You also find this in the Gettier examples... — Sam26
This stuff is complex. — Banno
justification, sensory justification. — Sam26
I don't think this is about hinge's, at least not how I interpret hinge's — Sam26
You may be right, I just thought that her belief that stuff was in the fridge was well grounded, true, and required no further subsequent justification method. — creativesoul
We like to imagine animal signals as, in essence, caused by the occurrence of particular features within the animal's environment. — Srap Tasmaner
When we demand (or command, or request, etc.) that someone tell the truth, we are demanding that they behave in a certain way. It would be a senseless demand of an animal that has no choice in the matter. But at the same time, we are demanding that the speaker relinquish their freedom to say whatever they like and instead be bound by the truth. — Srap Tasmaner
In a sense, this is all counterfactual business: you can ask someone to speak as if this situation now were the one they were in yesterday. And, further, if the link between your experience and what you say is not so snug as it is for non-linguistic creatures, we can ask you to behave as if it were. That is, we can ask you to say what you would, if you were in some particular situation, and if you had no choice about what to say.
On such an account, bizarre and cartoonish though it may be, honesty is a matter of the connection between a, possibly hypothetical or counterfactual, situation and what you would say in that situation. You can interpose beliefs here if you like, but the content of such beliefs goes back to situations. (For it to matter to your speech that you think, correctly or not, this is a snake-situation, you have to know how to speak in snake-situations.) — Srap Tasmaner
What does telling the truth consist in if not giving an honest and accurate account. What does giving an honest and accurate account consist in if not a correspondence of the the account with whatever it is (purporting to be) an account of? — Janus
This type of speculation is all pointless — Metaphysician Undercover
The living being's actions are influenced by, and affected by... — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is that there is no necessary relation between giving an honest and accurate account, and the account corresponding to to whatever it is purported to be an account of. — Metaphysician Undercover
Two very different questions that keep being mixed up:
What is "true"?
What sentences are true?
T-sentences answer the first. — Banno
(1) “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white.
(1’) “snow is white” is false if and only if snow is not white.
Thus (1) and (1’) provide satisfactory explanations of the meaning of the terms “true” and “false” when these terms are referred to the sentence “snow is white”. We can regard (1) and (1’) as partial definitions of the terms “true” and “false”, in fact, as definitions of these terms with respect to a particular sentence.
...
Partial definitions of truth analogous to (1) (or (2)) can be constructed for other sentences as well. Each of these definitions has the form:
(3) “p” is true if and only if p,
where “p” is to be replaced on both sides of (3) by the sentence for which the definition is constructed.
...
The problem will be solved completely if we manage to construct a general definition of truth that will be adequate in the sense that it will carry with it as logical consequences all the equivalences of form (3).
...
First, prepare a complete list of all sentences in L; suppose, for example, that there are exactly 1,000 sentences in L, and agree to use the symbols “s1”, “s2”, . . . , “s1,000” as abbreviations for consecutive sentences on the list.
...
(5) For every sentence x (in the language L), x is true if and only if either
s1, and x is identical to “s1”,
or
s2, and x is identical to “s2”,
. . .
or finally,
s1,000, and x is identical to “s1,000”.
We have thus arrived at a statement which can indeed be accepted as the desired general definition of truth: it is formally correct and is adequate in the sense that it implies all the equivalences of the form (3) in which “p” has been replaced by any sentence of the language L.
(5) for all p, 'p' is a true sentence if and only if p.
But the above sentence could not serve as a general definition of the expression 'x is a true sentence' because the totality of possible substitutions for the symbol 'x' is here restricted to quotation-mark names.
Therefore... they are not free... — creativesoul
What do you mean by asking for a "necessary relation"? Aren't all relations contingent...on context? The contingent relation would be one of correlation; we can see that the description is an accurate portrayal of what is described, can't we? — Janus
Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is a fact, — Michael
I don't think it correct to say that the proposition is the fact. — Michael
So, "p" is true iff p. What sort of thing is p? — Michael
Truth is relative. There is no absolute truth. — RussellA
"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno
"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno
"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact.
I'm unsure.
Snow being green isn't a sentence, so what is it? — Michael
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