Kettles don’t boil, even though that is the linguistic and therefore logical construct presented in the dialectic, which necessitates the unstated presupposition in order to validate the argument. — Mww

Ha! I hadn't even noticed. Which makes your comment all the more pertinent, I think. In my view, it goes back to what I was saying earlier about expectation and the use of language as a tool. I can communicate relatively well with someone who doesn't even share my language. I could say "the kettle is boiling", add a few gestures and, if I was in the right context, I could probably get the message across even if the other person had no idea what the words meant before our meeting. So what's happening here is not really to do with the semantic content of each word, or the order we put them in. It's to do with another person sharing my model, my expectations. Watching my behaviour, and using their own explanatory model of their own behaviour to predict what I'm thinking. The words are just me helping to facilitate that, but the process is happening anyway, facilitated or not.

HA!!! My post on pg 45 didn’t even get a response, even though it contained a distinct and irreducible answer to the question. Might not be correct, and is certainly open to disagreement, but at least it was there. — Mww

Is Kant's definition of truth, "the accordance of the cognition with its object”, much different to Aristotle's definition "To say of what is that it is ... is true"?

Does "imagining something" imply that the imagined thing is what is the case? How does "knowing something" elevate itself to a higher level than "imagining something", without the required premise, or definition? — Metaphysician Undercover

As @Srap Tasmaner has pointed out, know is a factive [*] term while imagine is not. One can imagine that Trump is still the president of the US but one can't know that he is, since he isn't. The required premise (Kp ⊢ p) comes from observing how the term know is ordinarily used in language.

--

[*] factive
adjective
1. (of a verb, adjective, or noun phrase) presupposing the truth of an embedded sentence that serves as complement, as realize in I didn't realize that he had left, which presupposes that it is true that he had left.

As Srap Tasmaner has pointed out, know is a factive [*] term while imagine is not. — Andrew M

The point is, that for the logic to be valid :"know" must be defined as a "factive" term as a premise. Other wise, this notion that knowing something logically implies the existence of the thing known is an unstated premise which is required for the claimed conclusion. Conclusions which require additional premises other than those stated are not valid conclusions.

The required premise (Kp ⊢ p) comes from observing how the term know is ordinarily used in language. — Andrew M

That's not a premise in Srap's proposal, because it's not stated as a premise. If it were stated then we could judge the truth or falsity of it. This is the problem, relying on unstated premises denies us the capacity to judge the soundness of the premise. Then the unsoundness of the unstated premise is allowed to contaminate the validity of the logic.

Also, there is very much ambiguity in the normal use of the term "know", so that premise, if stated ought to be judged as false (dishonest sophistry). Much more often than not, |know" is used in a fallible way, as I said much earlier. When people say "I know that X is the case", they are most often not claiming absolute certainty, that it is impossible for things to be otherwise

Is Kant's definition of truth, "the accordance of the cognition with its object”, much different to Aristotle's definition "To say of what is that it is ... is true"? — Andrew M

Regarding Aristotle, for those interested, and for context, see Metaphysics, 4, 1011b.

I think much different, yes. “...This will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood....”, which immediately precedes the passage in question, so it appears by defining both, he is merely pointing out what he calls “contraries”, and subsequently, to eliminate what he calls “intermediaries”. In effect, whatever is said about anything at all, that is to say, anything that exists....his words...., must be either entirely true or false, not both under the same conditions, and not part of one and part of the other under the same conditions. So we have statements concerning that which is true or false, but....again....not what true or false is.

As well, it is logically inconsistent to contain the word being defined within its own definition, which Aristotle does, but Kant does not. From that alone, it may be said Aristotle is not defining what truth is, but simply relating truth to that which is not false.

To relate Aristotle’s passage to Kant, it is probably better to use Kant’s, “the mark of truth is that for which the negation is a contradiction”. Not to be confused with, “ the mark of necessity is that for which the negation is impossible”.

Besides, a cognition qua procedural mental event, is far antecedent to its representation in language form in the saying of it. To say a thing is true presupposes, albeit perhaps only metaphysically, the cognition from which the language representing that truth, is assembled in the form of a particular judgement.

Yes? No? Maybe?

So what's happening here is not really to do with the semantic content of each word, or the order we put them in. It's to do with another person sharing my model, my expectations. — Isaac

D’accord. This notion holds even for rote instruction, such that those youngsters in their first years of schooling, by merely perceiving the objects of instruction, still have to relate those objects to an self-contained, internal, system of their own, consistently, with whichever arbitrary source they come from.

Taking the notion a step further, while it is your expectation, it is another’s anticipation. You expect me to understand; I anticipate I will. And vice versa.

We could say that it's true that you did something which matches the description. But that just gets us back to where I started (or was it another thread?), where the truth of "I boiled the kettle" amounts to little more than whether you've used the words correctly in your language. "I boiled the kettle" is true because the thing you did is one of the things the expression could rightly be used to describe. — Isaac

"Little more" is a bit of a covering word there right? It's also true because an event occurred which was parsed as the kettle boiling. You can go down the "argument from illusion" route to contest that claim though. It's another of these things that @Srap Tasmaner and @Mww have highlighted are easy to interpret in terms of old philosophical debates.

This one's a lot like Kant's distinction between phenomenon and noumenon (though please correct me if I'm wrong @Mww) in the context of sensible (proximally environmentally caused) and non-sensible intuition (not proximally caused by environment).

Quoting from SEP

In the section “On the ground of the distinction of all objects into phenomena and noumena”, which he substantially revised for the B Edition, Kant reiterates his argument that we cannot cognize objects beyond the bounds of possible experience, and introduces a complex distinction between phenomena and noumena.

Fortunately, it is relatively clear what phenomena are: “appearances to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories are called phenomena” (A249). Earlier, in the “Aesthetic”, Kant had defined appearance as: “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition” (A34/B20). All objects of empirical intuition are appearances, but only those that are “thought in accordance with the unity of the categories” are phenomena. For instance, if I have a visual after-image or highly disunified visual hallucination, that perception may not represent its object as standing in cause-effect relations, or being an alteration in an absolutely permanent substance. These would be appearances but not phenomena. The objects of “universal experience”, as defined in section 3, are phenomena because the categories determine the a priori conceptual form; universal experience represents its objects under the unity of the categories.

Kant’s then introduces the concept of noumena:

if, however, I suppose that there be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). (A249)

The concept of a noumenon, as defined here, is the concept of an object of cognition for an intellect that is not, like ours, discursive, and thus has a non-sensible form of intuition, which Kant here designates “intellectual intuition”.[64] A sensible intuition is one that can only intuit objects by being causally affected by them; a non-sensible intuition is one in which the intuition of the object brings the object into existence. Thus, the concept of a noumenon is the concept of an object that would be cognized by an intellect whose intuition brings its very objects into existence. Clearly, we do not cognize any noumena, since to cognize an object for us requires intuition and our intuition is sensible, not intellectual.

We could rehash the old ground of sensible vs non-sensible intuition in the context of the semantic content of "the kettle is boiling" necessarily having a causal relationship with the state of the kettle, vs claiming it does not have one (and instead proximally depends upon the correct use of words). More SEP on the matter:

Fortunately, it is relatively clear what phenomena are: “appearances to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories are called phenomena” (A249). Earlier, in the “Aesthetic”, Kant had defined appearance as: “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition” (A34/B20). All objects of empirical intuition are appearances, but only those that are “thought in accordance with the unity of the categories” are phenomena. For instance, if I have a visual after-image or highly disunified visual hallucination, that perception may not represent its object as standing in cause-effect relations, or being an alteration in an absolutely permanent substance. These would be appearances but not phenomena.

Effectively we're arguing about whether semantic content relates to appearance or phenomenon!

We could say that it's true that you did something which matches the description. But that just gets us back to where I started (or was it another thread?), where the truth of "I boiled the kettle" amounts to little more than whether you've used the words correctly in your language. "I boiled the kettle" is true because the thing you did is one of the things the expression could rightly be used to describe. — Isaac

I can understand the claim that the causal relationships we have with the environment place a constraint on the semantic content of phrases, rather than totally determining them. I would like to ask you though, what do you see as causing phrases to have semantic content that we can collectively relate to and are approximately constant between people in many circumstances? To me the simplest explanation is that the causal constraints are so tight that they are also strongly discriminatory about the environmental properties which generate them; like with @Michael's examples about the colour red and its intervals of light wavelength. We might not fix the edge cases of content between orange, yellow and red with that, but we fix it enough for semantic content to iterate over phrases (be learned and propagate) and be coupled to environmental dynamics so hard we can make demonstrative examples and often correctly infer how to use words.

This one's a lot like Kant's distinction between phenomenon and noumenon — fdrake

Effectively we're arguing about whether semantic content relates to appearance or phenomenon! — fdrake

Semantic content: having to do with meaning of linguistic or logic symbols.
A.) neither phenomena nor noumena, as such, have to do with symbols of any kind, with the acknowledgement that representation is itself not a symbol, but an integral member of a particular intelligence system, and......
B.) phenomena arise from sensibility as the faculty of intuition, but noumena arise from understanding as the faculty of thought, and while for human cognition they must work in conjunction with each other, they are entirely different faculties, and in and of themselves, do not relate to each other.

Regarding the kettle is boiling statement, the kettle is a phenomenon, insofar as there is a general, undetermined object of perception susceptible to being represented by a particular conception, or a manifold of related conceptions. (Kettles are metal of a shape, but also this metal or that metal of a shape). So it’s hard to see anything in the present discussion having to do with the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Perfect example of this, in relation to Kant anyway, is that there are a veritable plethora of representations of phenomena, the kettle being one of course, but not a single one, ever, anywhere, representing a noumenon. We can think noumenon, but we can never represent to ourselves, a noumenon. If we cannot represent to ourselves a noumenon, we cannot affirm semantic content for it.

If it be acknowledged that words represent conceptions, and conceptions arise from the faculty of understanding alone, then semantic content has nothing to do with phenomena nor appearance, insofar as those arise from sensibility. Semantic content, then, relates to what we think about phenomena, but does not relate to phenomena themselves. And what we think about phenomena, manifests in the conceptions attached to them. (Correctly....synthesized with them via imagination, but I suspect eyebrows reaching for the heavens here, so.....never mind)
————-

Hell...I’ve come this far, might as well continue, right?

Earlier, in the “Aesthetic”, Kant had defined appearance as: “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition” (A34/B20).

In Kemp Smith 1929 and Guyer/Wood 1989 this is correct, but in Meiklejohn 1856-7 it reads “...The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon...”. Why does this matter, you ask, and I know you are. Well, taking the standard pagination as gospel, in conjunction with the index of terminology, phenomena isn’t even mentioned, except in Meiklejohn, clean up to A249/B306. If phenomena are a condition of sensibility, why did he wait so long to present an exposition as to what they are, and when he did, it was in the section devoted to the faculty of understanding. An explanation for this can be found in the text, but sorta requires a certain interpretive inclination.

Ahhhh....now the nifty stuff, in which has made a great point: appearance with respect to sensibility is presence, the presence of an undetermined object of sensation, the schema of our intuitions; appearance with respect to understanding is image, the schema of our conceptions. We are not conscious of our phenomena, but we are conscious of our images. Kant was an admitted dualist, so does not contradict himself in using appearance in two senses, and the reader must satisfy himself as to the separation logically mandated by their respective use.

When appearance is in the sense of image, it must have been given a semantic content, re: a logical composition, re: a synthesis of related conceptions. Otherwise, there would be nothing comprehensible on which to form a rational judgement, and therefore knowledge of that object we initially sensed, would be false at best hence possibly correctable, or altogether impossible at worst, hence not correctable at all.

Kinda like....the image we construct is what the presence is judged to look like. I mean...we can really envision an object we know, without it being present.

it's (for me) an example of the way that hidden states constrain our models of them. We can have a range if modelled expectations for the entailments of 'boiling a kettle', but none of them can have cold water come out. None of them can result in ice. The hidden states we're trying to reduce surprise in are real and so have constraints. What I'm arguing here (though mostly paraphrasing Ramsey) is that because hidden states are not themselves models, nor bounded in any way, no 'natural kinds', there's no right model. There's only wrong ones. Truth (as correspondence) seems to need a right model. — Isaac

A particular bacterium’s niche involves its normative interactions with sugar molecules, its sensitivity to sugar gradients . Would I be correct in stating that what can surprise this creature, as a hidden state, belongs to this normative functioning? Are hidden states thus bounded in this sense by the the aims of the organism in its niche?
And if this is the case, can we not consider language use as also normative practices of interaction with an environment that is itself ‘bounded’ by the purposes of the language user, even when they are surprised?

the truth of "I boiled the kettle" amounts to little more than whether you've used the words correctly in your language. "I boiled the kettle" is true because the thing you did is one of the things the expression could rightly be used to describe. — Isaac

Do the words merely hook onto and describe an action, or are the words themselves actions , normatively guided forms of doing that aim to change an environment in anticipated ways that can be disappointed or invalidated as well as affirmed by the feedback from the environment they alter?

at (1) we agree to treat a part of the environment as a kettle, at (3) we do the same for 'boiling', but the theory that the kettle at (1) is exhibiting the pattern at (3) is still, like any theory, subject to underdetermination. Something as simple as 'the kettle is boiling' admits of very little wiggle room for such, but still an important point with regards to 'truth' because it means that even the process-derived truth at (6) remains somewhat agreed on. We don't escape the need for us to socially agree in order for something the have a truth value by this means, it's just that we're constrained in what we could ever possibly socially agree to and still function. — Isaac

In keeping with the idea of words as normatively guided actions on the world, intersubjective agreement on truth wouldnt merely be a conceptual normatively divided off from the natural objects that act as causes of our conceptual schemes. Agreement would be equally about material practices that are intrinsic to word use. Our words are not just accountable to the linguistic conventions of the group , but are directly accountable to the feedback from the modifications of material circumstances our words enact.

The point is, that for the logic to be valid :"know" must be defined as a "factive" term as a premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is how knowledge is ordinarily defined. As the following sources show:

1. Socrates: knowledge as true opinion that stays with us (Plato, Meno 97)

2. Knowledge as justified, true belief (SEP - The Analysis of Knowledge)

3. '... one cannot have "knowledge that" of something that is not true. A necessary condition of "A knows that p," therefore, is p.' (Britannica - epistemology)

4. factive: denoting a verb that assigns the status of an established fact to its object (normally a clausal object), e.g. know, regret, resent. (Oxford Languages)

That's not a premise in Srap's proposal, because it's not stated as a premise. If it were stated then we could judge the truth or falsity of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

So let's state it:

$\ \ \ \ \ Kp\ \vdash\ p$

Which is to say, if it is known that p is true then p is true. And from which follows, by modus tollens:

$\ \ \ \ \ \neg p\ \vdash\ \neg Kp$

Which is to say, if p is false then it is not known that p is true

When people say "I know that X is the case", they are most often not claiming absolute certainty, that it is impossible for things to be otherwise — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether people are claiming absolute certainty or not isn't relevant. That knowledge entails truth means only that if someone does know X then X is the case.

So we have statements concerning that which is true or false, but....again....not what true or false is.

As well, it is logically inconsistent to contain the word being defined within its own definition, which Aristotle does, but Kant does not. From that alone, it may be said Aristotle is not defining what truth is, but simply relating truth to that which is not false. — Mww

First, Aristotle says that he is defining truth and falsehood. Second, the word is not defined within its own definition. Truth is defined as "to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not". Falsity is defined as "to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is".

For example, to say of white snow that it is white snow, is true.

Besides, a cognition qua procedural mental event, is far antecedent to its representation in language form in the saying of it. To say a thing is true presupposes, albeit perhaps only metaphysically, the cognition from which the language representing that truth, is assembled in the form of a particular judgement.

Yes? No? Maybe? — Mww

Maybe? For Aristotle, to say something is a cognitive act. Kant says that “The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of [a cognition] with its object, is assumed as granted” (1787, B82) (SEP) Which to me implies that Kant isn't intending to differ from the classical account.

That is how knowledge is ordinarily defined. As the following sources show: — Andrew M

Yes, that is how "knowledge", as the subject of epistemology, is normally defined. But we were not talking about "knowledge", the epistemological subject, we were talking about normal use of "know" as an attitude. And the fact is that people often claim to know things, which turn out to be not the case. So the definitions which epistemologists prescribe as to what "knowledge" ought to mean, do not accurately reflect how "know" is truly used.

But this is all irrelevant, because the point was that without the premise being stated, the logic is invalid.

So let's state it:

     Kp ⊢ p     Kp ⊢ p

Which is to say, if it is known that p is true then p is true. And from which follows, by modus tollens: — Andrew M

So here you have the premise stated. But in Srap's rendition of the propositional attitude, this is not stated as a premise, it is presented as a valid conclusion. Srap also extended this invalid logic to other attitudes, to conclude if it is remembered it is what is the case, if it is seen it is what is the case, and if it is regretted it is what is the case. The point is that one might state these as premises, as you have, to be judged for truth or falsity, but to present them as logically valid conclusions without providing the premises required to make the conclusion, is a mistake.

That knowledge entails truth means only that if someone does know X then X is the case. — Andrew M

You can state this as a premise, in which case I would reject the premise as unsound, because much knowledge ends up not properly representing what is the case, and therefore requiring revision, but you have not yet shown the premises required to make this ("if someone does know X then X is the case") a logically valid conclusion. That is the point I've been making.

The problem I believe is in how you relate "true" to "is the case". If "true" means what is the case, and if knowledge entails truth, then knowing X means that X is the case. However, as I explained above, in common usage knowing X does not mean X is the case. So there is a problem here. But if we conceive of "true" as I proposed earlier in the thread, to be a representation of one's honest belief, then knowing entails truth, as commonly said by epistemologists, but truth does not necessarily mean what is the case.

:up:

And the fact is that people often claim to know things, which turn out to be not the case. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are repeating the same error that I pointed out to you before.

Does it turn out that the person does not know that the proposition, p, is true (i.e. ~Kp), or does it turn out that the person knows that the proposition, p, is not true (i.e. K~p)?

That is, does it turn out that they don’t know p, or that they know not-p?

If the former, then it’s irrelevant to what Srap said. If the latter, then what does it mean that they claim to know p but it turns out they know not-p? How is that possible?

Taking the notion a step further, while it is your expectation, it is another’s anticipation. You expect me to understand; I anticipate I will. And vice versa. — Mww

I think so. I'd been using expectation as if it were synonymous with anticipation. I'm used to talking as if our brains are surprised by what our bodies do. Bayesian models and all that...

It's also true because an event occurred which was parsed as the kettle boiling. — fdrake

"Also"? It seems to be saying the same thing. After all if a different event had occurred, or no event at all, you wouldn't have used the words correctly...?

Effectively we're arguing about whether semantic content relates to appearance or phenomenon! — fdrake

I see it a third way (if that's allowed). Our phenomena are private, so we can't have a public language referring to them. But appearances (hidden states) are inaccessible except via our models, so we can't have a language that's in a one to one correspondence with them either. So to what does the semantic content of expressions refer? My answer is that they refer to a collective fiction. an agreed on, shared model. Just like the fact that we all 'know' Aragorn was king of Gondor. We can talk about Aragorn and his goings on and be right/wrong about them. Kettles are like that. A collective story about the causes of the sensations we all experience, kept consistent by repeated joint activity and repeated joint language use. Which leads directly to...

what do you see as causing phrases to have semantic content that we can collectively relate to and are approximately constant between people in many circumstances? — fdrake

I don't think we do. I think that the success of a expression is a post hoc story. I think we're very good a modelling other people's intentions based on their behaviour and the environment they're in. So when they say "Put the kettle on" we almost know already what it was they wanted done. That's why, if someone with some form of aphasia accidentally said "Put the cat on" in those same circumstances we'd pause only a breath before carrying out exactly the same instruction as if they'd said "put the kettle on". We already seemed to have a good prediction of what it was they meant by the expression before they even said it.

Would I be correct in stating that what can surprise this creature, as a hidden state, belongs to this normative functioning? Are hidden states thus bounded in this sense by the the aims of the organism in its niche? — Joshs

In a sense, yes, but I don't think 'bounded' is quite right, more fuzzy edged than that. A creature (bacterium in this case) has to cohere to survive, it has to resist entropy, forces which would cause it to disintegrate. In order to do that, it has to be able to make changes to its environment (and I'm including it's body here, anything outside of the system's Markov blanket). In order to do that it has to reduce surprise (surprise here is just inconsistency, randomness, entropy).

So yes, this activity will take place within it's niche and so in that sense you're right, but the main driver of this activity is the need to reduce entropy in order to remain a bounded organism (rather than just soup) and that is not bounded by it's particular aims, it's common to any self-organising system.

can we not consider language use as also normative practices of interaction with an environment that is itself ‘bounded’ by the purposes of the language user, even when they are surprised? — Joshs

Yes, I think we can here because language use is a social tool, it only works if other people in our community go along with it. It's a surprise minimisation tool, like any other, it's job is to reduce the surprise other people's behaviour might otherwise exhibit, but it works by us all agreeing, to an extent, on the functions of each expression, the means by which the surprise is reduced. In that sense, language is absolutely going to be bounded by the purposes of the users because we're only going to be able to share models we ourselves have some version of and we don't develop those models in isolation, we often 'pick them off the shelf' of models our society has available for us, most of which are stored and disseminated in the medium of language.

Do the words merely hook onto and describe an action, or are the words themselves actions , normatively guided forms of doing that aim to change an environment in anticipated ways that can be disappointed or invalidated as well as affirmed by the feedback from the environment they alter? — Joshs

Yes, I think it's both. Words (expressions) are definitely actions aimed at making an environment match more closely our expectation of it (the enaction side of active inference). But they only succeed in doing that (when they do succeed) because of the hook they have to other people's models, and this hook is only possible because we quite good at modelling (ie our models are quite accurate predictors of hidden states). If this latter weren't the case, then we'd find it very difficult to share terms, we'd have no common ground over which to share them (unless by complete coincidence!). Which, if I've understood you correctly, is almost exactly what you're saying with...

Agreement would be equally about material practices that are intrinsic to word use. Our words are not just accountable to the linguistic conventions of the group , but are directly accountable to the feedback from the modifications of material circumstances our words enact. — Joshs

...is that right?

what is the point of testing a theory in science?
— Luke

To get a better theory? — Isaac

My guess is you would say that what makes one theory better than another is that it produces less surprises?

So to what does the semantic content of expressions refer? My answer is that they refer to a collective fiction. an agreed on, shared model. Just like the fact that we all 'know' Aragorn was king of Gondor. We can talk about Aragorn and his goings on and be right/wrong about them. Kettles are like that. A collective story about the causes of the sensations we all experience, kept consistent by repeated joint activity and repeated joint language use. — Isaac

[Language is] a surprise minimisation tool, like any other, it's job is to reduce the surprise other people's behaviour might otherwise exhibit, but it works by us all agreeing, to an extent, on the functions of each expression, the means by which the surprise is reduced. In that sense, language is absolutely going to be bounded by the purposes of the users because we're only going to be able to share models we ourselves have some version of and we don't develop those models in isolation, we often 'pick them off the shelf' of models our society has available for us, most of which are stored and disseminated in the medium of language. — Isaac

If the semantic content of expressions refers to a collective fiction, then how is surprise possible?

It is not possible that Aragorn was not king of Gondor, but it is possible that the kettle is not boiling.

That is, it is not possible that "Aragorn was not king of Gondor" is true, but it is possible that "the kettle is not boiling" is true.

Assuming one is fluent with the language/model, it is no surprise that Aragorn is king of Gondor, but it can be a surprise to find the kettle is not boiling.

If truth is no more than semantic content (i.e. if "p is true" is no more than "p"), then there should be no surprises. Otherwise, it could imply that "p is true" is something more substantive than "p".

@Srap Tasmaner @Andrew M @Metaphysician Undercover

Just to play devil's advocate: The Myth of Factive Verbs.

The SEP article on knowledge summarises Hazlett's view as:

Hazlett takes this to motivate divorcing semantic considerations about the verb “to know” from knowledge, the state of traditional epistemic interest. Even though “knows” is, according to Hazlett, not a factive verb, even Hazlett accepts that knowledge itself is a state that can only obtain if its content is true.

This is almost exactly what @Metaphysician Undercover is saying:

Yes, that is how "knowledge", as the subject of epistemology, is normally defined. But we were not talking about "knowledge", the epistemological subject, we were talking about normal use of "know" as an attitude. And the fact is that people often claim to know things, which turn out to be not the case. So the definitions which epistemologists prescribe as to what "knowledge" ought to mean, do not accurately reflect how "know" is truly used. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are repeating the same error that I pointed out to you before.

Does it turn out that the person does not know that the proposition, p, is true (i.e. ~Kp), or does it turn out that the person knows that the proposition, p, is not true (i.e. K~p)?

That is, does it turn out that they don’t know p, or that they know not-p?

If the former, then it’s irrelevant to what Srap said. If the latter, then what does it mean that they claim to know p but it turns out they know not-p? How is that possible? — Luke

Your two options do not contain the correct choice. What is correct, is that what is at one time called "knowledge", is at another time not allowed to be called knowledge. So the same ideas at one point in time qualify to be called "knowledge", yet at a later time are said not to be knowledge. The person knew proposition p as true, then later decided proposition p is not true.

This implies that "knowledge" is a product of judgement, not a product of "what is the case". And, when we recognize the following two premises, knowledge is a product of human judgement, and that human judgement is fallible, we can conclude logically that knowledge may consist of some faulty judgements.

Knowledge is a feature of one's attitude. There is nothing unusual or strange here, just a recognition of the fact that people can change their minds. At one time the person knows "p", and at a later time the person knows "not-p". This demonstrates the need for skepticism. We must always revisit our knowledge, and keep abreast of the need for change.

That is why we ought to define "true" in the way that I proposed, as related to honesty rather than "what is the case". Then we can accurately represent Knowledge as justified true belief, because "true" would then signify the position of the ideas which comprise "knowledge" as relative to an honest attitude, rather than some pie in the sky absolute, referred to as "what is the case".

So there is no need for us to enquire as to what does "what is the case" signify, just a need to enquire as to what does "honesty" signify. The modern trend is to completely ignore the importance of honesty in knowledge, and replace it with something which no one can understand, "what is the case". Then we can endless discuss the meaning of "what is the case" thereby avoiding the true issue which is honesty.

So, what does the paper say about factive verbs?

Which to me implies that Kant isn't intending to differ from the classical account. — Andrew M

I’ll have to leave that alone; I don’t see how classical can be derived from nominal, but that’s ok. Also....once again.....translator’s preference. The SEP quote is right, but mine on pg 45 herein, is also right, and different. In addition, the SEP quote, after “is assumed as granted”, leaves out “...and is presupposed”, which offers a clue as to what exactly definitions are supposed to do.

Nevertheless, there is rather apparently an intended difference between Kant and Aristotle, insofar as the former’s definition contains cognition, while the latter’s does not. They would have been much less different if Aristotle had said, “to think that what is is......”.
———

the word is not defined within its own definition — Andrew M

Granted, on a technicality.

“....This will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood. To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true....”

Still, it appears he writes that truth as such shall be defined, but really only exemplifies what form a true statement would have.

Anyway.....good enough for me. Thanks.

So, what does the paper say about factive verbs? — Metaphysician Undercover

That a verb like "know" isn't factive.

One of my aims here has been to convince you to abandon the idea that the 'factive verbs' form a sui generis semantic or syntactic category. Perhaps there is some sui generis semantic or syntactic category of expressions that deserves the name 'factive verbs' or 'factive expressions', but the list that philosophers usually offer does not comprise such a category. I have made a case for denying that an utterance of "S knows p' is true only if p is true, i.e. that "knows" is factive.

My guess is you would say that what makes one theory better than another is that it produces less surprises? — Luke

Basically, yes.

If the semantic content of expressions refers to a collective fiction, then how is surprise possible?

It is not possible that Aragorn was not king of Gondor, but it is possible that the kettle is not boiling.

That is, it is not possible that "Aragorn was not king of Gondor" is true, but it is possible that "the kettle is not boiling" is true.

Assuming one is fluent with the language/model, it is no surprise that Aragorn is king of Gondor, but it can be a surprise to find the kettle is not boiling.

If truth is no more than semantic content (i.e. if "p is true" is no more than "p"), then there should be no surprises. — Luke

I don't follow your argument here. I'm saying that the function of the collective fiction is to reduce surprise about each other's behaviour. Firstly one can still be surprised by that very behaviour if, for example, the fiction fails in its task. Second, one can still be surprised by one's environment. The actual response and the act of naming it are two different things. You seem to be conflating the two.

Just to play devil's advocate: The Myth of Factive Verbs. — Michael

Nice find, reading it now.

Even though “knows” is, according to Hazlett, not a factive verb, even Hazlett accepts that knowledge itself is a state that can only obtain if its content is true.

We'll see how it goes. I've been using "factive" as a shorthand for this:

The inference rule

     Kp ⊢ p

Allows you to conclude p from Kp — Srap Tasmaner

I would rather take the inference rule as primary and say that our usage of "know" mostly, though imperfectly, follows that -- that this is the nature of knowledge -- rather than saying the inference rule rests on an analysis of how we use the word "knows." (But there's a whole mess there on the relation of logic to the ordinary words we use for reasoning.)

Hazlett says

I'm suggesting, in other words, a divorce for the linguistic theory of knowledge attributions and traditional epistemology.

And I might be okay with that. Still reading.

Maybe it's something of an idiom. "It's raining cats and dogs" can be true, but not literally true. So, "I know p" can be true even if it's not literally true.

Your two options do not contain the correct choice. What is correct, is that what is at one time called "knowledge", is at another time not allowed to be called knowledge. So the same ideas at one point in time qualify to be called "knowledge", yet at a later time are said not to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

That was one of my two options: At one time the person claimed to know p, but it turns out later that they did not know p. That is ~Kp.

The person knew proposition p as true, then later decided proposition p is not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did they "decide" ~Kp or did they "decide" K~p? And how did they "decide" this?

At one time the person knows "p", and at a later time the person knows "not-p". This demonstrates the need for skepticism. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm skeptical. You said at the start of your post that it's ~Kp, but now you are saying it's K~p.


My understanding on the factivity of "know" is that you cannot know ~p where p is true. For example, you cannot know that "the sky is green" where "the sky is blue" is true, you cannot know that "2+2=5" where "2+2=4" is true, etc. It is simply impossible to know ~p without contradiction.

This is why negative knowledge claims (i.e. ~Kp) are irrelevant. It's about positive knowledge of a falsehood.

But you remain ambiguous on whether you are talking about ~Kp or K~p.

There are responses to the paper; I have three queued up that aren't buying it.

Should probably be pushed off to another thread if people want to get into this.

I have three queued up that aren't buying it. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, the SEP article does say that "Hazlett’s diagnosis is deeply controversial".

I don't follow your argument here. I'm saying that the function of the collective fiction is to reduce surprise about each other's behaviour — Isaac

I'm taking this "collective fiction" to be equivalent with our language, which I also take to be roughly equivalent to the view of redundancy/deflationism. If the world is the model, then there should be no surprises. I used your example of '"Aragorn was king of Gondor" is true' to demonstrate this. That proposition is part of the "collective fiction" model and it's not possible that it could be false. But it is possibile that our model could be false in at least some respects, and that we could be surprised, because you speak of the possibility of a better model. Since it is possible that our model could be false in at least some respects, and that we could be surprised, it follows that there is more to truth than a mere "collective fiction".

Firstly one can still be surprised by that very behaviour if, for example, the fiction fails in its task. Second, one can still be surprised by one's environment. The actual response and the act of naming it are two different things. You seem to be conflating the two. — Isaac

No, I'm saying that redundancy conflates the two. If "p is true" means no more than "p" and there is nothing "outside" language, then I don't see how it is possible for the fiction to fail in its task.

That proposition is part of the "collective fiction" model and it's not possible that it could be false. — Luke

I don't understand how it's not possible to be false. "Aragorn is the king of Mordor" is false.

Since it is possible that our model could be false in at least some respects, and that we could be surprised, it follows that there is more to truth than a mere "collective fiction". — Luke

Why? You're connecting 'truth' to surprise but that's the very connection in question - the degree to which the truth of "the kettle is boiling" is connected to the hidden states that might surprise me. I'm not denying that hidden states can cause surprise I'm denying the link (or the strength of it) between them and the semantic content of a speech act such as "the kettle is boiling".

I might have a model of my environment that I interact with and could be surprised by (if I get my predictions wrong, or fail to control it). Correspondence theory seems to want have it that our words somehow try to match that environment. I'm arguing that that's not what our words do. Truth is a property of statements, so the extent to which our words don't match an external world, is the extent to which the truth is unrelated to the external world.

None of which is related to the question of whether that external world can surprise us.

Here's some chitchat about one of his cases, since I can't help it. There are lots of big problems with Hazlett's account, not least his use of Grice.

(1) Alice knew that stealing is a crime.
(2) Alice knew that stealing isn't a crime.
(3) Alice didn't know that stealing is a crime.
(4) Alice wasn't aware that stealing is a crime.

Hazlett points out that both (1) and (3) implicate (either imply or entail) that stealing is a crime, supporting, he thinks, the case that "stealing is a crime" is a (conversational, i.e., non-conventional?) implicature of (1). But what it supports, if anything, is that "stealing is a crime" is a presupposition of (1) and (3). Presupposition is not the same thing as conversational implicature. (On Strawson's account, roughly, where "The present king of France is bald" and "The present king of France is not bald" both presuppose that there is a present king of France.)

Every philosophy neophyte learns to distinguish (2) from (3), and that (2) is not the negation of (1), but at the same time learns that (3) is ambiguous between (2) and (4). The version of (3) that aligns with (2) could be expanded to

(3') Alice didn't know that stealing is a crime because it is isn't.

Now we're in the territory of something else that might look like conversational (rather than conventional) implicature, because this looks like cancellation, just as one might say

(5) I haven't stopped beating my spouse, because I never started beating my spouse.

But similarly, we might say

(6) The present king of France is not bald, because there is no present king of France.

And that's Russell's account, which disambiguates the scope as

(7) It is not the case that the present king of France is bald, because there is no present king of France.

But Russell's account is not based on conversational, non-conventional implicature, but simply entailment. On Russell's account,

(8) The present king of France is bald.

has the logical form

(9) There is a unique entity such that it is the present king of France, and that entity is bald.

Can we apply a similar analysis to Alice's knowledge of the criminality of theft? On the one hand, (3) could have the form:

(10) Stealing is a crime but Alice didn't know that.

or

(11) Stealing is not a crime, so Alice could not know that it is, and therefore did not know that it is.

((Or, "what's more, she didn't know," etc. There are options here.))

(10) makes a simple claim about Alice's epistemic state. (11) makes a claim about what Alice's epistemic state could or could not possibly be, and then infers what it was. Both make simple claims about the criminality of theft, which allow us to negate them by negating that claim, without reference to Alice, as with Russell's analysis.

(10) is noncommittal on whether knowledge entails truth, as it simply states two facts, one about stealing and one about Alice; (11) is not only consistent with a claim that knowledge entails truth, but relies on it.

Where does that leave the question of conversational implicature?

Grice claims that conversational implicature is "triggered" by an apparent violation of a maxim of conversation, which suggests that what you mean by uttering p must be different from the plain meaning of p, in order to preserve the assumption that you are cooperative (and not after all violating a maxim).

It does seem that the most natural reading of

(3) Alice didn't know that stealing is a crime.

is

(10) Stealing is a crime but Alice didn't know that.

rather than (11), and if you mean (11), you need to say so explicitly. Why should that be? And is this indication of how you expect (3) to be understood a case of implicature?

One reason (10) might be the more natural reading is because we expect the clause governed by "know" to be true or to be asserted to be true, so it is surprising bordering on misuse to place after "know" a proposition you assert to be false, just because you intend also to deny that this is a case of knowledge, precisely because its object is false. To speak in such a way would be a rhetorical flourish. ("I know no such thing, because it is not so!")

There may be other points in favor of (10): it is simpler, and more to the point, suggesting compliance with other maxims to be relevant and concise. But what we're looking for, as evidence of implicature, is apparent maxim violation, not compliance.

I'm also tempted to wonder whether (10) is more natural because it is "common knowledge" that stealing is a crime, but that's not (to my memory) part of Grice's account.

I haven't resolved the implicature issue but I still see nothing to support "knows" not being factive.

+++

To clarify: the presupposition analysis relies on a pair of entailments, not implicature; neither of those entails that Alice knows something that is not the case.

(10) says stealing is wrong and she doesn't know it; (11) is perhaps most simply taken as the negation of (2):

(12) Alice did not know that stealing is not a crime.

But then we have ambiguity again, so that's no help, hence (11).

******

Actually there's no need to stress over (11) and its relation to (10). (Or about implicature, since his usage has other issues anyway.)

What Hazlett is interested in is the straightforward (10), because then we have both Kp → p and ~Kp → p. That's the point of his argument. That's supposed to undercut the unique entailment from Kp to p. But that's because he gets there by (10), rather than (11), which doesn't even lead there.

And (10) interprets "Alice didn't know that stealing is a crime" as "Stealing is a crime, and Alice didn't know that," which of course entails that stealing is a crime.

The issue here is how we justify the (10) interpretation of (3). We would not treat all content this way; we would not, for instance, render

(B1) Harry thinks today is Sunday.

as

(B2) Today is Sunday and Harry thinks that.

Why not?

The simplest answer is that "believes" is not factive, but "knows" is. It allows us to rewrite

(K1) S knows that p

as

(K2) p and S knows that.

Another Russellian move would be to look at the scope: we're taking

(3) Alice didn't know that stealing is a crime.

as

(3') It is not the case that: Alice knew that stealing is a crime.

That means we have all of (1) embedded, and it's form should come out that same as before, without negation in front of it. If that's as above, we have a negated conjunction, and our ambiguity is a matter of which conjunct is negated.

(3'') Not both (i) stealing is a crime, and (ii) Alice knew that.

And, again, that analysis only comes off if we have the rewrite rule (K2).

:up:

Words (expressions) are definitely actions aimed at making an environment match more closely our expectation of it (the enaction side of active inference). But they only succeed in doing that (when they do succeed) because of the hook they have to other people's models, and this hook is only possible because we quite good at modelling (ie our models are quite accurate predictors of hidden states). If this latter weren't the case, then we'd find it very difficult to share terms, we'd have no common ground over which to share them (unless by complete coincidence!). Which, if I've understood you correctly, is almost exactly what you're saying with...

Agreement would be equally about material practices that are intrinsic to word use. Our words are not just accountable to the linguistic conventions of the group , but are directly accountable to the feedback from the modifications of material circumstances our words enact.
— Joshs

...is that right? — Isaac

:up: