We proceed on the assumption that we can analyze "naked" propositions with no speaker; — Srap Tasmaner

As did Gettier when invoking entailment to go from "I have ten coins in my pocket" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket".

Gettier is hard. It seems clear there is no general way to block Gettier cases, because whatever you come up with will generate a revenge case purpose built to block your solution. What we should conclude from that pattern is hard to say, but most take it as bad news for the analysis of knowledge.

The other issue raised by this particular case (and @Michael this might be relevant to the difference between first- and third-person accounts) is whether the actual reasoning relied on de se modality, since there's reason to think this is often the case with epistemic questions. That is, the question of whether I would or could know something is sometimes irreducibly about me, so the first level of analysis isn't really about whether there are possible worlds in which I know or don't, but whether my epistemic alternatives know or don't, whatever world they reside in.

Yes, those possibilities are how we think "about" the future, just like we can say something "about" the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are they real possibilities which each have a genuine chance of being the actual outcome, or are they merely a function of our knowledge/ignorance and there is only ever one real possibility?

If the former, then what is actual is/was not necessary. If the latter, then we have no free will.

Perhaps the reason you do not share my optimism regarding avoiding anthropomorphism is because you have difficulty yourself in understanding what sorts of thought and belief are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not. — creativesoul

I disagree with this assessment. Animals without linguistic capabilities obviously do not think in linguistic terms, so presumably they think in sensorimotor ways; whereas we think in both sensorimotor and linguistic ways. All our understandings are, strictly speaking, anthropomorphic, or human-shaped, because we are human; so, leaving aside any imputation of what should be understood to be exclusively human qualities and capacities to animals, I think the question of anthropomorphism is beside the point. Do you have anything substantive to add to that or disagreement to express?

Is it the same to say logical rules are useful in support of the attainment of personal goals? — Mww

Not quite the same, because what I am saying is that the particular rules which become accepted by people, and therefore form the conventional rules of logic, obtain that status of being the conventional rules, because they are useful. The issue being a question of what a particular set of rules is useful for.

So here is the difference between what I suggest and what you suggest. What you suggest is that anyone could take any set of logical rules, and use them toward personal gain. What I suggest is that particular logical rules could actually be shaped such that their principal purpose is personal gain. So, if the specific type of personal gain is somewhat immoral, then what you would suggest is an immoral person using rational logic in an immoral way. What I suggest is immorality which inheres within the logical principles. This would be irrational logic.

If the most personal one can be, is demonstrated by his moral convictions, and if logical rules are the ground for particular personal goals, then it follows that logical rules are not so much merely consistent with, as in fact necessary for, the dispensation of him toward his moral activities. — Mww

Yes, but this assumes that there is no immorality inherent within the logical principles.

All rules developed and used by us, in private, rational decision-making, re: judgment, without exception, are reducible to logical rules. — Mww

I disagree, I think that all rules, including logical rules are reducible to moral rules. This is because the role of intention and purpose. Logical necessity is reducible to a form of need. We need to follow the rules of logic to understand, or for any other purpose we might use logic for. And the rules which dictate how we relate to our needs are moral rules. Therefore the necessity whereby we draw logical conclusions is a form of need, and how we treat our needs is governed by moral rules, so the rules of logic must conform to moral rules.

I'm pointing at that phenomenon so that I can block it from undermining our claim that actuality entails possibility. If it's only a conversational implicature, it has no bearing on the relevant entailments. — Srap Tasmaner

The issue is the implications for sophistry. "Sophistry" I would define as the misuse, or abuse of logic. If certain accepted principles of logic are designed such that they may facilitate sophistry, through a form of deception which inheres within the principles themselves, then this is an implication which ought to be addressed.

Are they real possibilities which each have a genuine chance of being the actual outcome, or are they merely a function of our knowledge/ignorance and there is only ever one real possibility? — Luke

As I said, they are a feature of one's knowledge. However, this does not mean that they are not real or genuine. Knowledge is real and genuine. The realness, or genuineness of the possibilities which one considers is dependent on the scope of one's knowledge of the situation. Sometimes a person will fail in an effort to do something, and sometimes a person might not grasp a possibility which is obvious to someone else. That the possibilities are in one's mind, and are features of how one understands one's current situation, does not mean that they are not real. Nor does it mean that the person has no real choice.

If the former, then what is actual is/was not necessary. If the latter, then we have no free will. — Luke

Sorry, I don't understand the basis of these conclusions at all.

Gettier is hard. It seems clear there is no general way to block Gettier cases, because whatever you come up with will generate a revenge case purpose built to block your solution. — Srap Tasmaner

Is it hard? Seems straight forward to me.

Gettier is attempting to take account of another's belief(granted, the other is a fiction borne of Gettier's own imagination, but nevertheless). Gettier invokes the rules of entailment in order for Smith to go from "I have ten coins in my pocket, and I will get the job" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job".

The point is that Gettier is talking about Smith's belief, not a naked proposition. With that in mind, because it is Smith's belief, "the man with ten coins in his pocket" refers to Smith and Smith alone. So, when someone else gets the job regardless of how many coins they have in their pocket, Smith's belief is false, because he did not get the job. Smith does not believe anyone other than himself will get the job.

The second case neglects the fact that Smith's belief is a complex one, and again fails to take that complexity into consideration due to treating the disjunction as a naked one. Smith only believes that either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, because he believes Jones owns a Ford. The disjunction is true because Brown is in Barcelona. Smith believes it's true because Jones owns a Ford. Smith's belief is false.

We need only to take notice that there is an accounting malpractice going on.

All our understandings are, strictly speaking, anthropomorphic, or human-shaped, because we are human; so, leaving aside any imputation of what should be understood to be exclusively human qualities and capacities to animals, I think the question of anthropomorphism is beside the point. Do you have anything substantive to add to that or disagreement to express? — Janus

I do not share your pessimism. It's not fait accompli, regardless of whether or not you poison the well. It does not follow from the fact that we are human that all our understandings are anthropomorphic. I sense a bit of chippiness from you. I added quite a bit of substantive examples to discuss earlier. You quoted the first statement of the post and ignored the rest. We can agree to disagree, but it would be far better for us to at least come to clear understanding of what the disagreement is about, and/or where it lies.

Animals without linguistic capabilities obviously do not think in linguistic terms, so presumably they think in sensorimotor ways; whereas we think in both sensorimotor and linguistic ways... — Janus

Well, that's a fine place to start. I agree. Although, the "think in sensorimotor ways" would be best fleshed out.

Some other animals - beside humans - do have language though, so drawing the line at language is not going to serve the purpose of drawing and maintaining the distinctions between thought and belief that is exclusively human in kind, thought and belief that could be had by other animals with language, and thought and belief that can be had by language less creatures.

Seems straight forward to me. — creativesoul

Maybe you should discuss it with @Metaphysician Undercover.

Did you read the rest of that post? I generally do not align with Meta.

Then you will have much to discuss.

Not interested. Was curious to get your take on that quick down and dirty summary, but evidently you're not interested.

So be it. Be well.

Are they real possibilities which each have a genuine chance of being the actual outcome, or are they merely a function of our knowledge/ignorance and there is only ever one real possibility?
— Luke

As I said, they are a feature of one's knowledge. However, this does not mean that they are not real or genuine. Knowledge is real and genuine. The realness, or genuineness of the possibilities which one considers is dependent on the scope of one's knowledge of the situation. Sometimes a person will fail in an effort to do something, and sometimes a person might not grasp a possibility which is obvious to someone else. That the possibilities are in one's mind, and are features of how one understands one's current situation, does not mean that they are not real. Nor does it mean that the person has no real choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't doubt that one's knowledge is real and genuine, but I am more interested in this idea of a "real choice". For example, if I had a real choice of whether to have toast or cereal for breakfast this morning, then it was not necessary that I had toast (as I did) because I could have had cereal instead.

You refuse to acknowledge this argument against the necessity of actuality. You simply repeat - without argument - that actual situations are necessary. Given that you refuse to even acknowledge this argument against inevitability, and since you seemingly contradict yourself by claiming that people have a "real choice", then it is unclear to me what you mean when you assert that actual situations are "necessary".

If every situation is necessary and had to turn out the way it did, then how does any situation allow for a "real choice" from among several possibilities? The implication is that I could never have really chosen to have cereal instead of toast; that toast was always the only real possibility.

For example, if I had a real choice of whether to have toast or cereal for breakfast this morning, then it was not necessary that I had toast (as I did) because I could have had cereal instead. — Luke

Right, at that prior time it was not necessary. However, at this posterior time it is necessary. Human beings have a completely different attitude toward acts in the past, in comparison to their attitude toward acts in the future. You seem to be refusing to account for the reality of time in the human attitude, and the difference between prior and posterior. Here is an explicit example from your earlier post.

If the former, then what is actual is/was not necessary. — Luke

See, you explicitly conflate "is" and "was". There is a reason why we have different tenses for verbs, if you insist on ignoring this, then this discussion is pointless.

You refuse to acknowledge this argument against the necessity of actuality. — Luke

How so? I've responded to your supposed argument. It is simply based in a failure to recognize the difference in temporal perspectives. Looking ahead in time at future acts, is not the same as looking backward in time at past acts. Therefore, within the minds of human beings, future acts have a different status from past acts.

If you are ready to accept this difference then we might be able to proceed by applying some names to describe the difference. I propose that we look at future acts as "possible", and past acts as "necessary". You are resisting this. Can you explain why? Your argument so far seems to be that if we name past acts as "necessary", then future acts must also be called "necessary". But as I've explained, that is to ignore the difference between how we look at the past and how we look at the future.

If the former, then what is actual is/was not necessary.
— Luke

See, you explicitly conflate "is" and "was". There is a reason why we have different tenses for verbs, if you insist on ignoring this, then this discussion is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not conflating them; I'm arguing against your claim that present and past situations are necessary. Hence, the "is/was".

I've responded to your supposed argument. It is simply based in a failure to recognize the difference in temporal perspectives. Looking ahead in time at future acts, is not the same as looking backward in time at past acts. Therefore, within the minds of human beings, future acts have a different status from past acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not explain why present/past situations are necessary; or why it is necessary that I had to have toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. You are doing nothing more than stipulating that present/past situations are necessary, which does not explain how you are using the term.

I propose that we look at future acts as "possible", and past acts as "necessary". You are resisting this. Can you explain why? Your argument so far seems to be that if we name past acts as "necessary", then future acts must also be called "necessary". But as I've explained, that is to ignore the difference between how we look at the past and how we look at the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am resisting your "proposal" because if we have a real choice in the matter, like you say we do, then it was not necessary that I had toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. I had a real choice to have had cereal instead of toast. That is, the past situation of me having toast for breakfast this morning was not necessary. I am using "necessary" here in the sense of "inevitable" or "predetermined", as opposed to having a "real choice" in the matter. How are you using "necessary"?

.....obtain that status of being the conventional rules, because they are useful. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, insofar as these kinds of rules are taped to the wall in high school, assembled in a code of conduct in the office. The reason for stop signs and traffic lights. Tax tables. Sales contracts. The manifold of objects conforming to....

......the particular rules which become accepted by people — Metaphysician Undercover

—————

The issue being a question of what a particular set of rules is useful for. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. Conventional rules are for private use by a subject in a communal domain, compliance with them being judicially motivated, their usefulness predicated on merely staying out of trouble relative to those rules, as judged by his peers. Moral rules, on the other hand, are for private use by a subject in a personal domain, compliance with them being obligatory, their usefulness predicated solely on staying out of trouble with himself, as judged by himself.

That being said, I agree moral rules are much more important than conventional rules, but that alone says nothing with respect to their logical ground.....

We need to follow the rules of logic to understand, or for any other purpose we might use logic for. — Metaphysician Undercover

....which does, and quite well at that.

If it should be the case that the human intellectual system, in whichever metaphysical form deemed sufficient for it, is entirely predicated on relations, it should then be tacitly understands that system is a logically grounded system, insofar as logic itself is the fundamental procedure for the determination of relations. Hence it follows, it being given that all rules are schemata of the human intellectual system, and the human intellect is relational, then all rules are relational constructs. From there, it’s a short hop to the truth that, if all rules are relational, and all relations are logically constructed, and all logical constructs themselves are determinations of a fundamental procedure, then all rules are logical rules.

Under those conditions, there is no procedural difference between rules determined by committee for the administration of a community and rules determined by each individual for himself, insofar as a committee is nothing more than a plurality of individuals, each one operating within the confines of an intellectual system common to all.
—————-

If the most personal one can be, is demonstrated by his moral convictions, and if logical rules are the ground for particular goals.......
— Mww

Yes, but this assumes that there is no immorality inherent within the logical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Logical principles are neither moral nor immoral. Morality is an innate human condition, determinable by logical principles which relate a purely subjective desire to an equally subjective inclination. In other words, this feels right, therefore it is the right thing to do and I shall will an act in accordance with it.

Immorality only manifests when an act is willed, even if that willed act never becomes an empirical event, that conflicts with that subjective relation. In other words, this volition feels right, but I’m going to will an act in non-compliance to it, or, this volition feels wrong but I’m going to will an act in compliance with it anyway. If I act, you may judge my morality with respect to yours. If I do not act, you will have nothing to judge, but I am left to judge myself

And so it goes....opinions galore.

@Metaphysician Undercover @Luke

At time A, my coffee is precariously perched on my car.
At time B, after A, the coffee falls off the car.

At time A, it is true of the coffee that it may or may not fall at some future time. At time B, it is no longer true of the coffee that it may fall, because it has already fallen.

No one is confused by an event having happened or not. What keep us up at night, is wondering whether things might have been different. No one can do anything, at times B and after, about my coffee having fallen; the question is specifically whether it was inevitable that it would fall. We believe we can make a distinction between events that were bound to happen, and events that were not; in which case, there must be a difference between (1) saying, at a time B or later, that nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee has not fallen, and (2) saying at a time A or earlier, nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee does not fall. To say that an event in the past was not inevitable, is to say that (1) is true of it but (2) false.

We assume, in fact, that (1) is true of all events — since we're not doing quantum mechanics or something here. Suppose (1) is false. Then there is a time C, after B, at which an event occurs such that my coffee did not fall off the car. The aftermath of my coffee falling lasts from B to C, at which it is undone; before B, and after C, the coffee has not fallen. Of course, that's not "possible," given thermodynamics and whatnot, but is it logically impossible? My coffee falling is not in the past for any time before B, of course, because B is still in the future; it is in the past for all times between B and C; and it is no longer in the past of any time after C. The time B is in the past for times after C; it's just that what happened at time B, for times C and after, is not the same as what happened at time B, for times between B and C.

Is there any non-question-begging way to deny this is possible? We cannot, ex hypothesi, object that an event in the past at time X is in the past for any time after X; the hypothesis is exactly that this is not so. In what, then, does the immutability of the past consist? Is it brute fact? Could it conceivably not be?

The aftermath of my coffee falling lasts from B to C, at which it is undone; before B, and after C, the coffee has not fallen. — Srap Tasmaner

So the coffee does fall at B, and then “unfalls” at (the later time) C? As though, as soon as the coffee hits the ground and spills, time then seemingly reverses, gathering up all the spilled coffee back into the cup and back on to the car? Except that time did not reverse from B to C, and this is what miraculously happened in “normal” time.

In what, then, does the immutability of the past consist? Is it brute fact? Could it conceivably not be? — Srap Tasmaner

I think that the immutability of the past consists in the fact that events occur in time sequentially from A to B to C, and that once they have occurred they are in the past. Your example does not appear to indicate otherwise; the cup falls and then “unfalls”.

I do not share your pessimism. It's not fait accompli, regardless of whether or not you poison the well. It does not follow from the fact that we are human that all our understandings are anthropomorphic. I sense a bit of chippiness from you. I added quite a bit of substantive examples to discuss earlier. You quoted the first statement of the post and ignored the rest. We can agree to disagree, but it would be far better for us to at least come to clear understanding of what the disagreement is about, and/or where it lies. — creativesoul

I just don't see this the way you do. In one sense anthropomorphism is inevitable because our understandings will always be human-shaped. In another sense anthropomorphism denotes "excessive" projection of human characteristics onto animals, or the world, or reality. Anthropomorphism is, like many other human characteristics, on a spectrum from the inescapable to the egregious.

So, I think that not all human inquiries suffer from anthropomorphism in the egregious sense. I don't know where we disagree, other than perhaps about what I have said about anthropomorphism. If you believed that you had come to some understanding which you believed was completely free from any anthropomorphism whatever, how would you demonstrate that to be so? Would there be a fact of the matter, or does it just come down to definitions or personal opinion?

I don't know what you mean by "poisoning the well" or "chippiness"; I think they are your own projections,it's not what I felt.

Well, that's a fine place to start. I agree. Although, the "think in sensorimotor ways" would be best fleshed out. — creativesoul

Thinking in terms of images, sounds, tactile sensations, smells, tastes or movements as opposed to thinking in symbolic language. What other possibilities can you think of?

I don't know of any other animals that have symbolic language; what did you have in mind?

once they have occurred they are in the past. Your example does not appear to indicate otherwise; the cup falls and then “unfalls”. — Luke

I mean, it's not possible. You're substituting another impossibility for the one I was entertaining: your question (if you were inclined to ask) would be, why don't cups unfall? My question was, why doesn't the past change? I pitched it as if some sort of backwards causation were possible, but trying desperately to avoid the word "cause".

Of course the past doesn't change. My question was whether this immutability is logical or merely, as one might say, thermodynamics, or even just the brute fact of time's arrow.

All in hopes, if it wasn't clear, of understanding how temporality relates to alethic modality. Is one logically prior to the other? Which one?

+++

Here's a dead obvious example of what I mean, with no cups unfailing: It's a Wonderful Life. In the film, the erasure of George from history is frankly miraculous: does that mean it violates the canons of logic or only the laws of nature?

I mean, it's not possible. You're substituting another impossibility for the one I was entertaining: your question (if you were inclined to ask) would be, why don't cups unfall? — Srap Tasmaner

In the scenario you described, you said:

Of course, that's not "possible," given thermodynamics and whatnot, but is it logically impossible? — Srap Tasmaner

I answered “yes” to this. Barring thermodynamic impossibility, your hypothetical situation is logically possible.

All in hopes, if it wasn't clear, of understanding how temporality relates to alethic modality. Is one logically prior to the other? Which one? — Srap Tasmaner

I personally consider them to be somewhat independent, in that I do not consider necessity or possibility to be dependent on temporality. If it was ever possible to prevent the cup of coffee from falling off the car, then at no time is it, was it, or will it be necessary or inevitable that it did fall. Otherwise, it was, is, and will always be necessary or inevitable that it did fall, but in that case it’s hard to see how we could have free will or any real choice about it.

I’m sure MU will have a different response.

I personally consider them to be somewhat independent — Luke

Well, see that's the thing. We might define the past relative to some time as all the times before that, just the times. But what about the events that have happened in the past? Is it inherent to the past that an event which occurs at a past time cannot change? Or is that something *else* we know about the past only a posteriori?

That does not explain why present/past situations are necessary; or why it is necessary that I had to have toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. — Luke

You are simply misrepresenting what I said (as is your usual habit) to continue with a strawman argument. I didn't say that it was necessary that you had to have toast instead of cereal. To the contrary, I said that was a choice you made from real possibilities. What I say, is that now, after you've had toast, it is impossible to change that fact, so it is necessary. So I'll repeat, though I doubt it will affect your strawman, before the act, it is possible, after the act, it is necessary.

I am resisting your "proposal" because if we have a real choice in the matter, like you say we do, then it was not necessary that I had toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. I had a real choice to have had cereal instead of toast. That is, the past situation of me having toast for breakfast this morning was not necessary. I am using "necessary" here in the sense of "inevitable" or "predetermined", as opposed to having a "real choice" in the matter — Luke

I agree with all this. You had real choice in that act. What I am saying is that after the act, after you had toast for breakfast, you no longer have that choice. It is impossible, at this time, after you had toast, to decide not to eat the toast you already ate. Since it is impossible for you to change this, it is a necessity, i.e. it is necessary.

We believe we can make a distinction between events that were bound to happen, and events that were not; in which case, there must be a difference between (1) saying, at a time B or later, that nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee has not fallen, and (2) saying at a time A or earlier, nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee does not fall. To say that an event in the past was not inevitable, is to say that (1) is true of it but (2) false. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, this would be my position, (1) is true but not (2).

Is there any non-question-begging way to deny this is possible? We cannot, ex hypothesi, object that an event in the past at time X is in the past for any time after X; the hypothesis is exactly that this is not so. In what, then, does the immutability of the past consist? Is it brute fact? Could it conceivably not be? — Srap Tasmaner

The immutability of the past is just a brute fact, which is upheld by empirical evidence, like gravity, the freezing point of water, etc.. Sure we can say that it is logically possible to change the past, just like we can say that it is logically possible to defy gravity, and we simply ignore all empirical evidence when proposing such "logical possibilities". These might even have purpose like hypotheticals or counterfactuals. But that's why there is potentially an infinite number of possible worlds, we can propose any sort of logically possible world, so long as it's not inconsistent or contradictory. Where this might become a problem is if we give priority of importance to what is logical possible over what is physical possible. Then a person might be inclined to say that because something is logically possible it must be true, without regard to whether it is physically possible.

f it was ever possible to prevent the cup of coffee from falling off the car, then at no time is it, was it, or will it be necessary or inevitable that it did fall. — Luke

As I've explained, this response indicates that you do not respect the reality of time. You say, what was once a possibility will always be a possibility. But that ignores the fact that things change as time passes, including possibilities. So it is very often the case that an event which was a possibility at time A, is not a possibility at time B. I think it is really inconsistent with our lived temporal experience to insist as you do, that an event which is truthfully described as "possible" at one time cannot be truthfully described as "necessary" at another time. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to know that possibilities have a window of opportunity.

That being said, I agree moral rules are much more important than conventional rules, but that alone says nothing with respect to their logical ground..... — Mww

Right, now the issue is how are logical rules grounded.

If it should be the case that the human intellectual system, in whichever metaphysical form deemed sufficient for it, is entirely predicated on relations, it should then be tacitly understands that system is a logically grounded system, insofar as logic itself is the fundamental procedure for the determination of relations. Hence it follows, it being given that all rules are schemata of the human intellectual system, and the human intellect is relational, then all rules are relational constructs. From there, it’s a short hop to the truth that, if all rules are relational, and all relations are logically constructed, and all logical constructs themselves are determinations of a fundamental procedure, then all rules are logical rules. — Mww

As I said in the last post, I think you have this backward. Logic is a highly specialized, formal way of thinking. So using rules is the more general category, and logic is a specific type of this broader category of activity. Therefore I think not all rules are logical. There are many rules which are not logical at all.

The question now is, if we break rule behaviour into subgroups, like the categories you did, conventional rules and moral rules, which does logic fall into? Or is it a distinct group on its own?

Logical principles are neither moral nor immoral. Morality is an innate human condition, determinable by logical principles which relate a purely subjective desire to an equally subjective inclination. In other words, this feels right, therefore it is the right thing to do and I shall will an act in accordance with it. — Mww

I don't at all agree with this. What would be the point of moral training if morality is innate? I agree that the capacity to be moral is innate, but this must be cultured to produce a moral character. I believe it is very clear that morality is not based in what feels right. I suppose these opinions are outside the scope of this thread.

The immutability of the past is just a brute fact, which is upheld by empirical evidence, like gravity, the freezing point of water, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, there's an answer.

(This thought experiment isn't important to me in itself, but if it were, I wondered how knowledge would work if the world were like this: would we, after the past had changed, have our knowledge become false beliefs — oh! this is the Mandela effect — or would all knowledge just vanish along with the other effects of an event that now has not occurred? If the latter, then of course we'd simply not know that the past had ever changed, and never could know...)

So the immutability of past events is a property we come to know a posteriori, good. But even if our knowledge is a posteriori, it could still be an essential property of a past event — and therefore necessary — that it be immutable. But you say it is not logically necessary that the past be immutable, so if it is, it is only in virtue of natural law, that sort of thing, physical rather than logical necessity.

Now you also agree that it's only events of the past that are immutable in this way, right? Events in the future are not only not immutable, they're not even fully determined; and the present, well, the present is presumably the moment of an event being fully determined and thereby becoming immutable.

It's easy to see how we could come to believe the future is not fixed, because we can experience making decisions, exercising our will, in ways that seem to determine how the future becomes concrete in the present. Even if we're completely wrong about that, it's clear how we would come to believe it. How would we come to know that this is not the case with the past? We cannot act upon the past, but maybe if we could, it could be changed. We have no experience of attempting to change the past and failing. So is the past immutable only in the sense that we cannot act upon it?

Or, consider this: we don't actually act upon the future directly either; that too, we are incapable of doing. We can only act in the present to select which possible future is realized. But every time we do that, we are also, immediately, filling the past with events of our choosing. The past is what we have some say-so in, never the future.

My goal was to see if we rely upon some independent conception of ideas like possibility and necessity in characterizing some portion of time as past and some other portion as future, rather than our ideas of possibility and necessity being derivative of our ideas of past and future. I think that in a great many cases when we say, things might have been different, the clearest meaning to attach to that is that at some earlier time, when certain events we know to have happened were still in the future, a different future might have come to pass, so that our past would now be different from what it is. If that sort of analysis is always available, then temporal modality would be logically prior to alethic. And that's not implausible.

But it also seems to me that to characterize the future as undetermined, the realm of possibility, and the past as fixed and incapable of change, is to rely on those ideas as given, so they are logically prior to our substantive understanding of the past and the future. That's my conundrum.

Only it turns out to be harder than I expected even to characterize the immutability of the past clearly, and we've barely talked about what challenges the future might pose.

And all of this is still circling around the problem of truth, because the past is the paradigmatic realm of truth, eternal and unchanging, while there is no truth about the future and for that reason no knowledge but only belief.

...If you believed that you had come to some understanding which you believed was completely free from any anthropomorphism whatever, how would you demonstrate that to be so? — Janus

Infallibility is unnecessary.

The belief you've attributed to me directly above is something I do not believe. Red herring. The belief you've attributed to me above does not follow from anything I've said. Non sequitur. The belief you've attributed to me above represents your misinterpretation of what I've written thus far. You'll just have to trust me when I say that somewhere along the line you've misattributed meaning to my parts of this exchange. I'm under no burden to demonstrate something I've not claimed.

It's worth mentioning to say that we need not be mistake free in order to know that anthropomorphism is a mistake. In fact, we had to have already been engaging in the personification of things that are not persons(anthropomorphism) in order to even become aware of the fact that we were.

Would there be a fact of the matter, or does it just come down to definitions or personal opinion?

Well... none of the above are adequate and all of the above are necessary in order for us to acquire knowledge of how thought and belief first emerges into the universe and later evolves into the rich and complex variety that we like to say that humans have. The evolutionary origen of thought and/or belief is not inaccessible to us. We need not know everything in order to know some things about that.

It's not as if knowledge of the differences between human thought and belief, non-human language users' thought and belief, and language-less creatures' thought and belief is something that it is impossible for us to understand. We have the tools, the knowledge base, and the potential to acquire such knowledge. I have seen no valid argument to the contrary.

Sometimes the best thing to do is to take a deep breath and go about figuring out exactly what it would take in order for humans to think in the ways that we do. We have to understand our own thought and belief in terms of its evolutionary progression prior to being able successfully discern between our own and other animals'.

Do you agree with all of the following?



1.)Anthropomorphism is when we attribute uniquely human kinds of thought and belief(those that are exclusively human) to things that are not.
2.)Some human thought and/or belief are exclusive to humans.
3.)Some human thought and/or belief are shared by other language using creatures.
4.)Some human thought and/or belief are shared by other language using creatures and language less ones alike.

Anthropomorphism is, like many other human characteristics, on a spectrum from the inescapable to the egregious. — Janus

I agree that - in the overall bigger evolutionary picture - anthropomorphism was inescapable. I disagree that it remains so to this day.

...the past is the paradigmatic realm of truth, eternal and unchanging, while there is no truth about the future and for that reason no knowledge but only belief. — Srap Tasmaner

Strangely enough, I'm in complete agreement with you here. Belief about the future goes from prediction to knowledge when it becomes true, and from prediction to falsehood when it becomes false.

now the issue is how are logical rules grounded. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the human intellect is itself a logical system, there’s no reason to ask and invites infinite regress when it is. Rules are grounded by the nature of their originating system, affirmed or denied by experience a posteriori or reason a priori. Simple as that.
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logic itself is the fundamental procedure for the determination of relations......
— Mww

I think you have this backward. Logic is a highly specialized, formal way of thinking. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seems an awful lot like the same thing, doesn’t it?
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What would be the point of moral training if morality is innate? — Metaphysician Undercover

Same point as just the innate capacity for empirical knowledge doesn’t contain any.
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I believe it is very clear that morality is not based in what feels right. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s fine; it isn’t a law that it should be so. But there is nevertheless a philosophy that does. Wants/needs, desires/interests, aesthetic/discursive judgement and such.

Besides....what sense does it make to get angry that, e.g. the Earth is third from the sun? By the same token, what sense does it make that, e.g. the women in Iran, by wanting to be free of headwear, are thereby violating natural law? The human being has feelings, which should be accounted for in a metaphysical exposition of the complete beast.

I suppose these opinions are outside the scope of this thread. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not when considering or stating one’s position for what truth is. Truth, as such, is every bit as subjective as one’s moral disposition and experiences.

Or, consider this: we don't actually act upon the future directly either; that too, we are incapable of doing. We can only act in the present to select which possible future is realized. But every time we do that, we are also, immediately, filling the past with events of our choosing. The past is what we have some say-so in, never the future. — Srap Tasmaner

I believe this is the most accurate description you've provided. We don't act on the future, nor do we act on the past, we act at the present. The past is filled with events which we've 'had some say in'. Notice the difference between this and what you said, "the past is what we have some say-so in". This is the main contention with Luke. Once it's in the past, we can no longer have an influence on it, so we cannot truthfully say we have some say in it, it's necessary. And, since as you say "We can only act in the present to select which possible future is realized", the present is the most significant aspect of time for us.

Now you also agree that it's only events of the past that are immutable in this way, right? Events in the future are not only not immutable, they're not even fully determined; and the present, well, the present is presumably the moment of an event being fully determined and thereby becoming immutable. — Srap Tasmaner

So we have this issue, the present, which you call "the moment of an event being fully determined and thereby becoming immutable". At this supposed "moment" of the present, events are neither possible (future), nor are they necessary (past), they are "becoming". And this is where logical categories tend to fail us. If we are categorizing past as necessary, and future as possible, then we have to name the intermediate. We could for example use "actual" here, meaning "of the act". But how do we deal logically with things which are of the act itself? If, as you say, the act is when things are being "fully determined",

The glaring problem is that acts always require time, and some parts of the same act are determined prior to other parts of that act. And the length of an act depends on how we identify the particular act. We might divide it in two for example, saying the beginning is the cause, and the end is the effect. So the result is that any identified act consists of aspects which are necessary, and aspects which are possible, and we might find that there is always at the fringes, at the boundaries of what is necessary, always some possibilities which are not "fully determined", such that an act can never be properly said to be "fully determined" in the absolute sense. Conversely, we have the similar argument against free will, that since the human being's capacity to act is very restricted, we do not have "free" will in any absolute sense. This would be because any act identified as a possibility, already has some necessary features. Now events which are occurring at the present contain both necessity and possibility.

Since there is always some degree of possibility intermingled with what we want to say is fully determined, and some degree of necessity intermingled with what we want to say is possible, this implies that the present, what is "actual", really exists as an intermingling of the future and the past. We might call this an overlap. At any precise time in which we make an observation, some aspects of reality are already in the past, necessary, and some are in the future, possible. So the difficulty we have in understanding the nature of reality, is in establishing that relationship between what is necessary, and what is possible. And if some logical axioms deal with possibilities, and others deal with necessities, how could we truthfully relate these two?

And all of this is still circling around the problem of truth, because the past is the paradigmatic realm of truth, eternal and unchanging, while there is no truth about the future and for that reason no knowledge but only belief. — Srap Tasmaner

I do not think that this is a correct representation of "truth". That is what Aristotle proposed, there is not truth concerning things not yet decided, like the sea battle tomorrow, and we ought not attempt to apply truth here, applying it only to things of the past. But we can see that this proposal was firmly rejected by the monotheist community, who associate Truth with God. And God in the Old Testament was associated with the present, "I am that I am".

So it may be more productive to associate truth with the present, what is now, at the current time. And here we have the much more difficult and complex issue of understanding how the past is related to the future.

Seems an awful lot like the same thing, doesn’t it? — Mww

It's not really the same thing, because you describe all decision making as based in some sort of "logic". But I describe "logic" as a specialized form of decision making, which shares in something which all forms of decision making have, but we do not really know what it is. So instead of claiming that all decision making uses logic, I say it uses something else, which logic also uses, but we do not really understand what it is.

Same point as just the innate capacity for empirical knowledge doesn’t contain any. — Mww

But then you are not saying that empirical knowledge is innate, you are saying that the capacity for empirical knowledge is innate. But in the case of morality, you seem to think that moral knowledge is itself innate, what one feels is right, is right. Which do you really believe, is the capacity for moral knowledge innate, or is moral knowledge itself innate?

Truth, as such, is every bit as subjective as one’s moral disposition and experiences. — Mww

That's what I've been trying to get at since the binging of the thread. The idea that truth is some sort of objective independent thing is really just a ruse. That idea leads us down the garden path, you might say, leaving us lost, and with nowhere to turn for guidance concerning what truth really is. So to understand truth we must proceed in the other direction, into the subject, and I see the starting point as honesty, because this is a common use of "truth". And this begins with ridding oneself of self-deception concerning faulty notions of truth.

So instead of claiming that all decision making uses logic, I say it uses something else, which logic also uses, but we do not really understand what it is. — Metaphysician Undercover

As is your prerogative. Still, under the auspices of “if/then” theoretical constructs, just seems the more instructive to choose that “if” which lends itself to being understood enough to permit whatever “then” may follow from it.
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you seem to think that moral knowledge is itself innate, what one feels is right, is right. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not need to know a feeling is right, if rightness is already given by the feeling of it. What it is possible to know, is that thing which justifies the feeling.

Best to recognize that I cannot reject that this is a bus when I already have experience of busses, which manifests as a blatant self-contradiction, in just the same way I cannot reject the feeling of moral reprehensibility, but without ever having the experience of an object by which a self-contradiction would arise. This is sufficient to prove feelings are not cognitions, from which follows that moral knowledge is a misnomer. Further support resides in the fact that I may know this is true now yet find later this is no longer known as true, a function of experience in which I must cognize something, but that for which I feel as moral will always be what I feel is moral, as a function of personality, for which no cognitions are necessary.
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I see the starting point as honesty, because this is a common use of "truth". — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ll grant half of that, re: honesty, but, if we go back to the subject himself as the starting point, which is the both necessary and sufficient ground, we should find that it is impossible to be dishonest with oneself. It is certainly the case we can be wrong in our judgements regarding a thing, but the means for obtaining them are determinable by logical law, re: “if this, then that”, and of course, law, under the assumption of predication by the principles of universality and absolute necessity, does not abide dishonesty.

Now it should be clear, that truth is that in which a cognition conforms to its object, and it is the case truth is reducible to the subject in which the cognition resides, and, dishonesty from such cognition is impossible.

While we may be intentionally dishonest in our representation of judgements, that will manifest naturally as a.....yeah, that’s right.....a feeling.

Not to mention, a common use of truth doesn’t give proper representation of what it is.

But what about the events that have happened in the past? Is it inherent to the past that an event which occurs at a past time cannot change? Or is that something *else* we know about the past only a posteriori? — Srap Tasmaner

My answer would probably be the same as MU's on this point.