Anyway, I suggest not saying: 'snow' is denoted as snow
But instead: snow is denoted by 'snow' or 'snow' denotes snow — TonesInDeepFreeze
liar paradox problem — TonesInDeepFreeze
Tarski doesn't even say that 'snow is white' is true — TonesInDeepFreeze
Tarski says, "Let us suppose we have a fixed language L whose sentences are fully interpreted." — TonesInDeepFreeze
The truth or falsehood of 'snow is white' is not dependent on 'snow' naming snow (precipitation...) and 'white' naming white (the chromaticity...). — TonesInDeepFreeze
should we take it that Raatikainen's summary of Putnam is correct? — TonesInDeepFreeze
but maybe Tarski is conceding that we can't have a truth definition that covers all interpretations, but only, for each interpretation, its own truth definition? — TonesInDeepFreeze
If 'white' denotes green, then 'snow is white' is true iff snow is white is not true. But it is still true. Made explicit — TonesInDeepFreeze
Tarski's schema is a definition not a claim of a logical truth — TonesInDeepFreeze
Given a language L, and an interpretation M of L, and a sentence P of L: A sentence 'P' is true per M iff P. That's just like any textbook in mathematical logic. No meta-metalanguage. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Tarski used "denote", but I don't think this term is strictly grammatically correct, — RussellA
I think snow is named "snow" would be better, rather than "snow" denotes snow. — RussellA
Denotes infers points to, and "snow" is doing more than pointing to snow. — RussellA
I don't think this term is strictly grammatically correct — RussellA
Denotes infers points to — RussellA
I still believe that "snow" is denoted as snow is grammatically correct. — RussellA
In the world there are no paradoxes. — RussellA
To avoid paradox in language we need to ensure that language corresponds with the world, because the world is logical.
Tarski is aiming at the same goal. — RussellA
the definition does not lead to paradoxes and it is not circular. — RussellA
IE, paradoxes in language may be avoided by ensuring that language corresponds with a world that is logical. — RussellA
It is true that Tarski does not say that white is a necessary condition for snow. — RussellA
Tarski uses the analytic proposition "snow is white" — RussellA
rather than a synthetic proposition such as "snow is always welcome" . — RussellA
You wrote - "snow" is precipitation ..............white...............
You didn't write "snow" is precipitation.........which may or may not be white........ — RussellA
"snow" is frosty stuff and "white" is the colour of St Patrick's Day T-shirt are external — RussellA
From the IEP - The Semantic Theory of Truth
"A standard objection against STT points out that it stratified the concept of truth. It is because we have the entire hierarchy of languages — RussellA
Yes, within a particular MML, there is only one interpretation. Between different MML's there are different interpretations. — RussellA
The axiom 1 + 1 = 2 exists within a Metametalanguage (MML) — RussellA
TonesInDeepFreeze will be in the know as to how far Tarski's usage (as clarified above) is agreed, in modern logic and maths related discourse. — bongo fury
It doesn't have to conform to ordinary linguistic usage in this narrower technical one. — bongo fury
'denotes', 'names', 'stands for', 'symbolizes'. All good. — TonesInDeepFreeze
For an n-place (n>0) relation symbol, the denotation is an n-place relation on the domain. — TonesInDeepFreeze
The T schema doesn't dictate
1) The type of truth object (sentences vs propositions)
2) The nature of the equivalence relation (analytic necessity vs material necessity vs modal necessity)
3) Whether the schema is used prescriptively to exhaustively define the meaning of "truth" e.g as in deflationary truth, or whether the schema is used to non-exhaustively describe truth but not explain the truth predicate, as in inflationary truth. — sime
And no! It's all pointing!... just how is "snow" doing more than pointing to snow?? — bongo fury
In summary, the meaning of "denote" is much debated, — RussellA
and words do more than pointing to snow and unicorns in the world. — RussellA
3) While the words "designates," "satisfies," and "defines" express relations (between certain expressions and the objects "referred to" by these expressions)
4) We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts which are denoted by one word — RussellA
The exact meaning of "denote" is debated, — RussellA
Starting with Tones whereby the denotation of 'snow' is: precipitation in the form of small white ice crystals formed directly from the water vapor of the air at a temperature of less than 32°F (0°C). Remove the expression "formed directly from the water vapor of the air at a temperature of less than 32°F (0°C)", as this describes how "snow" formed rather than what "snow" is. As "snow" is precipitation, can remove the expression precipitation. Therefore, can simplify the denotation of "snow" as small white ice crystals. — RussellA
You wrote - "snow" is precipitation ..............white...............
You didn't write "snow" is precipitation.........which may or may not be white........
— RussellA
That's a good point. I overlooked that I chose a definition that happened to include 'white' in the definiens of 'snow'. That was a mistake. I don't know whether Tarski even had a scientific definition of 'snow' in mind, and especially one that has 'white' in the definiens. So, I don't know whether Tarski thought of a particular definition so that he regarded 'snow is white' as analytic. I highly doubt that he did.
I should have chosen one such as this:
"precipitation in the form of ice crystals, mainly of intricately branched, hexagonal form and often agglomerated into snowflakes, formed directly from the freezing of the water vapor in the air"
The point of the Tarski schema is not to define 'is true' for just analytic sentences.
"grass: vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop"
So 'grass is green' is not analytic.
'grass is green' iff grass is green. — TonesInDeepFreeze
You are quibbling over details and things I never said. — RussellA
I'll say it again (as this is certainly not a mere "detail"): The schema says that for any sentence P, we have: 'P' is true iff P. He does not say that 'P' has to be analytic. Look it up. Anywhere. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Not really — bongo fury
But hopeless if you misunderstand "denote". — bongo fury
Don't edit when quoting. — bongo fury
When an article is edited, the article is changed. — RussellA
neither edited nor paraphrased, they were verbatim and in context. — RussellA
They are presented as a single quote; they come from 3 different pages — bongo fury
They are quite clearly not presented as a single quote, because the four quotations are individually numbered 1), 2), 3) and 4). — RussellA
You have the document so obviously know they aren't a single quote. — RussellA
The important knowledge to be gained from these quotations is that Tarski can use one expression to denote one or more objects, concepts or expressions. — RussellA
Trying to make Tarski look confused isn't helping you. — bongo fury
My goal is to understand Tarksi's Semantic Theory of Truth — RussellA
.not get bogged down in unimportant detail and misunderstandings — RussellA
I wrote "Denotes infers points to, and "snow" is doing more than pointing to snow."
You wrote "That is not correct. The word 'denotes' doesn't infer. People infer; words don't infer."
Of course I am not suggesting that the word "denote" is doing the inferring. — RussellA
Of course the T-sentence "P" is true IFF P is not a detail. It is extremely important. I never said it was a detail. — RussellA
And now have skipped twice the very exact response I gave about that.I said that in my opinion "snow is white" is an analytic proposition. — RussellA
I never said that Tarski said that "P" has to be analytic. — RussellA
Tarski in The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics uses denote for one or more items.
For example, he wrote:
1) The expression "the father of his country" designates (denotes) George Washington.
2) We have seen that this conception essentially consists in regarding the sentence "X is true" as equivalent to the sentence denoted by 'X' (where 'X' stands for a name of a sentence of the object language).
3) While the words "designates," "satisfies," and "defines" express relations (between certain expressions and the objects "referred to" by these expressions)
4) We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts which are denoted by one word — RussellA
Second, (4) is not about the meaning of the word 'denote' but rather it's about the meaning of 'true'. That 'true' has different conceptions. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Tarski in 1931 and 1944 is concerned with mathematical logic, not literary criticism. — TonesInDeepFreeze
It's the very simple idea: 'Chicago' maps to Chicago. 'Carl Sagan' maps to Carl Sagan. 'Cats' map to cats. — TonesInDeepFreeze
If you want to understand Tarski and not be bogged down in misunderstandings, then you'd do well to start there, and to refrain from dripping goop all over by ridiculously dragging Umberto Eco into it. — TonesInDeepFreeze
The complete paragraph containing item 4) is:
It seems to me obvious that the only rational approach to such problems would be the
following: We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one
concept, but with several different concepts which are denoted by one word; we should try to make these concepts as clear as possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other way); to avoid further confusions, we should agree to use different terms for different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations.
How is this paragraph about the meaning of true. The word "true" isn't mentioned. ? — RussellA
I have never said that Tarski was concerned with literary criticism. — RussellA
Within the article he wrote:
Semantics is a discipline which, speaking loosely, deals with certain relations between
expressions of a language and the objects (or "states of affairs") "referred to" by those expressions. As typical examples of semantic concepts we may mention the concepts of
designation, satisfaction, and definition as these occur in the following examples:
the expression "the father of his country" designates (denotes) George Washington; snow satisfies the sentential function (the condition) "2 is white"; the equation "2 . x = 1" defines (uniquely determines) the number 1/2. — RussellA
I haven't said that Tarski was not concerned with mathematical logic. I pointed out that Tarski had a concern with the semantic conception of truth, and the semantic conception of truth is not the same as the mathematical conception of truth. — RussellA
Are you saying that the ordinary sense of the word "denote" is the mathematical sense of the word "denote" ? — RussellA
It is a simple idea until one considers how "a unicorn" maps to a unicorn, or "beauty" maps to beauty. — RussellA
I am pointing out, as Umberto Eco pointed out, that the meaning of "denote" is far more complex than as used in the ordinary sense of "a cat" denotes a cat. — RussellA
Tarski's overriding concern is with defining 'is true' in context of formal languages for mathematics and the sciences. — TonesInDeepFreeze
He uses an ordinary sense of 'denote' (or cognates of 'denote), but then moves on to instead specify the method of formal modals, where 'denote' is subsumed by certain kinds of functions from linguistic objects to model theoretic objects. This is the movement from informal semantics to formal semantics that Tarski provides. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Whether 'snow is white' is analytic depends on which definition of 'snow' we're looking at. — TonesInDeepFreeze
I would say logical rather than mathematical or scientific. — RussellA
it is clear from his article that his definition of "true" is more relevant to the formal language of linguistics than either mathematics or science. — RussellA
The word "denote" may be used in different ways, but as there is no substantial difference in meaning between the "ordinary" sense of the word "denote" and a formal sense of the word "denote", he cannot have moved from an "ordinary" sense to a formal sense. — RussellA
The statement P is true IFF P. — Agent Smith
Doesn't this lead to a chicken-and-egg situation? — Agent Smith
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.