This is an assumption. You can invite people to share your assumptions, but you can't really bang them over the head with them. Assumptions have no weight. — frank
You've discovered the attractor of philosophical discourse. — Isaac
We advocate positions professionals consider to have nearly fatal flaws because we don't know that — Srap Tasmaner
revision theory — Banno
Your example only applies to a hypothetical world, in which it actually is raining. What good is it, if it doesn't apply to the real world? — Metaphysician Undercover
In other words, in the real world, it is possible that Alice could have real knowledge, — Metaphysician Undercover
but it is also possible that it is not knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
So we cannot correctly judge Alice as having knowledge because we cannot know the answer to this. Alice may have knowledge, or she may not. — Metaphysician Undercover
Andrew M Srap Tasmaner: we had a discussion about that Rovelli paper a few years ago here. — fdrake
You've discovered the attractor of philosophical discourse.
— Isaac
It's been done before, many, many times. (And whether I discovered it or invented it is exactly the debate.) — Srap Tasmaner
The hypothetical shows the logical consequences that follow when it is actually raining in the real world. — Andrew M
Your argument seems to be that if we cannot be certain that it is raining then it is not actually raining and that if we cannot be certain that it isn't raining then it is not actually not raining. This doesn't follow and is even a contradiction. — Michael
although the material is difficult and I was unable to garner much interest from anyone else. — Banno
This means that unless we are absolutely certain, we ought not call something "knowledge", because it could turn out not to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you not agree that as epistemologists, if there is a possibility that the thing which appears to be knowledge is not actually knowledge, then we ought not call it "knowledge"? — Metaphysician Undercover
So my argument is that if it has to be actually raining out for us to correctly call what Alice has "knowledge", (as Andrew asserts), then we ought not label what Alice has as "knowledge" unless we are certain that it is raining out. — Metaphysician Undercover
The hypothetical shows the logical consequences which follow from the assumption that it is actually raining in the real world. And, there is a very big difference in meaning between "it is actually raining in the real world", and "I assume it is actually raining in the real world". The latter recognizes the possibility that it is not raining in the real world. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you’re pretending you’re a lion, it’s good to know if you’re pretending you’re really a lion. — Ruth Kraus
nothing less than deception — Metaphysician Undercover
This means that unless we are absolutely certain, we ought not call something "knowledge", because it could turn out not to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
if there is a possibility that the thing which appears to be knowledge is not actually knowledge, then we ought not call it "knowledge"? — Metaphysician Undercover
I really do suspect there is no such thing as a language, in these terms of rules and such — Moliere
Maybe I'm just ignorant of its implications. — Moliere
Perhaps the whole approach of specifying rules of interpretation is what's wrongheaded? — Moliere
Which is a perfectly good prior. What do you do next? — Srap Tasmaner
Linguistics is littered with failed theories, even failed research programs, like any other science, but not all of them. — Srap Tasmaner
more substantial theories of truth [...] “7 + 5 = 12” is true iff “7 + 5 = 12” follows from the axioms of maths — Michael
Proof is in the pudding. There are lots of linguists doing lots of fieldwork. Maybe they'll find something, maybe they won't. Arguments that they must, or that they cannot, hang in the air exactly the way a brick doesn't. — Srap Tasmaner
Is that a proposed formulation somewhere?
It doesn't work in ordinary mathematics. A sentence is either true or false but not both. And a sentence is true if and only if its negation is false. But with our ordinary mathematical axiomatizations, there are sentences such that neither the sentence nor its negation are derivable. — TonesInDeepFreeze
But in any "adequate" system, there are statements such that neither the statement nor its negation is derivable. So derivability doesn't work for defining 'is true'. — TonesInDeepFreeze
We've been taking as a starting point "snow is white" is true iff p and then discussing p, whereas I think we should instead take as a starting point snow is white iff q and then discuss q.
Snow is white iff snow appears white, or
Snow is white iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
Snow is white iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness, etc.
We can then bring this back to truth-predication by understanding that if "p" is true iff p and if p iff q then "p" is true iff q.
"Snow is white" is true iff snow appears white, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness, etc. — Michael
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