Isaac - would you actually agree that "you burn your hand if you touch the kettle" would be the same as ""you burn your hand if you touch the kettle" is true" though? — fdrake
What do you see as being a significant difference between the "hidden states" that give rise to our models or collective representations, and the noumena that are represented as phenomena? Or perhaps Isaac, if he agrees with you, can answer that question in a more informed way than you can. — Janus
If we accept that model, then the extent to which language mirrors external states is, it seems, not entirely dependant on sensory states, but rather on the intent of active states. To use an analogy with perception, I see language more like saccades than V1 modelling, part of the active state response, not the passive state reception. — Isaac
That's how we determine the truth of a proposition, through judgement. How could the truth of a proposition be determined, except by a judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover
Actually, what you've just stated, that one must be right and the other wrong, is just a judgement itself, made by you, as Mww has already pointed out. — Metaphysician Undercover
A proposition being true and a proposition being determined to be true are two different things. — Michael
There is a correct answer to "how many coins are in the jar?" before we actually count them. — Michael
It's not just a judgement. See above. — Michael
An "answer" is something stated as a reply to a question. If no one has counted the coins, and it was not determined at the time of placing the coins in the jar, and the jar has been watched, then no one knows how many there are, and no one has stated the "correct answer" — Metaphysician Undercover
The fact that this is a mistake is fully exposed in quantum mechanics. The particle's location really is not determined before the process of determination, and it is obviously mistaken to think that it is. Therefore it is only the process of determination (the act of measurement) which can determine "the correct answer". — Metaphysician Undercover
I can say "there are 66 coins in the jar" and that claim can be true even if I haven't counted the coins in the jar and even if nobody knows how many coins are in the jar. — Michael
It's not the case that my claim retroactively becomes either true or false after someone has counted them. And it's not the case that if two people count the coins in the jar and come to a different conclusion that both of them are right. — Michael
We're not talking about quantum states though. — Michael
I take nominal to mean that the definition can't be employed to establish which statements are true — Andrew M
I don't feel qualified to comment on the potential differences because I wouldn't claim to know very much about Kant's noumena. From a complete layman perspective though, Kant's noumena are often referred to as the thing-in-itself, yes? Taking that literally (perhaps erroneously, though) I think the difference would be in that hidden states do not posit any 'thing' at all, they are an informational construct, about data, not material composition. As such they can be an implication of a data model, whereas any thing-in-itself would be ontological? But as I say, I'm not sure as I don't have a deep understanding of noumena. — Isaac
is that they're purposeful fictions. — Isaac
And then with all the causal language being used "noumena" seems wholly innappropriate as a boundary condition for this discussion. I'd say this falls under "empirical psychology", so the transcendental conditions of knowledge won't effect what we have to say here even if we are Kantians. — Moliere
I can say "there are 66 coins in the jar" and that claim can be true even if I haven't counted the coins in the jar and even if nobody knows how many coins are in the jar. — Michael
Thus, as a self-organising system, we must, by definition, have internal states, and boundary states (and there must exist external states). Without these three states we cannot say that there is a system at all, we cannot define it from 'not-system' without defining a boundary and (as far as data is concerned) that boundary must be Markov boundary if the internal network is any more complex than a single ring of nodes. — Isaac
might be interested — fdrake
The idea here (for me) is that despite having to posit hidden states as part of our informational meta-thoery (see my post to Srap above), these states can still be proper objects of reference. "the kettle" doesn't refer to my model of a kettle, it refers to (in the informational model) the hidden state itself. It's like us all speculating what's in the room next door. the subject of our speculations isn't our speculations, the subject of our speculations is what's actually in the room next door. As such, the best way I can find of 'translating' an active inference model to talk of "kettles" is to say that "kettle" refers (when it refers at all, that is - not all uses are referenential, of course) to the hidden state we're modelling, the contents of the room we're speculating about. — Isaac
"the kettle" doesn't refer to my model of a kettle, it refers to (in the informational model) the hidden state itself. — Isaac
"the kettle" doesn't refer to my model of a kettle, it refers to (in the informational model) the hidden state itself.
— Isaac
One can see why Joshs mistakes this for the thing-in-itself, or some such. — Banno
I recall a month or so back a conversation in which it was said (possibly Joshs, again) that the mind creates reality, and we asked the obvious question, if mind creates reality, what does it create it from? Here you are answering that question, showing how the kettle is created by a neural net that interacts with stuff outside it. — Banno
Fair enough; you've so little else to work with. — Banno
@MwwAs such they can be an implication of a data model, whereas any thing-in-itself would be ontological? But as I say, I'm not sure as I don't have a deep understanding of noumena. — Isaac
Neural networks do not use propositions. Hence, some explanation will be needed if they are "description-dependent". — Banno
Neural networks do not use propositions. Hence, some explanation will be needed if they are "description-dependent". — Banno
One can also think of these patterns in terms of forms of description, accounts, schemes... — Joshs
But there are no propositions present in neural nets. — Banno
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