Seems like Ukraine has achieved a strategic surprise.

All the talk about the counterattack in the Kherson region. Even the civilians were warned about the counteroffensive there, plus a lot of artillery bombardment in the section. Then a counterattack in the East. Hopefully the counterattack continues well.

Eerily similar. Guess that's because geography doesn't change much and the same points still make natural boundaries. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:100: :up:

↪ssu Pity poor boethius who thought this could never happen. — Olivier5

What are you talking about?

I stated taking Kherson is the litmus test of Ukrainian counter offensive potential.

It is obviously vulnerable and obviously strategically critical, as holding Kherson West of the Dnieper is a major strategic pain (Russia can constantly threaten counter offensive West of the river, which would be significantly harder if they were stuck on the East side of the river).

Ukraine had a serious offensive there that did not work. It's now said that it was a "faint" to attack around Kharkiv, but that doesn't seem the case to me.

Furthermore, if you could take Kershon you would for the reasons above, there would not be a strategic reason to not take it and hitting the brides is an obvious first step for a serious effort to take it.

The last times Ukraine suffered a strategic defeat, they would take land around Kharkiv, which is not strategically important and the Russians simply tactically retreat to the Russian border, re-advance later, as their war doctrine instructs.

Just a few months ago Ukraine "fought to the border!" and raised a flag, and this seems like
more like a repeat of that .

Kharkiv is simply not a strategically important offensive.

Of course, that they can do any offensive is still meaningful, obviously more than zero; however, armies are tested fighting over strategically important locations and everything else is "tactical retreat" and does not mean so much in itself.

Granted, it's not a good thing to lose territory, so Russia has responded by hitting power plants and taking down half the grid in Ukraine. In terms of pure military analysis, this sort of infrastructure is pretty important for Ukraine's war effort.

Ukraine has not just "won the war" as some parts of the internet seem to think.

Far, far from it.

Could they win?

Yes, with enough NATO support it's possible. But NATO does not give that "enough support".

My position is not "Ukraine can't win", but, as I've made clear many times, my position is US and NATO policy is to support Ukraine just enough to prop it up but not enough to win.

A sign of a "winning" army would be taking Kherson (which I have not said that Ukraine "can't possibly take it", just pointed out that whether they do or not is the best signal of their military potential), and that they couldn't take Kherson so instead attacked land Russia policy is clearly to just retreat from whenever attacked is very much compatible with the hypothesis that US and NATO will not support Ukraine enough to actually win.

Now, the reason the Russians tactically retreat from around Kharkiv whenever there is an offensive there is because it's not strategically important area. The area around Kharkiv only strategically matters in taking Kharkiv, which the Russians have never tried to do

Khodarkovsky, the exiled former Russian oligarch, posted a supposedly leaked government document that refers to internal MOD data and gives the number of Russian dead at 48,759 as of August 24.

Khodarkovsky has connections and resources, and as far as I know, he has not been implicated in disinformation, but I am skeptical. Not only is the figure staggering by itself, it is very close to official Ukrainian military estimates, which one assumes are exaggerated, and much higher than recent US intelligence estimates (70-80k casualties, which probably means about 15-20k dead).

Since the context is compensation payments, this would include only confirmed (and officially admitted) dead, which means that the real number would be higher still. The number would not include those conscripted in the breakaway "republics," but it may include at least some of the dead mercenaries: it is said that the military gets them to sign official contracts to avoid complications.

One wonders why the Telgram platform isn't shut down or "policed". Maybe Putin too relies on them for info... :smirk: — Olivier5

They tried to block it a few years ago. Succeeded only in breaking some innocent sites, as Telegram actively evaded blocking. Eventually they gave up.

Analysts are trying to guess Russia's response to the rout in the Kharkov region. Some fear the worst, reminding us (as @ssu has done in the past) that Russian military exercises often involve simulated nuclear attacks as a means to "deescalate." Until recently, it seems that Putin wasn't quite ready for that last step, although the crazy brinkmanship with the shelling of the largest nuclear plant in Europe came pretty close. But that was more characteristic of the Russian style than a direct escalation: acting stupidly dangerously while denying everything and blaming it on the other side.

The new form that escalation seems to be taking now is attacking Ukraine's critical civil infrastructure, especially its energy system. This is something that Russian war hawks have advocated for a long time. With the heating season coming, such attacks could become deadly. Earlier Ukrainian authorities have warned Donbass residents in cities that have been devastated by Russian bombardment that they had to evacuate or else face freezing temperatures with no light and heating. This could become the reality for Kharkiv and other cities even farther from the frontline.

The strikes on power and transformer stations in the recent days put the lie to the notion that the reason that Russia expends most of its "high-precision" munitions on civilian housing, schools and hospitals is because they are just that inaccurate, or else Russian military lacks up-to-date targeting data. That's not entirely false, but clearly, they can "do better" when they make an effort.

There's a rail nexus in Kupyansk east of Kharkiv. Might be of some importance, don't know.

A minute of silence for the fallen on both sides!

:death: :flower: — Agent Smith

Who knows how many civilians, children, non-combatants have been killed... Destroying infrastructure doesn't help.

LB in Kyiv reports (not independently confirmed) ...

^{Sep 10, 2022 Names of the nameless grave. The story of four people whose bodies were found in a ravine in the Kherson region
Sep 10, 2022 In a de-occupied village of Kharkiv region, they found dead people with traces of torture
Sep 12, 2022 At least a thousand civilians died in Izyum as a result of the armed aggression of the occupiers
Sep 12, 2022 Hostages of geography. How the Russians take revenge on Kharkiv for the counteroffensive
Sep 13, 2022 Not a single local resident remained in the village of Udy in the Kharkiv region, the police said}

Who knows how many civilians, children, non-combatants have been killed... Destroying infrastructure doesn't help. — jorndoe

Also, need to look into long-term consequences of living in war zones - depression, shell-shock, etc. Most statistics on war I've noticed are skewed, mortality (deaths) is given more weightage than morbidity (suffering); antinatalists might need to factor that into their philosophy. Perhaps suffering is hard to measure compared to deaths; after all with the latter all we need to do is count bodies & body parts.

Ukraine had a serious offensive there that did not work. It's now said that it was a "faint" to attack around Kharkiv, but that doesn't seem the case to me. — boethius

There you are going on against a lot of military analysts, to whom it's their actual job to analyze these.

First of all, a military operation to do such an attack has to be methodically planned and prepared a long time before. It's not just political "spin" of "Oh well, our offensive didn't work there, so let's try somewhere else". Military operations aren't done like that.

Kharkiv is simply not a strategically important offensive. — boethius

Really?

I think that when Ukraine is capable of such a counterattack, it tells quite a lot. It doesn't mean that the war is at all over or who will "win". The war can drag on for years still. That Russia has had to withdraw tells a lot of the situation.

Telegram actively evaded blocking. — SophistiCat

Thanks for this background. Still, couldn't they arrest the most negative milbloggers and send them to jail for 15 years?

There you are going on against a lot of military analysts, to whom it's their actual job to analyze these. — ssu

The same analysts that said Russian troops have low morale and will completely collapse ... like 2 days into the war?

Doesn't take an analyst to see Russia still holds Kherson.

I states that Kherson was the litmus test of Ukrainian military potential, it is still in Russian hands ... so I'm not so impressed.

If Kherson fell, then I'd completely agree things are clearly bad for Russia, but that didn't happen. I see no reason to change my analysis to the idea that Kharkiv region was the real prize all along.

There's nothing really in the Kharkiv region, you just have to cross it to take Kharkiv which the Russians have never tried to do, and it's gone back and forth precisely because the Russians have no reason to defend it fiercely and what they are trained to do is tactically retreat and bombard enemy forces.

It's these back and forth manoeuvres around Kharkiv which is where Russia is doing exactly their military doctrine, so it's difficult to say doing what you say is a good idea is somehow an embarrassment.

The reason Russia trains this way is because Russia is massive, so it's better to retreat, bombard as you go, regroup and then counter attack (hopefully) enemy formations that have overstretched their supply lines (see: Napoleon, Hitler).

Really? — ssu

We're not in disagreement. I agree being able to do any offensive is better than being able to do zero.

However, Kharkiv region itself is not critically strategically, unless you want to take Kharkiv. But anything else you want to do you can easily go around, unlike Kherson that is a critical bridge head for the Russians West of the Dnieper and controls the canal bringing water to Crimea (although I assume you'd need both sides of the river to shut that off again, but obviously taking one side is the first step to taking two sides).

What's critical in the current situation is Kherson for the reasons above, and Donbas for the political reasons that is where Russia declared it wants to liberate.

And I made clear I'm not saying this is a "good development" for Russia in some topsy-turvy reasoning. Any general would prefer not losing any ground and not losing any troops, no denying that.

However, development isn't all that great for Ukraine either.

What's a critically strategic battle is something like taking Mariupol or Donetsk; Russians say they're going to take it, Ukraine says they're going to defend it; the commitment of both armies to the battle is clear and the stakes are clear. That's power: you say you're going to do something, then you do it and no one can stop you. Ukraine said they would take Kherson, started something, were stopped. Now they say that was the pan all along, but that still presupposes they don't have the power to take Kherson.

From the Russian point of view, had they lost Kherson that's a major embarrassment they can't spin, so they commit serious troops there. Places that are less important will just be retreated from, counter attacked later if there was reason to.

That's pretty normal strategy.

But I agree that doing any offensive at all is better than doing nothing.

And it is still clearly bad thing even from Russia's perspective, as they've now escalated to Shock and Awe NATO playbook of destroying the electricity grid.

So, yes, militarily speaking that Ukraine can do any offensive is certainly good for Ukraine, but losing the power grid (potentially permanently) is bad for Ukraine.

Also of note, my prediction that Ukraine could not do any offensives at all was without armour in the "javelin hysteria" phase of the war, but these offensives had heavy use of armoured vehicles.

And this is still an important consideration, as it's unclear to me how much armour Ukraine has and can get. If these offensives heavily attrit their armour and if that can't be replaced, then we are not seeing sustainable gains (even if the attacks on the grid aren't a problem).

The same analysts that said Russian troops have low morale and will completely collapse ... like 2 days into the war? — boethius

Nope. Anyone serious hasn't said that.

So, yes, militarily speaking that Ukraine can do any offensive is certainly good for Ukraine, but losing the power grid (potentially permanently) is bad for Ukraine. — boethius

With every tenth Ukrainian being a refugee, the GDP having crashed and the possibility of hyperinflation would be devastating politically in peacetime. But Ukraine is facing an all out war and the people do understand it. Even if Russia's objective isn't to take of all of Ukraine, basically just the Novorossiya-part, it is an existential fight for the Ukrainians. That Russia has now postponed those referendums to join Russia tells very clearly to Ukrainians what is at stake. And there's still the option that Putin goes for martial law.

For us Europeans, living in our comfortable peacetime, energy shortages can be a huge issue.

Nope. Anyone serious hasn't said that. — ssu

Have you followed Western media?

However, if you're simply stating that the "retired generals" and other talking heads in major Western media aren't serious, but propagandists, then of course I agree.

With every tenth Ukrainian being a refugee, the GDP having crashed and the possibility of hyperinflation would be devastating politically in peacetime. — ssu

I'm not talking about those things, but the electricity grid which is required for things like the train system.

Even if Russia's objective isn't to take of all of Ukraine, basically just the Novorossiya-part, it is an existential fight for the Ukrainians. — ssu

So even if Russia's objective is not to threaten the existence of Ukraine ... it's still an existential fight for Ukraine?

That Russia has now postponed those referendums to join Russia tells very clearly to Ukrainians what is at stake. And there's still the option that Putin goes for martial law. — ssu

I'm not sure I understand what you mean here about postponing the elections. I'd interpret that as simply due to practical considerations of the war intensifying or then a diplomatic message that the status of these regions can still be negotiated (if would be more problematic, even perhaps impossible, for Russia to hold elections that declare independence, Russia recognises that independence and then "gives back" the territory; that would no longer make any legal sense).

For us Europeans, living in our comfortable peacetime, energy shortages can be a huge issue. — ssu

Electricity is not just about comfort. Having all sorts of systems running smoothly throughout the war was of critical strategic benefit to Ukrainians, not only in making military operations far easier but also less civilian problems to deal with.

Yes, generators are easy to run for military systems.

However, standing next to a generator is the "most likely to be killed" spot according to my military training. You can place them farther from your encampment but voltage and just the weight of cables places severe limitations on that.

Generators produce significant and persistent IR signatures.

Being able to conduct a war with access to the civilian grid all over the battle space is a major strategic asset (all sorts of systems either need to be plugged in or require battery recharge). Of course, it was a strategic asset gifted by the Russians that they've now clearly ungifted.

Grids are insanely fragile to explosions.

Point is, we are not seeing the war clearly "swing" in Ukraines favour (such as taking Kherson I would agree Russia would be clearly embarrassed, although that still would be a clear sign Ukraine could continue East of the Dnieper).

There are pros and cons for each side in recent developments.

Even ignoring the grid, to evaluate Ukrainians gains we need to know the losses, which don't. If they lost significant and unsustainable armour and troops to take territory that Russia tactically withdrew from, then that's not a victory.

As usual I think we agree, you are making the case developments are good for Ukraine (but we lack information to really know) and I am criticising that position but recognise things are clearly not "100%" in Russia's favour.

I have always accepted that surprises are possible in any way, just I (personally) could not see how offensives without armour would be possible to do, which the current events support (significant armour was used, so a critical question is whether armour attrition rates are sustainable not only for Ukraine but for NATO as a whole).

↪ssu Pity poor boethius who thought this could never happen.
— Olivier5

What are you talking about? — boethius

You seemed to be of the opinion that Ukraine could not win this war. It can, and it will!

Kharkiv is simply not a strategically important offensive. — boethius

Foxes and sour grapes, again. When the Russian are booted out of Ukraine, you will say that Ukraine was not strategically important! :-)

You seem to be of the opinion that Ukraine could not win this war. It can, and it will! — Olivier5

That's obvious.

First, "winning" the war would mean defeating Russia, which is pretty obviously Ukraine is not capable of invading and conquering Russia. That's what "winning a war" means.

For example, allies "won" against Germany by conquering Germany in WWII.

Even if they pushed Russia out of Ukraine that's still not "winning" a war, the war would still be on and Russia could re-invade anytime which is not an end to war in a "winning" state.

There could be military victories followed by a truce that people would consider a win, but there is basically zero chance of that, it would just be a frozen conflict.

Second, retaking Crimea does really seem not feasible from a military point of view, so even Ukraine's "winning light" definition, really does not seem militarily feasible.

Third, Russia could nuke all of Ukraine at anytime, so even if Ukraine did either of the above it's not because Russia "cannot" defeat them military, but because Russia chose not to for political reasons (obviously good political reasons, but not a straightforward military defeat).

Now, what diplomatic resolution to the war would be some sort of "win" is always up for debate, but if we're talking about winning wars in a military sense the conditions are clear: defeat the opposing military, conquer their territory or force surrender in the process of doing that.

Additionally, for sure Ukraine cannot defeat Russia in any of the proposed definitions of "winning" and has never been in a position to be able to.

The conflict is one between Russia and NATO with Ukraine serving as proxies using NATO weapons, NATO training and NATO intelligence.

And, as I've stated, I believe NATO can defeat Russia in a conventional conflict and can supply Ukraine sufficiently to produce some lighter form of battle field victory, even without Nukes which NATO could provide to even the playing field but obviously chooses not to (for the same entirely good political reasons that Russia doesn't nuke Ukraine).

My position is not that NATO does not have the capacity to push the Russians back to the border using Ukraine as proxy soldiers.

My position is that NATO chooses not to.

Ukraine is not capable of invading and conquering Russia. That's what "winning a war" means. — boethius

By this measure, since Russia is not capable of invading and conquering Ukraine, Russia cannot win either.

I'd rather think this is only what it means for people who want to invade other people's land. But for people not bent on invading other countries, winning a war can mean something else, to be defined in each specific case. That is what people mean when they speak of "war goals": What is the specific objective of this specific war? It's not always about conquering and invading.

We don't actually know what Putin was trying to achieve with his war; he hasn't made his war goals public, afraid as he is to be seen as a loser. We will probably never know for sure. Somehow I doubt it was about invading some hectares of land.

A couple of things that's come out so far ...

NATO getting directly involved or officially at war with Putin's Russia ups the stakes markedly, be it internationally, with respect to the Kremlin/Putin, loose-cannon'ery, or whatever;
the latest hi-tech equipment/weaponry, or similar, falling into the wrong hands is a tangible risk.

Someone takes this stuff seriously enough. Maybe direct foreign involvement happens some time, don't know, should it?

Regardless, it seems like foreign aid has made a difference this far:

List of foreign aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War

No one's marching on Moscow or has threatened to do so (as far as I know anyway); should someone? (Alternatively, should someone hand Putin further excuses to whip up domestics and/or spread fear?) Ukraine is being invaded attacked bombed by Putin's Russia — ruinage and killing. Basic facts setting up what others have to contend with and decide from through noise and diversion attempts.

Anyway, apart from the ?s perhaps, nothing new.

With every tenth Ukrainian being a refugee, the GDP having crashed and the possibility of hyperinflation would be devastating politically in peacetime. — ssu

I'm not talking about those things, but the electricity grid which is required for things like the train system. — boethius

What?

Oh you think that a -40% drop in GDP, a naval blockade and every tenth citizen being a refugee don't have real life implication quite somehow comparable to the electricity grid???

So even if Russia's objective is not to threaten the existence of Ukraine ... it's still an existential fight for Ukraine? — boethius

To have connection to the sea, or a long coastline as Ukraine has enjoyed, is quite existential.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean here about postponing the elections. — boethius

Of course.

A referendum on joining Russia has been postponed by the Russian occupation authorities in Kherson, a city in southern Ukraine, due to security concerns.

As the brutal war in Eastern Europe entered day 195 on Tuesday, a purported referendum on joining Russia has been postponed by the Russian occupation authorities in Kherson, a city in southern Ukraine, due to security concerns. According to Kirill Stremousov, the Deputy Head of the territory's military-civilian administration, the Kherson region is prepared for a vote on joining Russia but has postponed it because of security concerns.

During an interview with the Rossiya-1 television channel, Stremousov said, “We have got prepared for voting. We wanted to organize the referendum in the near future, but because of the current developments, I think we will take a pause.” He continued by saying, “It is quite explainable from the practical point of view. We are not running before the hounds and are focused on our key task - to feed people, to ensure their security".

According to the BBC report, the deputy head of the Russian-appointed administration asserted, “This is being paused because of the security situation". He further added that intense Ukrainian bombardment rendered a crucial Kherson bridge inoperable.

Even if they pushed Russia out of Ukraine that's still not "winning" a war, the war would still be on and Russia could re-invade anytime which is not an end to war in a "winning" state. — boethius

Hmmm... has then Israel won any of it's wars against it's neoghbors? It still has them around and never have Israeli soldiers entered Damascus, Amman or Cairo.

referendum on joining Russia has been postponed by the Russian occupation authorities in Kherson

Via TASS (Sep 5, 2022): Kherson region postpones referendum due to security considerations — authorities

Via RFERL (Sep 5, 2022): Kherson Referendum On Joining Russia Postponed, Official Says

(incidentally answers earlier question in the affirmative)

In February, Putin met with Xi in Beijing. Now, Xi will meet Putin somewhere in Central Asia just a month before Xi is poised to cement his place as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.

Meaning what? — magritte

What's more significant is that Xi's first foreign trip since the pandemic began will be not to Russia but to Kazakhstan, and the first head of state he will meet in person will be Tokayev, not Putin. This can't be just a matter of convenience: such moves carry symbolism, not least in Chinese politics. He is putting Putin in his place (pardon the pun).

Still, couldn't they arrest the most negative milbloggers and send them to jail for 15 years? — Olivier5

Good question. I find this puzzling as well. Russian authoritarianism hasn't quite morphed into totalitarianism. I suppose the regime isn't ready to unleash Stalinist purges on its supporters.

With his army on the back foot, is escalation over Ukraine Vladimir Putin’s only real option?

Putin's options:

• Invade Moldova
• Send a ‘stabilisation force’ to Kazakhstan
• Full mobilisation
• Draw NATO in
• Arrange a radiological ‘accident’
• Use tactical nuclear weapons

Good question. I find this puzzling as well. Russian authoritarianism hasn't quite morphed into totalitarianism. I suppose the regime isn't ready to unleash Stalinist purges on its supporters. — SophistiCat

There's obviously a lot of disgruntlement and dissatisfaction how this war is going in Russia. Putin is no Stalin and even if his Russia is totalitarian, it isn't as totalitarian as Stalin's Russia was. Yet people are killed in prominent positions: too many people die in "accidents" to be real accidents.

With his army on the back foot, is escalation over Ukraine Vladimir Putin’s only real option?

Putin's options:
Invade Moldova
Send a ‘stabilisation force’ to Kazakhstan
Full mobilisation
Draw NATO in
Arrange a radiological ‘accident’
Use tactical nuclear weapons — Banno

Invade Moldova > ummm...with what? How to supply them? Russia doesn't have total air superiority over Ukraine and the last thing the Russian troops defending Kherson front are capable to do is to push into Transnistria/Moldova. Troops in Transnistria can basically hold ground there.

Send a ‘stabilisation force’ to Kazakhstan > They already handled that. Kazakhstan is OK for now. Perhaps Armenia would be that place. That Russia would actually defend it's allies that it has (and not only look from the side and be a mediator when it's allies are attacked and lose territory).

Full mobilisiation > Oh, that's going to be so popular in St. Petersburgh and Moscow! But a possibility.

Draw NATO in > Great! Let's have WW3! That's the solution...

Arrange a radiological ‘accident’
Use tactical nuclear weapons > If Ukrainians want to take Crimea, perhaps nuke the narrow corridors into the Peninsula could work. Because Crimea is Russia, according to Putin. Just like defending Russia proper: then the established nuclear doctrine can be said to be followed. Perhaps just a nuclear test on Novaja Zemlija would be enough. That would scare enough of WW3 fearmongers to do the trick. Likely China could tolerate that. Simple fact: Ukrainian battlegroups especially on the vast plains of Ukraine are a lousy target for a tactical nuclear weapon. Weapons of Mass Destruction are more political instruments than solutions for the battlefield.

Likely option(?): hope the Ukrainian offensive loses it's momentum and winter comes quickly. And focus on keeping the power in the Kremlin.

Could the Russians hold Donbas and Crimea if they settled into just those regions?
It would at least be in line with their earlier propag...err statements, perhaps even be sold as keeping a promise to Donbas Russians.
They'd be taking a defensive position, though, which may not sit well with Putin and team.
And, if foreign support to Ukraine was to keep up, then holding those regions might not be feasible, unless some sort of peace deal was struck, which, in turn, might not be acceptable to Ukraine, after all, they've been subject to the invasion fire and whatnot for some time now.
If possible, then the destruction and killing would cease at least, but I'm guessing it wouldn't fly.

No, this is only what it means for people who want to invade other people's land. But for people not bent on invading other countries, winning a war can mean something else, to be defined in each specific case. — Olivier5

Hmmm... has then Israel won any of it's wars against it's neoghbors? It still has them around and never have Israeli soldiers entered Damascus, Amman or Cairo. — ssu

Sure you can define "win" in some way that doesn't involve defeating your enemy, why for the context I'm talking about I put "winning" quotations.

The context where "winning" comes up and where I define "winning the war" as meaning defeating Russia, is addressing the idea of Ukraine not requiring a diplomatic resolution to the war but can achieve victory through military force.

For, even Ukraine pushed Russia back to the border ... that wouldn't be an end to the war, the war would still be on.

And Isreal is a good example of this; without defeating their opponents the war isn't actually over. It's only in hindsight that it makes sense to call the 6 days a war over 6 days, and a win for Isreal. Had fighting re-intensified then it would have been just the first engagement in a larger war.

For example:

Following the war, Egypt initiated clashes along the Suez Canal in what became known as the War of Attrition. — Wikipedia - Six day War

After following other Arab nations in declaring war, Mauritania remained in a declared state of war with Israel until about 1999. — Wikipedia - Six day War

Is the kind of thing that happens when a military battle or campaign is "won" without actually defeating the enemy. States of war continue and the word choice quickly becomes debatable.

6 Days War was initiated by Isreal attacking Egypt pre-emptively ... so according to the definition of repulsing an invasion is a "win", Egypt actually won that war. Obviously, Israelis may argue very differently.

Point is that military conflicts that do not end with one side being defeated are only ultimately ended diplomatically; states of war simply persist even without fighting, and it doesn't make sense to say the war is over ... but a "state of war" persists.

War refers to both military conflict as well as a diplomatic relationship between nations or groups (that may not involve fighting all the time).

Now, in the case of Mauritania's state of war with Isreal that persisted for decades, it doesn't matter all that much because Mauritania did not have practical means to invade and attempt to defeat Isreal any given day. These sorts of state of war is symbolic, but nevertheless there is still technically a war.

However, the Ukraine-Russia situation is very different; pushing back Russia to its borders would not result in a situation such as Isreal and Mauritania where the persisting state of war could be said to be symbolic and there is no real threat. Russia would still be a considerable threat to Ukraine and could re-invade at any moment, the war would not be "over" and Ukraine would not have "won".

To force Russia to accept Ukraine's terms would mean going and defeating Russia, you know: "winning".

The alternative to winning in a military sense to end a war, is a diplomatic resolution (how most wars end); a diplomatic resolution is not a surrender, and so neither side is defeated and neither side "lost the war". Of course, one side will have lost more than the other, but this will always be debatable and each side will point to some evaluation criteria that implies they won, and certainly didn't do as badly as the other side claims.

For example, I have heard Americans mention many times that they sort-of-kind-of won in Vietnam because they killed way more Vietnamese.

In the case of this war, even if Ukraine pushed Russia back to the border and then a diplomatic resolution that ended the war ... at what cost in lives, trauma and infrastructure and economic development? If the West does not rebuild Ukraine as sort-of-kind-of-promised, is that "winning"? We can debate it.

However, this would be fairly hypothetical debate of what clear "winning" would be in a diplomatic resolution after pushing the Russians out of Ukraine, as Ukraine's current stated "war goals" is re-conquering all of Ukrainian territory including Crimea, which really seems completely unfeasible.

Currently Ukraine does not have enough military potential to push Russian's out of their enclave West of the Dnieper which would be a miniature version and far easier task than pushing Russians out of Crimea. And, definitely Ukrainians would push Russians back across the Dnieper if they could; it's a major strategic pain the enemy having a large bridgehead across a water body.

Could the Russians hold Donbas and Crimea if they settled into just those regions? — jorndoe

Crimea seems truly completely unfeasible for Ukrainians to ever reconquer, without NATO supplying systems like an entire fleet of ships and hundreds of fighter aircraft.

With enough NATO support (and Ukrainian willingness to fight to the death as NATO proxies) I would guess it would be possible to push Russia out of Donbas.

However, the risk for NATO of even trying to do that is Russia resorts to tactical nuclear weapons.

NATO policy is very clearly to give enough support to Ukraine that they don't outright lose, but not enough that they can "win", even in very limited definitions of achieving some key war goals.

The situation, however, is very unstable.

However, the dream of a long war that bleeds the Russians may not survive Russia finally implementing NATO's Shock and Awe playbook of disabling the electricity infrastructure.

It was not clear to me how long Ukraine can hold out without electricity (both militarily and civilian endurance). True, people have withstood significant hardship without electricity in past wars, as @ssu points out ... but that was before electricity was a critical need to pretty much all modern social and economic activities.

It seems to me people are attributing a little too much to this offensive. The fact that the captured territory was defended by tripwire troops implies it was not of any importance to Russia.

The only goal, in my opinion, that Ukraine has achieved is that it has signalled to the West to still be capable of offensives, in the hopes to garner more aid. An army that cannot conduct offensives is broken and has in essence already lost - an impression that certainly must have crept in with Western leaders after the failed Kherson offensive.

To followup my post above comparing to Isreal.

Perhaps a good diction for this sort of analysis, is defining military-diplomatic victory, which I would say Isreal definitely achieved in its various confrontations and negotiations with Arab neighbours, in contrast to purely military victory (such as defeat of Nazi Germany by the allies).

The Isreal example is a good example of what to do when you cannot simply defeat your opponents: win battles and negotiate acceptable resolutions.

Isreal did not continuously declare "we will not negotiate!" throughout all these conflicts with neighbours. Neighbours, useful to keep in mind, that had far more extreme rhetoric and really would have completely annihilated Isreal if they could, than Russia has against Ukraine.

That's called: statecraft.

Isreal did not throw temper tantrums and announce completely unrealistic demands in negotiations it rebuked as cowardly.

Isreal made consistent reasonable demands (such as the right to exist) as well as offers of compromise acceptable to opposing countries (despite anti-Isreal rhetoric 1000x more extreme than anything Putin has said about Ukraine), resulting in negotiated peace with Egypt, for example, that involved withdrawing from the Sinai (only way to make peace with Egypt).

Whether one approves or not of Isreal policies vis-a-vis the Palestinians, through force and diplomacy they have achieved key objectives, but it would be foolhardy to dismiss or minimise Israeli diplomats and statecraft in those achievements.

So, it's when people say Ukraine does not need to negotiate and can "win" militarily, which is when I point out that without diplomacy "winning" means conquering and defeating your enemy; otherwise, the war just continues forever.

It seems to me people are attributing a little too much to this offensive. The fact that the captured territory was defended by tripwire troops implies it was not of any importance to Russia. — Tzeentch

Agreed.

Losing Kherson would be both bad militarily (likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, stuck and captured troops) as well as intensely embarrassing.

Retreating from around Kharkiv is certainly some embarrassment, but if it's not important area to hold then Russia can easily reverse the embarrassment with an important victory elsewhere.

Russia has clearly stated its main war objective is conquering the Donbas, which the Kharkiv region is not a part of. So, if Russia goes on to complete conquering all the Donbas then it can declare "winning" this key military objective.

The only goal, in my opinion, that Ukraine has achieved is that it has signalled to the West to still be capable of offensives, in the hopes to garner more aid. An army that cannot conduct offensives is broken and has in essence already lost - an impression that certainly must have crept in with Western leaders after the failed Kherson offensive. — Tzeentch

I believe this is an excellent summary of both my and @ssu debate and position on this subject. Definitely important to show at least some offensive potential.

However, it's entirely possible the withdrawal from around Kharkiv was pre-determined and also pre-determined it would be followed by attacking Ukrainian's electricity grid as militarily "logical" to both home and diplomatic audience (rather than out of the blue).

Foxes and sour grapes, again. When the Russian are booted out of Ukraine, you will say that Ukraine was not strategically important! :-) — Olivier5

This seems to me completely delusional.

And again, I stated my position before these offensives: taking Kherson would be a turning point.

I have not changed my goal posts.

The pro-Ukrainians changed their goal posts as soon as the Kherson offensive failed, but for months were talking about taking Kherson, praising the brilliant Himars attacks on the bridges that would make Russia unable to defend Kherson etc.

If the Ukrainians take Kherson, then I would view that as step one.

There was zero talk of the region around Kharkiv as having any importance before this offensive, the idea it's important is entirely retroactive. Before this re-definition of things what was important was: Kherson, Donbas and also the Nuclear plant, and all talk was on those 3 important things.

Ukraine achieves nothing on those important things ... so goes and does something no one was claiming was important to do and declares a major victory.

And, it's a broken record at this point, just a couple months ago Ukraine "pushed to the border" in Kharkiv region and that was somehow a major victory.