It is against a background of 'uncertainty' that such confusion about 'truth' often emerges. — Jack Cummins

Keep in mind that uncertainty only exists against a background of truth. We only know there are novel viruses because we know there are viruses. Medical professionals are actively looking for problems with the vaccine, and for long-term health issue from the virus, against a background of knowledge of our immune systems. That background knowledge is constantly growing.

Post truth would have us disbelieve what we know in order to render us malleable.

Uncertainty exists in relation to 'established truth', but that truth is not absolute even if people think that it is. For example, many people framed understanding in relation to the Newtonian- Cartesian model and quantum physics brought a paradigm shift which affected science so much. Of course, paradigm shifts are rare and whether there will ever be another is unknown.

Most shifts are about small ones and the issues around Covid_19 are based on general understanding of immunology. Personally, I had the vaccine but I know many who didn't because they were afraid of the risks. I also remember when I was working in mental health nursing, having a flu jab was recommended but so many people chose not to, based on fear.

Fear is generated through lack of certainty, and even questioning of authorised knowledge occurs a lot, including medicine as a whole, as well as political leaders. There is a lot of uncertainty and it may be due to an overload of information, especially on the internet. People can go to extremes of believing almost anything on the internet, or to the other of not trusting expert sources.

The varying degrees of depth of knowledge and ideas, ranging from science, academic sources to the more informal ideas of the media. In some ways, human beings, with the insights of science, and being able to access so much information from the past have so much to access for finding 'truth' in the clearest possible way. Nevertheless, sifting through this, can be an arduous task and it may need philosophers to facilitate putting it all together in the attempt to avoid so much confusion. Apart from post-truth which may be deliberate twisting of ideas and knowledge, the task may be to give more clarity of 'truth' in the aftermath of postmodernism and the way it opened up cultural relativism.

Uncertainty exists in relation to 'established truth', but that truth is not absolute — Jack Cummins

Arrkh, forget about "absolute" truth. It's a nonsense expression. You responded to my post, so you understood it, you now it was in English, you know it was a response to your post, you know it was set against the background of call-and-answer that constitutes the forums, that it made reference to current affairs... and so on and so forth. Overwhelmingly, we agree as to what is the case. Supposing the need for an absolute truth adds nothing, gets you no further, indeed, blocks your path.

Plain old truth will suffice.

Jack, some people are what we in the trade call wrong.

Claiming that there no such thing as truth, or that truth is relative to someone's perspective, fumbles the issue rather than addressing it.

I am definitely not in favour of arguing that there is no such thing as 'truth' at all but it is simply not straightforward. I am not sure if the distinction between 'truth' and absolute 'truth' is particularly helpful as it may make truth too commonplace.
If truth was simple there would probably be no need for philosophy because everyone would agree.

The biggest areas of disagreement about truth may be related to religion and politics. These are idea based but such perspectives do come into the way in which events and 'facts' are interpreted. Even in history, it is about looking at different sources. I am not wishing to say that there is no truth at all, but it may involve putting together different fragments. It is sometimes like a jigsaw puzzle with missing pieces, making the picture incomplete. This even corresponds with the role of the participant observer in an experiment, which involves subjectivity in the process of understanding.

If truth was simple there would probably be no need for philosophy because everyone would agree. — Jack Cummins

Yes; and it is simple; and there isn't any need for philosophy, in so far as working out what is true and what isn't.

Disagreement in politics and religion isn't so much about what is the case, as about what folk choose to be the case. It's direction of fit, again. We disagree as to what we want. Framing that disagreement in terms of truth is... problematic. If philosophy has a role here, it might be in sorting such things out.

I don't understand how you see truth as being so simple because I see it as complicated in most instances. I am interested to know how you define truth, because it may be that we define it differently. My basic working definition would probably be that truth involves clear, reliable, trustworthy and certain established information or knowledge.

I am interested to know how you define truth — Jack Cummins

That's just the point; one cannot define a simple.

Consider, first, are you asking if it is your, or my, definition of "truth" that is true? As if we might step outside of those definitions in such a discussion...

Notice the special place of truth? We can't get away form it in order to analyses it. It is presupposed by analysis.

Then consider the good old T-sentence; "The kettle is boiling" will be true only if the kettle is boiling. IT says so little, and yet what it does say is right. If a properly formed T-sentence has, on the right, the meaning of the sentence mentioned on the left, then it cannot be wrong.

Notice the special place of meaning here? We can't make sense of truth unless we also make sense of meaning.

Consider also, the difference between asking what truth is and asking which sentences are true. The kettle is boiling only if "The kettle is boiling" is true, and yet that doesn't tell us if the kettle is boiling, nor help us to make tea.

I suggest that you don't need a definition of truth, and that any that might be proffered, beyond the T-sentence, would lead us astray - there will be situations in which it doesn't fit.

It's not truth that is complicated, but deciding which sentences are true and which false. And that is as it should be, since what makes a sentence true or false depends intimately on the meaning of the sentence, and hence varies from one to another.

My basic working definition would probably be that truth involves clear, reliable, trustworthy and certain established information or knowledge. — Jack Cummins

Well, if a sentence is certain or known, it is true, so those aspects already assume truth. And a sentence can be clear, reliable and from a trusted source and yet false, so they don't help, either. Perhaps you would be better thinking of what you have said here as a definition of what you ought believe, rather than of truth.

All Cretans are liars. — Epimenedes

Epimenedes was himself Cretan.

If everybody's lyin', there are, intriguingly, no truths i.e. we're livin' in a world of lies. Given this simple truth, a paradox that deserves further study, we must recalibrate ourselves to value things other than verum (truth). This is, in my humble opinion, what post-truth is all about. What those "things other than verum (truth)" are is anybody's guess. From having no choice (but to believe truths), we now have a choice (to believe any number of falsehoods that we wish).

@Jack Cummins

This is an interesting topic, but @Banno's right here with

Perhaps you would be better thinking of what you have said here as a definition of what you ought believe, rather than of truth. — Banno

The idea of 'Post Truth' is not really about truth at all, it's about belief. The people using the term (and rhetorical devices it describes) want us to do something, and for that they merely need to change our beliefs, not the whole concept of truth.

As a rhetorical device (or collection of devices really), the idea is to throw shade on the methods we used to rely on to decide what to believe, particularly in those cases where we are not ourselves sufficiently knowledgeable to decide empirically. But the aim is still to get us to believe that something is 'true' (or not 'true') and as such requires the same definition of truth as before.

The matter of trust is interesting, but unrelated to truth as a concept. It's related more to those methods. What we're seeing in the 'Post Truth' world is nothing more than politicians and campaign leaders attempting to co-opt the same credentials experts used to have for the entitlement to have their views taken seriously in public discourse aimed at establishing what we ought to to believe. To do this trick, they have to undermine the public trust in expertise (since raising themselves to that level is not an option). I think it's this process of undermining trust in expertise that Sachs is referring to, but that's about criteria for inclusion in the debate, not so much about Truth itself.

I don't really follow politics - can you give me an example of post-truth being used? No one brags about being post-truth do they? I thought it was just one of those (media) commentary terms to describe a politician who will do whatever, or say whatever it takes to maintain traction with supporters. I googled the history of the term from the 1990's but got distracted. I am interested more in the point of demarcation between where beliefs split from the different and dumb (but within the normal parameters), to the extravagantly loopy (like shape shifting lizard people).

No one brags about being post-truth do they? — Tom Storm

No, indeed. I understand 'Post Truth' to be a group term describing a set of rhetorical tools which all make use of the same basic theme - that of eliminating the criteria which previously barred entry into serious debate, that of expertise. The aim being to remove what might previously have been a leash on certain political ideas being taken forward.

Climate change is a good example. Where previously we might have had discussions about the best way to combat it, 'post truth' rhetorical tools allow politicians to pursue policies which don't even address it because they've opened the door to their voter's own lay opinions being included in the debate.

Of course, no one refers to such a trick directly, the term is used pejoratively by political opponents (who, in my experience, use exactly the same trick to their own ends - what smart politician is going to turn down such a powerful weapon).

Nice. Good example. In a funny kind of way the die hard supporters of political parties or candidates have never much seemed to concern themselves with the truth of claims made by their representatives. And politics trades on perception and personal judgements - so a significant aspect of it has always been 'beyond truth'. Where it gets particularly uncomfortable for me is where we might have a viable constituency which believes something untrue (let's say The Protocols to the Elders of Zion) and is ripe to be coopted into a political force by a predatory candidate.

Where it gets particularly uncomfortable for me is where we might have a viable constituency which believes something untrue (let's say The Protocols to the Elders of Zion) and is ripe to be coopted into a political force by a predatory candidate. — Tom Storm

Yes, I think something like that can happen these days in a way that would not have been possible 20 or 30 years ago. It's very worrying. We see a sweeping increase in populism and a rise in far-right politics such as we've seen in Sweden recently. Removing that leash was dangerous, but there seems to be little incentive to return it now.

Part of the problem (as I see it) is the bipartisan use of these tools. No one wants to put the leash back on. The moment we return to using qualification as a criteria for inclusion the right are going to weaken their positions on environmental issues, gun control (in America), welfare...; the left are going to lose ground on identity politics, public health, globalisation... Both sides use these tools to good effect and neither are willing to let them go, consequences go hang!

What you are giving is the basis of descriptions, which is probably why logic matters. I am not sure that is the same as 'truth' because it would be possible to formulate lies or 'post-truths' according to the rules of logic. For example, I can show you how a couple of bits of fake news which I read could be seen as being in compliance with the rules of logically possible truths.

One was that I read that the chain of shops, which was Woolworths, was going to be opening some stores again. That would make sense potentially as something which would be possible. Also, I read at some point during the pandemic that the sale of all alcohol was going to be stopped and the basis for this would be about essential and nonessential items. As there were restrictions on items which were not seen as essential it was possible logically. I went as far as telling my flatmates that the sale of alcohol would be stopping.

So, descriptive formulas are dependent on evidence in the first place. Some aspects are more verifiable than others. For example, the kettle is boiling can be observed by the steam, the kettle switching off and being hot to touch. In such situations it is sensory perception which is the basis for observations.

Such descriptions are dependent on observation according to a philosophy of realism. Part of the problem with some aspects of philosophy is that it goes into the area of abstraction, especially metaphysics, which may be why some people are extremely wary of it. Apart from the nature of abstract truths people rely on others' observation, especially in the media. When events on the other side of the world are described it depends on the accuracy and reliability of accounts. I am not saying that they are made up, but the focus or angle may have some distortions. For example, I know some Africans who say how the portrayal of Africa in the news presents a false picture because it shows the poorest villages. It is a matter of focus in framing of 'news', but what is omitted or excluded affects public opinion.

It seems like you appreciate the problem of 'post-truth'. It may not be about most aspects of daily experience but the underlying narratives in the background of life, especially political ones. For example, statistics can be used to blur and distort. With the pandemic it may not have been that there was a conspiracy going on but that prior to the vaccines the leaders were not sure what to do next, so there was a lot of bravado to cover up this uncertainty.

Iti s hard to know how much information is correct. For example, even in medicine a lot of research is funded by drug companies so is likely to represent the interests of those companies.

Truth must be readily available because everyone seems pretty satisfied with their own share of it.

And as to the faculties of the mind I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than any vulgar person. But this proves that men are in that point equal, rather than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share. — Hobbes, Leviathan

In my own last response to Banno, I may not have paid enough attention to his focus on belief. It is likely that it is possible to focus on beliefs rather than actual truths. Nevertheless, there are varying amounts of solidity of beliefs. For example, if someone believes in heaven and hell that cannot be verified because it is not material whereas if someone believes that it is the twentieth first century it is based on written dates.

Nevertheless, beliefs may be all one has, often on the basis of certain degrees of reliability of information and evidence. Also, rather than trying to fill in the gaps with fabrications of 'truth' scepticism may be more truthful, in admitting what is not known with any certainty.

I am pretty sure this is due the realisation (or rather subconscious arrival of) that traditions and cultural values are separate entities rather than being tied at the hip.

Given modern shifts - as in over the past few centuries - and the seeming acceleration of these shifts due to technological advances and greater integration/clashes, we are jumping from one huge cultural revolution to the next within a generation rather than within several generations … this has destabilised many people’s views of what is or is not ‘true’ because where tradition and cultural values tended to pull each other along back and forth over time (like the skis of someone traversing a flat surface) we are now witnesses each ski going off down its own slope. What seemed like two united parts are now having to be reimagined and we are stuck with two monopole entities and frantically trying to create two new complete poles to compensate for the disorientating effects.

What you might be able to see here is that the item that needs to be addressed is ‘change’. Change is the monopole that shadows both so some kind of paradigm shift needs to be imagined in order to create a better sense of stability.

How can ‘Change’ be two different items? I do not pretend to know. I can say that ‘tradition’ and ‘cultural values’ are certainly pieces of the puzzle. Accepting that they are two completely different things will be the first step.

Indeed Jack, indeed! The modern world is no longer about truth and how to get to it but about how to lie "well". Nevertheless, in that a lie hasta have mimic truth if it is to get past our bullshitometer; post-truth, paradoxically, is still nothing more than a homage to the goddess Veritas. Even when you insult Veritas, you can only do so via praise.

I don't understand how you see truth as being so simple because I see it as complicated in most instances. I am interested to know how you define truth, because it may be that we define it differently. — Jack Cummins

The common, perhaps it could be said universal, understanding of truth is simply "accordance with actuality". That's the basic idea, but of course in practice it's not always and everywhere so easy to see just what is and is not in accordance with actuality.

I think the notion of "post-truth" is a bit misleading; it's more a case of post-honesty, of promoting beliefs which have little or no justification, or of just plain lying in order to sway or deceive others to serve an agenda.

How do you understand the concept of 'post-truth" itself? — Jack Cummins

It's trendy for every generation to define lying and deception in politics again. Hopefully from a new angle.

I think the notion of "post-truth" is a bit misleading; it's more a case of post-honesty, of promoting beliefs which have little or no justification, or of just plain lying in order to sway or deceive others to serve an agenda. — Janus

I think this is an important strand of the problem. Vested interest groups have always lied to gain advantage. But when I think about this post-honesty/post truth issue I find myself wondering more and more about the average person and what they believe and why. Is the accuracy of reporting a criterion of value anymore? Is evidence important? Does something have to comport with actuality in order to be believable? For a lot of people the answer seems to be no. Are people more credulous now than they were in the mid or early 20th century? Is there some other factor going on in relation to what people will believe?

But when I think about this post-honesty/post truth issue I find myself wondering more and more about the average person and what they believe and why. Is the accuracy of reporting a criterion of value anymore? Is evidence important? Does something have to comport with actuality in order to be believable? For a lot of people the answer seems to be no. Are people more credulous now than they were in the mid or early 20th century? Is there some other factor going on in relation to what people will believe? — Tom Storm

These are interesting questions. My initial thought is that in relation to almost everything we call knowledge and information people do not have access, or at least easy access, to the evidence. Scientific knowledge is a prime example, but also what is presented in the media as news. We have an attitude of reliance on the informedness and honesty of the "experts" in the various fields of inquiry, knowledge and information.

" Does something have to comport with actuality in order to be believable?". I think this is the nub of the issue; in most cases we simply don't know and cannot find out, for example, whether the news we are served up is true. Probably people believe what they want to believe or what is presented by those whose ostensible values they identify with, or maybe they believe someone because they like the look of their face, they think they look honest or down to earth, and so on.

Or in the case of conspiracy theorists, they don't believe anything mainstream, because they don't trust any authority and they think everything it presents must be false due to the whole system being rigged and corrupt; but they believe one another just because they share the distrust and rejection of authority. So absurd memes proliferate in the petri dish of disaffection with establishment.

"Are people more credulous now than they were in the mid or early 20th century? Is there some other factor going on in relation to what people will believe?".

Possibly there is more anti-establishment sentiment around these days.

We have an attitude of reliance on the informedness and honesty of the "experts" in the various fields of inquiry, knowledge and information. — Janus

Agree.

Probably people believe what they want to believe or what is presented by those whose ostensible values they identify with, — Janus

Yes, that's likely too.

These days even the notion of an expert is highly contentious. And setting aside philosophical questions about epistemology for a moment, it does seem that people chose the experts or commentators who provide the scaffolding in support of their preexisting biases or beliefs.

I am still wondering about factors like QAnon and how it is that this emerging religion and untruths told in its wake seems to be attractive to people. Is it what happens when people no longer trust a mainstream narrative? Or is it a concatenative end result of economic and social factors, like diminished education, lack of opportunity, primitive forms of Christianity and a spread in magical thinking as a kind of protest against scientism and the technocratic approach to social concerns?

These days even the notion of an expert is highly contentious. And setting aside philosophical questions about epistemology for a moment, it does seem that people chose the experts or commentators who provide the scaffolding in support of their preexisting biases or beliefs. — Tom Storm

I think this is probably right, but it also seems to be the case that there are "official" expert spokespeople in the mainstream media, at least. It seems to be mainly in the areas of economicx and (of course) politics and political issues that conflicting views get presented there, and people align their choices with there preferred political views. It doesn't seem to be so much the case in science.

I am still wondering about factors like QAnon and how it is that this emerging religion and untruths told in its wake seems to be attractive to people. Is it what happens when people no longer trust a mainstream narrative? Or is it a concatenative end result of economic and social factors, like diminished education, lack of opportunity, primitive forms of Christianity and a spread in magical thinking as a kind of protest against scientism? — Tom Storm

I think it's probably generally a mixture of all the factors you mention here,with some or others of them being predominate in individual cases. Although I would say it is more a case that there is an element of protest against science than scientism, since I think most of the people caught up in QAnon and other conspiracy theories probably wouldn't have a clear idea of the distinction between science and scientism.

That said, there are probably those who do get the distinction, but think that science as an institution is so corrupted by vested interests that it cannot, as it is presented to the public, be trusted. And I would say there is an element, but only an element, of truth in that. The tendency of those who think without nuance is to totalize the recognition of some corruption to think in terms of absolute corruption; it's facile thinking, that is it's the common mode of "tribal" thinking ("you're either for us or agin us").

it does seem that people chose the experts or commentators who provide the scaffolding in support of their preexisting biases or beliefs. — Tom Storm

On what other grounds would you have people choose which experts to believe?

I don't have anything specific in mind. I see people quote Jordan Peterson as an expert on any manner of subjects, for instance - climate change, feminism, geo-politics and the war in Ukraine. Generally he is used because he already represents the general outlook of News Limited or Fox News. A giveaway is when people use 'experts' who don't really have qualifications in the area but hold a view they agree with and have some kind of nominal credibility somewhere else.

I would privilege an expert qualified in the subject for starters, and then maybe pay additional attention to someone who holds a different view to mine because they may know something I don't. I did this on the subject of Jesus as a real person. I used to be a mythicist but read additional work by Professor Bart Ehrman, who presents the argument Jesus was likely a real person, even if the NT is recounting a legend. I found him convincing.

A giveaway is when people use 'experts' who don't really have qualifications in the area but hold a view they agree with and have some kind of nominal credibility somewhere else. — Tom Storm

Ah, yes. I consider the term 'expert' to already cover the idea of it being a relevant field, but I see what you mean about people abusing the term. I'd also add that, although it's not always clear cut, one can identity (and so rule out) obvious conflicts of interest. For example, if a climate expert is directly paid by a fossil fuel company.

I would privilege an expert qualified in the subject for starters, and then maybe pay additional attention to someone who holds a different view to mine because they may know something I don't. — Tom Storm

That's an interesting approach, but then, what would you use as your criteria for then believing that expert? What's the convincer?

I'd also add that, although it's not always clear cut, one can identity (and so rule out) obvious conflicts of interest. For example, if a climate expert is directly paid by a fossil fuel company. — Isaac

Yes, that's a very important one, where it can be known.

That's an interesting approach, but then, what would you use as your criteria for then believing that expert? What's the convincer? — Isaac

On this I can only make judgements based on the arguments provided and assembled. Am I convinced or not? So I am not for a moment suggesting the method is foolproof. Me being the potential fool in this instance. But I do think that in general it is good to expose yourself to diverse thinking on any given subject to try to enrich or change your own views. I am quite happy to be wrong.

On some subjects I simply don't have the expertise to make a call like this. Take the so-called many worlds theory versus the Copenhagen interpretation. In this instance it's a case of buggered if I know. But I do know on judgement I am more likely to accept Sean Carroll than Deepak Chopra.

Thanks. One of the aspects of psychology I'm interested in is how people make judgments like that, particularly ones which seem to inform beliefs. I think people often take for granted the idea that some process is taking place which has some hook into the real world (such that following it is more likely to yield truer beliefs than not doing so would), but I find very few people can explain what they think that mechanism is nor how it works.

Some arguments just seem to sound more 'convincing' than others, but without being able to put a finger on exactly why.

Take the so-called many worlds theory versus the Copenhagen interpretation. In this instance it's a case of buggered if I know. But I do know on judgement I am more likely to accept Sean Carroll than Deepak Chopra. — Tom Storm

Yes, I feel much the same way. Partly expertise, partly a gut feeling that Chopra is somehow 'selling' something in a way I don't like. But also in there is the fact that accepting Chopra's version pulls on the threads of my other beliefs in a way that Carroll's version doesn't. I simply have to do less work to believe Carroll.