Putin has created a kleptocracy. It's not the people themselves. — ssu

Then from whom, with whom and by whose permit was such a catastrophe of a state created. You guys really need to get your Putin story straight. A minute ago the man could barely see two steps ahead now he's singlehandedly running the entire Russian military, and somehow taken control of an entire nation against their will.

many Russians understand that they attacked Ukraine, a country which didn't threaten them in any way. The reaction from the Russian people and the fighting spirit of the Russian soldier would be different, if... — ssu

I don't see what morale has to do with military strategy from years ago, but notwithstanding, are the Russian soldiers ruthless thugs or reluctant pacifists? Half and half? Do any of them just mistakenly believe Putin, or are they all angels or devils?

This is a strawman.

You don't need to assume specific character traits to get insights into morale and discipline. It's an emergent phenomenon, and highly situational.

All militaries in earlier history looted, raped, massacred civilians, and tortured for intelligence. Reductions in this type of behavior are partially due to cultural norms, but are largely a function of professionalization and better leadership. This also depends on the leadership recognizing that "taking the gloves of" and allowing their soldiers to engage in these behaviors isn't a winning strategy, because it has very deleterious effects on discipline.

Poor strategic decision-making can break morale even if well trained forces. US morale hit near rock bottom after MacArthur's arrogance and poor decision-making led to the worst rout in US history when the Chinese entered the Korean War in force. It was restored when Ridgway began to demonstrate that the leadership was making prudent decisions and had a realistic vision of what the situation was like on the ground.

It's a hard thing to measure. It's not just about conditions. Montgomery was able to lead a late-fall/winter offensive into Canada through horrendous terrain with 1770s supply technology. Laying siege to a walled city in a northern Quebec winter, during a blizzard is no mean feat. But after the Montgomery's death and the fall back to Montreal the force lost any sense of purpose and that killed morale. These things are hard to pin down and ephemeral.

Russia's military spending is very high compared to the size of its economy (about the same as Spain). It's very low compared to the opponents it says it wants to be the peers of. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So 'empire-building on a budget', that's the narrative you're going with? Putin's prepared to make the entire country an international pariah, run it into the ground for his imperial ambitions, but he's going to do so with a keen eye on the purse strings because...

that this money was clearly largely stolen or misused. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly. Largely by the likes of Putin and his cronies (and enemies, of course). It's this notion that Putin is anything other than an opportunistic kleptocrat that I'm finding hard to reconcile with what you're telling me about their military failures.

This also depends on the leadership recognizing that "taking the gloves of" and allowing their soldiers to engage in these behaviors isn't a winning strategy, because it has very deleterious effects on discipline. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, if you're publishing this information on a free internet forum, then presumably it's in the public domain. Do Russian generals not have internet access?

Another factor on Lyman is whether the Russians can retreat. If not, it won't encourage others to hold fast in precarious conditions.

don't think total humiliation will be accepted by the Russian regime, meaning, they might go crazy. One needs to give the opponent an off ramp, however distasteful it is. — Manuel

The problem with being entirely dishonorable and untrustworthy is that you can't get your opponent to accept a cease fire, especially when they're on a roll.

The problem with being entirely dishonorable and untrustworthy is that you can't get your opponent to accept a cease fire, especially when they're on a roll — frank

That's bullshit. Were fucking selling weapons to Saudi Arabia. We've dealt with the most ruthless despots when it suits us. And there'd be a de facto Ukrainian ceasefire the very second we cut off the weapon supply. So any notion that the failure of negotiations is somehow all on Russia's unique lack of honour is blatant crap. They're all dishonourable, from Putin to Biden to Zelensky. Our own recent addition to the cabal is a fucking sociopath.

Hell, they don't even have to dig that hard. The British MOD regularly posts conflict updates that point out poor Russian command decisions, as does ISW and other OSINT sources staffed by former military commanders. So do Russian nationalist milbloggers.

For Western officials, the judgement is likely that pointing out obvious incompetence will have a larger negative impact on Russian morale than it will a positive impact on Russian military decision-making. This isn't granular tactical data, it's obvious incompetence that would be corrected if there was an ability to do so. I mean, the recent Kharkiv offensive and the follow up around Lyman are almost exact duplicates of German advances in 1942, it's not like they were unpredictable.

My understanding of this war is that Putin, an opportunistic kleptocrat, saw an opportunity, in the machinations of US imperialism, to consolidate his power (and more importantly his wealth) by taking control over key strategic areas of Ukraine. He did this with an army that are neither saints nor monsters, one that is neither useless nor brilliant, but rather just exactly the kind of army we'd expect an ex-superpower to have left over - big, quite brutish, damaging, but perhaps not as sophisticated as the US military.

I'm told this narrative is not only wrong, but so wrong that believing it makes me some kind of Putin apologist. I'm struggling to see how the information you're providing doesn't just fit that narrative perfectly.

What it doesn't seem to match is a powerful dictator with an imperialist ambition strong enough to drive his army to war, but somehow too weak to get them to look on the internet for tips on how to win.

Ukraine accelerates bid to join NATO after Russia’s annexation

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/30/ukraine-accelerates-bid-to-join-nato-after-russias-annexation

Satalite imagery shows than organizing columns, but the road out is covered by Ukrainian artillery and they may have had time to move forces in for an ambush by now. If that's the case, it'd be a situation similar to The Gauntlet at Kunu-ri, at which point the smart decision would be to sit tight and hope for a better opportunity to break out later. Or surrender.

Such a retreat is a terrible situation. US divisions had a massive firepower advantage on Korea but the Second Division was still shattered by that withdrawal.

If their command gave a crap about force protection, they would have had them retreat while they could do it in order.

lgor Girkin on Lyman:

“Why the withdrawal from Lyman was not secured in advance by introducing forces into the ‘corridor’ sufficient to hold it and cover the withdrawal – I have no answer to that,” he added.

He said that if Russian forces are not able to withdraw from Lyman, “a relatively insignificant tactical defeat” would turn into “a huge moral success” for Ukraine.

It's fine. They made surrender punishable by 10 years in prison and Putin gave a no retreat order, how can they lose?

Plus, the calvary is on its way. Just 90 miles away there are videos of civilian busses unloading fresh middle aged soldiers who are razor sharp from their two day refresher training and ready to go (...well as soon as their families supply them with sleeping bags, tarps, and medical equipment, and armor, optional supplies anyway). They can ride to the rescue like the powerful Third Corps did in Kharkiv!

The 20th Motor Rifle Division and Bars-13 are there, along with some number of LNR militia. It's anyone's guess how under strength they are, or how many might have retreated earlier, but this would be around 8-14,000 if the bulk of each is cut off. That's a pretty substantial figure, although I would think at least some decent proportion withdrew earlier.

I do wonder if deteriorating conditions, particularly as conscripts make up more of the Russian forces, along with a large influx of POWs, might swell the ranks of the Freedom of Russia Legion. The massive outflow of men since conscription was announced could do the same.

If you're a dictator, historically it's never a good thing to have your own citizens gaining combat experience and motivation fighting against you in your attempts to invade a neighbor. They tend to become the core of future partisans trying to remove you.

Belarus has a similar problem. For all the hay the Kremlin has made about Western foreign fighters (actually NATO soldiers in some tellings), it certainly seems like most come from within Russia (Chechens included), or former Soviet countries (the Georgian Legion, Tactical Group Belarus, and to a lesser extent Poles and Fins).

Putin's tactic of recruiting extremely heavily from minority populations while mobilizing a much smaller share of ethnic Russians, particularly those in Moscow and St. Petersburg, could definitely backfire if the sort of unrest going on in Dagistan continues. At a certain point, leaders of the republics might tell the MoD to fuck off entirely. At that point there is nothing but terrible options for Putin. If you try to force the issue, you risk ending up with a home front crisis requiring security forces, if you don't, more republics might do the same thing, or even escalate, demanding more autonomy, etc. To make matters worse, in such a crisis you now have minorities as a very disproportionate amount of your armed forces, and news of trouble back home will invariably reach then and hit morale there too.

IDK, someone should offer to let him flee with a bunch of his wealth to some other oligarch nation with protections against extradition. That might save a lot of lives, although his ego probably wouldn't allow it. I suspect a cease fire could follow that fairly quickly.

If their command gave a crap about force protection, they would have had them retreat while they could do it in orde — Paine

In my understanding the forces holding Lyman are mainly East-Ukrainian, pro-Russian territorial defence militia. That's why they are so tough and resisted so long, I guess: they are not actually Russians. But it may also be why they are left hanging there.

The 20th Gaurds Combined Arms Army was there, with an additional battalion group of Russians, so a fairly substantial concentration, but it's unclear if components made it out.

I misspoke on the unit there earlier. The 20th Gaurds Army (not the 20th division) is two divisions plus two artillery brigades, plus attached regiments. But the Russian order of battle is a mess right now, so it's hard to say what the current organization would be at full strength. Probably 22,000-28,000 soldiers under its pre-war organization. However, at current strength it could be far less because units with high casualties are being broken up and consolidated into new ones. They obviously wouldn't be all within Lyman unless they got rolled up in there. Some must have withdrawn though.

Russian "armies" are much smaller than US field armies, more analogous to a corps.

Putin today: "People of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhie are now our citizens. Forever."

Putin eight years ago (upon the annexation of Crimea): "Don't believe those who are making a boogeyman out of Russia, who say that after Crimea other regions [of Ukraine] will follow. We are not looking to partition Ukraine, we don't need that."

My understanding of this war is that Putin, an opportunistic kleptocrat, saw an opportunity, in the machinations of US imperialism, to consolidate his power (and more importantly his wealth) by taking control over key strategic areas of Ukraine. — Isaac

Vexler says 30% of the motivation would be Putin creating domestic crisis so as to take tighter control of a shaky power structure. But that leaves a lot of room for also have a rather personal and inchoate sense of imperial mission.

Sick and at the end of his life, wealthy beyond imagination but a failure in his ambitions, he might have just found himself trapped in a cycle of escalating aggression as a gambler's last chance.

He knows – through a successful cult of personality and a clever policy of information autocracy – that he has the people with him. He has made the fascist connection between leader and the led.

But the consequence of that is the state machinery has become too corrupt and inefficient to execute any war plan. He has a crappy army because he had to squeeze all independent thought out of Russia's power structure.

So as a dictator, you win some, you lose some. And the only way forward becomes escalating to the next step in terms of external aggression and internal suppression. Putin becomes caught in the dynamics of his own machine.

So it is not opportunism vs strategic plans. Things just spin faster as they gurgle down the plughole.

What I would love to know is how Putin rationalises all this to himself. What secret hope does he harbour?

Maybe he acts in the belief that if he can just stir up enough chaos, then the worst that could happen is Europe also becomes brought down by it too. You don't need to roll your tanks into Latvia and Poland. You just need to wreck energy and food supply chains for one winter. Quite likely you will have economic collapse, hard right power grabs, a meltdown that cripples the EU.

If you know you can't win a conventional war or nuclear war, then is infecting your foe with social chaos a rational strategy given that everything must be escalated right now in your own eyes?

That said, it seems Putin did expect to be able to seize territory and topple the regime in Ukraine in weeks if not days. Mobilisation was never intended. Concrete gains were hoped for.

But behind that may be the mindset that if Russia can't succeed, then at least it can pull everyone else down to the same level. If this is the game plan, then it is all about tipping Europe into its own hard right chaos now. That is what Russian imperialism looks like these days. The crappiest version of itself.

Is Putin financing any of this with his vast amounts of wealth? His net worth is supposedly in the hundreds of billions.

Before setting forth upon the special operation, Putin was a popular figure in European ultranationalist circles. At the same time, he courted the EU to set up massive infrastructure deals. It seems safe to say that bit of dual theater is gone.

Or if it is not dead, what does that look like?

I ask it that way because the world has changed, whatever his intentions are.

Before setting forth upon the special operation, Putin was a popular figure in European ultranationalist circles. At the same time, he courted the EU to set up massive infrastructure deals. It seems safe to say that bit of dual theater is gone. — Paine

This interview with Ralph Schoelhammer sets up how things might go as Euro nationalism erupts in the coming sticky winter, especially if the US did blow up Nordstream to ensure Europe can't backslide on Ukraine.

(We still have to discover who actually did blow the pipes, of course. Or what it is that the majority will believe.)

The video is right wing propaganda. Yet there is truth in how the political situation could turn quickly if a new European narrative is adopted. The existential fear is legitimate.

My comment was that Putin would at least be calculating the possibility of Europe being at this very tippable point as a result of his chaos.

Climate change is the real existential threat, not this rerun of Tsarist or Soviet imperialism. And the world having failed to become collectively organised must logically dissolve into it collection of self-interested parts.



Peter Zeihan has then been spelling out northern Europe's problem with green tech for many years. In sum – for Germany in particular – not enough sun for solar, not enough wind for turbines. Plus German industry is all about turning fossil fuels into export goods.

So Germany – as the anchor of stability – is facing crisis. It has to jump in some direction.

He knows – through a successful cult of personality and a clever policy of information autocracy – that he has the people with him. He has made the fascist connection between leader and the led.

But the consequence of that is the state machinery has become too corrupt and inefficient to execute any war plan. — apokrisis

These are the two narratives I can't seem to square.

Putin has been in power for a long time. Against the wishes of the population (otherwise there'd be no need for the political suppression). That means either he's a useful puppet, or the military are on his side. In any other case he'd have been ousted.

So the idea of a leader hell bent (or even 70% bent) on imperial expansion, with a compliant military, being nonetheless unable to get it to make fairly simple training and strategic adjustments, stamp out a bit of corruption, and invest in the right kit... Seems absurd.

He can get the army to launch a full scale invasion even despite massive losses, but he can't get then to do some training?

He can pocket billions for himself out of the economy, but can't divert enough to buy the right tanks?

He can stamp out any political opposition, even in other countries, even to the point of murder, but he can't clean up a couple of incompetent generals and corrupt arms manufacturers?

It's not as if he even has a very high target. The US DoD is hardly a meritocracy is it?

All this against the alternative narrative that the Russian army is crap because Putin simply wasn't interested in using it to expanded his empire. And no one has yet given me any reason at all to reject that much simpler explanation.

What I do have, though is a reason to reject the 'hubristic imperialist' narrative. It's precisely the narrative the US arms manufacturers need to peddle to justify their lucrative drip feed of weapons. That alone counts strongly against such a narrative.

Maybe he acts in the belief that if he can just stir up enough chaos, then the worst that could happen is Europe also becomes brought down by it too. You don't need to roll your tanks into Latvia and Poland. You just need to wreck energy and food supply chains for one winter. Quite likely you will have economic collapse, hard right power grabs, a meltdown that cripples the EU. — apokrisis

This I can definitely see as being plausible. Like I said, I think he's an opportunist and Europe's twin reliance on Russian gas but also US foreign policy gave him ample opportunity. Let's not pretend the sanctions aren't crippling Europe too, but they have to also be 'all in' on any US venture. Again, none of this takes genius-level strategising, its stuff any half-competent political advisor would suggest.

But, importantly, this hypothesis doesn't have Putin aiming for total control over Ukraine either. It would just be a completely unnecessary headache. Kill Zelensky perhaps, that would sow a good bit of chaos, but take over the whole country...? To what end? He's already got the wealth-generating parts, he's made a big dint in EU stability, made America look more authoritarian than it would like... I can't think what he'd expect to gain additionally from more territory.


But...having said all that, I'm far less interested in the actual theories than I am in the social psychology around the way they're expressed. The in-group censorship, the exclusion of experts by laymen, the maintenance of inconsistent narratives, the suspension of critical thought... All this is going to have consequences, long after Russia finally hobbles home with Crimea and a puppet in Dombas.

These are the two narratives I can't seem to square. — Isaac

Think Achilles, maybe. Think every tragic hero destroyed by hubris. Think Samson, and be afraid. The dark side is always about lies, and the devil is the father of lies. But lies are parasitic on truth, and so the habitual liar destroys the world of communication that they depend on; to the extent that community continues, it establishes communication lines that exclude the liar, who is fed back the lies that he projects.

This means in some ways that there are two worlds ("two narratives", exactly), and two societies, the official vision of order, v the messy reality. The books are always cooked - like the tanks - but the tanks are never cooked in the master's books, and the masterful hero loses touch with reality.

lies are parasitic on truth, and so the habitual liar destroys the world of communication that they depend on; to the extent that community continues, it establishes communication lines that exclude the liar, who is fed back the lies that he projects. — unenlightened

So the US military, DoD, and government are a collection of honest, open individuals working toward collective goals? I don't buy it.

The US has managed to gain one of the most effective militaries in the world and it's done it via a system which is as corrupt, dishonest and individualist as any. It's done it because it wants to win, and anyone who wants to win (hubristic liar or not) will obtain the knowledge and equipment required for that purpose (to the extent they have the means to).

I get what you're saying about hubris and lies. Yes, it will ultimately destroy the system it creates, but the issue here is much more specific. It's a question of the exact mechanism in play - more like choosing which route to collapse.

I'm not saying it's implausible that Putin has this private imperialist agenda which he's somehow unable to adequately prepare for because he's been too hubristic to listen to advice. That makes some sense. But it doesn't make so much sense that all other interpretations are apologist fantasy... that's the point I'm making here.

So the US military, DoD, and government are a collection of honest, open individuals working toward collective goals? I don't buy it. — Isaac

Nor do I. And I wasn't selling it either. Western democracies are not in a good state either, and human nature is not that different around the world. The world is in a state of collapse due to cognitive dissonance, and Putin is one amongst many.

These are the two narratives I can't seem to square. — Isaac

It’s simple enough. If you set up a top down system with the goal of diverting blame from the leader then that prevents the bottom up feedback that tunes the system to be effective. The system lacks the independent thought and truth telling it needs to function well.

All this against the alternative narrative that the Russian army is crap because Putin simply wasn't interested in using it to expanded his empire. — Isaac

Do you have informed sources that argue this? They would be fascinating to read.

I'm not saying it's implausible that Putin has this private imperialist agenda which he's somehow unable to adequately prepare for because he's been too hubristic to listen to advice. That makes some sense. But it doesn't make so much sense that all other interpretations are apologist fantasy... that's the point I'm making here. — Isaac

This seems a welcome change of tune. :up:

Interesting piece on war theory, specifically on how wars end, in the New Yorker:

How the War in Ukraine Might End

In recent years, a small group of scholars has focussed on war-termination theory. They see reason to fear the possible outcomes in Ukraine.
By Keith Gessen, September 29, 2022

https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/how-the-war-in-ukraine-might-end

Not good news, but good reporting, if you see what I mean. Here's the blog referred to: https://slantchev.wordpress.com/2022/09/25/endgame/

Good piece, thanks. I might have to re-assess my opinion that nukes won't be used in this conflict and that the talks about nukes are gesticulations. In fact, the stem simply from the realization the Russia is losing the conventional war.