The Standard(s) for the Foundation Of Knowledge

Hello Human

In the 17th century, French philosopher René Descartes presents his famous Cogito Ergo Sum thesis as the foundation for his system of philosophy and for knowledge itself. He supports it by claiming that the only thing he cannot doubt his own existence.

However, there is a problem with that last claim. By using his seeming inability to doubt his own existence to support his proposal for a foundation of knowledge, Descartes effectively presents this inability as a standard to which any proposal for a foundation for knowledge must respect. But, if we don’t know the foundation for knowledge, how can we know whether the proposed standard must be accepted? We could only support a standard either with knowledge derived from the foundation, or with the foundation itself, but in either case, you already assume something as a foundation.

On the other hand, to have no standards would be to leave the door open for any proposition to be true. If someone considers logic and the senses as the foundation, and that another considers religious revelation as a foundation, there is no valid grounds on which one could change the mind of the other.

We must also consider that not all standards are of the kind of Descartes’ standard. Another standard one could propose that is of a different nature altogether is for example: “The foundation for knowledge must be something from which we can go about doing inquiry with agreement on some propositions.”
This standard’s aims are of a more practical nature. So it seems that there are at least two kinds of standards: practical standards, which aim towards some practical goal, and epistemological standards, which aim towards truth.

It seems to me that epistemological standards cannot be given without assumptions behind them, so we cannot provide them on valid grounds. Practical standards, on the other hand, seem to have no assumptions behind them, they are just given for achieving some goal other than truth and knowledge, and they can be used to convince others by showing that some standards achieve some goal(s) that the person(s) we are trying to convince care about. In fact, I believe the reason behind why a supposedly epistemological standard is given and accepted is only for practical purposes, for example Descartes’ standard was proposed so that the foundation for his system of philosophy would be solid ground that everyone agrees on.

What do you think ? Can we give any standards for a foundation of knowledge of an epistemological, practical, and/or maybe of another kind ? Or is this issue the result of another issue altogether?

Agent Smith

Descartes' cogito argument uses a well-known, time-tested, method of proof viz. reductio ad absurdum. I wonder if his argument makes any sense in paraconsistent logic or within a dialetheistic framework. :chin:

alan1000

A big subject, indeed the biggest. I would like to advise against taking the Cartesian "Universal Doubt" as a criterion for anything. You'll have noticed that there are all sorts of things which it never occurs to Decartes to doubt; that knowledge is possible, that "truth" and "error" are absolute categories, and that other beings exist, for example. He applies his own criterion in a very partial and disingenuous way.

The Cartesian "Universal Doubt" is the Classical approach on stilts; reduce everything to the smallest possible number of indubitable propositions, and see what can be built from that. Lacking the intellectual honesty and impartial rigour of a Socrates or a Euclid, however, Descartes quickly digs himself into a hole from which only an appeal to God's goodness can rescue him. Of all the most famous and influential of philosophers, Descartes is undoubtedly the least honest and least competent.

alan1000

“The foundation for knowledge must be something from which we can go about doing inquiry with agreement on some propositions.”

Pure gold, but it is not clear why you think this approach is primarily "practical", and does not form the basis of ALL knowledge?

I think there is no better introductory text to the foundations of knowledge than the first half-dozen pages of Euclid's "Elements of Geometry". There you will find the whole of the Socratic/Platonic/Cartesian enterprise set out in all of its clinical purity. Definition > axiom > theorem. All else is commentary.

Agent Smith

I sense a pattern here (in the classical logic sense). The idea is to come up/discover a proposition whose falsehood would entail a contradiction. The cogito does just that. I have one viz. there are some truths.

Hello Human

A big subject, indeed the biggest. I would like to advise against taking the Cartesian "Universal Doubt" as a criterion for anything. You'll have noticed that there are all sorts of things which it never occurs to Decartes to doubt; that knowledge is possible, that "truth" and "error" are absolute categories, and that other beings exist, for example. He applies his own criterion in a very partial and disingenuous way. — alan1000

:up:

Descartes' cogito argument uses a well-known, time-tested, method of proof viz. reductio ad absurdum. I wonder if his argument makes any sense in paraconsistent logic or within a dialetheistic framework. :chin: — Agent Smith

I sense a pattern here (in the classical logic sense). The idea is to come up/discover a proposition whose falsehood would entail a contradiction. The cogito does just that. I have one viz. there are some truths. — Agent Smith

Maybe using logic at all for this issue is misguided, because to use logic would imply assuming its validity as a source of knowledge, so we’d already assume an answer from the start.

Pure gold, but it is not clear why you think this approach is primarily "practical", and does not form the basis of ALL knowledge? — alan1000

I think it is practical because it seems to me that it aims towards the facilitation of inquiry instead of aiming directly towards knowledge. Also, it looks as though it doesn’t consider the foundation as being an accurate representation of the actual state of affairs but instead as some assumptions from which we can start our inquiries.

Agent Smith

I sense a pattern here (in the classical logic sense). The idea is to come up/discover a proposition whose falsehood would entail a contradiction. The cogito does just that. I have one viz. there are some truths.
— Agent Smith

Maybe using logic at all for this issue is misguided, because to use logic would imply assuming its validity as a source of knowledge, so we’d already assume an answer from the start — Hello Human

I know! It's a messy business and I don't see a light at the end of this tunnel. Pagliacci scenario and also Woozle effect (Piglet + Pooh lookin' for a woozle which unbeknownst to them is them ! :snicker: ).

That's why we need (a) God. We must pray for the technological singularity. :grin:

IntrospectionImplosion

But, if we don’t know the foundation for knowledge, how can we know whether the proposed standard must be accepted? We could only support a standard either with knowledge derived from the foundation, or with the foundation itself, but in either case, you already assume something as a foundation. — Hello Human

I think that the project of creating a philosophical foundation for knowledge gets things backwards. I have knowledge already, there are things I know. Whether I have a philosophical foundation for this knowledge is irrelevant. I don't need a theory of knowledge to explain how I know things, instead I need to understand the phenomenon of "knowing".

A universal theory of knowledge requires certainty about things I don't think we can be certain about. Describing our experience requires certainty about our experience, which I think is the only certainty we really have.

Hello Human

I have some propositions for standards we could use. The first one is: “If a proposition is such that if it can be verified, then it must be true, it is a foundation for knowledge”. It seems that this standard could work because it keeps specifically those statements which are necessary in order for verification of the truth or falsity of any other proposition, nothing more, and nothing less. One such proposition being: “There exists a mind capable of belief”. If it can be verified, then there exists such a mind.

I also think that we should use the above standard because either we can know things, or we cannot know anything. If we can’t know anything, then we can’t know whether we can know anything. So, we are left with two possibilities: either we can know, or we cannot know whether we know. From a practical point of view, it would be better to assume we can know, because at the very least, we’ll have tried to know.

Next one is:”If a proposition is such that to deny it eventually leads back to it being true, that proposition is a foundation for knowledge”. It seems that this standard could work because it would implement all propositions which you must always consider. I think that one such proposition is the law of non-contradiction, because if one denies the law of non-contradiction, then one makes it possible for the law to be true and false at the same time, so it seems you can’t deny it completely.

I have knowledge already, there are things I know. Whether I have a philosophical foundation for this knowledge is irrelevant. I don't need a theory of knowledge to explain how I know things, instead I need to understand the phenomenon of "knowing". — IntrospectionImplosion

But it seems that if you don’t know how you can know things, then you can’t create new knowledge systematically.

A universal theory of knowledge requires certainty about things I don't think we can be certain about — IntrospectionImplosion

And what are those things?

Alkis Piskas

↪Hello Human

By using his seeming inability to doubt his own existence to support his proposal for a foundation of knowledge, Descartes effectively presents this inability as a standard to which any proposal for a foundation for knowledge must respect. But, if we don’t know the foundation for knowledge, how can we know whether the proposed standard must be accepted? — Hello Human

1) It's not a "seeming" (= apparent, appearing) inability. It's a logical statement and proposition. He said, "I cannot doubt of my existence while I doubt". Which is true, i.e. one cannot reject that.
2) Descartes didn't use that statement "as a foundation of knowledge" or any kind of foundation for that matter. You and other people do. This statement became --I don't know when, but long after Descartes has made it-- "a fundamental element of Western philosophy, as it purported to provide a certain foundation for knowledge in the face of radical doubt." (Wikipedia). See, it is thought of (by people) as a certain foundation for knowledge. So, all that are interpretations. (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not even talk about any kind of "foundation for knowledge".)

For Descartes "cogito ergo sum" was a fundamental principle, which was based mainly on his irrefutable --not "seeming"-- truth that I cannot doubt my own existence and hence I think therefore I am. That's why, he expressed it elsewhere as "I doubt, therefore I am".

In his Discourse on the Method: "And as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search." [The stress is mine.]

As for standards for a "foundation of knowledge" that you are looking for, I think that this subject can cover volumes, and cannot be covered in here. Except for some thoughts on the subject. I have never given it much thought, but I have a slight idea that it would be a useless quest, because the burden is too heavy to carry. Here's a characteristic passage from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"A foundation of knowledge and justified belief restricted to infallible beliefs (as defined above) would arguably be far too thin to support any sort of substantial epistemic edifice."

180 Proof

↪Hello Human

e.g. Neurath's Boat
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurath%27s_boat

e.g. foundherentism
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundherentism

e.g. falsifiability
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability

IntrospectionImplosion

Thank you for the original post and for responding to my comment.

either we can know things, or we cannot know anything. If we can’t know anything, then we can’t know whether we can know anything. — Hello Human

I think this gets things backwards. There are things I know (my name, how to eat, what a cat is), I don't need a theory to tell me whether I know these things. I need a theory that can help me understand what it means that I know these things, but I take the fact that I know them for granted. If you don't, then that's probably where our disagreement/confusion comes from and we should talk about it.

And what are those things? — Hello Human

The only things I am certain about are my experiences. Whether they accurately represent the world (whether there even is a world) is not a question I can be certain about. All I have is consciousness, and a theory of knowledge that investigates questions outside of consciousness forces us to ask and answer impossible questions (what is existence? what is the nature of reality? is there anything other than reality?).

Hello Human

It's not a "seeming" (= apparent, appearing) inability. It's a logical statement and proposition. He said, "I cannot doubt of my existence while I doubt". Which is true, i.e. one cannot reject that. — Alkis Piskas

One cannot reject that on the grounds of logic. But if we’re searching for the ground on which knowledge stands, it’s at the very least questionable to use logic to guide us in our inquiries.

Descartes didn't use that statement "as a foundation of knowledge" or any kind of foundation for that matter. You and other people do. This statement became --I don't know when, but long after Descartes has made it-- "a fundamental element of Western philosophy, as it purported to provide a certain foundation for knowledge in the face of radical doubt." (Wikipedia). See, it is thought of (by people) as a certain foundation for knowledge. So, all that are interpretations. (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not even talk about any kind of "foundation for knowledge".) — Alkis Piskas

I don’t know much about Descartes or the different interpretations of his work, so maybe you’re right on this point.

Alkis Piskas

One cannot reject that on the grounds of logic. But if we’re searching for the ground on which knowledge stands, it’s at the very least questionable to use logic to guide us in our inquiries. — Hello Human

This could be a possibility, only that I don't undestand what do you mean by "the ground on which knowledge stands". :smile: An explanation and an example would allow me to undestand it ...

BTW, I'm not an expert on Cartesian philosophy. Whatever I need to know regarding a specific subject like the present one, I have to search for and study it.

BTW, your very interesting topic will offer me the opportunity to learn soon more about the foundation of knowledge, a subject that I had never considered studying up to now. Thank you for this! :smile:

Alkis Piskas

e.g. Neurath's Boat
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurath%27s_boat — 180 Proof

I find the occasion to mention that the known "Theseus' Ship" is one of the many pseudo-paradoxes, i.e. paradoxes based on wrong interpretation of facts (fallacies, wrong deductions, etc.)
In this case, the fact that most of the parts of the ship were replaced does not imply that it was not the same ship anymore. The reason is simple: Where has all the work of replacing parts been carried on? On the ship itself. The ship never lost its identity. It has never stopped being the ship of Theseus! Even if they had changed its name, it would still be the ship of Theseus, only with a different name.
It would have been a different case if the did the opposite: they kept the good parts of the ship and had built a new one (from start) using those parts. That would be of course a different ship.

180 Proof

↪Alkis Piskas

And, with respect to "foundationalism" (OP), what's your point?

Alkis Piskas

And, with respect to "foundationalism" (OP), what's your point? — 180 Proof

I have not seen the term foundationalism appearing in tit OP.
Then, what does this have to do with my explanation of the "Theseus Ship" paradox (which I guess you are referring to)?

Hello Human

e.g. Neurath's Boat — 180 Proof

Interesting analogy. Problem being how do we know whether a plank is rotten if we aren’t sure of what standing on a plank that’s not rotten feels like ? How do we know if a belief is incoherent with “safer” beliefs if we don’t know what makes a belief safer ?

180 Proof

↪Alkis Piskas

You're missing the forest for the trees. Also, I referred to Neurath's Boat (re: anti-foundationalism

↪180 Proof

) and not the "Ship of Theseus" (re: identity-in-change). Clearly, you ignored the links I'd provided, so why bother with your uninformed, lazy reply to my initial post? :roll:

↪Hello Human

Good questions. Read all three links provided for a contextual summary of how knowledge without "certainty" – anti-foundationalism – works in practice.

Agent Smith

Neurath's Boat — 180 Proof

Repair/improve your boat as you sail her. :up: On the fly!

Dogmatists just won't give up will they?

Hello Human

↪180 Proof

From reading those articles, I think that the general methodology of knowledge that comes out of them is:
Knowledge is gained through the verification of the logical consequences of propositions through empirical observation.
Propositions that pass a few tests are never truly certain, they could be falsified later on.
A proposition may be used to support other propositions.

Adopting this method allows for what could be described as inter-subjective verification of the falsifiable propositions through the means agreed upon by what we could call a community of knowledge-makers.

This seems to me to be an efficient way of gaining empirical knowledge, perhaps even the most efficient, because if we can’t get out of our own subjective experience, then we may as well take it as our basis because it’s the closest thing to an objective world we have. It also allows for precise verification which makes the acquisition of knowledge more clear and precise.

But for knowledge about more abstract objects, such as mathematics, we need another method. So what do you think is the most efficient way to gain knowledge about those abstract objects?

Agent Smith

Syād, post-Agrippa('s trilemma) life has been tough for dogmatists. The quest to find a firm foundation for knowledge, the epistemic bedrock as it were, is an ongoing enterprise and the 3 approaches (infinitism, foundationalism, coherentism) still don't qualify as safe harbor. Instead of solving the problem, they merely ignore it. It's kinda like a patient who visits a doctor complaining of a headache, and the doctor, instead of prescribing medication, tells the fellow that, despite the pulsating waves of pain, there's no headache! :snicker:

180 Proof

So what do you think is the most efficient way to gain knowledge about those abstract objects? — Hello Human

Use theorems, proofs and axiomatic systems (i.e. indefeasible reasoning).

Pantagruel

One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws ('a world of identical cases') as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made possible:we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.

Our cognitive apparatus is not organized for 'knowledge.'

[T]he aberration of philosophy comes from this:instead of seeing logic and the categories of reason as means to the adaptation of the world to ends of utility (that is, "in principle," for a useful falsification) men believe to possess in them the criterion of truth or reality.
~Nietzsche

I agree with Habermas, extending this reasoning, that in the context of this "transcendentally-logically conceived pragmatism" there are a wide array of "knowledge-constitutive and knowledge-legitimating interests" beyond the merely logical and technical.

Manuel

↪Hello Human

No. We cannot put forth foundationalism with certainty. This leaves open a very big problem in philosophy, we have a certain mechanism or capacity to acquire knowledge, yet we do not know what these mechanisms are. Furthermore, introspection will not reveal it to us, no matter how hard we try.

So we have to begin with consciousness as that with which we have the most confidence of existing and must merely do the best we can with what we are given.

Hello Human

↪Alkis Piskas

This could be a possibility, only that I don't undestand what do you mean by "the ground on which knowledge stands". :smile: An explanation and an example would allow me to undestand it ... — Alkis Piskas

My understanding of it is that it is our means for gaining knowledge.

BTW, your very interesting topic will offer me the opportunity to learn soon more about the foundation of knowledge, a subject that I had never considered studying up to now. Thank you for this! :smile: — Alkis Piskas

Hopefully it will be as useful as you think it is then.

↪Agent Smith

Syād, post-Agrippa('s trilemma) life has been tough for dogmatists. The quest to find a firm foundation for knowledge, the epistemic bedrock as it were, is an ongoing enterprise and the 3 approaches (infinitism, foundationalism, coherentism) still don't qualify as safe harbor. Instead of solving the problem, they merely ignore it. It's kinda like a patient who visits a doctor complaining of a headache, and the doctor, instead of prescribing medication, tells the fellow that, despite the pulsating waves of pain, there's no headache! :snicker: — Agent Smith

Perhaps instead of searching for the epistemic bedrock, it would be better instead determine whether or not such a bedrock exists.

↪180 Proof

Use theorems, proofs and axiomatic systems (i.e. indefeasible reasoning). — 180 Proof

Why do you think it’s indefeasible ? There’s nothing stopping us to question the axioms or the rules of the systems.

↪Pantagruel

One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws ('a world of identical cases') as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made possible:we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.

Our cognitive apparatus is not organized for 'knowledge.'

[T]he aberration of philosophy comes from this:instead of seeing logic and the categories of reason as means to the adaptation of the world to ends of utility (that is, "in principle," for a useful falsification) men believe to possess in them the criterion of truth or reality.
~Nietzsche — Pantagruel

Indeed, even the “tools for knowledge” we have created have led to the conclusion through evolutionary biology that our cognitive abilities evolved not for the sake of having more knowledge, but for the sake of evolutionary fitness. However, perhaps evolutionary fitness and knowledge are linked in some way, as knowing what kind of world one lives in helps a lot for survival and reproduction. But then again, knowledge of abstract concepts is not really useful in terms of evolutionary fitness, so perhaps we know more about concrete objects than we do about our environment and the objects in it.

I agree with Habermas, extending this reasoning, that in the context of this "transcendentally-logically conceived pragmatism" there are a wide array of "knowledge-constitutive and knowledge-legitimating interests" beyond the merely logical and technical. — Pantagruel

What do you mean exactly by “transcendentally-logically conceived pragmatism” and “knowledge-constitutive and knowledge-legitimating interests” ?

↪Manuel

We cannot put forth foundationalism with certainty. — Manuel

Indeed we cannot. In fact we cannot put forth any theory of knowledge at all with certainty, because to do so implies that we assume some things about knowledge and how it is gained, else we can’t know whether the theory is correct or not.

we have a certain mechanism or capacity to acquire knowledge, yet we do not know what these mechanisms are. — Manuel

I think we do not even know whether those mechanisms exist in the first place because to know whether they exist we must assume their existence.

So we have to begin with consciousness as that with which we have the most confidence of existing and must merely do the best we can with what we are given. — Manuel

And what are we given exactly?

TheGreatArcanum

how is this for a first principle of knowledge?

“when I am thinking, I know that I am thinking and not not thinking, and this is because, when I am not thinking, I still know, at least intuitively, that I possess the a priori potential to begin thinking; hence, I cannot deny the existence of thought without contradiction, and because that which thinks cannot possibly be non-existent, the fact that I think, and know that I think and have the potential to think, implies that I exist as a subject.”

180 Proof

↪Hello Human

"Indefeasible reasoning" denotes systemic use of deductive inferences. That e.g. axioms are variable is a feature of deduction, not a bug or exception (e.g. non-Euclidean geometries).

Benj96

when I am thinking, I know that I am thinking and not not thinking, and this is because, when I am not thinking, I still know, at least intuitively, that I possess the a priori potential to begin thinking; hence, I cannot deny the existence of thought without contradiction, and because that which thinks cannot possibly be non-existent, the fact that I think, and know that I think and have the potential to think, implies that I exist as a subject — TheGreatArcanum

You do exist as a subject indeed. Contradiction comes in the form of other existents - other subjects - that do not think the same way as you do.

At best you can execute your best reasoning and best ethical principles to convince them to relinquish their previous notions/beliefs.

But it's likely you will only be successful if your reasoning and moral are both sufficient to highlight how theirs may be inferior. The rest, is up to choice.

We cannot force others to believe what we believe, and simultaneously we must always hold a certain skepticism towards what we think, for it is just so easy, to embrace the temptation of certain delusions, we must always ask if what we think is a) rational and b). ethical, and argue with the open-mindedness to be proven otherwise and re-evaluate. No harm no foul.

Hello Human

↪TheGreatArcanum

Ok, I see, but there’s a problem which is considering the first principle, which is here that when I am not thinking I know that I can think, as « known ». How do we know the first principle, if the first principle is meant to be more fundamental than knowledge itself ? Maybe there is another formulation of this idea that avoids involving knowledge.

↪180 Proof

So are some axioms more reasonable than others or are axioms necessarily arbitrary ?

Philosophim

Hello Hello. If you're interested in some deep dives into epistemology, I've spent years thinking on the issue here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1

I use my theories in my own day to day life. It works. Here's an introduction.

The one thing we can know is that we are able to discretely experience. Meaning, you can take the experience you have as a whole from all your senses and awareness, and focus on parts of it. This cannot be disproven, therefore we know it as a fact.

Because of this, what we discretely experience is known. The next question of knowledge is identity. Identity is formed when we first discretely experience a "thing". At that point we assign essential properties to it within our own context. Properties that can change but still allow us to keep the identity in our heads for the thing we are observing are non-essential. For example, person A could be standing in one spot, then in another spot at a later time. The location of person A is non-essential to their identity of being person A.

So how do we know that person A is person A upon encountering them again. We simply match the essential properties either consciously or unconsciously with our experience of person A again. The initial claim is a belief. If we examine the situation to the point where it is deductively certain that the person is in fact person A, that is how we know them to be. Could there be information we missed? Sure. But personal knowledge is about the deductions we make within the limits of our own limitations.

The theory goes on to explain how knowledge works through societies, and ultimately explains how we can form cogent inductions. I'll let you read it for yourself if you're interested in exploring more.

The Standard(s) for the Foundation Of Knowledge

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