Can you explain the similarities?
One is a mathematical simplification, the other a philosophical confusion. — Banno
This doesn't seem to be saying anything cogent; can you explain further? — Janus
The "hidden state" being "hidden" doesn't necessarily make the claim that the hidden state's "content", whatever it is, is "hidden" from perception or symbolisation since it's used in those processes AFAIK (that needs to be demonstrated or interpreted out of it). That's like placing a semantic or perceptual veil over reality. — fdrake
It's the difference between a representational relationship... exemplified by a neural model — fdrake
From my perspective, what makes Banno and @Isaac able to agree on a surface level is that they're able to agree that there is a semantic or perceptual veil of some sort; just for Banno it's transparent to the point of non-existence — fdrake
See?As to whether or not the hidden states are hidden from perception... — Janus
To be sure, neural models are not representational... So that doesn't look right. — Banno
So for me there is a veil that doesn't exist...? Again, that doesn't look right. — Banno
the world ends up "English shaped" — fdrake
Why the insults? — Banno
If your use here of "hidden states" is supposed to be the same as Isaac's, then is seems you have made a category error. — Banno
So your claim to know that it isn't "English shaped" is either wrong or I've misunderstood it. — Banno
I find it amusing to supplement passive insult with active? — Janus
With no explanation of what you take Isaac's conception of "hidden states" to be... — Janus
One is a mathematical simplification, the other a philosophical confusion. — Banno
Hidden states are inputs in recurrent neural networks, not things-in-themselves or some other philosophical notion. Confusing the two seems to be the source of the present impasse. — Banno
Can we please postpone that discussion for now? — fdrake
I've got two flavours of worries; — fdrake
As I said to another poster a few days ago, all this says is that we determine the meaning of a proposition. It doesn't follow from this that we determine the truth of a proposition. — Michael
Our language use determines the meaning of the proposition "water is H2O". John believes that this proposition is true and Jane believes that this proposition is false. The laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction entail that one of them is right and one of them is wrong, irrespective of what they or I or anyone else judges to be the case. — Michael
Yes, that is how "knowledge", as the subject of epistemology, is normally defined. But we were not talking about "knowledge", the epistemological subject, we were talking about normal use of "know" as an attitude. — Metaphysician Undercover
And the fact is that people often claim to know things, which turn out to be not the case. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the definitions which epistemologists prescribe as to what "knowledge" ought to mean, do not accurately reflect how "know" is truly used. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if we conceive of "true" as I proposed earlier in the thread, to be a representation of one's honest belief, then knowing entails truth, as commonly said by epistemologists, but truth does not necessarily mean what is the case. — Metaphysician Undercover
Just to play devil's advocate: The Myth of Factive Verbs.
The SEP article on knowledge summarises Hazlett's view as:
Hazlett takes this to motivate divorcing semantic considerations about the verb “to know” from knowledge, the state of traditional epistemic interest. Even though “knows” is, according to Hazlett, not a factive verb, even Hazlett accepts that knowledge itself is a state that can only obtain if its content is true.
This is almost exactly what Metaphysician Undercover is saying — Michael
I’ll have to leave that alone; I don’t see how classical can be derived from nominal, but that’s ok. Also....once again.....translator’s preference. The SEP quote is right, but mine on pg 45 herein, is also right, and different. In addition, the SEP quote, after “is assumed as granted”, leaves out “...and is presupposed”, which offers a clue as to what exactly definitions are supposed to do. — Mww
Nevertheless, there is rather apparently an intended difference between Kant and Aristotle, insofar as the former’s definition contains cognition, while the latter’s does not. They would have been much less different if Aristotle had said, “to think that what is is......”. — Mww
A flat-earther can claim to know that the world is flat. He nonetheless doesn't know that. — Andrew M
Actually, it does. For example, people once said that they knew that Hilary Clinton was going to win the 2016 election. But since she didn't win, they didn't know that at all, they only thought they did. The term knew is retracted because of the implied truth condition. — Andrew M
I see that Oxford Languages lists that as an archaic usage, as in "we appeal to all good men and true to rally to us". — Andrew M
Since the world is all that is the case, it is also a collective story. — Banno
'According to the Bible' or 'Fred says that' are not restricting modifiers; they do not pass through the truth-functional connectives. 'Fred says that not P' and 'Not: Fred says that P' are independent: both, either, or neither might be true. If worlds were like stories or story-tellers, there would indeed be room for worlds according to which contradictions are true. The sad truth about the prevarications of these worlds would not itself be contradictory. But worlds, as I understand them, are not like stories or story-tellers. They are like this world; and this world is no story, not even a true story. — David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds
Because we could never be surprised to find that Aragorn was not king of Gondor, or that "Aragorn was king of Gondor" is false. Surely we know our collective fiction (which is the model, which is the world) in exactly the same way, and with the same level of surety, that we know Aragorn was king of Gondor. So, whence surprise? — Luke
Then the model is not equivalent to the world; there is a distinction between them. The world is not the model or a collective fiction, because the world can surprise us. — Luke
My point was that I'm not assuming, either. How am I begging the question — Luke
Since it is possible that our model could be false in at least some respects, and that we could be surprised, it follows that there is more to truth than a mere "collective fiction". — Luke
I take the position of redundancy to be that there are no matters outside of language, and that the model is equivalent to the world, whether that is your personal view or not. — Luke
If we have modeled imperfectly some detail of the hidden states, but we never encounter evidence that would encourage us to update our model, were we wrong? — Srap Tasmaner
can our model be properly said to supervene upon the hidden states? That is, can there be a change in our model without a change in the ("underlying") hidden states?
If the answer is "no," if our model is not so tightly coupled to the hidden states as that, what is the source of that relative freedom? And if our model is then, to some undetermined degree, independent of the hidden states, what entitles us to describe changes to our model as updates rather than just changes, which could, for all we know, be arbitrary, or, if not arbitrary, free? — Srap Tasmaner
There is nothing, it seems, that we can point to as "evidence" that is outside the model, not even surprise; surprise is not a fact, but part of our model of ourselves. — Srap Tasmaner
What becomes questionable is the claim that the "map" is not the territory but only a map, and the positing of a "genuine" territory out there, somewhere, that the "map" we wander around in is a copy of. That will surely strike most residents of the "map" as an article of faith. Anything can count as evidence for it, and nothing can count as evidence for it. — Srap Tasmaner
I don't think it will quite do to answer that "data underdetermines theory." What "data" there is, is not just theory-laden; it is crushed under the weight of the theory it's carrying on its back. It could, for all we know, be 100% theory. — Srap Tasmaner
(1) nothing entitles us to make any claim that there is such a true state, or to make any claim about how close our conception is to it, — Srap Tasmaner
We have a model that is, for all we know, 100% mistaken, and at the same time, for all we know, all there is and no model at all. — Srap Tasmaner
Before you post "pragmatism" and count that as a job well done, plan on explaining exactly how pragmatism answers any of the questions I asked, or shows the questions to be ill-conceived. — Srap Tasmaner
Since the world is all that is the case, it is also a collective story. That does not meant hat just anything goes. You will still burn your hand if you touch the boiling kettle. — Banno
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