Russia just tends to stock their stuff with too much ammunition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. So, if you know this, and you're not committing treason by openly saying it on the internet, then how is it that Russian generals don't know it too?

What mechanism is in place whereby you can freely talk about this tactical insight on a public internet forum yet the information somehow remains hidden from one of the larger intelligence agencies in the world?

A few days ago, a twitter account called Gandom ("wheat" in Persian) posted a video of an anonymous, unveiled Iranian woman singing Bella Ciao.

https://twitter.com/Gandom_Sa007/status/1573300331412348930

It seems the Italian antifascist song has fans in Ukraine too. From three months ago:

Well, now what? (I said in a mildly annoyed voice)

^{• Norway oil safety regulator warns of threats from unidentified drones (Sep 26, 2022)
• Norway raises emergency level, coordinating with armed forces over oil and gas drone threat (Sep 27, 2022)
• Drones seen near offshore platforms, Norwegian regulator says (Sep 28, 2022)
• Nord Stream: Norway and Denmark tighten energy infrastructure security after gas pipeline 'attack' (Sep 28, 2022)
• Sightings of several unidentified drones in Norwegian North Sea (Sep 28, 2022)
• Drone activity observed near Total offshore installation in North Sea (Sep 29, 2022)}

Well, now what? — jorndoe

Nothing whatsoever I should think...

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/may/13/oil-gas-producers-first-quarter-2022-profits

Do you see any reason there why anyone in power would want to for anything at all about this situation?

Likely heightened security on oil infrastructure, apparently.

Let's not hope it goes to things like in Saudi-Arabia...



At least now (with the Baltic gas pipeline sabotage) Gazprom can refer to force majeure and not be worried about fines from not holding up gas deals.

Happier times with Nordstream earlier... Angela and Dmitri had fun back then. Now literally the thing ended with bangs.

lol, it isn't hidden, there are tons of videos of tanks hurling their turrets due to cook off. There was also plenty of commentary from before the war that the Moskva, despite an impressive armorments (several S-400 systems essentially), was loaded with more munitions than most comparable ships in other navies, and that this necessarily increases the risk of secondary explosions. Leaked pictures of (if I recall from the Moskova itself in some of them) showing munitions strewn about corridors only added to that conception.

You could also come to this conclusion comparing the damage sustainable by the Stark when hit by an Exocet, versus the damage to a larger ship hit by a Neptune (similar payload), although impact site matters a lot. It's not exactly classified that there is a trade off between how many munitions you pack into any vehicle and how likely it is to suffer catastrophic cook off if it is hit by an explosive.

Cramming things with high explosive makes them more likely to explode. If there is a high incidence of this effect in combat vehicles that are supposed to be able to sustain such attacks, then you appear to have a problem. Although it might just be with armor quality for the tanks. And context matters. Cook off after a top attack weapon strike or big bore mortar strike that would likely be fatal anyhow is less of an issue than having a tank that appears to have survived an indirect 155mm shell explode a few seconds later. In the latter, it is the cook off that is destroying the tank and killing the crew.

It's not exactly classified that there is a trade off between how many munitions you pack into any vehicle and how likely it is to suffer catastrophic cook off if it is hit by an explosive. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's not your claim though is it? Your claim was that they packed too much, not that they made an informed decision about the trade off between pros and cons. I'm asking why they didn't know it was too much if you, and apparently the rest of the world knew.

Because Russian arms manufacturers are incompetent and tests likely get rigged. There is plenty of other evidence for this. Putin is pounding the table about nuclear war and mobilizing old men, yet the Su-57 and T-14 are nowhere to be seen except parades. This implies they don't actually work. Why would you be using T-62s if you have functional stealth super tanks?

Not to mention an Su-57 just arrived in Russia's experimental aircraft graveyard, which is visible on satalite imagery. This strongly implied they tore the engine out of it (used in other planes) because the Su-57 isn't combat worthy. The fact that they never started major production also suggests this. They could certainly use a stealth fighter right now given they can't do SEAD and are losing fighters to MANPADs because they have to fly so low.

At least now (with the Baltic gas pipeline sabotage) Gazprom can refer to force majeure and not be worried about fines from not holding up gas deals — ssu

Gazprom already declared force majeure earlier this year, apparently due to its "problems" with turbines. They already turned off Nord Stream 1, with every indication that it would stay off for the foreseeable future. And Nord Stream 2 was under sanctions, although Moscow lobbied hard for it to be turned on, even after it cut off Nord Stream 1. So I find it hard to explain how the catastrophic sabotage of both pipelines (it looks like they are gone for good) could benefit Russia. They have already demonstrated that they could turn the flow of gas on and off at will, using it either as a bargaining chip or a weapon. If they blew it up, they have robbed themselves of this tool, because they no longer have any choice in the matter. Not to mention that they have sunk a very costly investment.

Because Russian arms manufacturers are incompetent and tests likely get rigged. There is plenty of other evidence for this. Putin is pounding the table about nuclear war and mobilizing old men, yet the Su-57 and T-14 are nowhere to be seen except parades. This implies they don't actually work. Why would you be using T-62s if you have functional stealth super tanks? — Count Timothy von Icarus

So you're not on board with the idea that Putin is ideologically committed to expanding the Russian empire militarily?

Where exactly do you get the idea from that Russian tanks carry significantly more ammunition than other tanks? What tank types are you comparing to this end?

From what I gather the T-72 carries around 45 rounds of ammunition for its main armament. For comparison, an M1 Abrams carries around 42.

This may vary between variants, but that doesn't look like a very significant difference to me.


It seems more likely that the difference you are trying to describe has to do with the loading systems that Russian tanks use. Russian tanks favor autoloading systems, which do increase the chance of cook-offs since a portion of the ammunition is carried in a ring in or below the turret, as opposed to the ammunition storage.

That is clearly a weighed design feature, though. It allows the tank to be operated by fewer crew.

Cook off after a top attack weapon strike or big bore mortar strike that would likely be fatal anyhow is less of an issue than having a tank that appears to have survived an indirect 155mm shell explode a few seconds later. In the latter, it is the cook off that is destroying the tank and killing the crew. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even though I don't know what footage you're referring to, that does not sound like a typical cook-off at all. In order for a cook-off to happen, heavily armored compartments of the tank need to be penetrated - something which is unlikely to result from an indirect 155mm artillery hit.

Cook-offs can happen to all tanks, and it matters very little to the crew inside whether one round explodes inside the tank or twenty.

When they happen, the tank has already been penetrated, and with some likelihood knocked out.

If there is a high incidence of this effect in combat vehicles that are supposed to be able to sustain such attacks, then you appear to have a problem. Although it might just be with armor quality for the tanks. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This all depends on range. Tanks are made to fight over long ranges, and their armor protects them in that context. When a tank is said to be able to withstand a frontal impact from another tank's main armament, they might be talking about ranges of 1km+, over which the projectile loses a lot of energy.

If the same tanks would meet in an urban setting, at ranges of a few hundred meters, the armor might be easily beaten. Even side armor can become vulnerable to for example 30mm rounds at close ranges. This is nothing strange.

Also why the Moskova went down to a fairly small payload (Iran hit a much smaller Israeli ship with a similar payload and it sailed home under its own power, but of course where the hit occurs matters a lot). The Moskova had a ridiculous amount of ordinance for its size and I suspect this is what killed it — Count Timothy von Icarus

I suspect out-of-control fire is what took the Moskva out of action. Perhaps ammunition explosions did contribute to her eventual sinking, though a real ammunition cook-off of a ship of that size and capacity would probably have not lead to a "sinking", but to a complete blow-up.

It's an old ship, likely with somewhat outdated fire-fighting equipment on board. It was also taking on water.

I doubt many commanders would send their crew into a sinking, burning wreck of an old ship when they're only a few miles off the friendly coast. Not to mention they had no idea whether more missiles were being sent their way.

You could also come to this conclusion comparing the damage sustainable by the Stark when hit by an Exocet, versus the damage to a larger ship hit by a Neptune (similar payload), although impact site matters a lot. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And in the case of the USS Stark incident, you're comparing a ship and weapons platform of roughly the same time period (OHP-class, been in service since 1977, air-launched Exocet since 1979).

In the case of the Moskva, you're comparing a ship from 1983 to a weapons platform from 2021.

Gazprom already declared force majeure earlier this year, apparently due to its "problems" with turbines. — SophistiCat

These "problems" were already called out, when Siemens did provide the services. But of course this is just theater, basically.

So you're not on board with the idea that Putin is ideologically committed to expanding the Russian empire militarily? — Isaac

Everybody agrees with that. The majority also believe that Putin is ideologically committed to expanding the Russian empire. :smirk:

Everybody agrees with that. The majority also believe that Putin is ideologically committed to expanding the Russian empire. :smirk: — ssu

So what, he's going to do so by stealth? Steal Latvia while they're all out?

You'll have to fill in a few blanks for me. The theory is that an almost complete autocrat obsessed with expanding his empire has, nevertheless, knowingly let his army decay to the point of malfunction and lets them use military strategies that even the denizens of an internet philosophy forum know are flawed? He's chosen this strategy above say, using his autocratic power to build up the best military possible for his expansionist plans?

Your theory as to why he's chosen this 'crappy army' approach to imperial expansion...? A cunning bluff, perhaps?

I'd say it like this.

After the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, which Russia won only because Georgia was even more unprepared for the war (basically the field commander was one major) and because Russia had numerical superiority, the need to modernize and dramatically reorganize the armed forces was evident to all and was started by Putin.

Russia modernized it's forces equipment partly, that is true. Partly because it had a huge force to modernize. Planes and tanks couldn't be built in the thousands. Yet Russia could do a very successful military operation with the annexation of Crimea. It used it's most elite troops, the VDV paratroops and military intelligence soldiers (from the GRU) in this operation. Here strategic surprise was achieved and the information warfare of the intelligence services worked extremely well. And this good performance lead to people think that Russia had really modernized itself.

Then it performed well in Syria too, yet with a rather small contingent. Basically it had two squadrons of mixed combat aircraft and air base Air Defence + security troops in Syria. Some mercenaries were used, but in all this was a small force. Yet it helped Assad substantially. Again everything looked good.

Then suddenly this Putin decided to do an all out attack against Ukraine and start a huge conventional war that basically involved the majority of Russia Army ground forces. Not only the elite troops, not only a small limited force that then could be backed up logistically by other troops. Nope, basically everything was involved! Then the attack came as a surpise to many in the forces, as the official line was that Putin wouldn't be invading (which some in this thread believed).

Here the Potemkin village collapsed. Basically it would be stressful to any armed forces that is used to limited operations, then suddenly face an all out conventional war.

And needless to say, the Ukrainians themselves have a lot to do with the poor performance of Russia. They did't collapse as the Afghan National Army. They had been preparing for this from 2014. Not only was the Ukrainian armed forces quite large, it also had the will to defend it's country (unlike some here seem to forget and think it would have been better for them just to surrender).

Hence the theory isn't that Putin chose a crappy army. More like the crappy Russian system couldn't make it any better and the really crappy idea of invading Ukraine cemented the outcome.

I think one of the lessons of this war that power crazed politicos would do well to learn is that war is a cooperative venture, and relies on good communication because the chaotic situation cannot be planned for in advance. This puts any government that has undermined its lines of communication with habitual lying at a great disadvantage. Those that do not tell the truth, end up not hearing it either.

Hence the theory isn't that Putin chose a crappy army. More like the crappy Russian system couldn't make it any better — ssu

Ah, that generalised Russian uselessness we hear so much about. An entire nation just generally a bit crap. A far more plausible explanation for Putin's crappy army than the alternative theory that Putin didn't put much effort into making an empire-conquering land invasion force because he had no major plans for any empire conquering.

Just remind me again why that's the more plausible theory... (assuming, of course, the fact that it just so happens to better enrich one of the most influential industries in the world is just a coincidence).

And just to drag us out of your Wikipedia-polluted mire back to the point...the argument was actually about a strategic decision (too much ammunition in tanks). I was asking why the Russians continued with a tactic that is widely known to be wrong. I suppose that's to do with their genetic uselessness too? Poor Russians.

The M1 is also 25% heavier than the T-72, significantly larger, with more modern armor and counter measures, designed for a 105mm gun until armor and weaponry improvements led to a swap to 120mm. The T-72 always used a 125mm gun and also rounds with significantly more propellant. So yeah, the comparison is like 15-20% more material that might explode in 75% of the space, with less effective measures to make sure it doesn't explode.

And yes, 155mm shouldn't make tanks cook off with indirect hits. This might have something to do with having external fuel tanks on while in range of enemy artillery fire. I suppose this is a training and logistics issue rather than an equipment itself. You can have cook off without penetration anytime there is extremely high heat, or if unstable rounds go off from overpressure (more of an issue a very long time ago before more stable HE existed). Obviously not much can be done about a direct hit from 155 or 152mm on the top of a tank. I have to assume that most cases of that happening were with tanks that were stopped since it would be incredibly lucky otherwise (and even still).


Who knows? The problem with authoritarian systems is that over time the leader often gets very disconnected from reality. I would not be surprised with the Russian command had no real idea how many men they've lost, nor that they lie to Put in about how many they think that figure truly is. The information he receives is going to be fair removed from reality. On top of that, he's an old man who supposedly has cancer and a degenerative brain disease. I'm not going to assume his decision making is entirely rational.

Putin faces the nightmare scenerio for dictators, his interests in winning the war, even at extremely high costs, are rapidly becoming more divergent from Russia's national interests. Other powerful actors will see that removing him might allow them to end the war and Russia's isolation. But Putin has to double down, because he needs to ensure he keeps power, or that his brand is strong enough to ensure someone loyal to him takes power. If someone not loyal to him gets power, trying him and blaming him for ongoing problems would be a way to shift public resentment away from the new leader. That there is substantial evidence that Putin organized a terrorist campaign against Russian apartment buildings to aid his bid for power makes his risk much greater, regardless of if he actually did it or not.

The problem is that, even if he wanted to have a strong military, the political organization he has fostered is not designed to create one. A strong military requires cutting edge technological innovation, which requires an open society and an ability for people to dissent. Developing good strategy and tactics also requires a meritocratic system and an ability for people to dissent. A big problem for authoritarians is that they cannot let leaders of merit and ambition raise through the ranks because they create a rival to the strongman.

Why Nations Fail was pretty much "selecting of the dependant variable - the book," but I do think the point it makes about extractive economic regimes only being able to produce catch-up growth, not innovation, is largely true. As autonomous systems and vehicles, drone screens for tanks and ships, autonomous smart mortars for near instant fire missions and constant indirect fire support, loitering munitions, drone swarm cluster munitions, interceptor systems, HUD systems like IVAS, interconnectivity of air and ground assets from fighters to soda bottle sized zones to infantry into a single battle space intelligence system, etc. all scale up, technologically backwards forces are not going to be successful. I can only imagine the hit to morale if in a hard fought battle the damage you inflict on the enemy is mostly destroying a bunch of automated robots.

It's a catch 22. If Russia modernized and had a per capita GDP more in line with say Spain, it would be able to create a more effective military. But such a system would likely remove Putin from power and destroy the incentives to start such wars in the first place.

Russian milblogger @RYBAR reports on the Lyman front:

On the night of September 29-30, Russian troops had to withdraw from Yampil' , and the defensive lines at Drobysheve were also broken through. The Lyman defensive line had narrowed to the administrative borders of the city.

Yeah, the Russian milblogger sphere seems to suggest that Lyman is essentially encircled. It seems for now that there is a substantial force caught in the pocket. If that's true, whether Ukraine is forced to reduce that encirclement or whether it surrenders will be a litmus test of morale.

It's not a catastrophic loss, but it positioning Ukraine closer to rail lines whose loss would prove catastrophic for Russia.

Would Russia's army have been victorious without Western support for Ukraine?

Apropos no specific comment here, but, for the purposes of the war, it does not matter than the US, Europe and even the UN, don't consider these new territories as part of Russia, what matters is that Russia does.

We should expect Ukraine to fight for these territories back, now Russia will consider it a direct attack on them. Quite a problem.

We should expect Ukraine to fight for these territories back, now Russia will consider it a direct attack on them. Quite a problem. — Manuel

Those areas are part of Ukraine.

I didn't say they weren't. Russia doesn't consider it though, so it will take any attacks on these territories as an attack on Russia.

Not saying Ukraine shouldn't get them back, but I'd be careful in handling the situation.

Not saying Ukraine shouldn't get them back, but I'd be careful in handling the situation. — Manuel

Careful how?

The problem with authoritarian systems is that over time the leader often gets very disconnected from reality. I would not be surprised with the Russian command had no real idea how many men they've lost, nor that they lie to Put in about how many they think that figure truly is. The information he receives is going to be fair removed from reality. On top of that, he's an old man who supposedly has cancer and a degenerative brain disease. I'm not going to assume his decision making is entirely rational. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But this isn't about Putin, it's about basic military strategy and procurement. Do you seriously think Putin is directly in charge of what tanks to buy and how much ammunition to stick them with? One man can't micromanage an entire country.

Putin faces the nightmare scenerio for dictators, his interests in winning the war, even at extremely high costs, are rapidly becoming more divergent from Russia's national interests. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What on earth would his personal interests be here? Putin is going to retire on a fat pile of kleptocratic wealth no matter what. Why would he give a shit about Ukraine?

even if he wanted to have a strong military, the political organization he has fostered is not designed to create one. A strong military requires cutting edge technological innovation, which requires an open society and an ability for people to dissent. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Go on... I can't see the mechanism here.

Developing good strategy and tactics also requires a meritocratic system and an ability for people to dissent. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not at all, that much is unquestionable. Good tactics, in this case, requires only that he read the philosophy forum. Clearly this information is public knowledge, nothing more than an internet connection is required to obtain it.

Russia modernized and had a per capita GDP more in line with say Spain, it would be able to create a more effective military. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Russia's military spending is really high isn't it? Why would more GDP be required?

Impossible to say. The collapse of the Kyiv and Sumny axes occured before most heavy equipment arrived and before Ukraine's summer's shortages of Soviet era munitions. Further progress by Russian lines into Ukraine would have just made supply issues more acute, perhaps offsetting the benefit Ukraine got from early arms shipments.

It would all be decided based on the level of Ukrainian resistance. Mariupol is right on the border, and was encircled rapidly. It didn't receive new aid and yet taking degraded Russian forces significantly. Similar levels of resistance in much larger cities where Russia was not able to use its air resources with impunity would likely exhaust the Russian military. But you'd see a much higher civilian death toll for Ukraine and far more destruction of infrastructure.

Even if Russia did eventually take these key cities, their force numbers are wholly inadequate for counter insurgency on this scale. So it would depend largely on if the additional costs Ukrainians faced due to a greater arms mismatch resulted in a large shift in resistance. If it didn't, I don't see Russia being successful in their maximalist aims. But certainly without Western support Ukraine would be hard pressed to retake dug in positions as they are now, so Russia would likely be able to keep some territory as long as they didn't fully exhaust their military.

In how it handles trying to get the territories back. If they go full force, it would be akin to Ukraine "invading" Russia. This might allow Russia to expand its quite horrible hands and create an extremely dangerous situation. In my view, these territories should be part of the negotiations, if we ever get to that point. I think there has to be some kind of minor land swap or a token victory of sorts that allows Putin to delcare this a "victory" - (as happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis).

I don't think total humiliation will be accepted by the Russian regime, meaning, they might go crazy. One needs to give the opponent an off ramp, however distasteful it is.

Ah, that generalised Russian uselessness we hear so much about. An entire nation just generally a bit crap. — Isaac

You just hold your racist hints to yourself.

Corruption makes it Russia what it is. And Putin has created a kleptocracy. It's not the people themselves. Individuals are quite the same. How societies function is different.

And lastly, which likely you might not understand, is that many Russians understand that they attacked Ukraine, a country which didn't threaten them in any way. The reaction from the Russian people and the fighting spirit of the Russian soldier would be different, if their country was attacked and they would defend their country from an aggressor that describes them to be an artificial country. Then it would be Russians military aged men coming from abroad to join the military. (As in the case of...Ukraine)

Russia's military spending is very high compared to the size of its economy (about the same as Spain). It's very low compared to the opponents it says it wants to be the peers of. It was below just the UK's spending in 2021. About a fifth of European NATO spending or Chinese spending, just 7% of US spending.

But the larger point is that this money was clearly largely stolen or misused. Russian expenditures are around 47% higher than the ROK, but the ROK has a more modern air force, arguably given the number of Russian tank losses before they had to pull out T-72s more modern tanks, and can definitely mobilize a larger active component despite a much smaller population. Hell, Israel, with a third of the budget and a population the size of a large city appears to be able to equip their front line infantry better, in similar numbers.

Russia has a large hardware advantage, but this is left over Soviet capital. It's become quite clear that the vast majority of this is not upgraded. Old models aren't necessarily a liability. The F-15 is an old air frame, but Korea isn't fielding the 1970s variant, the platform has seen continual upgrades.

And procurement is another issue. The FA-50 is racking up sales, already passing 1,000 units while the Su-57 has had six production models made, none of which seem fit for use. Aircraft development is incredibly expensive so there are serious issues when you make a supposedly high end air superiority fighter and try to drum up sales and then the project collapses.