I follow Russell, Quine, et. al in seeing there just being one mode of inquiry, which can be arbitrarily subdivided into that one inquiry across several domains (philosophy, science, and mathematics, then, form a spectrum instead of being fundamentally distinct from each other)

In this sense, to me it makes sense only to evaluate philosophy on the standard of truth. I understand this notion of danger you speak of, but these can also be habituated in this notion of truth, in propositions along the form "x ideas influence y people to do z things", which can still be evaluated as fact or false. Based on this, I think the standard of truth is the most general and appropriate standard for philosophical evaluation.

(Also, I may even argue other standards have to collapse to this standard: otherwise, are these other standards claiming they're the right standard? Surely my hypothetical opponents will have it that I'm wrong and that they're right)

In my opinion truth or effects do not effect how philosophy is evaluated. If so Kant wouldn't be regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of all time. His philosophy contributed to Nazism and certain things about his metaphysics and space and time being intuitive are simply nonsense. However, I think the reason Kant is considered one of the greatest philosophers is basically reason itself. He demonstrated mastery of philosophical concepts and presented reasoned arguments that take a great deal of skill and aptitude to confront. Ultimately if philosophy is 'love of wisdom' then philosophy is best evaluated by how much someone's wisdom is loved.

So, in this thread I am asking about how this area is important in evaluating philosophies and philosophical ideas? It is a different way of thinking about truth' from the quest for validity and accuracy of knowledge, which is often valued as the measure by which philosophy is measured. It involves thinking of the potential which they have psychologically, as well as the use and abuse of knowledge.. — Jack Cummins

Have no fear, an intrepid group of philosophers is working on this very issue as we speak.



”A familiar conception of science emphasizes its role in justify­ing belief; we are accustomed to thinking of ourselves as believers who formulate and accept representations of how things are. The meaning and justification of those beliefs would then be the primary target for philosophical explication and assessment. Sellars, Brandom, McDowell, Haugeland, and others within this tradition suggest a different concep­tion of ourselves, which also changes the central tasks for science and
philosophy. We are concept users who engage others and our partially shared surroundings in discursive practice. The primary phenomenon to understand naturalistically is not the content, justification, and truth of beliefs but instead the opening and sustaining of a “space of reasons” in which there could be conceptually articulated meaning and justification at all, including meaningful disagreement and conceptual difference.
This “space of reasons” is an ongoing pattern of interaction among our­selves and with our partially shared surroundings. As Ian Hacking once noted, “Whether a proposition is as it were up for grabs, as a candidate for being true-or-false, depends on whether we have ways to reason about it” (2002, 160). The space of reasons encompasses not only the claims
that we take to be true or false but also the conceptual field and patterns of reasoning within which those claims become intelligible possibilities whose epistemic status can be assessed” (Joseph Rouse)

Determining the psychological, social or material
effects of a philosophy begins with recognizing how it orients us towards the world, how it configures a space of reasons, which truth and falsity doesn’t get at.

They should be evaluated on the basis of accuracy or other measures. The potential of how others might use them is irrelevant to the philosophies themselves. Not only that, but it is a dangerous grammatical mistake to treat words as subjects and human beings as their objects. Philosophies in particular and words in general do not act upon human beings in the way we pretend they do.

If one were able to separate the effects of a philosophy from the 'truth' for the sake of evaluation, wouldn't all efforts toward that end have to be verified by separating actual causes from illusory ones?

I think Aristotle would say this proposal is an infinite regress.

:death: :flower:

I "judge" a philosophy, as CS Peirce taught, by the habits – particularly, ethical and psychological habits – its reflective inquiries and dialectic practices cultivate in the thinker. As Pierre Hadot points out, philosophy (should be) a way of life.

Most of my thinking life I have defined myself (i) in the broadest sense a 'freethinking fallibilist absurdist' and (ii) in particular, the last couple of decades or so, as an 'Epicurean-Spinozist', (iii) which in practice (applied to life, the universe & everything, so to speak) consistently frames, or interprets, (my) existence in terms of 'philosophical ¹realism and methodological ²naturalism'.

= = = = =
(e.g immanentism)¹ https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plane_of_immanence

(e.g. actualism)¹ https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actualism

(e.g. disutilitarianism)¹
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism

(e.g. physicalism)² https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/physicalism-and-its-discontents/methodological-role-of-physicalism-a-minimal-skepticism/ADFEE2705BA45CB7C5C83C4966B72FBB
= = = = =

I've always practiced philosophy like a martial art and hygienic discipline (for maintaining ethical fitness-flexibility) rather than as a scientistic, religious/mystical or ideological endeavor. Unlearning self-immiserating habits (i.e. reducing foolery ~ maladsptive fixations / attachments) rather than seeking "knowledge" (i.e. "ultimate truths") is how I love that which 'the wise' must love, what Socrates ... Spinoza ... Peirce ... Wittgenstein ... call understanding (or lucidity à la Camus) – recognizing what we do not know about whatever (we think) we know – reasoning about yet within the limits of reason – reflectively aligning one's expectations with reality. Ergo: suppositions without dogmas.

Also :point:

Caveat – From the 'history of ideas' this recurring tragedy-farce (which Plato warns of): only when Suppositions are reduced to Dogmas (re: sophistry) can philosophical ideas be abused by ideologues, theocrats & occultists.

I am glad that some people are working on this area Even though it may be regarded as of lesser importance than 'truth', I am sure it has some value for consideration because ideas have profound effects in life beyond whether they are right or wrong logically.

While ideas are needed to be evaluated on the basis of 'truth', to see this as the only matter seems onesided. I am not saying that it is beneficial to be happily deluded or for people to believe lives. It would be ridiculous to go that far, but I am suggesting that some concern or attention should be paid to the effects and repercussions of the impact of ideas on psychological and social aspects of life.

It is probably not possible to separate the 'truth' of ideas from their effects completely. It may be that people need to see some benefits to some kind of belief to pursue it at all. It is just that some ideas may reap more benefits than others and it may not be apparent immediately but seen more clearly retrospectively, including learning from mistakes.

I definitely agree with philosophies as 'a way of life', including the development of habits or as a basis for practice in life. That seems to make them more than abstract principles. It may be that dogmas are a main source of ideas being treated too concretely and without careful examination of their usefulness in life which can be a basis for them being turned into ideologies.

I appreciate your pragmatic spirit.
It seems to me that what counts as a 'benefit' is one of the issues that is most fiercely debated.
I don't want to say there is no world of shared values that could stand as the premise for a shared world. But I am not able to provide the basis for it either.
Where do the facts begin?

Seems to me people are generally drawn to ideas/philosophy that reflect dispositions. We are attracted to ideas which resonate - with which we already have a sympathetic alignment. We can then use a theorist to help us build a scaffolding around our own presuppositions. This is banal, but I've generally found that failed romantics will go for Schopenhauer, self-appointed outliers will be drawn to Nietzsche (and post-modernism) and those who struggle to throw off the religion of their childhood will probably find their way to Jung. And many other variations of the above. I'm drawn to anti-foundationalism because I can't make up my mind about anything. :wink: :razz:

I find it hard to make up my mind on so many ideas, as well as decisions, and it can be difficult when so much time is spent ruminating. I definitely agree that different people are drawn to different philosophies. Part of that is based on psychological issues, but there is the issue whether any philosophies are dangerous intrinsically or not. It is likely that there is a clear subjective aspect, just like with music taste. I do find that nihilism leads me to feel depressed, but I know that there are some who are happy nihilists.

As facts are not always straightforward at all it seems to make sense that some are drawn to different philosophies. It is likely that there is selective bias and people seeing what they wish to see. Perhaps, it is why philosophy seems to be so much of an area for heated debate, with the emotional side involved in the process of logic itself. The emotional aspects beyond logic may also explain why some people change and modify their ideas and perspective through life rather than simply on the basis of rational analysis.

Perhaps, it is why philosophy seems to be so much of an area for heated debate . . . — Jack Cummins

Amongst the philosophical minded. :smile:

Interesting question Jack - it is a dilemma of the greatest importance. We have an obligation to find/tell the truth (accuracy of knowledge) but this might come into conflict with our other obligation which is to prevent harm (potential consequences), truth can be deadly. The free speech vs. censorship issue seems related to the larger point the OP is about.

Imagine if we conclusively prove God doesn't exist. As far as getting to the truth is concerned we get an A+, but what are the consequences - some say chaos will follow - of atheism (re gennaion pseudos).

I'm drawn to anti-foundationalism because I can't make up my mind about anything. — Tom Storm

:smirk:

:pray: :mask:
Thus,

Truth is ugly. We possess art lest we perish of the truth. — Freddy Z

Jack Cummings: With regard to your original post, this is why most theoretical philosophy textbooks on university campusses come with warning labels (if warranted).
Plato: first degree red alert.
Marx: third degree red alert.
Noam Chomski: First degree "safe" green badge.
Hume: yellow badge. (Off the grid.)
Nietzsche: burns the finger of the student who touches it to pick it up for purchase.

Truth is ugly. We possess art lest we perish of the truth — 180 Proof

Amazin' stuff! :up:

Ethics of belief by W. K. Clifford vs. William James' pragmatism

It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. — W. K. Clifford

It is ok to believe without evidence says William James and lists a few of the occasions when we're free to do so.

dialectic — 180 Proof

wellbeing and philosophy — Jack Cummins

To the both of you

Just as Pyrrho the skeptic once said, on any issue there are good arguments for and against i.e. everything is adiaphora (logically undifferentiated) and hence which is the truth and which is the falsehood is anepikrita (undecidable); thus epoché (withold judgment). Summing up, truths are unknowable (in your terms Jack accuracy is impossible).

The only option then, my brain informs me, is to believe stuff that are good for my our well-being/potential effects (pragmatism wins!).

Peircean-Deweyan fallibilism rather than Jamesian 'expedience' (or Rortyan 'relativism').

So, in this thread I am asking about how this area is important in evaluating philosophies and philosophical ideas? It is a different way of thinking about truth' from the quest for validity and accuracy of knowledge — Jack Cummins

I'm not getting this at all.

On the one hand, elsewhere in your OP you seem to raise the spectre of ideas that are dangerous (Nazi ideas). (Also: ideas that wish to appear to be dangerous, i.e., Crowley.)

Can ideas be dangerous? Maybe. I'd rather think it's the people who have bad ideas that are dangerous, but there's just so much evidence that many people are susceptible to ideas that would make them dangerous. I'd rather they weren't. I'd rather people pass by some of the crap out there that passes for thought, but they don't. But the idea of protecting people from ideas, that's kinda sickening, no matter what the idea.

But now here you're talking about knowledge, and saying what? Are you suggesting there is knowledge that is dangerous? That there are some things we aren't meant to know? Like that?

No. Absolutely not. The dangerous ideas contemplated above are no kind of knowledge. They're pretty uniformly bullshit, purpose-built bullshit.

There is no case against knowledge. It was the Frankfurt school, right, that started this thing of treating the Nazis as some sort of apotheosis of the Enlightenment, because they made genocide efficient and mechanical. That's bullshit. The race thinking, the occult, the mysticism, all that's true, and none of it has anything to do with being too rational.

And there are always people who will blame what we're doing to the planet on science -- that we're in this sorcerer's apprentice scenario, wielding knowledge we were not meant to have to terrible effect. That's also bullshit. For a shocking amount of what's wrong with the world, the explanation is just base venality, greed, selfishness, indifference. It is never that someone knows something humans are not meant to. The lesson of the sorcerer's apprentice was already captured by Pope: "A little learning is a dangerous thing. Drink deep or taste not the Pierian spring." If we knew more, sooner, all of us, we might not be in this mess, though it would still have been an uphill battle because venality.

But I digress. Your interest is psychological. You're worried that knowledge might hurt you? Make you sad? Yes, probably. There are generally, for almost any person, things that if they knew them it would make them sad. Not many of those things are philosophy. (The suffering of others should make you sad if you know about it, but in some cases it should also make you angry, and in some cases it should make you appreciate the fleeting joys of life as well. It's a package deal. This world is a vale of soul-making.) Nihilism might count as philosophy, but I don't think it counts as something you can know. It's an idea. Well, it's more like a quarter of an idea. Maybe a third.

It's a good idea, as implied above, not to be susceptible to bad ideas. And not to be susceptible to bullshit. Knowledge of various sorts is often helpful in defending yourself against the tide of crap. I finally read the Analects a few years ago, and Confucius is always talking up tradition, fidelity, fortitude, the sort of stuff you'd expect, but always also learning. No fool.

Your interest is psychological. You're worried that knowledge might hurt you? Make you sad? Yes, probably.

It's a good idea, as implied above, not to be susceptible to bad ideas. And not to be susceptible to bullshit. — Srap Tasmaner

:fire: :up:

... "The use of philosophy is to sadden. A philosophy that saddens no one, that annoys no one, is not a philosophy." ~G. Deleuze — 180 Proof

Peircean-Deweyan fallibilism rather than Jamesian 'expedience' (or Rortyan 'relativism'). — 180 Proof

Si, si! :up:

This is (what I think is) the truth > This is a useful lie.

When I am speaking of the question of 'dangerous' ideas, like the Nazi's on one hand and the question of knowledge as questionable I am probably referring to conflicts in assumptions which have appeared historically. These have been tensions arising at different juncture and are connected to a mixture of fear and changing knowledge, especially in the rise of scientific discovery.

Some of the tensions may be due to the interplay within science and religion. This may have been based on the rise of humanism. Sometimes people speak of humanism as if it is identical with secular humanism. It is not as simple because it goes much further back and was interconnected to a lot of debate which emerged linked to theism and atheism, as well as agnosticism. There was also the conflict between rationalism, which was emerging in science and the romantic movement, from which Nietzsche's thinking stems.

The Nazi movement was connected to the development of ideas within Germany which may have been more related to cultural tensions, especially between Germans and Jews. It is likely that this provided a ground from which certain ideas could have been grasped in support. Hitler was influenced by theosophy and, Jung, who had an interest in the esoteric also wrote some ideas which adopted the view of the superiority of the German race. His own disagreement with Freud was also relevant in the context of the friction between Jews and Germans. Even though Hitler is the figurehead of this, the tension was about implicit cultural war

Also, the emphasis on the distinction between the right and left path is probably related to the political aspects of esotericism. Certain ideas may have been in the hands of the privileged elite and in the hands of organisations such as the Rosrucians. In addition, the emphasis on development of one's potential in esoteric thought may have been discouraged because it goes beyond the following of groupthink and is about exploration.

When I speak of the various 'dangers' it is in the context of many human beings having access to so many ideas so easily. If anything, the biggest danger may be one of confusion. In addition, one's own psychological state may come into play. For example, when I got particularly depressed by nihilism it was in the time of lockdown. So, it is not just about ideas 'out there' but in relation to one's own experience and circumstances.

It is a different way of thinking about truth' from the quest for validity and accuracy of knowledge, which is often valued as the measure by which philosophy is measured. — Jack Cummins

No it isn’t. Philosophising about philosophy is still philosophy. Evaluating some proposed body of ‘philosophical work’ can be done from multiple parallel perspectives (artistically, historically, scientific, psychologically, etc.,.) often, if not always, in some admixture of these lenses of focus.

The horizon always appears as a flat, one-dimensional line but the closer you edge towards it you become aware of the reality … the ‘line’ is as broad as your entire world. Nevertheless we require some form of delineation and a place to anchor ourselves or everythinf is just one big grey and formless mush.

His own disagreement with Freud was also relevant in the context of the friction between Jews and Germans. — Jack Cummins

But you're not saying Jung was antisemitic and that's why he and Freud had a falling out, right? Because that's the sort of thing one ought to have considerable evidence for.

As facts are not always straightforward at all it seems to make sense that some are drawn to different philosophies — Jack Cummins

It is not straight forward. But it can be said that events happen and attempts to understand how and to what extent a reality is shared while it is happening is the work of different philosophies.

In the example of Nietzsche, for instance, he is read by some to argue that events are ultimately arbitrary formations and by others as a rejection of that idea because Nietzsche rejects Kant's separation of subject and object that would be able to say what an accident is.

Which prompts me to wonder if "different philosophies" are like available locations from which to take common objects into view.

You're giving philosoohical ideas much more agency than they possess or deserve, Jack. I don't see the point of worrying about them (tools) being misused or abused by charlatans, criminals and cretins (tools) – that way leads to censorship, etc.

I definitely am not in favour of censorship. The issue of philosophy being used in a negative way was simply something which I was thinking about the other day. I am sure that people are better with philosophy than without it. In my case, the biggest problem is that I overthink but it may be better than too little thinking, although overthinking can be a recipe for insomnia.

When you speak of different philosophies being like different locations for viewing objects, it may be like the many different angles or perspectives of perception. It is as if each person at any given moment is like one of the infinite aspects of the multiverse.