so shouldn’t it be taken for granted he means an answer to “what is truth?”, which must be a definition of it, to be just that? To repeat what he doesn’t mean would be disastrous. — Mww
On the other hand, perhaps one could reject that “truth is.....”, is technically sufficient as a definition, but is rather merely an exposition of the conditions which make all truths possible. But the rejoinder to that would be that’s precisely what a definition does, serves as the criterion for the validity of any conception.
Personal choice, then? — Mww
But as I said, the findings of science are that the position of an electron isn't like the number of coins in the jar. The former is in a superposition, the latter is not. If you want to use science to support your position then you cannot pick and choose which bits you like. — Michael
I'm not even sure what you're asking. If you're asking if somebody has determined the number of coins before somebody has determined the number of coins, then of course not. If you're asking if there is some number of coins before somebody has determined the number of coins, then yes. — Michael
Your argument seems to commit a fallacy of equivocation. — Michael
If the procedure terminates, then the number we have reached is the number of coins that were in the jar before we started counting. — Srap Tasmaner
But if we do agree what to count as a coin and which coins to count, we know there is a procedure available, and that we will be able to determine the number of coins currently in the jar, even if we have not yet made that determination. — Srap Tasmaner
The flat-earther is not claiming it is. He will point to what he regards as evidence for a flat earth. Is his claim thereby justified? — Andrew M
Let me put it differently: Cartesian certainty is not a condition of knowledge, as ordinarily defined and used. — Andrew M
The issue is not about what language one uses to refer to a kettle. It's that someone can conceivably, and honestly, mistake something for being a kettle that is not, or for not being a kettle when it is. — Andrew M
That's exactly the point. Someone might be mistaken about whether the object before them is a kettle. Similarly someone might be mistaken about whether they have knowledge. People can make honest mistakes. They thought it was a kettle when it wasn't. They thought they knew something when they didn't. — Andrew M
One supposes that this counting as is the result of neural processes yet need not be located in any particular process. There need be nothing in common, perhaps, in the neural patterns that enable one to make a cup of tea and the neural process that enables one to order quality Russian Caravan from an online supplier. Yet both are to do with tea. — Banno
In contrast, the latter thinks that Davidsonian "physical properties" and "the micro-structural level" are just theoretical suppositions that are meaningful only within a description or vocabulary.
— Joshs
would be to claim that neural science is imaginary... — Banno
Sorry, I'm not familiar with "Cartesian certainty". Maybe you could explain how it's relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
If anything which may turn out to be false in the future cannot be correctly called knowledge, then there is no such thing as knowledge, because we cannot exclude the possibility of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is not about what language one uses to refer to a kettle. It's that someone can conceivably, and honestly, mistake something for being a kettle that is not, or for not being a kettle when it is.
— Andrew M
I don't see how such an honest mistake is an issue. The person is simply wrong, by the norms of word use. Therefore calling the thing a kettle will create disagreement requiring justification. — Metaphysician Undercover
Retroactively, after counting, we can now employ a premise about temporal continuity, to conclude that this was the number before counting. — Metaphysician Undercover
prior to counting, we have to admit numerous possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree, that prior to counting, we can truthfully say that we might count the coins, apply logic, and say how many coins are in the jar now. But that does not mean that the coins in the jar have a number now. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no number assigned to the supposed quantity within the jar, until the coins are counted — Metaphysician Undercover
Let's return to the beginning of this exchange: — Andrew M
That we "exclude the possibility of mistake" is not a condition of knowledge, as ordinarily defined and used. — Andrew M
That we "exclude the possibility of mistake" is not a condition of knowledge, as ordinarily defined and used.
For example, Alice claims it's raining outside as a result of looking out the window. We can conceive of ways that her claim can be false (say, Bob is hosing the window), and thus not knowledge. But if it is raining outside, then she has knowledge. — Andrew M
The temporal continuity of what? I don't understand the point you're making here. — Srap Tasmaner
The procedure I described, if it terminates at all, yields a unique value. It cannot do otherwise unless the procedure is undermined by other premises. Did you have such a premise in mind? — Srap Tasmaner
Suppose a jar contains some coins, but for no natural number n is it the case that the jar contains n coins. Then for no natural number n is it the case that removing exactly n coins from the jar would leave the jar empty. If the number of coins in the jar could be determined by counting to be some natural number k, then removing exactly k coins from the jar would leave the jar empty; therefore the number of coins in the jar cannot be determined by counting to be any natural number k. — Srap Tasmaner
One supposes that this counting as is the result of neural processes yet need not be located in any particular process. There need be nothing in common, perhaps, in the neural patterns that enable one to make a cup of tea and the neural process that enables one to order quality Russian Caravan from an online supplier. Yet both are to do with tea. — Banno
We must premise a temporal continuity of the quantity in order to conclude that the quantity at the time prior to being counted was the same as the quantity at the later time of being counted — Metaphysician Undercover
But to say that there will be one number, after being counted, out of a present infinite number of possibilities, is not the same as saying that there is one number presently. — Metaphysician Undercover
That we "exclude the possibility of mistake" is not a condition of knowledge, as ordinarily defined and used. — Andrew M
Your reasoning appears to be that there are 66 coins in the jar because we have counted 66 coins, whereas my reasoning is that we have counted 66 coins because there are 66 coins in the jar. — Michael
The problem with your reasoning is that it doesn't explain why it is that we counted 66 coins (and not, say, 666), and also that it can lead to the contradiction which I reject in (b). — Michael
What do you mean by a number being assigned? — Michael
No, we needn't take that as a premise. We can argue for it. — Srap Tasmaner
If we remove a coin from the jar, then there is some time t1, after t0 and after we have removed one coin but before we have removed another. If the jar is empty at t1, then the initial state of the jar at t0 was that it contained 1 coin, and 1 is a natural number. If the jar is not empty at t1, we go again. If we remove another coin, then there is a time t2, after t1 and after we have removed another coin but before removing any others (if there are any). If the jar is empty at t2, then it contained 1 coin at t1, and 2 coins at t0, and 2 is a natural number. If the jar is not empty at t2, we go again. — Srap Tasmaner
Prior to this, you were insisting that if something which is thought to be "known" turns out to be incorrect, then we must conclude that at the time when it was thought to be known, it really was not known. — Metaphysician Undercover
That we "exclude the possibility of mistake" is not a condition of knowledge, as ordinarily defined and used.
For example, Alice claims it's raining outside as a result of looking out the window. We can conceive of ways that her claim can be false (say, Bob is hosing the window), and thus not knowledge. But if it is raining outside, then she has knowledge.
— Andrew M
I don't see how this is an example of anything relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
(1) If it is raining outside, then Alice knows that it is raining outside. She knows that even though she didn't exclude the possibility that it was not raining and that Bob was hosing the window. She knows it is raining because her belief is both justifiable and true. Alice has satisfied the conditions for knowledge. — Andrew M
I think this is just too vague. — Srap Tasmaner
The trouble is not our knowledge, but our beliefs, and around here it's our beliefs that we know that p, which clearly can be mistaken even though our knowledge cannot. — Srap Tasmaner
It's also possible that generally people only believe that they're probably wrong about something, and that's as much "fallibility" as they're committed to. — Srap Tasmaner
Even though the original claim was that my beliefs are overwhelmingly right, I have the epistemic problem of not knowing which are the good ones and which the bad. (But attaching a modicum of doubt to all your beliefs is so ham-fisted, I don't think anyone actually does it or can do it.) — Srap Tasmaner
(1) If it is raining outside, then Alice knows that it is raining outside. She knows that even though she didn't exclude the possibility that it was not raining and that Bob was hosing the window. She knows it is raining because her belief is both justifiable and true. Alice has satisfied the conditions for knowledge.
— Andrew M
OK, but someone has to judge "if it is raining outside", in order for us to call what Alice has "knowledge". We need to know the answer to this. And if we know the answer to this, then we have excluded the possibility of mistake. So we cannot say whether Alice has "knowledge", unless we determine that it is raining and there is no possibility that it is not raining, thereby excluding the possibility of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think this is just too vague.
— Srap Tasmaner
Just trying to capture the essential idea here! Apparently not successfully... — Andrew M
I think the other issue is that standards can vary according to context. For example, Alice might know that it's raining outside, having looked. But when challenged with the possibility of Bob hosing the window, making that possibility salient, she might doubt it and go and look more carefully. — Andrew M
↪Metaphysician Undercover
I addressed in my posts a single issue you raised: must the coins in a jar actually be counted, by you, me, God, or anyone, to know that there is a specific number of coins in such a jar? — Srap Tasmaner
In quantum mechanics, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to speak "meaningfully" of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e., the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured). — Counterfactual definiteness - Wikipedia
One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial, one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. — On Interpretation, §9 - Aristotle (Problem of future contingents - Wikipedia)
You seem to be saying that the numeral "66" is already related to the coins, prior to being counted — Metaphysician Undercover
For there to be "66 coins in the jar", it is necessary that "66" is the symbol which has been associated with the quantity of coins in the jar. You seem to think that the symbol "66" is somehow magically associated with the coins in the jar, without anyone making that association. How do you believe that this comes about, that the symbol "66" is related to the coins in the jar, without someone making that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover
Truth alone cannot resolve contradictions, because two people will both insist on knowing "the truth", even though they contradict each other. — Metaphysician Undercover
for the agent, there would be a potential (but not actual) number of coins in the jar that is only actualized in the counting of the coins. — Andrew M
To use a macroscopic analogy, an interpretation which rejects counterfactual definiteness views measuring the position as akin to asking where in a room a person is located, while measuring the momentum is akin to asking whether the person's lap is empty or has something on it. If the person's position has changed by making him or her stand rather than sit, then that person has no lap and neither the statement "the person's lap is empty" nor "there is something on the person's lap" is true. Any statistical calculation based on values where the person is standing at some place in the room and simultaneously has a lap as if sitting would be meaningless. — Same wiki article on counterfactuals in QM
I think it is an inescapable entailment in Kant's philosophy that the noumenal gives rise to the phenomenal. or it could be said that phenomena are supervenient on noumena. Can we avoid thinking of this supervenience as some kind of being-caused? Even in relation to phenomenal experience, causation is postulated, not ever directly experienced except perhaps in the case of our own bodies acting upon and being acted upon, and even that seems arguable.I believe there is a Kantian distinction between the "thing in itself" and noumena; the former is a purely formal or logical requirement to the effect that if there is something as perceived there must be a corresponding thing as it is in itself. .'Noumena' I take to signify the general hidden or invisible nature of what is affecting us pre-cognitively such as to manifest as perceptual phenomena. — Janus
Thanks. So 'noumena' might be closer to hidden states in that respect, but I'd be interested to hear what you think of what Moliere says about the problem of causality. Hidden states are definitely considered causal. — Isaac
In the first scenario it is raining, in the second scenario it is not. According to knowledge as justified, true belief, do you judge that Alice has knowledge in either or both of those scenarios? — Andrew M
That question I answered as clearly as I could, and even provided informal proofs to support my position.
If you have no rebuttal besides "maybe coins spontaneously appear and disappear," then we're done here. — Srap Tasmaner
In the sense that the numeral refers to a number and that number is the number of coins prior to being counted. — Michael
t's not magic. We agree to use the word "triangle" to refer to the shape of some object that we have seen. Now, every object with that shape -- even objects we haven't seen -- are triangles, even though we haven't explicitly used the word "triangle" to refer to each of those objects individually. They are triangles by virtue of having the same shape as an object that we have referred to as having a shape named "triangle". — Michael
We've already agreed that the numeral "66" refers to a specific number.. — Michael
You make the mistake of saying that because we need to explicitly assign a particular word or numeral to a particular kind that we need to explicitly assign that particular word or numeral to every individual of that kind. This is false. We need to do the former to establish meaning, but we don't need to do the latter. — Michael
The T-schema is useful here. There are 66 coins iff "there are 66 coins" is true, there are 67 coins iff "there are 67 coins" is true, there cannot be both 66 and 67 coins, therefore "there are 66 coins" and "there are 67 coins" cannot both be true. — Michael
This is consistent with how we actually understand the meaning of the word "true". I don't know why you're trying to make it mean "honest belief". What evidence or reasoning is there for that? — Michael
On the other, you would be claiming that "there are 64 coins in the jar" is neither true nor false. That is, you are rejecting bivalence, the view that all statements are either true or they are false. — Banno
Here, you are asserting "In the first scenario it is raining, in the second scenario it is not". Do you know whether or not it is raining in each scenario, in an absolute way? If so, I can give you an answer. If not, I cannot. This is because I cannot say whether Alice has knowledge or not unless I know infallibly whether or not it is raining. — Metaphysician Undercover
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