Of course the will may be thought of as having an unconscious aspect, but I don't see this as constituting a good analogy with the notion of the absolutely unknowable. For a start what is unconscious, unknown may become conscious and known. That said, it may reasonably be thought that there is always an ineffable aspect to anything: intelligence, love, fear, beauty, goodness, wisdom, whatever and of course including will, but that just speaks to the limits of human knowledge and understanding. Will is nothing special, it's just one aspect of life, or more accurately one way of thinking about certain aspects of becoming.

I don't interpret everything through the lens of Schopenhauer (who is not a second-rate philosopher). Why do you think he is second-rate? — schopenhauer1

I think I've already answered that. His philosophy lacks depth, subtlety and nuance; it's a bastardization of Kant blended with his misunderstanding of the Upanishads and Buddhism. He cannot be compared with the greats, and his thought consists in an absolutization of what is merely an aspect of life. I have a similar criticism of Nietzsche's 'will to power', which I think is the weakest part of his thought, but the difference is that Nietzsche is a much more subtle thinker in my view. And this is only my view after all, as in all aesthetic matters there is no fact of the matter.

The idea of "will" or volition is the idea of just one aspect of mind or awareness. — Janus

But it wasn't an aspect of mind.. It was simply the foundational principle that he named "will" for good or bad. It was to denote that the root of existence is the principle of striving (pace Buddhism). It does have similarities to conatus but whilst conatus was sort of an enjoyment of being in its fullness, will is a negative principle. That is to say, it is always becoming, something that it is not- at least in the world as representation.

As far as using one's subjective consciousness as "proof" that there is some striving force at play in existence-writ-large is an interesting one. I don't know that I would fully agree with that step he is doing. Rather, I would simply agree with the more modest conclusion that human (and animal) nature leads to a sort of striving principle which does lead to much suffering- the pendulum swing of trying to satisfy needs and wants. Again, this is all very familiar with Buddhist understandings of suffering.. And no, please don't try to "school" me in what "real" Buddhism means.. Of course we are just talking very generally here.. I am not going into whole analyses on the corpus of sutras and the Pali Canon and whatnot.. and variations on the Theravada school versus the Mahayana and such.

good analogy with the notion of the absolutely unknowable. For a start what is unconscious, unknown may become conscious and known. That said, it may reasonably be thought that there is always an ineffable aspect to anything: intelligence, love, fear, beauty, goodness, wisdom, whatever and of course including will, but that just speaks to the limits of human knowledge and understanding. Will is nothing special, it's just one aspect of life, or more accurately one way of thinking about certain aspects of becoming. — Janus

So I think here you are demonstrating a misunderstanding of how Schopenhauer is using "Will". It is NOT just a psychological aspect. It is a metaphysical principle at play. It may be unfortunate that he calls it "Will" because of precisely this misunderstanding whereby it is confused with other things. Willing rather is the background principle behind at work behind the representational playground of the subject-object conditioned by time/space/causality- that is to say, the world as it is in representation. Other psychological aspects may take place in this playground, but the foundation of it all is that striving principle.

Now, the ineffable part is mentioned because if you know of Schop's philosophy, his main recommendation is to escape one's own willing nature through ascetic practice. The question remains, how can one escape from something that is a sort of totality of being? That's where I mentioned that Will has the aspect of representation but there is also the aspect of Will submerged beyond the representation. Perhaps that is how one reaches a sort of Nirvana-like state whilst retaining Will.

But it wasn't an aspect of mind.. It was simply the foundational principle that he named "will" for good or bad. It was to denote that the root of existence is the principle of striving (pace Buddhism). It does have similarities to conatus but whilst conatus was sort of an enjoyment of being in its fullness, will is a negative principle. That is to say, it is always becoming, something that it is not- at least in the world as representation. — schopenhauer1

Spinoza's idea of conatus is precisely that of "striving", not "sort of an enjoyment of being in its fullness"; that would be more thriving.

I don't see will as a "negative principle" at all; will is a positive striving for what one wills. This is something we recognize in ourselves and generally project anthropomorphically onto other lifeforms as, most basically, will to live. But we also have the ideas of the will to procreate, the will to consume, the will to seek pleasure and avoid pain, the will to understand, the will to know, the will to possess, the will to be (this or that) and so on. We even have the idea of thanatos; the will to die.

As far as using one's subjective consciousness as "proof" that there is some striving force at play in existence-writ-large is an interesting one. I don't know that I would fully agree with that step he is doing. — schopenhauer1

As I said, I think it is an absolutizing anthropomorphic projection.

So I think here you are demonstrating a misunderstanding of how Schopenhauer is using "Will". It is NOT just a psychological aspect. It is a metaphysical principle at play. It may be unfortunate that he calls it "Will" because of precisely this misunderstanding whereby it is confused with other things. — schopenhauer1

No, I understand very well that is the way he is using it, and I think it is, as I said, an anthropomorphic reification. What else could he call it without losing the character he portrays it as exemplifying?

Now, the ineffable part is mentioned because if you know of Schop's philosophy, his main recommendation is to escape one's own willing nature through ascetic practice. The question remains, how can one escape from something that is a sort of totality of being? That's where I mentioned that Will has the aspect of representation but there is also the aspect of Will submerged beyond the representation. Perhaps that is how one reaches a sort of Nirvana-like state whilst retaining Will. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I understand all that and its commonality with certain interpretations of the Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism. But I don't see escape or ascetism as being valorized by those practices, but rather an attitude of calm contemplation and acceptance, which is exemplified in the idea found in both teachings that samsara is nirvana.

We, as long as we live, are never going to lack will, and nor would we want to; it is attachment to that will, that is being unable to happily accept when things don't go our way, that is the real problem. So, will is not the negative, it is attachment that is the negative, and I cannot think of a philosopher whose life shows more attachment than Schopenhauer.

:fire:

What I recommend, and I think most of us actually do, is to start somewhere and then move back and forth, expanding the picture, filling in gaps, and correcting the picture. — Fooloso4

:100: :up:

A second rate philosopher [Schopenhauer] as compared to first rates such as Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger — Janus

:yikes: WTF?

I think he pinched the idea [Will] from Spinoza's "conatus" in any case. — Janus

No doubt.

Spinoza's idea of conatus is precisely that of "striving", not "sort of an enjoyment of being in its fullness"; that would be more thriving. — Janus

Well, now we are parsing out analyses and interpretations, but it can be derived from things like this:

each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being — "(Ethics,

I don't see will as a "negative principle" at all; will is a positive striving for what one wills. This is something we recognize in ourselves and generally project anthropomorphically onto other lifeforms as, most basically, will to live. But we also have the will to procreate, the will to consume, the will to seek pleasure and avoid pain, the will to understand and so on. — Janus

But you are parsing out Will into its various manifestations as it plays out in representation (in animal form). That is precisely what he is saying.. Will is a unified principle that plays out in how the human animal strives forward. That striving principle in all its variations as they play out (like the ones you list) come about through a "lack" of what is not present currently. There is an incompleteness, or more appropriately, a dissatisfaction that leads to the goal, want, need, etc.

No, I understand very well that is the way he is using it, and I think it is, as I said, an anthropomorphic reification. What else could he call it without losing the character he portrays it as exemplifying? — Janus

Again, I think it is an unfortunate use of the word Will here.. You can change it to a sort of impulsive force, that in humans/animals is more embodied as a will-towards/striving. I go back and forth as to whether he is truly an idealist proper or an early panpsychist.. He mentions the "force" being in inorganic matter because.. But perhaps he means simply the forces at play in the matter? Even if so, he discusses time going back billions of years earlier, yet not existing without the sentience of the animal. So there is some murkiness there.. but not quite in the way you are describing it. I think you are being just uncharitable rather than engaging with it.

valorized by those practices — Janus

I mean, certain sanghas /arhats would probably disagree.. There are a multitude of interpretations, but I don't think all of them are as non-ascetic as you portray.. Yes some Buddhists aren't advocating for hardcore ascetic practices, but there are some that are more about this.. And ones that deign to be close to achieving Buddhahood probably have this kind of rigor... It is very bohemian-convenient-modern to put a spin on it like.. "Nah, real Buddhists are too cool for ascetic stuff".

samsara is nirvana — Janus

Well, through living one achieves nirvana.. etc. The samsara can be considered the "veil of tears" with which the nirvana is the clarity of realization. It's all linked together. Nowhere to go, nothing to do, but there is sort of. It's all contradictory as the Zen exercises would at least have it..

We, as long as we live, are never going to lack will, and nor would we want to; it is attachment to that will, that is being unable to happily accept when things don't go our way, that is the real problem. So, will is not the negative, it is attachment that is the negative, and I cannot think of a philosopher whose life shows more attachment than Schopenhauer. — Janus

Just purely uncharitable and using old canards. He wasn't purely Buddhist by-the-way.. Clearly his ascetic ideas were of a much more rigorous idea about negating self. It is taking the negation of Will to its ultimate end. I don't think he expected most people to reach it or even try.

I'd like to reiterate here, I am just trying to answer this thread.. I don't agree with everything Schopenhauer said about metaphysics and epistemology. I'm not a blind follower. I have my own ideas on lots of things.

But you are parsing out Will into its various manifestations as it plays out in representation (in animal form). — schopenhauer1

I see no reason to posit some transcendent overarching Will to explain its phenomenal manifestations. I suppose you could say that just as there is the trees-in-themselves, which is thought as the counterpart of the trees-for-us, so you could have willings-in-themselves as counterpart of the willings-for-us. But I think it should be remembered that for Kant this is a merely formal or logical move and should be accorded no ontological status.

Just purely uncharitable and using old canards. — schopenhauer1

According to a biography I read years ago by Safranski (I think that's the name) he was an irritable, egomaniacal arsehole who treated people like shit (if my memory serves). He was also a spoiled rich kid who never had to work a day in his life, a fact which enabled him to spend his time philosophizing. In my view, neither an admirable character nor a great philosopher; but as I already said that is just my opinion, and it doesn't bother me if you disagree. A lot of people disagree with me about Heidegger, who I think was also probably an arsehole, but a great philosopher.

If Schopenhauer hadn't use the word 'will' what other word could he have used while remaining true to his philosophical vision?

I see no reason to posit some transcendent overarching Will to explain its phenomenal manifestations. I suppose you could say that just as there is the trees-in-themselves, which is thought as the counterpart of the trees-for-us, so you could have willings-in-themselves as counterpart of the willings-for-us. But I think it should be remembered that for Kant this is a merely formal or logical move and should be accorded no ontological status. — Janus

But this isn't Schopenhaurian but perhaps more Kantian. There is no "will-for-us" or "tree-for-us" or whathaveyou. Rather, there is representation, which is simply the "maya" of a conditioned existence (of space/time/causality) and there is the Will, which is a unified thing that is the principle with which the representation separates using the principium individuantionis that is illusory of some kind so that the will can present as if it was a subject-for-an-object.

But this isn't Schopenhaurian but perhaps more Kantian. There is no "will-for-us" or "tree-for-us" or whathaveyou. Rather, there is representation, which is simply the "maya" of a conditioned existence (of space/time/causality) and there is the Will, which is a unified thing that is the principle with which the representation separates using the principium individuantionis that is illusory of some kind so that the will can present as if it was a subject-for-an-object. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I realize this is not Schopenhauer; it is precisely what I think he is lacking, that is nuance. I just see no reason whatever to identify the transcendental with Will, and the 'Will/ Representation' thing for me is a dualistic reification akin to Plato's duality of phenomena and the reification of their essences as universal forms, which leads to the notion of two distinct realms; one "illusory" realm and its substantive underpinning. Of course I'm not saying that Schopenhauer's philosophy equates to Plato's, but there is a certain commonality there, to be sure.

Perhaps someone can help me with S’s speaking of the noumenal world....or anything noumenal....cuz I can’t find it, at least in WWR, or FPSR.

All that aside, S pats Kant on the back, then criticizes his foremost “error”, by committing the exact same kind:

“....That the will which we find within us does not proceed, as philosophy has hitherto assumed, first from knowledge, and indeed is a mere modification of it, thus something secondary, derived, and, like knowledge itself, conditioned by the brain; but that it is the prius of knowledge, the kernel of our nature, and that original force itself which forms and sustains the animal body, in that it carries out both its unconscious and its conscious functions;—this is the first step in the fundamental knowledge of my metaphysics.....
(WW & I, 3, XXIII, 1844, in Haldane/Kemp, 1889)


.....That, further, it is that same will which in the plant forms the bud in order to develop the leaf and the flower out of it; nay, that the regular form of the crystal is only the trace which its momentary effort has left behind, and that in general, as the true and only αυτοματον, in the proper sense of the word, it lies at the foundation of all the forces of unorganised nature, plays, acts, in all their multifarious phenomena, imparts power to their laws, and even in the crudest mass manifests itself as gravity;—this insight is the second step in that fundamental knowledge, and is brought about by further reflection....
(Ibid)

....For it is the tracing back of that which is quite inaccessible to our immediate knowledge, and therefore in its essence foreign and unknown to us, which we denote by the words force of nature, to that which is known to us most accurately and intimately, but which is yet only accessible to us in our own being and directly, and must therefore be carried over from this to other phenomena. It is the insight that what is inward and original in all the changes and movements of bodies, however various they may be, is in its nature identical; that yet we have only one opportunity of getting to know it more closely and directly, and that is in the movements of our own body. In consequence of this knowledge we must call it will. It is the insight that that which acts and strives in nature, and exhibits itself in ever more perfect phenomena, when it has worked itself up so far that the light of knowledge falls directly upon it, i.e., when it has attained to the state of self-consciousness—exists as that will, which is what is most intimately known to us, and therefore cannot be further explained by anything else, but rather affords the explanation of all other things. It is accordingly the thing in itself so far as this can ever be reached by knowledge. Consequently it is that which must express itself in some way in everything in the world, for it is the inner nature of the world and the kernel of all phenomena....
(Ibid)

.....The unity of that will, here referred to, which lies beyond the phenomenon, and in which we have recognised the inner nature of the phenomenal world, is a metaphysical unity, and consequently transcends the knowledge of it, i.e., does not depend upon the functions of our intellect, and therefore can not really be comprehended by it. Hence it arises that it opens to the consideration an abyss so profound that it admits of no thoroughly clear and systematically connected insight, but grants us only isolated glances, which enable us to recognise this unity in this and that relation of things, now in the subjective, now in the objective sphere, whereby, however, new problems are again raised, all of which I will not engage to solve, but rather appeal here to the words est quadam prodire tenus**, more concerned to set up nothing false or arbitrarily invented than to give a thorough account of all;—at the risk of giving here only a fragmentary exposition.
** “it is something to proceed thus far, if it be not permitted to go farther” (Horace)
(ibid XXV)

So....Kant says there is that knowledge unavailable to us simply because our particular intelligence is not equipped for it, to which S says he merely didn’t examine properly why such should be the case. S then goes about substituting “force of nature”, or, “unity of will”, or simply “will”, which is the most known to us of all things, for the ding an sich. But, alas....even that “unity of will”, which is a facile euphemism for “will-in-itself”, is that of which human knowledge has no immediate access, but at the same time, “will” is that of which each otherwise rational human intellect, has full and complete access, albeit on an individual basis. Just as things are that which are known as opposed to things-in themselves which are not, so too is will that which is accessible, but will as force of nature, is not. All that really happened here is effectively reducible to a “recourse to pitiful sophisms” (CPR, A58).

There may be a force of nature by which “...the plant forms the bud in order to develop the leaf and the flower out of it...”, but by what warrant should that force be derived from the conception....as transcendental as it must be....of the human will?

S comments that K’s thesis is a form of negative knowledge, in that K grounds his theory on what knowledge is not, or, on how knowledge illegitimately acquired is no knowledge at all. S then stipulates that his own metaphysics, taken as an improvement on K’s insofar as the thing-in-itself can be immediately known to us when conceived as “will”....but ultimately declines to forward a positive knowledge with respect to it, by invoking Horace.

Over the years, I’ve come to favor the notion that if S hadn’t begun by heaping praise on Kant by the bucketful, thereby putting himself in the limelight of a paradigm shift, hadn’t deemed himself a proper German transcendental idealist, thereby conforming to the philosophical standard of his time and place, and at the same time hadn’t ridiculed his peers mercilessly....especially Hegel and somewhat less-so Fitche.....his metaphysics wouldn’t have however much traction subsequently attributed to it. It seems rather obvious that if WWR preceded CPR, or, which is the same thing, if proper human intellect had been attributed necessarily to an external ontological domain rather than an internal epistemological one.....it may not have even got off the scholastic ground.

Thus it is, contra S is not so much a second-rate philosopher as a coattail rider, and, in affirmation with , a poor critic of Kant.

All that, without ever asking...... how in the HELL is it possible to “trace back” from the unknowable, re: a necessary force of nature, to the most known, re: freedom as ground of the human will? How S accomplished that, is even more suspect than the exchange of the Kantian unknowable thing-in-itself (an altogether empirical something), to a Schopenhauer-ian knowable metaphysical condition (an altogether transcendental something). This isn’t just apples and oranges; it’s more like apples and dump trucks.

Now...back to the noumenal world: what about it?

Now...back to the noumenal world: what about it? — Mww

I have to go so can't spend much time on this right now, but are you looking for the specific term "nominal" in his writings? Or rather, are you simply trying to understand more about his notions of Will as the thing-in-itself? Seems like you sort of get it, etc.

are you looking for the specific term "nominal" in his writings? — schopenhauer1

No. I’m questioning the OP, in which is stated, “Schop says that the narrow door to the truth is that our bodies appears to us as both external physical objects (as representation) and as something we can experience such as touch hunger and desire I.e as will. And because our bodies appears to us as both will and as representation-the noumenal world is entirely constituted out of will.[/quote]

I can’t find any justification for S relating the dual nature of our understanding of ourselves, to the noumenal world. Maybe there isn’t any, in that S never did actually relate one to the other, instead, invoking the thing-in-itself, which the post-Kantians, and meager philosophers in general, illegitimately seized upon as noumena.

I guess I was hoping someone could transfer the notion of will with respect to the empirical world, to the noumenal world.

I guess I was hoping someone could transfer the notion of will with respect to the empirical world, to the noumenal world. — Mww

I think Kant’s use of noumenal vs thing-in-itself is notoriously convoluted.
Is there a difference that makes a difference?
My crack at it is noumenal in its positive sense is an intuitive understanding of an object that somehow isn’t amenable to the senses. The negative sense is something akin to the thing-in-itself which can only be known in a sort of hedging way of what it is not.

But I’d like to know your interpretation before stepping forward with Schopenhauer’s demonstration of this or that.

But I can start by saying the demonstration was the use of one’s own internal willing nature and he took the leap to apply it to all phenomena where there are forces, and animals with a striving force etc.

He mentions that our knowledge of the will is the closest approximation we have of the thing-in-itself, but it's not the thing-in-itself, itself, as it were. If you remind me, I'll post the relevant passage which is rather important, in my opinion.

Kant’s use of noumenal vs thing-in-itself is notoriously convoluted. — schopenhauer1

The relevant texts sustain the fact he doesn’t convolute one with the other; they are entirely different conceptions. It is those who followed that are guilty of it. His interchanging of the terminology is understood, and forgiven, in context.

A difference that makes a difference? I think not, insofar as our knowledge extends to neither of them.
————

the demonstration was the use of one’s own internal willing nature and he took the leap to apply it to all phenomena where there are forces, and animals with a striving force etc. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, I see the demonstration, but don’t quite accept the justification. I mean, he’s authorized to speculate as he wishes, as are philosophers in general, but he still needs to give empirical evidence in support of it. To equate “force of nature” with “unity of will” just seems a bridge too far.

Thus it is, contra ↪Janus
S is not so much a second-rate philosopher as a coattail rider, and, in affirmation with ↪Janus
, a poor critic of Kant. — Mww

So, Schopenauer is not even a second rater, in your view? Interesting post! After further digestion, if I have any questions or concerns, I'll come back to you...

not even a second rater, in your view? — Janus

Ehhhh.....his philosophy is, in my view. And as a regular guy, I think he’s way too harsh on his peers, almost disrespectful. Combining the two subjective judgements, one could relegate S to the second tier. On the other hand of course, if there has already been one chosen to be at the top, all the others are second-rate, or less.

Read the Wikipedia page on Arthur Schopenhauer. World as Will is not a conclusion. At best it's a hypothesis and at worst it's an opinion.

Sounds about right...

Albero,

I’m a Schopenhauer newbie not an expert. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Arthur Schopenhauer
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/
has “An alternative title for Schopenhauer’s main book, The World as Will and Representation, might well have been, The World as Reality and Appearance. Similarly, his book might have been entitled, The Inner and Outer Nature of Reality.”

Maybe “will” is not an ideal label for what Schopenhauer had in mind?