• hypericin
    1.6k
    I won't summarize the thought experiment myself, since I think most people here have heard of it:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twin_Earth_thought_experiment

    This experiment conflates meaning and reference. Consider the sentence:

    S: "The water is cold".

    Would you say you know what S means? If you do not, you certainly wouldn't understand the sentence you are reading right now, as you cannot read English.

    And yet, despite our clear understanding of S, we have no idea what the referent is. What water is cold? The relevant context is unknown. S has no clear referent and yet is perfectly understandable. This can only be the case if meaning and referent are different: only then can we make sense of understanding the one without knowing the other.

    Twin Earth fails because it does not distinguish meaning and referent.

    The meaning of "Water" is the same on both planets: that wet clear stuff we have to drink every day. The meaning certainly cannot include chemical composition, otherwise no one knew what "water" meant before its composition was discovered. Yet people were happily and usefully saying "water" long before this discovery.

    Only the referents, water and twin water, are different, in their chemical composition. "Water" means the same thing on earth and twin earth.
  • Banno
    25k
    Twin Earth fails because it does not distinguish meaning and referent.hypericin

    Trouble is, the thought experiment does explicitly distinguish meaning and reference.

    On Earth, "water" denotes.
    On twin Earth, "water" denotes.

    In both worlds, the supposition is that the word "water" is used in the exact same way.

    Same meaning in each case, but different referent. Hence, the argument goes, the meaning of "water" is not its chemical composition.

    Here's the original paper.

    SO I suppose the obvious question is, since you think the argument fails, what is it you think it fails to do?
  • jgill
    3.8k
    I miss the subtleties of arguments like this.

    So, if I am talking with someone we may each use the same word or phrase in our discussion, unaware that we are talking about two different things. For instance, I may mention marveling at the smooth expertise of Olympic gymnasts, picturing men's gymnastics, and my friend agrees, thinking of women's gymnastics. This occurred recently, in fact. The nonsense of twin worlds isn't necessary.

    Please explain where I go wrong. :chin:
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    Same meaning in each case, but different referent. Hence, the argument goes, the meaning of "water" is not its chemical composition.Banno

    Trouble is, this just isn't what Putnam says.


    From the paper:

    Let W 1 and W 2 be two possible worlds in which I exist and in which
    this glass exists and in which I am giving a meaning explanation by
    pointing to this glass and saying "this is water." (We do not assume
    that the liquid in the glass is the same in both worlds.) Let us suppose
    that in W 1 the glass is full of H20 and in W2 the glass is full of XYZ.
    We shall also suppose that W 1 is the actual world and that XYZ is the
    stuff typically called "water" in the world W 2 (so that the relation between English speakers in W 1 and English speakers in W 2 is exactly
    the same as the relation between English speakers on Earth and English
    speakers on Twin Earth). Then there are two theories one might have
    concerning the meaning of "water."
    ( 1) One might hold that "water" was world-relative but constant in
    meaning (i.e., the word has a constant relative meaning). On this
    theory, "water" means the same in W 1 and W 2; it's just that water is
    H20 in W 1 and water is XYZ in Wz.
    (2) One might hold that water is H20 in all worlds (the stuff called
    "water" in W 2 isn't water), but "water" doesn't have the same meaning
    in W1 and Wz.
    If what was said before about the Twin Earth case was correct, then
    ( 2) is clearly the correct theory.
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    XYZ = H2O (functionally)

    XYZ H2O (chemically)

    That's all there is to Twin Earth.

    Xenobiology & Xenochemistry territory.
  • bongo fury
    1.6k
    And yet, despite our clear understanding of S, we have no idea what the referent is. What water is cold? The relevant context is unknown. S has no clear referent and yet is perfectly understandable. This can only be the case if meaning and referent are different: only then can we make sense of understanding the one without knowing the other.hypericin

    So reference is to some particular item (e.g. glass of liquid), whereas meaning is reference to a wider class or extension (e.g. of water)?

    We can refer to the wider extension (know the meaning of "water") without being able to refer to the particular item? Although wouldn't that (being so able) be knowing which item you meant?
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    So reference is to some particular item (e.g. glass of liquid), whereas meaning is reference to a wider class or extension (e.g. of water)?bongo fury

    I'm not using any philosophical jargon here.

    Simply, we English speakers all know what S means. It is basic English. But we don't know to what it refers.

    Therefore, meaning and reference are distinct concepts, and must not be conflated.

    Therefore, it makes sense to say that water means the same thing on Earth and Twin Earth, and yet it refers to different substances.
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    Please explain where I go wrong. :chin:jgill

    Putnam is setting up an artificial scenario where two people's mental states are identical when they use a term, and yet the term is referring to different things. Therefore he concludes that meaning must involve more than just mental state, it must be located in the state of the world.

    In your case, your mental states are different when you are using the same terms, and they are referring to different things. This is just ambiguity.
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    Here is another example:

    S2: "The point on the ground two feet in front of you"

    This has the same meaning for everyone who reads it. I would translate it into the same words in French no matter where I was standing. And yet, for every reader, the referent is a different point.

    Same meaning, different referents.
  • Banno
    25k
    If you prefer. The point being that it clearly distinguishes meaning and reference, in contrast to your title.
  • bongo fury
    1.6k
    Simply, we English speakers all know what S means. It is basic English. But we don't know to what it refers.

    Therefore, meaning and reference are distinct concepts, and must not be conflated.
    hypericin

    I suggest they're interchangeable. We all know that your sentence S refers to water in general, and cold things in general. We just don't know which bit of water you mean.
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    I suggest they're interchangeable. We all know that your sentence S refers to water in general, and cold things in general. We just don't know which bit of water you mean.bongo fury

    The use of the definite article means that S refers to a specific bit of water, not water in general.

    If meaning and referent were interchangeable it would not be possible to know the meaning but not the referent.
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    If you prefer. The point being that it clearly distinguishes meaning and reference, in contrast to your title.Banno

    You got the argument totally wrong, nothing to do with my preference.

    It would be silly to suggest that someone like Putnam would be naive to the distinction between meaning and reference. Nonetheless I'm claiming that he conflated the two in his conclusion.
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    I suggest they're interchangeable.bongo fury

    Compare the four sentences:

    S1: The water is cold.
    Meaning known, referent unknown

    S2: ទឹកគឺត្រជាក់។
    Meaning unknown (unless you are Cambodian), referent unknown

    S3: The water in Lake Michigan is cold.
    Meaning known, referent known

    S4: The water in Lake Michigan is ironic.
    Meaning unknown, referent known


    Meaning and referent can each be independently known or unknown.
  • bongo fury
    1.6k
    that S refers to a specific bit of water, not water in general.hypericin

    Yes, or as I put it: that you mean a specific bit of water, and we don't know which.

    But, as you say, we all still know, as English speakers, what it means for the water (whichever it is) to be cold. Or, as I put it: we all understand your reference to cold things in general intersecting with water in general.
  • bongo fury
    1.6k
    S1: The water is cold.
    General reference/meaning is indicated, specific not.

    S2: ទឹកគឺត្រជាក់។
    General not, specific not.

    S3: The water in Lake Michigan is cold.
    Both indicated.

    S4: The water in Lake Michigan is ironic.
    Specific reference/meaning is indicated, but general not: we are unable to infer the general application of both "water" and "ironic" in the event that they intersect.

    General and specific can each be independently known or unknown.
  • jgill
    3.8k
    In your case, your mental states are different when you are using the same terms, and they are referring to different things.hypericin

    Thanks. :ok:
  • Michael
    15.6k
    The relevant parts are these:

    (II) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of "intension") determines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension).

    ...

    Let A and B be any two terms which differ in extension. By assumption (II) they must differ in meaning (in the sense of "intension").

    Given that "water" on Earth and "water" on Twin Earth have a different extension (i.e. refer to different things), and given that two words with the same intension have the same extension, it then follows that "water" on Earth and "water" on Twin Earth have a different intension (i.e. mean different things).

    So he's not conflating meaning and reference, rather pointing out that if they have a different referent then they have a different meaning. Two words that mean the same thing don't refer to different things.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    5k
    I guess I should reread the paper.

    I'm tempted to say pragmatics is already all over this sort of thing. If I say, "Hand me the blue one," the meaning of that seems to be readily determined by any English speaker, and it could certainly be unambiguous in context, even though that sentence can be used to request completely different items in different situations. -- That the meaning is clear enough can, I think, be shown by cases of misspeaking or mistaken belief on the part of the speaker: if there isn't a blue one, and you really meant to ask for the green one, I'll understand that you were asking me to do something I can't, without ever fixing the reference of your request.

    It would be a little odd to have to extend "situation" to cover the entire history of your species and your planet, though. But that breathtaking expansion of the prerequisites for making sense might be forced on us more often than we think. It's already kinda implied in there being water to talk about in the first place...
  • jgill
    3.8k
    I guess I should reread the paper.Srap Tasmaner

    Same here. Reading it lightly didn't work for me.
  • hypericin
    1.6k

    Hmm, good point. I think you're right.

    My current thinking:
    From our omniscient perspective of the posers of the thought experiment, "water" and twin "water" mean something different, for us. Nonetheless, when earthlings and twin earthlings say "water", they mean the exact same thing, for them. You can see this by imagining an earthling being transpose into twin earth, or vice versa. The alien's extension for water will exactly match the natives.

    Putnam unjustifiably projects the perspective of the thought experiment onto its subjects.
  • Michael
    15.6k
    Nonetheless, when earthlings and twin earthlings say "water", they mean the exact same thing, for them.hypericin

    By this you mean that the subjects have the same psychological state? The point of Putnam's argument is to show that:

    a) the subjects have the same psychological state, and
    b) the word "water" means different things (both in the sense of intension and extension, as explained above) in each world

    So therefore the subjects' psychological states have nothing to do with the meaning of the word "water", hence his conclusion "meanings just ain't in the head".

    In other words, there's no such thing as what I mean by the word "water", there is only what the word "water" means.
  • hypericin
    1.6k

    I think I agree, and I think you hit on the mistake of my op.

    The full meaning of a sentence can only be gotten with it's context. The context free part, the part you understand just by knowing the language, is only part of the meaning. The other part of the meaning is the part gotten from context. This contextual meaning may include referent(s), though the actual, physical (or mental) referent is of course not a meaning.

    I was confusing contextualized meaning and referent.
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    n other words, there's no such thing as what I mean by the word "water", there is only what the word "water" means.Michael

    Imagine you were killed and replaced by an evil doppelganger. Your friend George, unaware of this, says "Hi Michael". George doesn't mean the doppelganger, he means to greet Good Michael. Only for those who learned of substitution would "Michael" mean the doppelganger.

    Let A and B be any two terms which differ in extension. By assumption (II) they must differ in meaning (in the sense of "intension").

    Seems very dubious when applied to differences in extension which the speaker is unaware of.
  • bongo fury
    1.6k
    I was confusing contextualized meaning and referent.hypericin

    And so was I, but deliberately. As per Goodman: https://fdocuments.in/document/goodman-likeness.html

    Not necessarily as per Putnam, but I think it's arguable he is problematising non-extensional meanings.
  • Michael
    15.6k
    Imagine you were killed and replaced by an evil doppelganger. Your friend George, unaware of this, says "Hi Michael". George doesn't mean the doppelganger, he means to greet Good Michael. Only for those who learned of substitution would "Michael" mean the doppelganger.hypericin

    That's a proper name. "Michael" doesn't really mean anything1.

    1 Unless you want to address the Hebrew etymology, in which case it means "who is like God?"
  • Joshs
    5.7k
    The context free part, the part you understand just by knowing the language, is only part of the meaning. The other part of the meaning is the part gotten from context. This contextual meaning may include referent(s), though the actual, physical (or mental) referent is of course not a meaning.hypericin

    If an actual, physical referent is not a meaning , what is it? The thing in itself? Isnt that what Kant says we never have access to? Arent we condemned to a world of ideas?
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    That's a proper name. "Michael" doesn't really mean anything, it's just an identifier.Michael

    What is a proper name if not a word that means a particular thing?

    The same example can be made without using a proper name. Suppose all the world's water was suddenly replaced with twin water. Until I learned of this replacement, I would still mean water when I said "water". Only when I learned would I mean twin water. While still acknowledging that the people who were naïve to the change still mean water.
  • Michael
    15.6k
    What is a proper name if not a word that means a particular thing?hypericin

    It refers to a particular thing, but whether or not it means something is a contested subject. See the SEP article on names:

    As well as having a range of entities to which it applies, the common noun “bachelor” has a meaning; it means man who has never been married. What about names? “Socrates” certainly applies to things. It applies, most obviously, to the founder of Western philosophy. Understood as a generic name (see Section 1), “Socrates” applies to several individuals: to a first approximation, all those who are called “Socrates”. But does “Socrates” also possess a meaning?

    Some names have meanings in a sense. I have heard “Merlot” used to summon a child, and once knew of a married couple whose respective names were “Sunshine” and “Moonlight”. These names, we would say, have meanings. “Moonlight”, for instance, means light from the Moon. Something similar goes on when we say that “Theodore” means gift of god, or interpret a Mohawk name as a verb phrase. But this sense of meaning turns out not to be the one we are after.

    Consider that for “bachelor” the meaning—man who has never been married—is also what determines the noun’s range of application. When the noun “bachelor” applies to someone, it’s because they are a man who has never been married. And when it fails to apply to someone, it’s because they are not. By contrast, the kind of meaning just canvassed for the names “Merlot” or “Moonlight” places no direct constraint on what they apply to. One may be named “Merlot”, and so fall within the name’s range of application, no matter what relationship one bears to the wine grape variety, Merlot (Mill 1843: 34). Moreover, one’s particular relationship to the grape is not the reason the name applies.

    In this long tail of the article on semantics, we will confine ourselves to the question of whether names have a meaning in the sense in which “bachelor” does. Do they have a meaning that determines, or at least restricts, their extension (i.e., either range of application or reference)?

    ---

    The same example can be made without using a proper name. Suppose all the world's water was suddenly replaced with twin water. Until I learned of this replacement, I would still mean water when I said "water". Only when I learned would I mean twin water. While still acknowledging that the people who were naïve to the change still mean water.hypericin

    And in such a scenario if you were to say "this is a glass of water" you would be wrong because it isn't a glass of water, it's a glass of twin-water. The extension of the word "water" isn't just whatever you claim to be water; it's whatever satisfies the intension of the word.
  • hypericin
    1.6k
    And in such a scenario if you were to say "this is a glass of water" you would be wrong because it isn't a glass of water, it's a glass of twin-water.Michael

    Suppose this change happened in 2000BC? Would everyone suddenly be wrong when they said "this is a cup of water" in their language?
bold
italic
underline
strike
code
quote
ulist
image
url
mention
reveal
youtube
tweet
Add a Comment

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.