BTW not saying humans are all that rational, but rather rational some of the time quite consistently.

This post is about how reason comes into direct contact with free will when considering free will and choice - with some unintended consequences regarding materialism. — ToothyMaw

It would probably help if you gave the definition of FW with which you're working here. It seems to vary considerably depending on one's biases. I for instance define it as being able to make my own choices, and not having an external (supernatural?) entity do it for me. Pretty biased, I know. No, I'm not a materialist, but again, maybe you have a different definition of what being a materialist means.

An example of lack of free will is a rabid dog that bites things despite not being the sort of animal to do that. The rabies virus is the external entity controlling the dog.

My more typical example is one where somebody is trying to cross a busy street. There's more than one time to do it safely, but one must still choose a safe one over one that puts you in unreasonable danger. Some people's definition of free will would get this person killed almost every time. The rational robot should have no trouble with the task, because it has the sort of free will that I defined.

The title implies that you're presenting an argument for materialism, but I see no mention of materialism beyond the initial sentence. No 'consequences regarding materialism' are identified. If you're arguing for it, it would seem more logical to spell out the consequences regarding not-materialism.

a. Humans are somewhat inherently rational and take some actions based upon reasoning and internal logic.

So we love to believe, but I've found it to be otherwise. It is actually a good thing that we're not particularly rational.

b. A rational action a need only have internal logic and consistent reasoning given a set of premises g to be rational to an actor x.

OK, but what if the premises are mostly wrong?

d. If actor x has free will, they can choose combinations of courses of action that are subsets of p that are not otherwise available to actor x even with the intent to act rationally.

A simple mechanical device can make such choices. Does such a device have free will then?

e. By necessity, all actions p + a that are considered with the intent to act rationally and those that are precluded by reasoning/faulty logic must be rational or action a is unfree depending upon whether or not free will exists.

Don't understand this. It seems to suggest that all possible actions considered must be rational ones. If one considers an irrational one, the choice eventually made (even of a different action) is not free. That makes no sense, so I probably got it wrong.

each's premises must be differentiated in terms of subsets of the collection of infallible premises q.

The premises are infallible now. Does that means they're necessarily true (which would defeat them being called premises at all), or they're not open to debate, in which case they're irrational biases instead of premises arrived at via rational choice.

Sorry, but it's really hard to follow the points and figure out what you're driving at. Most of what you call a necessity seems to not be necessary at all.

To begin: when discussing “rational” actions, “rational” means in accordance with reason or logic, which are two very different things. A belief that results in an action can have internal logic but be the result of poor reasoning and still be rational according to some faulty premises. I will define rational as such:

An example of something that involves reasoning that is not logical would help clarify this. Maybe something else that is logical but lacks reasoning.

Rational: A reference to any belief that possesses internal logic and reasoning consistent with a set of premises that may or may not be accurate.

It's only about beliefs? Not choices? Must the logic be valid? Plenty of supposedly rational choices are made by poor logic skills, resulting in actions inconsistent with their premises. Reaching for the next cigarette for example, despite knowledge (premises) that doing so will ruin one's health.

If the OP claims that rationality is a force that negates/limits free will, I'd have to agree but with the proviso that as per some sources it (rationality) also liberates in the sense that if a particular factor that influences our decisions is identified, we can take (logical) steps to counter it (effectively).

a. Humans are somewhat inherently rational and take some actions based upon reasoning and internal logic.

b. A rational action a need only have internal logic and consistent reasoning given a set of premises g to be rational to an actor x.

c. The reasoning supplied for the action a of actor x must necessarily preclude all otherwise possible courses of action p, which contains both rational and irrational decisions, based upon reasoning and/or considerations of internal logic.

d. If actor x has free will, they can choose combinations of courses of action that are subsets of p that are not otherwise available to actor x even with the intent to act rationally.

e. By necessity, all actions p + a that are considered with the intent to act rationally and those that are precluded by reasoning/faulty logic must be rational or action a is unfree depending upon whether or not free will exists.

f. If all actions p + a are to be deemed rational or not based upon merit, then each's premises must be differentiated in terms of subsets of the collection of infallible premises q. — ToothyMaw

I don't see that you have properly distinguished between rational and irrational. You seem to be saying that an irrational act follows from some kind of "internal logic", which is logic that may be faulty, and this is the means by which you can say that an irrational act is actually in some sense rational.

So, the fault in (b) is that what you call a "rational action", may actually be irrational, because the internal logic may be faulty, yet the irrational act qualifies as a "rational action" by your definition.

Then, in premise (c) you go way off track. The selection of a course of action, does not necessarily "preclude" all other possible courses of action. One may set out on a course of action, being somewhat unsure of oneself, and ready to change course at a moment's notice. And, the changes which occur at a "moment's notice" are often the most irrational. This is where stress, anxiety, and various emotions can quickly overcome the rationality of one's actions. When a person gets frustrated, angry, or experiences other emotions like these, one's actions may easily become very irrational.

In conclusion, I can say that your representation of "p", at (c), as "all otherwise possible courses of action", being precluded by one's decision, is completely incorrect. What you seem to be neglecting is that it is most often the case that an "irrational action" is one which occurs without due consideration of otherwise possible courses of action. So the proceeding into the irrational act occurs without considering all the other possible courses of action. and without the appropriate reasoning and internal logic, and this is what makes it truly "irrational".

Therefore "p" as the possible courses of action, in an irrational action, is completely backward in your representation. You represent the possible courses of action as having been considered by the acter, when in reality, the irrational acter does not consider those possible courses of action, hence the irrational act follows.

Thanks for the quick reply!

It would probably help if you gave the definition of FW with which you're working here. — noAxioms

FW is the ability to choose between different courses of action unimpeded. This would imply autonomy and the ability to have done otherwise.

It seems to vary considerably depending on one's biases. I for instance define it as being able to make my own choices, and not having an external (supernatural?) entity do it for me. Pretty biased, I know. No, I'm not a materialist, but again, maybe you have a different definition of what being a materialist means. — noAxioms

I admit I didn't really spell out the way the OP relates to materialism because I was getting bored re-reading and refining the post. If the only thing that is relevant to rational discussions is science, math, and logic, that sounds a lot like some sort of materialistic view. Although maybe there is a better word for that?

My more typical example is one where somebody is trying to cross a busy street. There's more than one time to do it safely, but one must still choose a safe one over one that puts you in unreasonable danger. Some people's definition of free will would get this person killed almost every time. The rational robot should have no trouble with the task, because it has the sort of free will that I defined. — noAxioms

Yes, and a smart, rational person that could exercise their free will and get themselves killed could also hit the button that lights up the sign that indicates to them that it is safe to cross the street, because people are often rational or think rationally when making decisions that involve not dying, for instance. So, the presence of free will does in no way imply that humans cannot be as rational as a rational robot when necessary.

a. Humans are somewhat inherently rational and take some actions based upon reasoning and internal logic.
So we love to believe, but I've found it to be otherwise. It is actually a good thing that we're not particularly rational. — noAxioms

I think we should always be rational when we can be, but maybe that's just me. And I think people are consistently rational when it matters.

d. If actor x has free will, they can choose combinations of courses of action that are subsets of p that are not otherwise available to actor x even with the intent to act rationally.
A simple mechanical device can make such choices. Does such a device have free will then? — noAxioms

If the machine is conscious and is actually considering and choosing between different courses of action, then maybe. But a mechanical device cannot think, and thus cannot have free will.

e. By necessity, all actions p + a that are considered with the intent to act rationally and those that are precluded by reasoning/faulty logic must be rational or action a is unfree depending upon whether or not free will exists.
Don't understand this. It seems to suggest that all possible actions considered must be rational ones. If one considers an irrational one, the choice eventually made (even of a different action) is not free. That makes no sense, so I probably got it wrong. — noAxioms

You did. p + a includes both the rational decision made - a - and also the collection of other rational decisions and those that are also not rational - p. So, the whole group together represents the collection of possible actions. I just grouped the possible rational actions not taken with the irrational ones not taken in p. The other irrational actions grouped into p are not able to be deliberately taken because they are precluded by the intent to act rationally.

One can choose another rational course of action, but it will ultimately be unfree, or all of the choices - even the ones precluded by the intent to act rationally - become rational if free will exists.

each's premises must be differentiated in terms of subsets of the collection of infallible premises q.
The premises are infallible now. Does that means they're necessarily true (which would defeat them being called premises at all), or they're not open to debate, in which case they're irrational biases instead of premises arrived at via rational choice. — noAxioms

Yes, the premises must be based on verifiable truths because that way we can sidestep the whole thing about rational actions having false premises yet still being rational. If you have an issue with that it is an issue of definition. To repeat the definition: one can reason with faulty premises and come up with something rational given those premises. I think there is something between irrational biases and things that are necessarily true.

To begin: when discussing “rational” actions, “rational” means in accordance with reason or logic, which are two very different things. A belief that results in an action can have internal logic but be the result of poor reasoning and still be rational according to some faulty premises. I will define rational as such:
An example of something that involves reasoning that is not logical would help clarify this. Maybe something else that is logical but lacks reasoning. — noAxioms

One might assert that the covid vaccine is a death serum intended to reduce the earth's population and that if you don't want to die you shouldn't take it. Logically makes sense, but obviously the vaccine isn't a death serum.

Rational: A reference to any belief that possesses internal logic and reasoning consistent with a set of premises that may or may not be accurate.
It's only about beliefs? Not choices? Must the logic be valid? Plenty of supposedly rational choices are made by poor logic skills, resulting in actions inconsistent with their premises. Reaching for the next cigarette for example, despite knowledge (premises) that doing so will ruin one's health. — noAxioms

If one starts with the false premise that cigarettes are worth ruining one's health then maybe it is rational to smoke a cigarette. And I explain that I also apply the term rational to actions and decisions later in the OP. And yes, the internal logic should be valid. I get that it isn't always when people are actually making decisions, but I can't really call it rational otherwise. But I think my argument applies when we get it right.

I don't see that you have properly distinguished between rational and irrational. You seem to be saying that an irrational act follows from some kind of "internal logic", which is logic that may be faulty, and this is the means by which you can say that an irrational act is actually in some sense rational. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm saying that an act is definitely irrational if it possesses no internal logic, and that if it has internal logic and consistent reasoning - especially with non-contradictory premises - it is definitely rational. Sorry if I didn't make that clear.

So, the fault in (b) is that what you call a "rational action", may actually be irrational, because the internal logic may be faulty, yet the irrational act qualifies as a "rational action" by your definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said "and", not "or". It must have both internal logic and consistent reasoning given as set of premises, but these premises need not be strictly true. If the internal logic is faulty, it cannot be rational even with consistent reasoning given a set of premises according to my definition.

Then, in premise (c) you go way off track. The selection of a course of action, does not necessarily "preclude" all other possible courses of action. One may set out on a course of action, being somewhat unsure of oneself, and ready to change course at a moment's notice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not deny this. I'm saying that if we are talking about someone actually being rational and making a rational decision, they must eliminate all other possibilities because of reasoning - even if that reasoning is faulty. Otherwise, a rational decision is not being made. And what is rational could change and it would be relevant up until a course of action is selected. But while actions are limited by our intent to act rationally, act a is not free, or every action becomes rational.

I am discussing what is the case in a perfect instance of rational decision making. Considerations of whether or not humans make decisions irrationally is irrelevant.

Therefore "p" as the possible courses of action, in an irrational action, is completely backward in your representation. You represent the possible courses of action as having been considered by the acter, when in reality, the irrational acter does not consider those possible courses of action, hence the irrational act follows. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps, but one need not consider every possible irrational course of action to come up with one that is while deliberating. I didn't say that p represents all irrational courses of action, but rather those considered. And even if one does not consider many irrational actions because irrational people don't think before acting, and thus are acting irrationally, people almost always deliberate and consider multiple courses of action if they are acting rationally.

Once again, I am talking about people who are by definition making rational decisions. They are not being irrational if they are looking to spot errors in internal logic or consistent reasoning and, thus, eliminate certain irrational courses of action.

If the OP claims that rationality is a force that negates/limits free will, I'd have to agree but with the proviso that as per some sources it (rationality) also liberates in the sense that if a particular factor that influences our decisions is identified, we can take (logical) steps to counter it (effectively). — Agent Smith

I sort of agree with that, at least insofar as it expands choices. But one can act freely without having any more than two options really. Because that way you could have chosen otherwise.

FW is the ability to choose between different courses of action unimpeded. — ToothyMaw

Fairly aligned with my definition, but even a roomba has this.

This would imply autonomy and the ability to have done otherwise.

This seems to be the classic wording, but it is self-contradictory as worded. It is in past-tense, suggesting that it be somehow possible for both X and ~X to have happened, which is a logical contradiction. Sure, the choice was there at the time, but this is worded as the ability to choose at some time to alter a choice made at a prior time.
This sort of gets into your point c, where you say the choice “must necessarily preclude all otherwise possible courses of action p” which seems to contradict your requirement of ‘could have done otherwise’.
So for example, I am skating fast and come up on a slower skater, too fast to slow in time. The choice is to pass this slower person on the left or right. There are other options like bowl them over and such, but say you choose right. For a while the choice remains open and you can still do otherwise (as pointed out by Meta). But once you veer to the right, the option to go left soon disappears. The point of choice has passed, at which point it is no longer possible to have chosen otherwise. I don’t think this violates free will, but that’s a popular wording nevertheless.

Meta is speaking more of a long-term choice like quitting smoking forever. The choice made: Don’t smoke anymore. But later on, your resolve breaks down and you light up. The choice here is always open to do otherwise. This is different than having done otherwise, which implies some sort of reverse causality where one might decide to change an action made in the past.

If the only thing that is relevant to rational discussions is science, math, and logic, that sounds a lot like some sort of materialistic view. Although maybe there is a better word for that?

That would be a scientific view, one with practical implications. Materialism is a philosophical position that has limited implications for science.
Science currently (not always) operates under methodological naturalism, which means it assumes naturalism (the lack of supernatural phenomena).
Materialism suggests that material (matter) is fundamental at that all can be explained by it, but quantum mechanics seems to suggest otherwise.
The only quantum interpretation that seems to negate free will is something like superdeterminism, where say there are black and white swans all around you, but you are prevented from ever choosing to look in the direction of a black one, so you conclude that all swans are white. Wiki doesn’t even bother to list superdeterminism in its list of valid quantum interpretations.

Yes, and a smart, rational person that could exercise their free will and get themselves killed could also hit the button that lights up the sign that indicates to them that it is safe to cross the street

Using the button lets the device decide for you, which is hardly most people’s idea of free will. The scenario is a normal street crossing where the pedestrian never has the right of way. I don’t think your definition of FW has a problem here, but I’ve seen some definitions that very much would result in fatal choices being made.

I think we should always be rational when we can be, but maybe that's just me. And I think people are consistently rational when it matters.

You said in point a ‘somewhat inherently rational‘ which is something with which I can agree. My observations have shown that we’re fundamentally just animals with animal decision making mechanism, but with an addition of a rational advisor. But the advisor is not in charge and the part that chooses can veto the rational advice, which is very much not being consistently rational, especially when it matters. This seems to be an optimal setup most of the time, making for a fit individual.
My example of when it matters is the lack of rational decisions when it comes to global warming, where personal profit today matters more than the future of the human race in the near future, something which seems not to matter to anybody.

If the machine is conscious and is actually considering and choosing between different courses of action, then maybe.

’Conscious’, another undefined word. Most people with an agenda equate that with ‘is human’ or at least a vertibrate or something, but if a roomba detecting a table leg and choosing to go right or left of it needs to be conscious to do that, then it is conscious because it does that.

But a mechanical device cannot think, and thus cannot have free will.

And there’s the bias. You didn’t make this anthropocentric assertion before. What possible evidence do you have of this? How are you not a mechanical device, albeit a somewhat wet one?

Yes, the premises must be based on verifiable truths

Name a few? Science is no help since it works by inductive reasoning which cannot verify anything, only falsify wrong things. That leaves philosophical positions, few of which lacks a counterpart which suggests the opposite. I mean, I tried elsewhere to suggest that the sum of three and five being eight is an objective truth, and I get pushback from even that.

If one starts with the false premise that cigarettes are worth ruining one's health then maybe it is rational to smoke a cigarette.

Speaking from experience (with something other than cigarettes, something I’ve never tried), that premise is not there. The premise is that the bad habit is not worth it, and the rational decision/resolution made based on that premise, but the choice is overridden anyway by the irrational part that is in charge and wants the short term hit despite all the long term damage that makes it not worth it.

I said "and", not "or". It must have both internal logic and consistent reasoning given as set of premises, but these premises need not be strictly true. If the internal logic is faulty, it cannot be rational even with consistent reasoning given a set of premises according to my definition. — ToothyMaw

OK, that should clarify this matter. You would say that the action is a logical action, even if it is based in false premises. So, for example, if I hold as a belief (a premise), that violence is an acceptable means for getting what I want, so I practise violence when I want something, then this is not acting irrationally?

I do not deny this. I'm saying that if we are talking about someone actually being rational and making a rational decision, they must eliminate all other possibilities because of reasoning - even if that reasoning is faulty. — ToothyMaw

This is not a fair representation of "being rational" at all. It is not necessary that we eliminate all other possibilities before acting, in order to act rationally. It is most often the case that many options are all rational, like noAxiom's right or left, and we must choose from a large number of equally rational options.

And what is rational could change and it would be relevant up until a course of action is selected. But while actions are limited by our intent to act rationally, act a is not free, or every action becomes rational. — ToothyMaw

Nor is this a fair representation. Intentional acts are limited by the intent, but the intent is not necessarily to act rationally. People have all sorts of different intentions, and many will supersede rationality, even forcing rationality right out of the picture sometimes. That's a big problem with morality, we even sometimes know that our acts are irrational yet we go ahead anyway, because the desire for something else is stronger than the desire to be rational.

So it is only by saying that we necessarily intend to act rationally that you can conclude here that the will is not free. But that is not a true premise, because obviously in the majority of our actions we do not even intend to act rationally. Our attentions are directed toward things other than being rational, and we just do them, rational or not, because acting rationally is usually not placed as the top priority.

I am discussing what is the case in a perfect instance of rational decision making. Considerations of whether or not humans make decisions irrationally is irrelevant. — ToothyMaw

I'm afraid that "perfect instance of rational decision making" is an oxymoron. Rational decision making is never perfect, that's why there is always a very strong probability that there was a better course of action than the one taken. We usually don't think about this though, unless there is a very serious, or injurious mistake. So we just take the consequences of our actions as they come, as satisfactory outcomes, not dwelling on the fact that the decision was less than perfect and that if we had taken a different course the outcome might have been even better.

Perhaps, but one need not consider every possible irrational course of action to come up with one that is while deliberating. I didn't say that p represents all irrational courses of action, but rather those considered. And even if one does not consider many irrational actions because irrational people don't think before acting, and thus are acting irrationally, people almost always deliberate and consider multiple courses of action if they are acting rationally. — ToothyMaw

I can't understand what you are trying to say here. Isn't it necessary for a person to deliberate on a possible action, to know whether it is an irrational or a rational act? If the person doesn't consider the possible action, the person will never have any idea as to whether it is the best possible action, or the worst possible action. So each possible action, rational or irrational, must be deliberated on, in order for the person to exclude a possible act as irrational. If a person does not consider all possible actions, the best possible action might be overlooked.

I sort of agree with that, at least insofar as it expands choices. But one can act freely without having any more than two options really. Because that way you could have chosen otherwise. — ToothyMaw

Most interesting. — Ms. Marple

Wasn't I talking about something else though?

Interesting discussion of rationality/free will. I'm not sure rationality is really an important mechanism in regards to free will. I get the point that rationality is a limitation on choice, but even given a situation that extreme rationality prevails over humankind, that is merely a deterministic element to daily life, that really doesn't have any bearing on 'free will'. Sure determinism is the opposite of free will, but if we didn't have the choice to choose determinism and deterministic possibilities we wouldn't really have complete free will. If there is in fact free will in the universe, rationality will not have any effect on it.