I’ve already presented a case in which someone flatly denies having knowledge that they do in fact have. — Srap Tasmaner
“I know the answer! — At least, I think I do. I could be wrong.” — Srap Tasmaner
Unless we intend to define certainty or knowledge, that’s about all we’ve got so far. — Srap Tasmaner
They were right, but does it then follow that they knew? — Michael
I know but I could be wrong? I was the one saying that last time and you spent days telling me that was nonsense. — Michael
What does "but I'm not certain" actually mean? It might be that when we tease this out we are confronted with the conclusion that "I'm not certain" actually means "I don't know". — Michael
But we’re not just interested in what people mean by what they say. — Srap Tasmaner
But here I’m talking about what someone might say, not about the fact of their knowing that P being consistent with ~P. — Srap Tasmaner
From “I’m certain that Trump won,” we can’t infer that Trump won. We can’t infer that you know that Trump won. We can’t even infer that you are certain that Trump won. It’s a thing you are saying. What it means, what you mean by it, what you mean by saying it, all that might be interesting, but is not the same as addressing the question of whether knowing that P is equivalent to being certain that P, or if there’s some other relation or what. — Srap Tasmaner
That was the point of having B suddenly remember that she moved the book; A suggested that her book would have been in the way, and B then remembered that it was in the way and she moved it. — Srap Tasmaner
Unless you want to say that she knew all along, despite not have the relevant justified true belief? — Michael
Are you claiming she *discovered* that she herself put A's book on A's nightstand? That she *inferred* it from the evidence of her memory? — Srap Tasmaner
B knew where the book was, but that knowledge was unavailable to her for the moment. It seems clear that the belief was unavailable as well — Srap Tasmaner
So she believed that it was on the nightstand, but that belief wasn’t available to her? That just seems very farfetched. — Michael
I think it far more sensible to say that, at the time, she didn’t believe that it was on the nightstand, and so didn’t know that it was on the nightstand. Further prompting then elicited the memory, and from that spawned the belief and the knowledge. — Michael
You’re saying that at the time that I believed that the pint was mine I knew that the pint was Jane’s? I knew something that I believed was false? — Michael
Philosophers often distinguish dispositional from occurrent believing.
...
Suppose Harry thinks plaid ties are hideous. Only rarely does the thought or judgment that they are hideous actually come to the forefront of his mind. When it does, he possesses the belief occurrently. The rest of the time, Harry possesses the belief only dispositionally. The occurrent belief comes and goes, depending on whether circumstances elicit it; the dispositional belief endures.
So if I have a stack of boxes and put an X on one of them with a Sharpie, it’s no longer a box. Cool. Nice job. — Srap Tasmaner
we'd take a bunch of boxes, and assign the same value to each of them, "possible". Then we take one, mark it with an X, and assign to it a special value, "actual". We cannot say that the one with the special value still has the same value as the others. — Metaphysician Undercover
What's strange here is that I accept that "I am certain" doesn't mean "I know" but it does seem to me that "I am not certain" does mean "I don't know". I suppose ordinary language just isn't always consistent. — Michael
In knowledge-first terms, I know it is raining because I already know what it is to be raining.
A precise reduction to the thread’s original question. I know what is true because I already know what it is to be true. I know what is true because I already know what truth is. — Mww
And we do not know whether it is raining or not, if knowing requires truth in your sense, — Metaphysician Undercover
One motive for demanding a guaranteed mistake-proof brand of observation seems to be this. It would be absurd to say that there are, or might be, matters of empirical fact which could not, in principle, be found out by observation; so, since any ordinary observation actually made might be mistaken, there must be a special sort of mistake-proof observation, in order that ‘empirical’ may be defined in terms of it. And then sensing is invented to play this role, for it is certainly improper to speak of a mistaken sensation. But the reason why sensation cannot be mistaken is not because it is a mistake-proof observing, but because it is not an observing at all. It is as absurd to call a sensation ‘veridical’ as to call it ‘mistaken’. The senses are neither honest nor deceitful. Nor does the argument justify us in postulating any other kind of automatically veridical observation. All it requires is what familiar facts provide, namely that observational mistakes, like any others, are detectable and corrigible; so no empirical fact which has in fact been missed by a lapse, need be missed by an endless series of lapses. What is wanted is not any peculiar certificated process, but the ordinary careful processes; not any incorrigible observations, but ordinary corrigible observations; not inoculation against mistakes, but ordinary precautions against them, ordinary tests for them and ordinary corrections of them. Ascertaining is not a process which bases upon a fund of certainties a superstructure of guesses; it is a process of making sure. Certainties are what we succeed in ascertaining, not things which we pick up by accident or benefaction. They are the wages of work, not the gifts of revelation. When the sabbatical notion of ‘the Given’ has given place to the week-day notion of ‘the ascertained’, we shall have bade farewell to both Phenomenalism and the Sense Datum Theory. — Gilbert Ryle, Concept of Mind
Well, yes, that's exactly what I'm trying to do. What does "but I'm not certain" actually mean? It might be that when we tease this out we are confronted with the conclusion that "I'm not certain" actually means "I don't know", in which case our initial assumption that we can have knowledge without being certain is mistaken, and that such cases were simply successful guesses (with or without some degree of justification). — Michael
in knowledge-first terms, Alice knew that it was raining because she looked out the window and saw that it was raining.
— Andrew M
In knowledge-first terms, I know it is raining because I already know what it is to be raining. — Mww
I know what is true because I already know what it is to be true. I know what is true because I already know what truth is. — Mww
Not *only* the same, because it's the one with the x on it, but it's still a box. You forgot to give an argument that putting an x on a box makes it not a box, or that you have to erase "possible" in order to write "actual". — Srap Tasmaner
What's odd here is that the complement of possible is impossible. Me, I assumed actuality implied possibility. I'm puzzled why you think actuality implies impossibility. — Srap Tasmaner
We don't know with deductive certainty. But that's not the relevant or appropriate standard. The relevant standard is to look out the window and see whether it's raining. — Andrew M
I'm not saying the actual world is no longer a world. It's still a world just like the box with the X is still a box. — Metaphysician Undercover
The X signifies that the box is not in the same category as the unmarked boxes, just like "actual" signifies that the world is not in the same category as the possible worlds. — Metaphysician Undercover
I never used "impossible", you are putting words in my mouth — Metaphysician Undercover
It is a common misunderstanding to think that impossible is the opposite of possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
Fine. It’s not my usual usage, but if you want to reserve possible for non-actual, it makes no real difference. It makes world carry a little more of the burden, but that’s also fine. — Srap Tasmaner
"Possible" is not defined as non-actual, it is defined as what may or may not be. And, since actual is defined as what is, it is a logical conclusion that the possible is non-actual. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I was. But I can adapt to your usage. All I need to say, using your terminology, is that the actual world is a world. Done. In my usage, if the actual world is not a member of the class of possible worlds, it’s a member of the complement, which would be the class of impossible worlds — if there are any such things, depending on the accessibility relation. — Srap Tasmaner
An assumption H, for the purposes of hypothetical reasoning, picks out a set of worlds at which H is true. The actual world may be such a world. — Srap Tasmaner
All good? — Srap Tasmaner
In modal logic, p → ◇p. If something is true then it is possibly true. Possibility is defined as "not necessary", and something is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. — Michael
Obviously, this is the problem, we are working on a different definitions of "possible". I define it as what may or may not be, consistent with common use. — Metaphysician Undercover
....it’s that any factive instance of one of the others is necessarily also an instance of knowing. — Srap Tasmaner
the old argument (...) against any analysis of knowledge, was that there is no non-circular way to carry out such an analysis. — Srap Tasmaner
there is no opposite to "possible". And to use "impossible" as the opposite to "possible" is to stray from the definition "what may or may not be". — Metaphysician Undercover
Is there any verb that isn’t fractive [ sic ]? How would One become apparent to me? — Mww
Chuck Norris doesn’t go hunting — that implies the possibility of failure. Chuck Norris goes killing.
And.....what benefit in them is there for me? — Mww
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