I think you're conflating two different senses of "meaning" — Michael
I'm concerned with meaning in the sense of definition. — Michael
"I believe that the book is in my room" and "the book is in my room" do not share a definition. — Michael
Otherwise how do you make sense of the "the book is in my room" part of "I believe that the book is in my room"? The latter isn't to be interpreted as "I believe that I believe that the book is in my room". — Michael
I think you're just taking meaning-as-use to an irrational extreme. — Michael
"It can be true that I believe something even if what I believe is false" is something I believe. — Michael
↪TonesInDeepFreeze The sad thing is that your clear explanation will not correct the confusion here. — Banno
I'm not clear on what you expect to achieve by posting it — Srap Tasmaner
You're surely not arguing that someone's intuitions can be refuted by the definitions and axioms we've chosen — Srap Tasmaner
What models? — Srap Tasmaner
How do you construct them? — Srap Tasmaner
I don't think we get to assume this is all settled for natural languages. — Srap Tasmaner
It's not that simple. — Srap Tasmaner
If the point you wanted to make was "quit doing that, because you can do this instead," I'd endorse that! — Srap Tasmaner
...then best reject it. Quit doing that, and do this instead."Possibly P" implies "Not P" — TonesInDeepFreeze
"Possibly P" implies "Not P" — TonesInDeepFreeze
You appear to be equivocating on the meaning of "means". We're using it in the sense of a definition, not in the sense of entailment. — Michael
The T-schema doesn't say that asserting the proposition "the book is in my room" entails that the book is in my room. It only says that the book being in my room is the truth-condition of the proposition "the book is in my room", and according to Davidson the definition of a proposition is given by its truth-conditions. — Michael
What you mean by "possible" is that the future holds more than one possibility; that there are several possible worlds and one of those becomes the actual world. — Luke
If there is more than one possible world at t0 and one of those becomes the actual world at t1, then the actual world at t1 is still one of those possible worlds that was at t0; one of the possibilities that could have been. — Luke
If you had many possibilities prior to the act, then the one that became actual remains one of those possibilities. — Luke
Ok. What is communion as you’re using the word? — Mww
What was meant in the quoted passage, was that "possible worlds" referred to logical possibilities for what is the case. If we do not know precisely what is the case in a specific situation, we allow for many different possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
The particular possibilities at 10, are no longer possibilities at 11. That's the nature of passing time, things change as time passes — Metaphysician Undercover
No, none of them are possibilities after the act, not even the one you chose, that's the point. You can't have your cake and eat it too. Once you eat the cake, eating it is no longer a possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
Those different possibilities are regarding a future situation, not the current situation. — Luke
For example, the hypothetical assumption “Suppose I have lost my copy of Lewis 1973” picks out a set of possible worlds at which I have indeed lost my copy of Lewis 1973. If I determine that in any such world (or only in nearby worlds, or in sufficiently similar worlds, etc., whatever the appropriate restriction is) I would be a miserable cuss, and I would prefer not to be, then I can discharge the assumption by concluding, for example, “If I were to lose my copy of Lewis 1973, I would have to replace it.” — Srap Tasmaner
We do not know whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, and it is possible today that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there won't be a sea battle tomorrow. But. come tomorrow, there will be no other possibilities regarding the sea battle except for the one that becomes the actual situation. — Luke
Exactly. The particular possibilities at t0 are possibilities regarding the future situation at t1; they are not possibilities regarding the present situation at t0. There are no other possibilities (for t0) at t0 other than the actual situation. — Luke
ou either had other possibilities (prior to eating the cake) at t0 besides eating the cake at t1, or you didn't have other possibilities at t0 besides eating the cake at t1. If you had other possibilities at t0, then eating the cake at t1 was possible. If you didn't have other possibilities at t0, then eating the cake at t1 was necessary. I don't agree that eating the cake at t1 was necessary if you had other possibilities at t0. This a misuse of the term "necessary". — Luke
Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.
— creativesoul
You seem to think I have disagreed with this
— Janus
That's how to avoid anthropomorphism. — creativesoul
You are talking with a poster not capable of making sense. — TonesInDeepFreeze
The sad thing is that your clear explanation will not correct the confusion here. That confusion is wilful. — Banno
The particular possibilities at t0 are possibilities regarding the future situation at t1; they are not possibilities regarding the present situation at t0. There are no other possibilities (for t0) at t0 other than the actual situation.
— Luke
No, the possibilities are the ones which are present, at the current time. Yes, they are derived from our view toward the future, but they are stated as the possibilities which are present. They are an aspect of one's knowledge. So, "that there will be a sea battle tomorrow", is a possibiltiy present right now in my mind, if I believe this. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm saying that after the act is carried out it is no longer a possibility in my mind, it is necessary, as what has been carried out, what is actual. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's simple that the poster is nuts to think that "Possibly P" implies "Not P". — TonesInDeepFreeze
A psychologist, not very well disposed toward logic, once confessed to me that despite all problems in short-term inferences like the Wason Card Task, there was also the undeniable fact that he had never met an experimental subject who did not understand the logical solution when it was explained to him, and then agreed that it was correct. — same wiki page
I have no idea what you are trying to say. — Janus
I have no idea what you are trying to say. — Janus
But — Srap Tasmaner
it is also the case that "It might be in the car" implicates (but does not entail) "I don't know for sure where it is" — Srap Tasmaner
If I candidly assert an indicative sentence, I imply that the content of my belief is represented by that sentence — Srap Tasmaner
You can't assert that the book is in your room, or that you believe the book is in your room, and that it is not true that the book is in your room. — Srap Tasmaner
As I said, the possibilities which are present, at the current time (at t0), are possibilities regarding the future situation (at t1). You acknowledge this with the example about today's possibility of tomorrow's sea battle - the possibilities are regarding the future situation, not the present situation. The possibilities are not about themselves; they are about the future potential sea battle. — Luke
And I am saying that if there were other genuine possibilities prior to the act being carried out, then it was not necessary, because one of those alternative possibilities could actually have been carried out instead. It is only if there had been no other genuine possibilities that could actually have been carried out instead, that the act being carried out would be necessary. — Luke
Your assertion that all actual situations are necessary negates that there are ever any genuinely alternative possibilities, and thus precludes free will. — Luke
No, the speaker might know that the book is in the car but choose to be coy, though literally honest and correct, in saying "The book might be in the car". If I was looking for the book, then I would not appreciate my friend being coy that way, but he would not be logically incorrect. — TonesInDeepFreeze
John: The book is in my room — Michael
Our upcoming discourse on this topic will be safely and perpetually interpretable as pointing all appropriate paraphrases of "the book" and of "is in my room" at the same region of space-time.
Jane: What you say is wrong because the book is not in your room — Michael
I predict that our discourse will either reject that basis for interpretation or become far less agreeable.
his assertion being true or false has nothing to do with what he believes (or what Jane believes), and everything to do with whether or not the book is in his room. — Michael
Communion would be (....) communication and working together. — Metaphysician Undercover
(...) logic (...) is (...) in its foundation, a private activity, like strategy. — Metaphysician Undercover
usefulness is defined relative to particular goals, which are personal, and this is what supports these rules — Metaphysician Undercover
the rules of logic are fundamentally inconsistent with the rules of communion (human interaction), which are moral rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
it is also the case that "It might be in the car" implicates (but does not entail) "I don't know for sure where it is"
— Srap Tasmaner
No, the speaker might know that the book is in the car but choose to be coy, though literally honest and correct, in saying "The book might be in the car". If I was looking for the book, then I would not appreciate my friend being coy that way, but he would not be logically incorrect. — TonesInDeepFreeze
If I candidly assert an indicative sentence, I imply that the content of my belief is represented by that sentence
— Srap Tasmaner
Yes, you imply it. But that asserting a sentence implies something isn't that that sentence (or assertion) means that thing. [ ... ]
This is where I think you're conflating different senses of "meaning" or "expression". — Michael
You can't assert that the book is in your room, or that you believe the book is in your room, and that it is not true that the book is in your room.
— Srap Tasmaner
Sure I can: I believe that the book is in my room but the book isn't in my room. I can assert anything I like. — Michael
I've been at pains to say that we're only talking about implication not literal meaning. — Srap Tasmaner
I've been at pains to say that we're only talking about implication not literal meaning.
— Srap Tasmaner
Then I'm not sure what relevance it has to the discussion. — Michael
But we’re not just interested in what people mean by what they say.
— Srap Tasmaner
Why not? If "I'm not certain" means "I don't know" then "I know but I'm not certain" means "I know but I don't know" which is, of course, a contradiction. So it doesn't make sense to say "I know but I'm not certain".
And if it doesn't make sense to say "I know but I'm not certain" then it shouldn't make sense to say "I can know without being certain". — Michael
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