The meaning of "the water is cold" is the same on Earth and Twin Earth. We can see this by the fact that it would translate to the same sentences in other languages on both planets.

It just so happens that the worldly referent on Twin Earth is different — hypericin

How could the meaning of “the water is cold” be the same in both places if on Twin Earth water is xyz rather than H2O? What if on Twin Earth the word ‘water’ refers something similar to what we think of as fire here on Earth? Would it make sense on Twin Earth to say the water is cold?

The meaning of "the water is cold" is not about chemical composition. It is certainly not about some covert inaccessible property of water. It is about the everyday water we experience. This is the same in both worlds. Only the referents are different.

If the meaning of "water" was swapped with "fire", then of course the meanings of the sentences would be different. And then the sentence would translate into different foreign sentences on the two worlds.

And it seems that others (@Michael) have tried to make the same point to you. — Banno

I don't think so. @Michael grudgingly accepted the very same clarification you continue to reject. I don't know if this is because you also reject truth-makers corresponding to whole sentences. On which the clarification is premised. So do I. Maybe @Michael only accepts them for the sake of argument. So can I. And so you seemed to do here:

"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno

So I used your word "represents" to clarify

The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

as

The thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact.

But whereas @Michael found this manner of clarification too obvious for words, you start critiquing correspondence theory:

It's clear that the thing on the right is not the name of a fact. — Banno

I wouldn't mind, if you wouldn't keep on equivocating between the factual literature on the right hand side of the T-schema and its worldly subject matter.

It is invented, or pretended, by people using their heads, but that doesn't locate it in the head. — bongo fury

Then where is it located?

Then where is it located? — hypericin

Wherever we pretend it to be located. In a diagram we might draw an arrow between our depiction of a symbol and our depiction of the corresponding object. We may or may not pretend some corresponding bolt of energy passes between the symbol and object themselves.

But I'm treating meaning as synonymous with reference, and I notice from your discussion with @Joshs that you baulk at that. I think Putnam points out a history of the supposed distinction, through denotation vs connotation, sense vs reference, and others more ancient. And recommends dropping it.

We may or may not pretend some corresponding bolt of energy passes between the symbol and object themselves.

But I'm treating meaning as synonymous with reference — bongo fury

So meaning is both purely imaginary and not in the head, an imaginary lightning bolt from symbol to object which is also the object? This does not strike me as a particularly coherent account.

And recommends dropping it. — bongo fury

Then how does he deal with sentences with no referent? "The cat in the hat" has meaning but no reference in the world. If the meaning of "The cat in the hat" is in your head, then mustn't all meaning be in the head?

The point, lost, is that there seems to be nothing in common in the correspondence in each case. — Banno

I don't see that; it seems to me that the logic in common is simply correspondence of what we say (or not) with some kind of actuality. For me it starts with being able to say meaningful things about experienced and imagined things; without that basic correspondence between saying and seeing/ imagining, we've got nothing. I guess we'll have to agree to disagree about that: I'm not going to labour the point.

Now if we look at what "one's honest opinion" means, and what "an accurate portrayal of what happened" means, we see a huge gap between these two. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would an honest opinion about, say, what happened not be an accurate account of what happened? Perhaps you could give an example showing how these might diverge.

I don't see how we can proceed here, since to my eye your approach looks incoherent. You repeatedly quote what I have written as if you were citing obvious contradictions, but they are not.

"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact.
— Banno — bongo fury

"Snow is white" is not a fact; it is a sentence. That snow is white is how things are, and so, it is a fact.

Now the bit in the above sentence that I italicised is a string of letters, "snow is white", and it is not dissimilar to the bit I bolded.

I'm emphasising that the very same thing can be marks on a screen, a string of letters, a sentence and a fact.

Do we at least agree on this?

Why can't an individual be a fact? Isn't snow a thing in the world and, therefore, a fact of the world? — Luke

Well, I'm going to just stipulate that names are not facts. The person Luke is not a fact, but that Luke posts on the forum is.

And I don't think I will be alone in doing this.

Why would an honest opinion about, say, what happened not be an accurate account of what happened? — Janus

There are very many reasons for this. Simply put, human beings do not have infallible observational skills. Here's a few of the reasons. We do not pay attention. We do not have superb descriptive skills (knowing the best words to use, etc.). And, we do not have an infallible capacity for memory. If you come to recognize the weaknesses in your own observational capacity, you will come to see that an honest opinion doesn't guarantee an accurate account of what happened. Perhaps though, you believe yourself to be some sort of divine being.

Perhaps you could give an example showing how these might diverge. — Janus

I already did give an example, the court of law. Have you ever been in a court of law, and listened to the variance between different peoples' honest account of what happened?

Here's another example which might be easier for you to relate to. My wife and I sometimes will go out to an event. The next day we may discuss what happened at the event. Most times we have conflicting descriptions about various details. Since the two descriptions are both honest opinions, and they directly conflict one another, we can conclude that an honest opinion about what happened is not the same thing as an accurate description of what happened.

Here's another example which might be easier for you to relate to. My wife and I sometimes will go out to an event. The next day we may discuss what happened at the event. Most times we have conflicting descriptions about various details. Since the two descriptions are both honest opinions, and they directly conflict one another, we can conclude that an honest opinion about what happened is not the same thing as an accurate description of what happened. — Metaphysician Undercover

I grant that when it comes to extended or complex events people can fail to notice and/or remember things. An honest account in those kinds of cases need not be a completely) true account. But it's not black and white, and the point is that, insofar as one's attention and memory have reliably informed them of some aspects of the event, then an honest account of what is remembered will be an accurate, that is a true, if not a complete, account. I haven't suggested that people are infallible. But the main point is that we think that there is, even if it is not realizable, a true account of all events, and that if someone were to be able to give such an account it would necessarily also be an honest account.

But it's not black and white, and the point is that, insofar as one's attention and memory have reliably informed them of some aspects of the event, then an honest account of what is remembered will be an accurate, that is true, if not a complete, account. — Janus

Your logic here is unacceptable induction. If we know that our observational capacity can and does regularly fail us, from time to time, with regard to different aspects, then we cannot conclude that an honest account gives us an accurate account. Even if most times an honest account is an accurate account, we cannot make the conclusion that an honest account is an accurate account. That' is simply the way that inductive reasoning works, exceptions to a proposed rule invalidate the rule.

Therefore we must seek justification for each aspect of each honest (true) account, because without this procedure we will never know where the faults in these honest descriptions lie. Not knowing where the mistakes lie is what happens if we take it for granted that an honest description is an accurate description.

But the main point is that we think that there is, even if it is not realizable, a true account of all events, and that if someone were to be able to give such an account it would necessarily also be an honest account. — Janus

Well, some people might believe that, it's an ontological decision. But most of these people are the ones who believe in God. Consider that "a true account" is given in words, or maybe other symbols like mathematical ones. How do you think that there is a "true account" of things which human beings have no understanding of, and have no symbols for, fundamental particles which have not yet been named for example. Obviously there are no human words or symbols for these things which have not yet been apprehended by the human mind, so how could there be a true account of them. Or do you believe that God has words for these things? Then your God supports this notion that there is a true account for all events.

"Snow is white" is not a fact; it is a sentence. That snow is white is how things are, and so, it is a fact.

Now the bit in the above sentence that I italicised is a string of letters, "snow is white", and it is not dissimilar to the bit I bolded.

I'm emphasising that the very same thing can be marks on a screen, a string of letters, a sentence and a fact.

Do we at least agree on this? — Banno

Only if facts are true sentences/statements. If facts are situations, circumstances, states of affairs, or what's happened and/or happening, then the answer is "no", because none of those things are marks on a screen, strings of letters, or sentences.

If there is a mouse behind the tree, then the fact consists of a mouse, a tree, and the spatial relationship between them from some frame of reference/vantage point. That fact is no more a sentence, string of letters, or marks on a screen than the tree, the mouse, or the spatiotemporal relationship is.

Its truth value can only be known if its meaning is first known. — RussellA

Sounds right to me. My granddaughter knew what "there's nothing in there" meant, thus she knew it was false when someone said it about the fridge. Given she was barely able to string two or three words together at the time, it shows us that we can know what some statements/sentences/claims mean long before we're able to vocalize and/or utter them. It also shows us that knowing what a statement means and/or whether or not it is true or false does not always require metacognition and/or doubt that is informed by thinking about our own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right.

The point, lost, is that there seems to be nothing in common in the correspondence in each case.
— Banno

I don't see that; — Janus

Me either. That each corresponds to and/or is consistent with different facts does not mean that correspondence is not the commonality between them.

When we talk about truth, we're referring to what people believe. — Sam26

That surprises me coming from you.

What are we doing when we talk about belief if not referring to what people believe?

Seems to me that people can believe things that are not true and/or clearly and demonstrably false. Truth cannot be not true and/or demonstrably false. What people believe can. Thus, truth is not equivalent to what people believe.

False, given the current paradigms at play, simply means doesn't correspond, doesn't fit, or is useless. Make what you wish out of this simplified account (of truth falsity). :snicker:

the very same thing can be marks on a screen, a string of letters, a sentence and a fact. — Banno

Sure. Just not the fact which, as a sentence, it represents. Except of course in cases of self-reference: "this sentence has thirty one letters" etc.

The very same thing can be marks on a screen, a string of letters, a noun or noun phrase, and a thing. Just not the thing which, as a noun or noun-phrase, it represents. Except when it is "word" etc.

Now, I happen not to believe that there are such things as facts, which are represented (your word) by whole sentences, analogously to how such things as cats and dogs are represented by names or nouns. But I don't mind discussing or making a diagram about them. For the sake of argument.

You appear to be motivated by a similar scepticism, hence:

It's clear that the thing on the right is not the name of a fact. — Banno

Surely, a sentence doesn't work like a name? Agreed. Unfortunately you think you have a better idea, but you don't perceive that it involves equivocating, as is borne out by

the very same thing can be [generally, not just exceptionally] marks on a screen, a string of letters, a sentence and a fact [the one it also represents]. — Banno

So how did this happen?

"Snow is white" is not a fact; it is a sentence. That snow is white is how things are, and so, it is a fact.

Now the bit in the above sentence that I italicised is a string of letters, "snow is white", and it is not dissimilar to the bit I bolded. — Banno

Yes, but the bolded string and the italicised string both represent (allegedly) a non-linguistic fact. Only the slightly larger string that includes quote and unquote represents a string. So,

"Snow is white" is not a fact; it is a sentence. [But only the string without quotes is a sentence. The string with quotes is a name, facilitating talk about the sentence.] That snow is white is how things are, and so, it is a fact. [But only the fact represented by the string is how things are. The string is a sentence, talking about the fact.] — Banno

So meaning is both purely imaginary and not in the head, an imaginary lightning bolt from symbol to object — hypericin

Yep, why not?

... which is also the object? — hypericin

Eh?

Then how does he deal with sentences with no referent? "The cat in the hat" has meaning but no reference in the world. — hypericin

See the link above.

(For Goodman's solution. I'm not sure how Putnam deals with it. Good question. :smile: )

When we talk about truth, we're referring to what people believe.
— Sam26

That surprises me coming from you.

What are we doing when we talk about belief if not referring to what people believe?

Seems to me that people can believe things that are not true and/or clearly and demonstrably false. Truth cannot be not true and/or demonstrably false. What people believe can. Thus, truth is not equivalent to what people believe. — creativesoul

Where did I say, "...truth is equivalent to what people believe[?]" When we talk about truth, we are talking about what people believe, or what they believe to be true. Just because someone believes something is true, doesn't make it true. It, obviously, can turn out to be false. So, what I'm saying is that you can't separate true and false from people, and their linguistic forms of life.

Hopefully, this makes it clearer.

When we talk about truth, we are talking about what people believe, or what they believe to be true. — Sam26

What are we doing when we talk about belief if not referring to what people believe(to be true)? — creativesoul

When we talk about truth, we are talking about what people believe, or what they believe to be true.
— Sam26

What are we doing when we talk about belief if not referring to what people believe(to be true)?
— creativesoul — creativesoul

So, what I posted didn't clear it up for you?

Yep, why not? — bongo fury

If I imagine that there is a dragon on Neptune, that imagining is in my head, not Neptune. Are you claiming that meaning is something like a social reality which is not localized in any one person's head?

Eh? — bongo fury

You just claimed that meaning and reference were synonymous.



I'm not sure how your earlier post pertains.

Maybe.

I just think that talking about truth and talking about belief are quite distinct in their focus. There is also a possible unspoken presupposition and/or implication that I'm curious about.

Is your position such that there is no such thing as true belief beyond people and their linguistic forms of life?

Do you deny and/or reject language less true/false belief?

Do you deny and/or reject language less true/false belief? — creativesoul

Yes, I do deny it. I don't see how you can have true and false apart from propositional content, which is necessarily linguistic.

Okay. That's the conventional view when it comes to belief as propositional attitude. I agree that propositional content is necessarily linguistic, but I see no reason to agree that all our belief amounts to an attitude towards a proposition which represents that belief such that we take the proposition to be true.

For example, if one believes that a sheet is a sheep(a common cottage industry Gettier example), they do not have an attitude towards the proposition "a sheet is a sheep" such that they take it to be true, but they most certainly believe that that sheet is a sheep.

I don't see how you can have true and false apart from propositional content... — Sam26

Imagine the world before humans...

In this world before humans, if it is possible for a mouse to be behind a tree, and it is possible for a language less creature to believe that a mouse is behind a tree, then it is possible for a language less creature to have true belief(assuming the mouse is behind the tree) and/or false belief(assuming the mouse is not).

Okay. That's the conventional view when it comes to belief as propositional attitude. I agree that propositional content is necessarily linguistic, but I see no reason to agree that all our belief amounts to an attitude towards a proposition which represents that belief. — creativesoul

Saying that talk about true and false amounts to talk about what people believe, is not the same as saying that all belief "amounts to an attitude towards a proposition which represents that belief." As you know, I do believe, along with you, that beliefs in themselves, are not necessarily linguistic. For example, if we are referring to beliefs that dogs have, those beliefs are only true and false for us, not for them. They have no concepts of true and false, their beliefs are completely devoid of propositional content.

In this world before humans, if it is possible for a mouse to be behind a tree, and it is possible for a language less creature to believe that a mouse is behind a tree, then it is possible for a language less creature to have true belief(assuming the mouse is behind the tree) and/or false belief(assuming the mouse is not). — creativesoul

The mouse is in a particular state-of-mind, but it's not equivalent to our linguistic states, in particular, our beliefs as statements. So, the mouse is not believing that there is a mouse behind the tree, as you and I might believe. How could it do that without a linguistic framework to work with. It has no concept tree and mouse. If it did, well, maybe we could also infer the concepts true and false to the mouse also. You seem to be imposing linguistic concepts where there are none.

When I refer to beliefs (pre-linguistic beliefs in animals or humans), it's completely devoid of any conceptual framework for them, but not for us, as linguistic users. So, it seems that the tendency is to impose our conceptual framework onto them.

Saying that talk about true and false amounts to talk about what people believe, is not the same as saying that all belief "amounts to an attitude towards a proposition which represents that belief." — Sam26

Ah, my mistake. That's very true. This is more interesting.

As you know, I do believe, along with you, that beliefs in themselves, are not necessarily linguistic. For example, if we are referring to beliefs that dogs have, those beliefs are only true and false for us, not for them. They have no concepts of true and false, their beliefs are completely devoid of propositional content

If we're saying that a dog's belief can be true, we're not necessarily saying that the dog is aware of that. The dog has no language. We agree there. The dog has never used "true" or "false". We agree there. The dog's belief is completely devoid of propositional content. We agree there. Our account of the dog's belief consists of propositional content. I strongly suspect we agree there as well.

My post prior to this one begins to address how true and false belief could exist in their entirety prior to the concepts of "true" and "false". I'm curious to get your take on that. I see that you have in the meantime while I was writing this...