I have no idea what that means. — Janus

Indeed.

It was embedded before humans started counting? — Tate

That's not what was claimed.

It was embedded before humans started counting?
— Tate

That's not what was claimed. — Banno

It became embedded after they started counting? Also interesting.

No, the numerals on a number line do not represent the number of numerals, because there is zero, and negatives. — Metaphysician Undercover

That series of numerals I presented was not meant to represent anything other than the series of numerals that it is.

You could have a series of the numeral '1' like this: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, ..... Select any point and the numeral equivalent to the '1' at that point can be found by counting all the way to the left. If you chose the last '1' on the right. then the numeral equivalent at that point in the series would be '11' because there are eleven '1's including the one selected and all those to the left of it. .

I don't see how that's relevant. it has nothing to do with how we count. That it takes a quantity of eleven things to establish an order consisting of eleven things, does not imply that a person needs to know the quantity in order to know the order.

That your example was meant to convey something about someone without language using correspondence, so I thought it important to say that language is part of your example.

But I missed the last sentence. OK, this is a contrast case, not an example. My bad. I was reading it as the example.

Sure, I agree that with a language less creature that they do not speak about truth or falsity or anything like that. Say a wild bird -- they communicate, but it's not with language. Or, perhaps we could say, it's a proto-language, prior to having the ability to represent its own sentences. — Moliere

I'm not talking about communication. I'm also not attributing communication to birds. I'm talking about belief, and how it pertains to and/or is germane to discourse about truth.

I can see how my example could have been taken the way you did. My bad, more than yours on that!

The example is one of an in between stage, meant to point out how we understand when some statements are false long before we have anything close to a linguistically informed notion of "truth".

Counting without understanding quantity would just be a meaningless regurgitation of words. I have nothing further to say on this.

Again, you really do not seem to have any understanding of the concept of "order". If you have no desire to consider such a concept, then go right ahead, and allow order to remain a meaningless regurgitation from your perspective.

Counting without understanding quantity would just be a meaningless regurgitation of words. — Janus

At around the same age you learn your ABC's. That's pure sequence, no quantity.

The, you know, point of math is that things like sequence and quantity end up fitting together.

Learning to count, for instance, is not the same as learning to measure -- right up until it turns out it is.

That all sounds about right. We can know the sequence of the 26 letters of the English alphabet without knowing what number in the sequence each letter corresponds to, but in the analogous case of the number series it seems essential to understand that relation before one could be said to be counting. Although, I suppose if a child knew the alphabet and someone presented her with twenty apples and asked 'what letter do all these apples correspond to' the child could call the fist one 'a', the second one 'b' and so on down to 't'; 't' being the twentieth letter. Would we expect the child to intuitively "get" the idea of quantity or number from an exercise like that?

Would we expect the child to intuitively "get" the idea of quantity or number from an exercise like that? — Janus

From one time? No. (It takes kids more than a couple weeks to make it from kindergarten to 6th grade.)

I briefly taught math in a homeschool co-op, to a bunch of teenagers. My favorite exercise was asking them why the internal angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees. They knew that they do, and with enough help they could prove it -- but why is it provable? Why is it true?

And now we're back on topic.

Truth comes from the realm of facts and it's what is considered directly fact whereas Lie is what is less than or indirectly fact.

I have lived over a year - fact.
I have lived hundreds of years - lie.
I might live to a hundred - indirectly fact.

Here are some thoughts on truth I can't figure out how to use. (Possibly in the next neighborhood over from yours @fdrake.)

In thinking about how truth does seem comfortable playing with the other alethic modalities, and still in a possible worlds mood, I was thinking about how truth has to be about our world, about where we live, and is thereby also about us, every time, whether it seems to be or not, because every truth says something about what kind of world we live in and that says something about us as its residents, as part of it. (This is a sort of positive spin on Davidson's Big Fact argument.)

It has to be our kettle boiling, here in this world, for "The kettle is boiling" to be true. There is a sense in which, if our kettle is not boiling, even if it's boiling in many nearby worlds, the sentence "The kettle is boiling" doesn't belong here. (I was tempted to say that a falsehood is like taking a piece from a another puzzle and trying to force it in -- and it's true, falsehoods are an affront, but the puzzle thing ended up sounding more like coherentism, so I've let it go.)

Another way to put it is that truth is when what we say and where we live harmonize. Falsehoods are discordant.

I don't know what to do with any of that, but I do want to understand why truth matters. It does matter, and not only for practical reasons, and I think the answer might be around here. Somehow truth is the speech that is properly of here and properly of us.

From one time? No. (It takes kids more than a couple weeks to make it from kindergarten to 6th grade.) — Srap Tasmaner

Right, I agree one time would be too much to expect except in the case of genius perhaps, so it is probably by coming at it from a variety of examples and directions over time that kids do get it at some point, different for each kid I imagine.

Somehow truth is the speech that is properly of here and properly of us. — Srap Tasmaner

Hypotheticals are also truth apt. "If the volcano blows, a cooling trend will begin.". This isn't specifically about us, and it isn't here.

Whether truth is about a particular relationship between us and the world falls to the point of the Tractacus.

Hypotheticals are also truth apt. "If the volcano blows, a cooling trend will begin.". This isn't specifically about us, and it isn't here. — Tate

Maybe, but even if you're not stating a fact ("The volcano is erupting") you're saying something about how our world works, aren't you? That our world is such that this event would lead to this other event. The place we belong works this way, not some other way, and surely that matters to who we are.

Anyway, this is more hunch than thought right now. Might be nothing to it.

Because correspondence to fact is presupposed within all belief about the world, the presupposition of truth connects all thinking believing creatures to the world. This has been generally said to be limited strictly within the bounds of humanity. Entrenched in hubris borne of a gross misunderstanding of their own thought and belief, in addition to the overwhelming influence and power of the Church combined with ignorance, humans at the time were certain that thought and belief, in the main, separated us from other mere animals. One of those Greeks mirrored the sentiment. The Church had it that the other animals were, afterall, just beasts put here for us, not like us, but for us to use however we saw fit. While it is true, without doubt, that our thoughts and beliefs do indeed separate us from other animals, it quite simply does not follow from that that no other animal has any thought and/or belief about the world. Rather, it is the sheer complexity of our thought and belief that separates us and our meaningful experiences from 'dumb' animals, not the fact that we have thought and belief. Natural common language is pivotal here. That is what separates our thought and belief from language less thought and belief. That difference along with the transition between language less thought and belief and thought and belief that includes language use cannot be rightly understood by equating all belief to propositional attitude, for that is belief about language use. Language less belief is not about language use.

Basic rudimentary thought and belief formation is the inevitable autonomous result and/or product of certain biological machinery just plain doing its job. It's nothing magical, god-given, or all that special. It's also not all that complicated to understand. We need not turn on our biological machinery in order for it to begin working. We cannot turn it off. It happens all by itself. Thought and belief just happens given the right sorts of circumstances.

The presupposition of correspondence to fact is inseparable from the attribution of meaning within rudimentary thought and belief formation. Indeed, the two remain forever entwined. Some language less creatures are equipped with biological machinery similar enough to our own to be capable of drawing correlations between directly perceptible things. That is how all belief systems begin, how correspondence to fact is first presupposed, and how all things meaningful become so. The cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree and that belief is true if the mouse is behind the tree, and false if it is not. The cat can have true or false belief that is meaningful to the cat despite not having language.

"Truth" is a term borne of language. Meaningful correspondence to fact is not and needs none.

My views on truth

A proposition p says something of/about something. If what p says corresponds to how that something is, p is true; if not, p is false. For example take the word "to". If I say "t appears before o" then it is a true statement because t does appear before o. By the same token, "o appears before t" is false. I believe this is called the correspondence theory of truth.

I'm told there are some mathematical objects that don't correspond to anything in reality - this I suppose is one reason for the is math invented/discovered? controversy. Unfortunately, I can't think of an example off the top of my head but what about so-called imaginary numbers ($i = \sqrt -1$)? Plus how about the inconceivability of 4D space ($a \times b \times c \times d$ - what's that?). As far as I can tell this necessitates a different definition for (mathematical) truth: p is true iff p is provable (from the relevant axioms)? Your guess is as good as mine.

That's all I have so far. Should've worked harder in school & college. Oh well!

Why doesn't everyone just sum up their views of truth in roughly two to three paragraphs. No responses to the summation, just your particular point of view. At least no responses until the summaries are complete. — Sam26

My view is probably a mix mainly of deflationism and the correspondence theory (but I also see some value in the coherence theory, too).

Correspondence is restricted only to the empirical, but there might be a way of viewing all propositions as "worldly" and contingent if their meaning depends on use. Even the truth of propositions concerning fictions find their origin in the books of the world or in the way our stories are taught and told. We can verify whether or not Peter Pan wears a green hat by checking the source work or checking what authoritative sources have to say about it.

With the meaning of a proposition being found in its use, this might signify that mine is a strongly deflationary view of truth. However, I have concerns that such a view is too self-contained and stagnant; an unchanging form of "community idealism", where truth is no more than what most experts would believe and say is true. If this were the case, then there would be little room for science to make any discoveries about the world, or for our worldviews to change. At the edges of our society's best understanding of the world must be some sort of contact or correspondence with the world. We must be able to propose and test theories and find results that conflict with our expectations; with our best theories.

Of course, we will remain within our self-contained bubble of endorsing best guesses even when we do make new discoveries; even when we find that the world conflicts with our best theories; and even when we come up with better theories to replace the old ones. But a reflection on human history indicates that we do have a better understanding of the world now than we did before; that our technology is better; that we can make better and more sophisticated use of the resources of the world than we did previously. Perhaps we understand ourselves a little better. We can recognise that some propositions that were once considered true no longer are, and that this will likely be the fate of at least some propositions that we call 'true' today. Of course, some who consider propositions to be timelessly true may find this comical. But that's simply not how we normally use the word.

I was thinking about how truth has to be about our world, about where we live, and is thereby also about us, every time, whether it seems to be or not, because every truth says something about what kind of world we live in and that says something about us as its residents, as part of it. — Srap Tasmaner

What about counterfactuals? Are they false (or not truth-apt)?

And now we're back on topic. — Srap Tasmaner

But the thread is very uninteresting. As usual for a thread on "truth", pages and pages with nothing conclusive, not even any agreement as to which direction to go. I'll take the road to Damascus. No! Don't go that way, the sun's too bright, and you might see the Way out of Plato's cave. No one knows what truth is, so they just make things up, whatever seems reasonable from their world view. How could made up stuff be the truth?

No wonder Pilate would not wait around for an answer, that would be an extremely long wait. Instead, he threw Jesus to the Jews, to let them decide "the truth" about him. Saul figured it out, didn't he? No, he was dishonest, he did not really believe that Jesus was Son of God. But at least his dishonesty was designed for compromise, which produced a semblance of peace amongst fractured theists.

What about counterfactuals? Are they false (or not truth-apt)? — Michael

In addition to my reply to Tate above, counterfactuals also imply, right up front, something that is the case, and try to show how that matters, in this world, by imagining that it's not. Anyway, why would the counterfactual as a whole just be false? (Whether they're truth-apt at all has in the past been controversial but not so much anymore I think.)

And that's kin to the idea of truth as revelation. We start out not knowing which of all the possible worlds we're in. The evidence reveals this to us. What was hidden is unconcealed.

It's a wide open invitation. — Sam26

I do so love being invited. It’s only later I sometimes regret it.

“...The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: “What is truth?” The definition of the word truth, to wit, “the accordance of the cognition with its object,” is presupposed in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition....”

After all the analytical hoopla....there isn’t one.

Yeah, I'm afraid so. I am thinking it all comes back to being, but I'm in no hurry to get there.

I would quibble a little with the word "evidence," which is appropriate for reasonable belief in the absence of knowledge.

For instance, much of a typical chess game can be played heuristically, with little calculation, but there are times when you need to know the truth of the position. When you see it, it's like finding a really good proof in mathematics (yes, there are good proofs and bad proofs); the whole position sort of lights up and you see the truth in perfect clarity, and everything else you were thinking about blows away like so much smoke. Secrets are revealed, indeed. I'm not saying truth is always like that, of course, but that kind of experience clarifies the distinction between your ignorance, before you had seen the truth, however much evidence you may have had for your beliefs, and your knowledge, once you had.

but that kind of experience clarifies the distinction between your ignorance, before you saw the truth, however much evidence you may have had for your beliefs, and your knowledge, once you have. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree with this. There's a reason the myth of the cave has appeal -- it captures the feeling of discovery very well.

I'm not saying truth is always like that, of course, but that kind of experience clarifies the distinction between your ignorance, before you saw the truth, however much evidence you may have had for your beliefs, and your knowledge, once you have. — Srap Tasmaner

At least we've drawn the scope of our analysis to our experience, as opposed to trying to tie it to something metaphysical.

In addition to my reply to Tate above, counterfactuals also imply, right up front, something that is the case, and try to show how that matters, in this world, by imagining that it's not. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm a bit confused. I just don't quite see the connection between "if Hitler had not committed suicide then he would have been executed by the Allies" being true (assuming for the sake of argument that it is) and the truth being "about our world, about where we live, and is thereby also about us, every time", as you say.

It seems to me that the counterfactual says something about some other possible world.

Although if you want to say that counterfactuals like the above are about our world (somehow) then I'm not entirely sure what significance there is in saying that the truth is "about our world". What would it mean for the truth to not be about our world? Are you just saying that "is true" means "is about our world"?

At least we've drawn the scope of our analysis to our experience, as opposed to trying to tie it to something metaphysical. — Tate

If that's what we've done, then I was way off. Wouldn't be the first time.

But my thought was exactly that they go together. The sort of thing you can come to know is the sort of thing that makes our sentences true. If the kettle is not boiling, I can't know that it is, and "The kettle is boiling" remains, let's say, unfulfilled.

If that's what we've done, then I was way off. Wouldn't be the first time. — Srap Tasmaner

:grin: I just meant we don't have to get our boxers in a bunch over the status of truthbearers, the content of truthmakers, and the mysterious correspondence relation that's supposed to hold between them.

And we definitely don't need Tarski.

The sort of thing you can come to know is the sort of thing that makes our sentences true. — Srap Tasmaner

Maybe. Or maybe it's more that we have a constant yearning for revelation, occasionally satisfied by various means, by evidence, by reason, by a moment of clarity where facts come together more comprehensively, or in a new way (if you're Isaac Newton or Einstein).

I just meant we don't have to get our boxers in a bunch over the status of truthbearers, the content of truthmakers, and the mysterious correspondence relation that's supposed to hold between them. — Tate

Is there something mysterious about correspondence?

We have a sentence "the cat is on the mat", we have the cat on the mat, and we say that the former is about or describes the latter. Is that mysterious? I don't really think so. So why would it be mysterious to say that the former corresponds to the latter?