Does the weather forecaster actually know something — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is, who determines whether or not it is raining. — Metaphysician Undercover
By Andrew's definition, we can't honestly call anything knowledge, because we can't really know whether it actually is knowledge or not. I don't agree, that's why I argued against that. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I said, is that your logic is not valid without a premise of temporal continuity. That a coin might disappear without one noticing, is just a simple example as to why such a premise is necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is "a number"? Are you taking a position of Platonic realism here? — Metaphysician Undercover
How do you honestly believe that there are objects called "triangles" which have never been called by that name?
The issue is, that the thing must be judged to be of that kind. because a "kind" is something artificial, created by human minds, a category. A natural object isn't just automatically of this kind or that kind, because it must fulfill a set list of criteria in order to be of any specific kind. And, whether or not something fulfills a list of criteria is a judgment.
This does not tell us whether "there are 66 coins" is the product of a judgement, or whether it's something independent from judgement. Nor does it tell us if there is 66, or 67 coins. It really tells us nothing. It is a useless statement. — Metaphysician Undercover
No one determines whether or not it is raining. — Banno
Then, how do, or could, we know that something is knowledge, according to you? (A concise, short-winded answer will do just fine). — Janus
If you mean that my argument is only valid in a world very much like ours, I agree. — Srap Tasmaner
To return to the issue at hand: I consider my arguments valid in worlds very much like this one. In worlds like this, if the number of coins in a jar can be determined by counting them, then you can know, without counting, that there is a specific number of coins in the jar. — Srap Tasmaner
Do you agree? — Srap Tasmaner
No. A number is a value. It is the "propositional content" of one or more mathematical symbols. For example, 0.250.25, 1414, and 2828 are different mathematical symbols that refer to the same mathematical value. — Michael
Being called a triangle and being a triangle are two different things. — Michael
This is where we disagree. Objects exist and have properties even if we are not aware of them. — Michael
You seem to be asserting that a thing which a person might name as a triangle, has an independent property, which you call "being a triangle", which is separate from being named a triangle. How could you justify such a claim? — Metaphysician Undercover
A "property" is a concept — Metaphysician Undercover
This is how "truth" is most commonly used. When someone is asked to tell the truth, the person is asked to state what they honestly believe. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think the mathematical vocabulary is clearer: if they can be counted, then the cardinality of the set of coins in the jar exists and is unique, though we do not know its value until we count. — Srap Tasmaner
A person who has no lap has nothing in their lap. Russell's analysis of definite descriptions works just fine here, but physicists don't read Bertrand Russell. It's also tempting here to give a counterfactual analysis: if a standing person holding nothing were to sit, they would have an empty lap; if a standing person holding a child on their back and nothing else were to sit, they would have an empty lap, until another child scrambled onto it; if a standing person holding a child against their chest were to sit and loosen their grip upon the child even a little, they would have a child in their lap, and they would sigh with relief. — Srap Tasmaner
Quantum mechanics may have some specific prohibitions on the use of counterfactual values in calculations, but it is, for me anyway, inconceivable (!) that we could get along without counterfactuals. They're hiding absolutely everywhere. — Srap Tasmaner
The issue is, who determines whether or not it is raining. Here, you are asserting "In the first scenario it is raining, in the second scenario it is not". Do you know whether or not it is raining in each scenario, in an absolute way? If so, I can give you an answer. If not, I cannot. This is because I cannot say whether Alice has knowledge or not unless I know infallibly whether or not it is raining. You have provided no justification for your assertions, therefore I cannot honestly give you an answer. So I do not believe that you know infallibly whether or not it is raining in each of those scenarios — Metaphysician Undercover
That is, according to your representation of "knowledge", which requires infallibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
if a pointer is measured to be pointing North along the North-South axis, then what direction is it pointing along the West-East axis? — Andrew M
In our world, time passes, and things change as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then, how do, or could, we know that something is knowledge, according to you? (A concise, short-winded answer will do just fine). — Janus
Your question is misleading. We do not judge if something is knowledge or not, because we do not see, or sense things which might be judged as knowledge. What I think is that "knowledge" is something which we infer the existence of, through people's actions.
As I said earlier. "knowledge" consists of principles used for willed actions. If a person acts intentionally then the person has knowledge. What is required is to judge actions, and if they are judged as intentional, then the person has knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
Close enough. To get closer, change “if not” to “but not”. — Mww
you would say the ding an sich, being the empirical object, is empirically real? — Janus
Anyway....this is far too complex to get into here, because the concept is spread out over so much stuff. And sorry this doesn’t help much. — Mww
The independent property is having three edges and vertices. — Michael
They have a nature, including a mass, an extended position (i.e. a shape), and often a certain kind of movement. — Michael
That we decide which words refer to which properties isn't that the object only has these properties if we refer to it using these words. This is the fundamental mistake you keep making. If something has three edges and vertices then it is a triangle even if we do not call it a triangle. — Michael
If I ask someone to tell me the truth of where my kidnapped wife has been hidden I'm not interested in where the person believes my wife has been hidden; I'm interested in where she's actually been hidden. — Michael
The request to "tell the truth" is premised on the notion that things actually are as this person believes them to be. — Michael
They are hypothetical scenarios, and you know up front whether or not it is raining in each scenario. In the first scenario, it is raining (that's a given premise of the hypothetical). In the second scenario, it is not raining. — Andrew M
No, as demonstrated by the first scenario, Alice knows that it is raining not because she is infallible (or because she had ruled out all other possibilities such as Bob hosing the window), but because she had a justified, true belief. — Andrew M
The issue here is not all of metaphysics but a simple conditional: if they can be counted -- if -- then there must be a specific number of coins in the jar right now. — Srap Tasmaner
But it is easily fooled because all it does is count, and counting doesn't require -- so the machine doesn't offer -- judgment. — Srap Tasmaner
My question was concerning how to distinguish between belief and knowledge. Beliefs can be understood to be "principles used for willed actions". So "being intentional" cannot be a sufficient criterion for saying that someone has knowledge as opposed to merely having belief. — Janus
Bear in mind I am not concerned with "know-how" but with 'knowing-that' (knowing how to do anything does not seem to have anything to do with justified true belief). So, do you have a way to distinguish between knowledge and belief, or do you reject the distinction? — Janus
You didn't even have to align your direction right on the North-South axis to get here: if it were pointing exactly Northeast (45° off North), or, you know, almost anywhere, it's not aligned on either of your canonical axes! Oh my god! Its direction is undefined! — Srap Tasmaner
Isn't this like asking for the z coordinate of a point plotted on a plane? — Michael
They are hypothetical scenarios, and you know up front whether or not it is raining in each scenario. In the first scenario, it is raining (that's a given premise of the hypothetical). In the second scenario, it is not raining.
— Andrew M
You're missing the point. Unless you explain how one could "know up front" whether or not it's raining (someone might be hosing the window), you are just begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover
I follow the traditional formula, knowledge is a particular type of belief, justified and true. Justified is having been proven, and true is honest (that's my difference, how I define "true). Generally, being intentional shows knowledge, because we do things in set ways (justified beliefs), and we honestly believe in what we are doing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Knowing -that is a type of knowing-how, just like knowledge is a type of belief. — Metaphysician Undercover
But an arrow is only ever observed pointing along one of the grid lines. Thus raising the question of which direction the arrow is actually pointing (if it has a definite direction at all) when not observed. — Andrew M
You and I know up front because I created the hypotheticals that way. — Andrew M
I don't think you can claim to follow the traditional formulation, because your understanding of what constitutes justification and truth is not in accord with the usual understanding. The usual understanding does not demand "proof" to underpin justification, and does not consider truth to be dependent on human intentions, honest or dishonest. — Janus
JTB is a definition of propositional knowledge, not know-how. — Janus
Even if propositional knowledge could be, at a stretch, considered to be a kind of know-how; there are many other kinds of know-how which have nothing to do with truth or justification. — Janus
the transcendental/ empirical dichotomy opens up paths for whole suites of different ways of traversing the territory. — Janus
This isn't to disagree (...), but to complement.... — Moliere
So thing-in-itself is more like a place-holder concept to guard against treating metaphysical (non-empirical, and unbounded by the categories) judgments about objects as knowledge..... — Moliere
The way I'd put it is that the thing-in-itself is a noumenon — Moliere
I don't see that you have a point. Justified, in general does mean proven. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, I do not respect this separation. Knowing-that, or propositional knowledge is just a special form of knowing-how. Using language and logic is a type of acting, so this is a type of know-how. — Metaphysician Undercover
Justified cannot mean proven. When it comes to empirical beliefs, nothing we consider ourselves justified in believing can be proven. The provenance of proof is in logic and mathematics, not in inductive reasoning. — Janus
I haven't disputed that, but it does not follow that all kinds of know-how are forms of knowing-that, which is why I have been trying to point out to you that there are kinds of know-how that have nothing to do with justification, truth or even belief. — Janus
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