in '"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' point to the grounding fact of snow being white (or not).

To be sure 'snow is white' is a generality, and, in a sense an approximation, since there is no absolute standard of white, but if snow is, generally, white, then it is that actuality that leads us to count '"snow is white" is true', or 'snow is white' as being true. — Janus

It's really just a piece of redundancy which says nothing useful. It says "Snow is white" is true, if and only if "Snow is white" is true.

It should be obvious I don't agree with that unargued bit of nonsense.

I can hardly doubt there are plums in the fridge if I'm looking at them. — Janus


Sure, but this is a comment about belief. It's psychology, not grammar. — Pie

To my way of thinking if I'm looking at plums in the icebox, I don't believe they are there, I see them there, I know they are there. And this has nothing to do with justification; it is more direct than that..Once I move away and the icebox is shut again, then I can't rightly say I know they are there, even if I can say I am justified in believing them to be there. They might be there or not; for example, say someone came just after I left the room and took them out.

This is not a Gettier case, but I see a problem with JTB here; am I justified in believing they are there or not, once I have left the room and the icebox is closed? If I think it unlikely, or even impossible, that anyone would, or could, have come and moved the plums, then I am justified in believing them to be there, but I still don't know they are there, and according to JTB could only be said to know they are there if they are there. But despite thinking I might be justified in believing they are there, I don't know it, and it seems absurd to condition my being counted as knowing they are there or not on whether they are there or not, when I don't really know whether they are there or not, but merely count myself as being justified in thinking that they are there..

I suggest that knowledge is not about certainty but rather about protocols. Do I know that 2–√ is irrational ? Yes. But I can't gaze on it. I just know how to justify that claim.

But let's say that I think I saw them with my own eyes. Perhaps my memory is incorrect. Perhaps I hallucinated. Metaphysical certainty is a dead end. In fact, it only makes sense with the help of an absolute concept of truth. Assume P. — Pie

Perhaps unsurprisingly, I have a different view. For me knowledge is about certainty, certainty that is, not in any "absolute" sense, but in the context of everyday experience. If I see plums in the fridge, I am certain they are there. If I close the fridge door, and am still standing in front of the fridge I am virtually as certain that they are there. If I leave the room for a few moments and then return, I might still be almost as certain. If I left the room for an hour, and was confident no one else was around then I might still be almost as certain. And so on. But I would say that I only know, that is I can only be certain ( i.e. without any attendant doubt) that they are there if I am looking at them. Once I step away, knowledge steps aside with me, and belief kicks in, to be assessed as more or less justified.

Obviously here I am not taking seriously the possibilities that I have hallucinated the plums or that my memory might be incorrect; such possibilities belong to the unknowable, 'absolute' radically skeptical context I am ignoring as being irrelevant in the everyday context, the only context that I, at least, am concerned with.

As I understand it, nothing in the deflationist's theory of truth "hits the bitumen of the world".
— Luke

Sure, on that account the meaningfulness of truth-bearers has nothing to do with truth. As I have said several times, T-sentences allow us to either assume meaning and explain truth, or to assume truth and explain meaning.

So of course it is assumed that ("p" is true) means the same as (p). — Banno

Are you suggesting that deflationists have a theory of meaning rather than truth? I don't see how this is relevant to the present discussion.

Also, if you agree that nothing in the deflationist's theory of truth "hits the bitumen of the world", then I don't understand why you said:

...the right hand side of A T-sentence is being used, it's where the spinning wheel of the T-sentence hits the bitumen of the world. — Banno

I took you to be arguing for the deflationary theory.

The right hand side of the t-sentence is being used, not talked about. It shows what makes the left side true. — Banno

How is the right hand side being used? Is the left hand side not being used? Is the left hand side meaningless because it is not being used? If so, then how are the two sides equivalent?

See 4.9. — Banno

4.9 states that "deflationism is incompatible with truth-conditional theories of meaning" and that "most deflationists reject truth-conditional semantics".

Incidentally, 4.9 also states that "Others have gone further, arguing positively that there is no incompatibility between deflationism and truth-conditional theories." I suggested the same earlier in the discussion.

Perhaps it would be most accurate to say that deflationary theories remain incomplete, but offer a better account that any other theories. — Banno

How does the deflationary theory offer a better account of truth than other theories?

Are you suggesting that deflationists have a theory of meaning rather than truth? — Luke

No.

I don't know how to be more specific. T-sentences can be used to define truth, or meaning, but preferably not both in the same argument.

Yes, I am arguing in favour of deflation.

I dunno, Luke. Yes, deflation does not make use of truth-conditions to define truth, since that would be circular. I don't see what it is you are missing - unless you think that any theory of truth must make use of truth conditions...?

How does the deflationary theory offer a better account of truth than other theories? — Luke

Other theories over egg the cake. They add other, superfluous stuff that fucks up other issues.

According to you, the meaning of "true" is independent of anyone's beliefs or judgments. — Luke

In general, concepts have public meanings, however imperfectly grasped or exploited by this or that user. I'm suggesting that grammar of 'true,' or at least the part of it relevant here, is different than that of 'justified' or 'warranted' or 'likely.' 'True' is primitive or absolute in its simply endorsing P. It's confusingly, brutally simple.

Yes, deflation does not make use of truth-conditions to define truth, since that would be circular. I don't see what it is you are missing - unless you think that any theory of truth must make use of truth conditions...? — Banno

I don't think that any theory of truth must make use of truth conditions. You said:

...the right hand side of A T-sentence is being used, it's where the spinning wheel of the T-sentence hits the bitumen of the world. — Banno

What I'm "missing" is why you used a truth-conditional T-sentence to explain the deflationary theory.

To my way of thinking if I'm looking at plums in the icebox, I don't believe they are there, I see them there, I know they are there. — Janus

In such a case, I think you'd be justified using 'know,' not only as an expression of certainty but also in the sense I'm suggesting of being prepared to defend or explain the claim. Noninferential reports about everyday objects from a reliable source are strong support. 'I saw those plums with my own eyes. They were in there.' We can imagine a scientist recording a measurement. This is what Sellars what call 'language entry,' the connection between 'direct experience' and public concepts.

On the other hand, such reports from an unreliable and perhaps insane person would not be accepted. I might be sure that I am sane while others are not so sure. I could even be reliable in everyday situations but be suspected as my claims became less ordinary. I could swear I saw a ghost or an angel or heard the voice of God.

In general, concepts have public meanings, however imperfectly grasped or exploited by this or that user. I'm suggesting that grammar of 'true,' or at least the part of it relevant here, is different than that of 'justified' or 'warranted' or 'likely.' 'True' is primitive or absolute in its simply endorsing P. It's confusingly, brutally simple. — Pie

But where you said:

A justified belief may be false. An unjustified belief may be true. We could, no matter how careful and clever, still be wrong.

What is the grammar of being right or wrong ? True or false ? To me it seems absolute. It is not reducible or exchangeable for warrant. — Pie

That's not about endorsing P. That's about P being true or false regardless of our endorsement. Therefore, "true" does not mean "endorsing P" in that sense. You want "true" to mean both "endorsing P" but also something else.

I see you are puzzled. It's what the puzzlement is about that puzzles me.

SO you are re-classifying disquotation as not a deflationary theory. Fine.

Or do you think truth conditional is the same as truth functional?

How does the deflationary theory offer a better account of truth than other theories? — Luke

As I see it, the hypothesis is something like...truth is primary, like unmitigated assertion. It's as if language was initially too simple for doubt or qualification. The vervet monkey's eagle-cry means 'there is an eagle coming to eat us...watch out!'

Vervet monkeys have four confirmed predators: leopards, eagles, pythons, and baboons. The sighting of each predator elicits an acoustically distinct alarm call.[18] As infants, vervets learn to make the variety of calls from observation alone, without explicit tutelage.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vervet_monkey

Eventually we learn to doubt. We learn to mitigate claims, call them beliefs, attribute them to individuals in order to explain them, and just generally take a new distance from them. From this POV, truth is so basic that it's hard to talk about, like being perhaps.

That's not about endorsing P. That's about P being true or false regardless of our endorsement. — Luke

If I claim that P is true, I am expressing a belief, correct ? What if I said that P is justified, but I still don't think it's true ? I'd be saying that standards dictate its acceptance but that I still refuse to endorse it. This might even take the form of a confession. Perhaps I think I ought to be swayed by the evidence but can't sincerely assert P.

If I claim that P is true, I am expressing a belief, correct ? — Pie

Yes. But how do you reconcile that with this:

A justified belief may be false. An unjustified belief may be true. We could, no matter how careful and clever, still be wrong.

What is the grammar of being right or wrong ? True or false ? To me it seems absolute. It is not reducible or exchangeable for warrant. — Pie

Yes. But how do you reconcile that with this: — Luke

Where's the contradiction ?

I added to the post two posts above, in case that helps.

That's not about endorsing P. That's about P being true or false regardless of our endorsement. — Luke

To call P true is different than to call P warranted. To call P true is basically to assert P, express belief.
While there are many assertions that seem to be either true or false, that seems like a separate issue to me.

Where's the contradiction ? — Pie

If "true" means only "endorsing P", then that's all there is to the truth. Therefore, how can a justified belief be false? In what sense could we "still be wrong" about P if to say that P is "true" is merely to endorse it?

If "true" means only "endorsing P", then that's all there is to the truth — Luke

'P is true' does roughly the same thing as 'P'. So yes. Truth is so basic that's there's nothing to say about it, except that there's nothing to say about it. That's the theory anyway, which looks rightish to me.

how can a justified belief be false? — Luke

Let's say that there's a strong consensus reached, after months of discussion, among the most prestigious virologists that a certain dangerous mutation is impossible (not just very unlikely but inconceivable.) 'Yes, Dr. Jones, it's true that such a mutation cannot happen here.' Given their unchallenged expertise, they are justified in believing this mutation will not occur. So perhaps are their brighter grad students, who can follow the relevant arguments. Nevertheless the mutation occurs.

Perhaps a team of oncologists, after extensive tests, give a patient only weeks to live ('it's true what Dr. Smith says, and you indeed have only a few more weeks')...but then he 'miraculously' recovers.

In what sense could we "still be wrong" about P if to say that P is "true" is merely to endorse it? — Luke

I can simply think that P is true (believe P) with P not actually being true.

I can simply think that P is true (believe P) with P not actually being true. — Pie

What does the second instance of "true" mean in the statement above?

What does the second instance of "true" mean in the statement above? — Luke

I can simply think that P is true (believe P) with P not actually being true. — Pie

To say that P is not true is to assert the negation of P , or ~P. Or that's what makes sense to me. (I'm allowing for the possibility of a belief being wrong here.)

VARIANTS

I can believe P is true although not-P is true.

I can believe P while actually ~P.

I can be wrong about my belief P.

~~

You said earlier:

'True' is primitive or absolute in its simply endorsing P. It's confusingly, brutally simple. — Pie

So if "is true" does the work of simply endorsing P, then wrt your statement:

I can believe P is true although not-P is true. — Pie

This can be translated as: you endorse P although you endorse not-P?

Yes. I say indeed that calling P true is endorsing it, repeating it, asserting it.

This can be translated as: you endorse P although you endorse not-P? — Luke

I think not. You ignore the crucial word 'believe.' To believe P is true is just to believe P.
I can believe P although or despite ~P.

I can think/believe/assert that it's true that plums are in the icebox without it being true that plums are in the icebox. (The grammar of 'believe' is not the grammar of 'true.')

No. I'm surprised you ignore the crucial word 'believe.' To believe P is true is just to believe P.
I can believe P although or despite ~P. — Pie

Fine, let me translate it properly.

I can believe P is true although not-P is true. — Pie

This can be translated as: you can believe you endorse P although you endorse not-P?

I can think/believe/assert that it's true that plums are in the icebox without it being true that plums are in the icebox. (The grammar of 'believe' is not the grammar of 'true.') — Pie

What you are failing to notice is that you are not using "true" here in the sense of an endorsement. If it's not true that "there are plums in the icebox", does that mean (only) that you disendorse it? If so, then why do you also endorse it (or believe that you endorse it)?

I use endorse this way: to approve openly. In this context, I equate it with repeating or (re)asserting P.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/endorse

ENDORSEMENT
'These fries are cold.'
'Yes indeed.'

REPETITION
'These fries are cold.'
'These fries are cold.'

DESCRIBING AS TRUE
'These fries are cold.'
'True.'

'I can believe P is true although not-P is true.'

This can be translated as: you can believe you endorse P although you endorse not-P? — Luke

'P is true' is not replaceable context-independently by 'I endorse P.' Instead you should just use 'P' as the replacement. You can probably so replace 'I claim P is true' by 'I endorse P.'

Your proposed translation might work for 'I can believe that I claim P is true although not-P is true.'
This can be shortened: 'I can believe that I claim P though P is false.'

Your proposed translation might work for 'I can believe I claim P is true although not-P is true.' — Pie

But, again, the last word in the statement is not an endorsement! What makes not-P true is that there are no plums in the icebox, not that you are disendorsing or disapproving of the statement "there are plums in the icebox". You already approved that statement!

Perhaps it'll help if I make the variable use of 'I' clearer.

One can believe that P is true while in fact not-P is true.
One can believe P despite not-P.
One can believe P and still be wrong.

He endorses P.
He claims P.
He claims P is true.
He assents to P.
He agrees that P.
He affirms P.

One can believe that P is true... — Pie

One can believe that they approve of P?

...while in fact not-P is true. — Pie

Is it "in fact" you approve of not-P? Or "in fact" not-P despite your approval of P?

One can believe that P is true..

One can believe that they approve of P? — Luke

I believe that you think are making a point here, but to me you are lost in a misunderstanding. Perhaps it's the complexity in the pronoun use.

Bob believes P is true while not-P is true.
Bob believes P but he's wrong.

This is not the same as 'Bob believes that Bob endorses P, despite not P,' for this discusses Bob's belief about Bob and not his belief about P.

'P is true',if spoken by Bob, is roughly equivalent to Bob saying 'P' or endorsing 'P' when said by someone else, perhaps with a 'yes indeed.'