What you're not really explaining is how you believe it works mind-independently, in terms of the mechanics involved. Okay, so say that we have the sounds or the text "There is a window in the wall." First, I say that mind-independently, we only have a set of sounds, or a set of marks on paper, say. You're claiming that we actually have some mind-independent "subject predicate structure"--well, how do we have that with just sounds or marks on paper, exactly?

My claim is that a "subject predicate structure" is a way of thinking about those sounds or marks on paper. But in your view, it's something mind-independent. Just what properties of those sounds or marks on paper is it?

The subject-predicate structure is the structure of the window existing in the wall. It is a feature of reality. It is mind-independent. The sounds or marks on paper can correspond to this feature if we assign to those sounds or marks what they refer to in reality.

How would they mind-independently refer to something? Take the sound or ink marks "window." It mind-independently refers to something by ______?

How would they mind-independently refer to something? Take the sound or ink marks "window." It mind-independently refers to something by ______? — Terrapin Station

I didn't say they refer mind-independently. It takes a mind to assign referents to words.

If "The window is in the wall" being true has something to do with reference, but reference doesn't work mind-independently, then how is truth mind-independent?

First, you need to differentiate between proposition and statement. Proposition is a feature of reality, completely mind-independent. Its truth in a world is mind-independent too - it is identical to the instantiation of the proposition in that world.

Second, a statement requires a mind to assign referents to words. But once those referents are assigned, the truth of a statement, based on the assigned referents, is mind-independent, depending on whether the statement corresponds to reality, that is, whether it corresponds to the instantiated proposition.

I don't at all agree with the distinction you're making. (I do agree with a distinction between a particular sentence and a statement/proposition, however.)

But we can ignore that for the moment.

So, once those referents are assigned, you'd say that the statement refers mind-independently, right?

So again, I'll ask you how, in that situation, the statement refers mind-independently. What are the mechanics of that? Just how does it work?

I don't at all agree with the distinction you're making. — Terrapin Station

I don't agree with your view that it is a matter of subjective judgment whether there is a window in a wall or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window.

So again, I'll ask you how, in that situation, the statement refers mind-independently. What are the mechanics of that? Just how does it work? — Terrapin Station

It's just the reference/correspondence relation between the statement and reality. If you point to a dog and say "This is a window", you refer to a dog with a word that refers to something else and therefore your statement doesn't correspond to reality and is false.

I don't agree with your view that it is a matter of subjective judgment whether there is a window in a wall or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window. — litewave

I'm not saying that the fact of whether there is a window or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window is subjective. I'm saying that truth, which is a property of propositions (namely, it obtains via a person making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else), is subjective.

It's just the reference/correspondence relation between the statement and reality. — litewave

What I'm asking you is how that corresondence relation works, in mechanical/physical terms.

You can't talk about people pointing at things, saying things, doing things, etc.--that's not mind-independent. You're claiming that once the reference is set, it's mind-independent.

I'm not saying that the fact of whether there is a window or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window is subjective. — Terrapin Station

But if it is a fact that there is a window then the proposition "There is a window" is true. And if it is a fact that there is no window then the proposition "There is a window" is false.

What I'm asking you is how that corresondence relation works, in mechanical/physical terms.

You can't talk about people pointing at things, saying things, doing things, etc.--that's not mind-independent. You're claiming that once the reference is set, it's mind-independent. — Terrapin Station

I said what is mind-dependent and what is mind-independent about statements. I don't know how to put it more clearly.

But if it is a fact that there is a window then the proposition "There is a window" is true. — litewave

I'm having a conversation with someone else about the same thing on another thread, and we're kind of at the same place.

On my view, a proposition only obtains when an indiviual thinks that proposition. You might not agree with that, but that's my view. Is that much clear?

On my view, a proposition only obtains when an indiviual thinks that proposition. You might not agree with that, but that's my view. Is that much clear? — Terrapin Station

Ok but I don't see how subjective truth is useful. I am interested in reality, not in beliefs.

Ok but I don't see how subjective truth is useful. I am interested in reality, not in beliefs. — litewave

Usefulness is irrelevant to reality. The reality is that propositions only obtain when individuals think them. There's absolutely no evidence of them existing otherwise.

And "thinking a proposition" is a state of an individual's brain, right? It is not a relation between the individual and an object, the abstract object that the proposition is, because there are no abstract objects.

And "thinking a proposition" is a state of an individual's brain, right? It is not a relation between the individual and an object, the abstract object that the proposition is, because there are no abstract objects. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, it's a particular state of a particular individual's brain. "Abstract objects" are conceptual particulars in persons brains.

I know that reifying the structure or a structure of language is often done in modern philosophy, but it's a move to be justified. Many won't agree that it is as self evident as "it's the structure of things as evidently showed by experience". What's the subject-predicate structure of instinctual action? Of surrealist art?

First, you need to differentiate between proposition and statement. Proposition is a feature of reality, completely mind-independent. Its truth in a world is mind-independent too - it is identical to the instantiation of the proposition in that world.[/quote]

The usual distinction is between proposition and states-of-affairs, no? And weither or not states-of-affairs are mind-dependent, and to which degree, and further weither or not propositions are, and to which degree, and in which relation those two are to each other, is that not the whole modern interrogation of philosophy of language? Of the largest branch modern metaphysics, even? To distinguish authoritatively during a debate is jumping the step of putting the question to everyone's evaluation.

Second, a statement requires a mind to assign referents to words. But once those referents are assigned, the truth of a statement, based on the assigned referents, is mind-independent, depending on whether the statement corresponds to reality, that is, whether it corresponds to the instantiated proposition. — litewave

Could you explain how language is capable of such a trick? First, there are wild propositions roaming reality, and their structure is that of language, but they are outside of language because there's no mind. What changes about the proposition when it is snared by a hunting mind, that it wasn't true before it could be put in words?

Usefulness is irrelevant to reality. The reality is that propositions only obtain when individuals think them. There's absolutely no evidence of them existing otherwise. — Terrapin Station

What I called instantiated propositions is what you called facts. If you jump out of a window you will fall - that is a fact and a true proposition.

So you wouldn't say that propositions necessarily have to do with meanings?

What's the subject-predicate structure of instinctual action? Of surrealist art? — Akanthinos

Propositions have a subject-predicate structure, for example "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery." "Surrealist art" is subject and "is exhibited in the local gallery" is predicate.

Could you explain how language is capable of such a trick? — Akanthinos

The trick of corresponding to reality? Apparently, language evolved to do that trick because it was useful to communicate in a way that corresponded to reality.

What changes about the proposition when it is snared by a hunting mind, that it wasn't true before it could be put in words? — Akanthinos

A proposition is true or false regardless of whether it is thought by someone.

So you wouldn't say that propositions necessarily have to do with meanings? — Terrapin Station

They have, but their meanings are in reality, in facts.

I have no idea what your philosophy of meaning would be then or how it would work, but it's sure different than mine. We seem to have a lot of very different views on a lot of fundamental issues.

I don't know anyone who would think that it is a fact that you will fall when you jump out of a window, and at the same time doubt that the proposition "You will fall when you jump out of a window" is true. But that seems to be your view.

Propositions have a subject-predicate structure, for example "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery." "Surrealist art" is subject and "is exhibited in the local gallery" is predicate. — litewave

How about non-finite clauses? They certainly expresses states-of-affairs, but do not have a subject-predicate structuration. And yes, you can translate one from the other and then backwards again a thousand times, but how do you justify epistemologicaly the claim that reality is also so structured, which is logically incompatible with the claim that non-finite clauses can correspond to states-of-affairs?

How about every realistic phenomenon involving surrealist art which aren't expressed by the proposition "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery". Do they find no place in your ontology? If so, that's a pretty tiny reality you live in.

The trick of corresponding to reality? Apparently, language evolved to do that trick because it was useful to communicate in a way that corresponded to reality. — litewave

So, before language was evolved, we had no way to correspond to reality? That must've been rough.

I don't know anyone who would think that it is a fact that you will fall when you jump out of a window, and at the same time doubt that the proposition "You will fall when you jump out of a window" is true. But that seems to be your view. — litewave

Once saw a dude who claimed he was Jesus and that the bonfire wouldn't burn him.

You shouldn't doubt the ability of people to deny reality.

I don't know anyone who would think that it is a fact that you will fall when you jump out of a window, and at the same time doubt that the proposition "You will fall when you jump out of a window" is true. But that seems to be your view. — litewave

Then you don't have a very good grasp on what my view is. Probably because you really aren't that interested in understanding it for its own sake.

If someone believes that there are facts that they can know, such as that one will fall if one jumps out of a window, and they believe that's a fact, then it would be very unlikely that they'd not assign "true" to the proposition "One will fall if one jumps out of a window" (assuming no unusual meaning assignments, etc.)

This doesn't imply that meanings are not simply something that individuals do, that propositions aren't simply something that individuals do, or that truth values aren't simply judgments that individuals make about the relations of propositions (to facts from their perspective in this case).

Duplicate

How about non-finite clauses? They certainly expresses states-of-affairs, but do not have a subject-predicate structuration. And yes, you can translate one from the other and then backwards again a thousand times, but how do you justify epistemologicaly the claim that reality is also so structured, which is logically incompatible with the claim that non-finite clauses can correspond to states-of-affairs? — Akanthinos

Non-finite clauses have an implied subject-predicate structure too, and they can be reworded to make the structure explicit.

How about every realistic phenomenon involving surrealist art which aren't expressed by the proposition "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery". Do they find no place in your ontology? — Akanthinos

That was just an example of a proposition.

So, before language was evolved, we had no way to correspond to reality? That must've been rough. — Akanthinos

Well, there was non verbal language, like animals have, but that was much more limited.

Once saw a dude who claimed he was Jesus and that the bonfire wouldn't burn him. — Akanthinos

But I guess he didn't think that it was a fact and simultaneously that it wasn't true.

Non-finite clauses have an implied subject-predicate structure too, and they can be reworded to make the structure explicit. — litewave

They can be translated from one to the other, and with enough imagination, probably to an equal degree. Which means that you have to explain why you posit subject-predicate as the structuration of the world, if it happens that non-finites clauses are just a co-extent with reality as finite ones. As of now the move seems arbitrary.

If someone believes that there are facts that they can know, such as that one will fall if one jumps out of a window, then it would be very unlikely that they'd not assign "true" to the proposition "One will fall if one jumps out of a window" (assuming no unusual meaning assignments, etc.) — Terrapin Station

But what are facts if not objective truths?