Einstein seems to answer that the past and future exist as much as the present. If we grant this, then there is nothing mysterious about a specialness to "now" that cannot be explained by science. It is simply an illusion. After all, every single "now" has this apparent specialness. — hypericin
To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin
I am wondering more about what it is saying about the person who says it and in what situation saying it would be of any use. — Fooloso4
I am wondering more about what it is saying about the person who says it and in what situation saying it would be of any use. — Fooloso4
To say “This rock exists” is saying something about the rock. But have I said anything less if I just pointed to the rock and said “This rock”. — Richard B
And would I say anything more if I said “This is the rock I stubbed my toe on yesterday and by the way it still exists. You mean now? No, I mean still exists in yesterday.” — Richard B
This is good example of confusion disguised as deep metaphysical musings. — Richard B
This rock exists cannot be said of the rock of yesterday nor the rock of tomorrow,
— Mww
No, but you can say, "the rock of yesterday exists", "the rock of tomorrow exists". — hypericin
The present is 2022 AD. I exist.
We're in the future relative to 1997. I exist.
We're in the past relative to 2060. I exist. — Agent Smith
Could I christen yesterday at 10:30 pm "now"? — Tate
(1) Tensed language centered on our notional now (most common);
(2) Untensed language with "timestamps" or times as parameters (common among scientists and not too uncommon among philosophers);
(3) Tensed language centered on some other time than our notional now (pretty uncommon except for the historical present -- the option you asked about). — Srap Tasmaner
According to presentism, if we were to make an accurate list of all the things that exist...there would be not a single merely past or merely future object on the list. Thus, you and the Taj Mahal would be on the list, but neither Socrates nor any future Martian outposts would be included. (Assuming, that is, both (i) that each person is identical to his or her body, and (ii) that Socrates’s body ceased to be present—thereby going out of existence, according to presentism—shortly after he died. Those who reject the first of these assumptions should simply replace the examples in this article involving allegedly non-present people with appropriate examples involving the non-present bodies of those people.) And it is not just Socrates and future Martian outposts, either—the same goes for any other putative object that lacks the property of being present. No such objects exist, according to presentism.
There are different ways to oppose presentism—that is, to defend the view that at least some non-present objects exist. One version of non-presentism is eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist. According to eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things.
It might be objected that there is something odd about attributing to a non-presentist the claim that Socrates exists now, since there is a sense in which that claim is clearly false. In order to forestall this objection, let us distinguish between two senses of “x exists now”. In one sense, which we can call the temporal location sense, this expression is synonymous with “x is present”. The non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal location sense of “x exists now”, it is true that no non-present objects exist now. But in the other sense of “x exists now”, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that “x exists now” is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers. Using the ontological sense of “exists”, we can talk about something existing in a perfectly general sense, without presupposing anything about its temporal location. When we attribute to non-presentists the claim that non-present objects like Socrates exist right now, we commit non-presentists only to the claim that these non-present objects exist now in the ontological sense (the one involving the most unrestricted quantifiers). — SEP article on Time
To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin
One can certainly say something about the rock in the present, the present being defined as what is happening right now, at this moment, while I am looking, and maybe feeling, the rock. But I cannot say anything with certainty about that rock when the moment passes and the event is something in the past. Much less can I say anything with certainty about what will happen to this rock in the future.To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin
To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin
To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin
If they are real, then where are they? — Tzeentch
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.