.Ukraine’s security services repeatedly denied the violations the two organizations documented. They have also sought to deflect criticism by repeatedly claiming, falsely, that reports of enforced disappearances were disinformation spread by Russian propaganda
The torture, ill-treatment and other violations described by detainees involved in the simultaneous release [an exchange of prisoners between both sides] are of a systematic nature and may amount to war crimes.
so, your proposed "solution" to your question is to cease the foreign aid to Ukraine and see what happens
It's all doom and gloom on Russian state TV right now
But criticism of Vladimir Putin remains absolutely off limits — Francis Scarr · Oct 6, 2022
Your argument is so under water that all I can hear is the bubbling. — apokrisis
Zelensky is now seen as a hero the world over and quite probably in Ukraine as well. Good job Vlad!
— Olivier5
If you bother to read the context, the article predicts Russia is unlikely to undertake a full scale invasion - and if so, super limited incursions such as only in Dombas - and in that context the Russian buildup or then very limited incursions is to undermine Zelenskyy.
However, what the article gets right is:
The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas.
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS
Likewise, article also gets right:
Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion
"The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case."
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS
However, what the article gets wrong is that a full scale invasion for the purposes - not of occupation and dealing with insurgency in major cities - but for securing the land bridge and solve "a real problem", is one way to do it.
That being said, the article does go over the possibility of multiple parallel incursions, what it calls "Course of Actions subordinate to Course of Action I" (sub-COA's; COA I is the full scale invasion).
"But he might also execute several of these sub-COAs on their own to achieve independent objectives without intending to go all the way to full-scale invasion. We will consider the major sub-COAs here ordered by the likelihood we assess for each and laying out the separate objectives each might pursue beyond setting conditions for the full-scale invasion."
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS
So, correct analysis after all, only fails to mention the Russians could choose to have so many of the parallel "sub-COA's" that it appears to be a full scale invasion, but it's not.
The reason for doing so is more-or-less presented in the article, in that Western reaction is likely to be fairly strong (at least sanction wise) and a limited incursion to test Ukrainian and Western resolve and then pulling back has a lot of drawbacks (but the article mistakingly concludes that's more likely than major incursions anyways).
As for Zelenskyy, what would major incursions cause?
"It would cause panic and crisis in Kyiv and drive Zelensky to plead for NATO help that would be unlikely to come"
— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS
Correct. — boethius
Dude, the whole current war is precisely because NATO isn't Ukraine's friend ... or it would be in Ukraine right now shoulder to shoulder, protecting its "friend".
Saying NATO arms dealing with Ukraine is "friendship" is like saying your meth dealer dealing you meth is "friendship".
Maybe you need the meth, but big mistake thinking your meth dealer's your friend. That's how suicides happen. Public service announcement everyone. — boethius
What I find most interesting about the incompetence narrative is that's it's needed to support the idea there should not be any negotiation strategy — boethius
Who says that? — apokrisis
Everyone agree about the surprising degree of Russian incompetence, but who says that is the reason not to negotiate. — apokrisis
A full-scale Russian invasion of unoccupied Ukraine would be by far the largest, boldest, and riskiest military operation Moscow has launched since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. It would be far more complex than the US wars against Iraq in 1991 or 2003. It would be a marked departure from the approaches Putin has relied on since 2015, and a major step-change in his willingness to use Russian conventional military power overtly. It would cost Russia enormous sums of money and likely many thousands of casualties and destroyed vehicles and aircraft. Even in victory, such an invasion would impose on Russian President Vladimir Putin the requirement to reconstruct Ukraine and then establish a new government and security forces there more suitable for his objectives.
↪boethius Are you claiming the Russian army has been competent??? — RogueAI
What is your source for this? — Paine
Nobody really knows how many combatants or civilians have died, and claims of casualties by government officials — who may sometimes be exaggerating or lowballing their figures for public relations reasons — are all but impossible to verify. — At 100 Days, Russia-Ukraine War by the Numbers, VOA
The number of soldiers dying is sensitive information and shapes the story of how the war is going for both sides, Gavin Crowden, of casualty-recording organisation Every Casualty Counts, says. — War in Ukraine: Can we say how many people have died?,BBC
Zelenskyy said this week that 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are dying in combat every day, with about 500 more wounded. — At 100 Days, Russia-Ukraine War by the Numbers, VOA
A clear picture of Ukraine’s losses could not be independently assessed.
Denys, sitting upright on his hospital bed, said almost every member of his 120-person unit was injured, though only two were killed.
A 25-year-old soldier being treated for shrapnel wounds said that, within his unit of 100 soldiers, seven were killed and 20 injured. Ihor, the platoon commander, said 16 of the 32 men under his command were injured and one was killed.
[...]
“We lost five people for every one they did,” said Ihor, a 30-year-old platoon commander who injured his back when the tank he was riding in crashed into a ditch.
[..]
Russian tanks emerged from newly built cement fortifications to blast infantry with large-caliber artillery, the wounded Ukrainian soldiers said. The vehicles would then shrink back beneath the concrete shelters, shielded from mortar and rocket fire.
Counter-battery radar systems automatically detected and located Ukrainians who were targeting the Russians with projectiles, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire in response.
Russian hacking tools hijacked the drones of Ukrainian operators, who saw their aircraft drift away helplessly behind enemy lines. — Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive - Washington Post
Everyone? You're literally debating right now the issue with 3 other interlocutors who disagree. — boethius
That is not a sign of military incompetence. The issue of whether it was politically wise, — boethius
If you read the analysis cited, what actual experts believed before the war was that an invasion would be costly, involving thousands KIA and significant armour and airframe losses. — boethius
However, we're now at a point in the war where Ukraine has lost all of its initial tank stock and is now nearing critical depletion of all the Soviet tanks NATO could scrounge up and send. — boethius
This was a feint, remember? Your story was there was no intended future use at all. Kyiv was a ruse to fix Ukrainian forces who might otherwise head for the Donbas. — apokrisis
so this move?
so, your proposed "solution" to your question is to cease the foreign aid to Ukraine and see what happens — jorndoe
It's honestly bizarre your insistence on Russian military incompetence. — boethius
These are simple, rational arguments based on contemporary military logic, in light of which much of the popular narratives can be dismissed outright. — Tzeentch
Far from bestowing glory on Russia’s military brass, the war in Ukraine is proving toxic for top commanders, with at least eight generals fired, reassigned or otherwise sidelined since the start of the invasion on Feb. 24.
After a long string of failures and few significant victories, the knives now seem to be out for Russian generals, amid criticism from prominent Russian military correspondents, state television propagandists and even members of the normally obedient parliament.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/07/russia-military-commanders-dismissed-war/
However, there is also another big military difference in that Finland does not host any Russian naval bases, whereas Ukraine hosted one of Russia's most important ports.
There is a lot of pretty common sense reasons Russia would view Ukraine in NATO as a major threat to its security, which has no parallel with Finland. Of course, "never say never" but I seriously doubt anyone in Russia, Finland or the whole NATO seriously believes in any conflict between Finland and Russia, with or without Finland in NATO. — boethius
For now. Things can change. Now, if you say this is one negative for now, then we agree. — boethius
So, if Russia is confident that Ukraine cannot sustain this offensive, then the greater the despair the greater the catharsis and euphoria when the tide is reversed. And such an observation is not "copium" but psychology 101 and hinges on the "if" statement. If Ukrainian gains are sustainable then the greater the despair the greater pressure to start use tactical nuclear weapons or justify some other policy shift. — boethius
"last word" so to speak (only in Russia). — boethius
Most importantly, even the Western media is forced at some point to recognise Russia is "winning" if they clearly are. This was what was happening before these offensives. Ukraine was "resisting" heroically around Kiev and the withdraw from the North was a huge victory for Ukraine and Embarrassment for Russia, war crimes rinse repeat, but after some time even the Western media had to recognise that Russia was winning, especially after Ukraine retreat from major centres like Donetsk. — boethius
The argument that this war is finally the "kick in the arse" Europe needed to transition to renewables all along, is not a good argument, it simply establishes we have been led by traitors to European citizens and all of humanity and all life all this time. — boethius
Further, the difference between Sweden, Finland and Ukraine should be obvious. Sweden and Finland have no strategic relevance to Russia at all, while Ukraine is the most important region for Russia outside of Russia proper. — Tzeentch
However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive for 2 strong reasons: 1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. Talking generically about NATO expansion and Russophobia (think about Russian minorities in Baltic Regions), signals generic aspirations over territories and people Russia perceives as “theirs”, no matter what NATO countries have to say. 2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance (https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-baltic-region). And evidently in line with Russian expansion trends (under Putin) to encircle Europe, given Russian militar and threatening presence in north Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea (bridged by the control over the Black Sea) and Baltic Sea (see Kaliningrad). Besides Russian aren’t certainly short on pretexts or motivations hostile to the West (see the wild resentment and grievances against the West exposed in their State TV). — neomac
However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive... — neomac
1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. — neomac
2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance. — neomac
I wasn’t talking about anonymous keyboard warriors of course. I meant credible public sources. — apokrisis
The two ain’t exactly mutually exclusive. Indeed they are evidence that a kleptocracy now getting sentimental about lost imperial promise is a generally incompetent structural setting. — apokrisis
That is true. And it is also true that the degree of military incompetence was a surprise to these same analysts. Indeed a happy bonus from a hawkish US perspective as it created the chance to mire Russia in its own backyard Afghanistan. — apokrisis
Putin’s ineptitude looks to be delivering the US’s every defence policy wish. NATO expanded overnight. — apokrisis
Russian oil gone. Putinism destined to die the death of a thousand cuts. — apokrisis
All they have to avoid now is nuclear escalation and the US finally wins biggly in a proxy war. — apokrisis
But the Russian collapse is delivering more tanks and ammo to the Ukrainians in a few weeks than the west supplied in seven months. Of course the quality isn’t so great. But you know. Russian incompetence. — apokrisis
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