What does this have to do with Tarski? — Michael

If I understand what you're after, because the meaning of denoting (designating) is central to Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth.

If I understand what you're after, because the meaning of denoting (designating) is central to Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth. — RussellA

In the sense that words have to mean something for his theory to have any relevance, sure. But Tarski doesn't need to give a comprehensive account of meaning to make his point.

Doesn't this lead to a chicken-and-egg situation?

We can't know "Snow is white" is true unless we know Snow is white and/but we can't know Snow is white unless we know "Snow is white" is true. — Agent Smith

We can know snow is white before we know "theluji ni nyeupe".

There was a world pre-language
In the world 100,000 years ago, there was something that was snow having the property white. In this world, the English language had not yet been invented, and therefore not only did the words "snow", "is" and "white" not exist, but neither did the proposition "snow is white".

IE, even if there was a life-form that knew snow is white, it couldn't have known that "snow is white".

The world post-language
At some point in the past, in an Institutional Performative act in the English-speaking world (metaphorically speaking), snow was named "snow", is was named "is" and white was named "white". Subsequently, these words were then accepted by society as a whole as the proper names of these things.

Today, an individual within society can decide whether "snow is white" is true or false in two ways.

First, even without observing white snow in the world, but knowing from the dictionary that "snow is white". IE, I know that Aristotle was a Greek philosopher and polymath during the Classical period in Ancient Greece even though I have never met him.

Note: I know Aristotle was Greek not be acquaintance but by description. IE, I don't know the person, but I do know the description. My knowledge is of the description, not the person.

Second, by observing white snow in the world, knowing "snow" names snow, "is" names is and "white" names white, they know "snow is white". IE, I know from my knowledge of language and the world that "snow is white"

IE, in answer to your question, the situation is not circular as we can know snow is white by observing the world even if we don't know that "snow is white". IE, I know snow is white by observing the world even if I don't know that "theluji ni nyeupe".

"snow" denotes snow because "snow" denotes snow. — RussellA

Tarski mentioned no such pointless tautology.

But Tarski doesn't need to give a comprehensive account of meaning to make his point. — Michael

But if we don't know what Tarski means by the words he uses, then how do we know what he means ?

"is" names is — RussellA

That's not how it works in the context of Tarski. Rather, 'is white' is an undivided unit.

I really don't understand what you're asking.

In simple terms his argument is just that "Schnee ist weiß" is true if and only if snow is white, where "snow is white" is a translation in the meta-language (which in this case is English) of the object-language (which in this case is German) sentence "Schnee ist weiß".

You seem to want to know how it is that the English sentence "snow is white" is a translation of the German sentence "Schnee ist weiß". That's irrelevant to Tarski's point. He just argues that assuming that it is the translation the T-schema follows.

Whether or not any given meta-language sentence is a translation of any given object-language sentence is a separate matter entirely.

Tarski mentioned no such pointless tautology. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I quite agree that Tarski never said ""snow" denotes snow because "snow" denotes snow".

But I imagine you are inferring that I said that Tarski made this tautological comment.

I have never said Tarski made this tautological comment.

I made the tautological comment to illustrate, as Umberto Eco and others have done, the complexity of meaning in the word "denote".

:zip:

You seem to know a helluva lot about the history of language.

I'm not inferring that you are claiming that Tarski made that comment. I'm pointing out that the comment is irrelevant to understanding Tarski.

Meanwhile, it would be helpful if you'd recognize the 15 instances of 'truth' or 'true'. And take note that 'is' is not a standalone denoter in this context.

I asked previously, what textbook in mathematical logic is your main reference for the subject of mathematical logic. The context of Tarski here is overwhelmingly mathematical logic.

You seem to know a helluva lot about the history of language. — Agent Smith

I'm pretty confident that 100,000 years ago people weren't going around saying "snow is white".

I'm pretty confident that 100,000 years ago people weren't going around saying "snow is white". — RussellA

That would be a translation issue, oui monsieur? They just used different words to convey the meaning snow is white.

Anyway, as I said in my last post, how do we determine "snow is white" is true? We first look at the individual words and see if they match the denoted objects and then if there's a correspondence, we conclude "snow is white" is true. That makes sense to me and I suppose that's how we break the vicious cycle.

One poster coemmented that P is true IFF P is a definition, but a definition is basically a list of sufficient and necessary conditions which means my argument stands that this is a chicken-and-egg situation.

Whether or not any given meta-language sentence is a translation of any given object-language sentence is a separate matter entirely. — Michael

Susan Haack Philosophy of Logics
"Tarski emphasises that the (T) schema is not a definition of truth – though in spite of his insistence he has been misunderstood on this point. It is a material adequacy condition: all instances of it must be entailed by any definition of truth which is to count as 'materially adequate'. The point of the (T) schema is that, if it is accepted, it fixes not the intension or meaning but the extension of the term 'true'".

Given the T-schema - "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white

From my reading, Tarski's T-schema doesn't give the meaning, ie intension, of "snow is white", but if "snow is white" is true, then the T-schema does give the extension of "snow is white", ie snow is white. The T-schema, in not giving an intension for "snow is white", is using the concept of "satisfaction" to allow for a recursive definition of truth.

As the T-schema doesn't give the intension of "snow is white", then it doesn't allow translation between "snow is white" and "schnee ist weiss".

Yes, whether "snow is white" is a translation of "schnee ist weiss" is a separate matter to Tarski's T-schema.

One poster coemmented that P is true IFF P is a definition — Agent Smith

No, I did not.

I said:

'P' is true iff P

is a definition of 'is true'.

Leaving off the quote marks is ruinous.

As far as I can tell, you are unfamiliar with use-mention.

this is a chicken-and-egg situation — Agent Smith

Saying "''P' is true iff P" does not preclude that one cannot investigate P without first establishing that 'P' is true: (1) Establish P (such as looking at snow), then (2) infer 'P' is true. That is not circular.

If you actually READ Tarski's papers, you would see how he goes on to explicate that.

As the T-schema doesn't give the intension of "snow is white", then it doesn't allow translation between "snow is white" and "schnee ist weiss". — RussellA

You're putting the cart before the horse. Tarski is saying that if "snow is white" is the translation of "schnee ist weiss" then "schnee ist weiss" is true iff snow is white.

Yes, since Tarski's context is formal, he is not opining on the intensional senses.

Back to the point:

"snow" denotes snow because "snow" denotes snow — RussellA

That unedifying tautology has nothing to do with understanding Tarski.

Tarski's indefinability theorem. — Banno

Here is his actual proof of that theorem:
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
You seem to have the same passion for this subject that I do.

Something not quite right there. Did you mean (the Goldbach conjecture is) true XOR false? Any proposition is either true or false (principle of bivalence). — Agent Smith

It is unknown whether the Goldbach conjecture is true or false because there is currently no known shortcut to the infinite proof of simply testing every natural number.