I was merely pointing out that declarations do not necessarily set out how things are, — Janus

What?

are we actually arguing about anything? — Janus

I'm not. You appear to think you are. Odd.

My question was why Not Necessary (◇~) is not also equivalent to Possible (◇).

In the section quoted above, you start out referring to Not Necessarily (red), which means that "there is at least one non-red marble to be picked". But you then make the subtle switch to talking about Necessarily Not (red), — Luke

There was no "subtle switch."

Not Necessarily Red is equivalent to Possibly Not Red.

Not Necessarily Red is consistent with Necessarily Not Red, which ought to be obvious because Possibly Not Red is clearly consistent with Necessarily Not Red.

If Not Necessarily Red (Possibly Not Red) is equivalent to Possibly Red, then Possibly Red is consistent with Necessarily Not Red. But it's not, therefore, Not Necessarily Red is not equivalent to Possibly Red.

If Not Necessarily (red) means "there is at least one non-red marble to be picked", then I still don't see how that differs from Possibly (red), which means that "at least one of the marbles is red" and that not "all the marbles are red" (otherwise red would be necessary). — Luke

What you're missing is that we only have Not Necessarily Red — so we know at least one marble is non-red — but we don't have Not Necessarily Not Red (i.e., Possibly Red), so it is entirely consistent for the set of marbles to be all non-red.

I was merely pointing out that declarations do not necessarily set out how things are, — Janus


What? — Banno

Below is what I quoted from you and responded to:

Recall that declaratives are curious in having two directions of fit: a declaration sets out how things are, yet how things are changes to match the declaration. — Janus

So, it seemed you were claiming that declarations do set out how things are, perhaps you meant not do, but can, in which case it should have been obvious that I was not disagreeing.

The alarm screech symbolizes danger.
— creativesoul

I don't think that's right; I think the alarm screech signals danger. Symbolization is more abstract, and this is just where our use of language distinguishes us from the other animals. — Janus

Okay. Replace "symbolizes" with "signals" and the argument that that bit was excised from still stands strong. You need to address it along with all the earlier arguments that have went sorely neglected since being made.

Either it's irony or deliberate deception. Neither is acceptable.

:roll:

Ok. Whatever.

In case you need a little help on where you need to be looking...

The alarm screech symbolizes danger. The creatures using the screech connect the two and become language users as a result. The screech becomes meaningful with use.

All 'linguistically mediated thought' involves language use. Some non human animals have language. Thought they have that involve language use are 'linguistically mediated thought'. The sounding of the alarm is a 'linguistically mediated thought' because it is a thought consisting of correlations drawn between the vocalization and danger. Becoming aware of danger by virtue of knowing what an alarm sound means is linguistically mediated thought.

We cannot draw and maintain the distinction between the sorts of thoughts that we have and the sorts of thought that other language using animals have with the notion of 'linguistically mediated thought'. — creativesoul

The proof for that is demonstrated by the way you attribute agency to language. Again that's been proven. You've yet to have squared those circles despite repeated attempts at redefinition.

You cannot avoid anthropomorphism because "linguistically mediated thought" is a prima facie example of anthropomorphism. All this and then some has been more than adequately argued for without subsequent due attention.

Thanks, great discussion, as usual!

Okay. Replace "symbolizes" with "signals" and the argument that that bit was excised from still stands strong. You need to address it along with all the earlier arguments that have went sorely neglected since being made.

Either it's irony or deliberate deception. Neither is acceptable. — creativesoul

I haven't been addressing, or even attempting to address the question of whether animals and humans alike are conscious in ways enabled by the capacity to signal; I'd say yes to that of course.

It's incredible that you impute irony or deliberate deception on my part, when it should have clear to you that I have all along only been addressing the question of the kind of consciousness enabled by symbolic language.

The proof for that is demonstrated by the way you attribute agency to language. Again that's been proven. You've yet to have squared those circles despite repeated attempts at redefinition. — creativesoul

I have never imputed agency to language. If, in your confusion, you think I have, then quote the relevant passage(s).

You cannot avoid anthropomorphism because "linguistically mediated thought" is a prima facie example of anthropomorphism. All this and then some has been more than adequately argued for without subsequent due attention. — creativesoul

Is this a joke? Explain how ""linguistically mediated thought" is a prima facie example of anthropomorphism" or if you think you already have, then cite or quote the relevant passages. Keep in mind my two definitions of anthropomorphism, and be mindful that I only have the "egregious imputation of human characteristics onto the non-human" in mind here, which should be obvious given what I have said I think about the other definition.

I have never imputed agency to language. — Janus

Does language mediate human thought?

Where's the Collingwood fan at? There is an absolute presupposition amidst us.

Does language mediate human thought? — creativesoul

Of course it does.

mediate
vb
1. (intr; usually foll by between or in) to intervene (between parties or in a dispute) in order to bring about agreement
2. to bring about (an agreement)
3. to bring about (an agreement) between parties in a dispute
4. to resolve (differences) by mediation
5. (intr) to be in a middle or intermediate position
6. (tr) to serve as a medium for causing (a result) or transferring (objects, information, etc)

Look at '6.' From here

Language does those things?

No agency required?

Keep in mind my two definitions of anthropomorphism, — Janus

Open admission of an equivocation of terms fallacy?

You cannot avoid anthropomorphism because "linguistically mediated thought" is a prima facie example of anthropomorphism. All this and then some has been more than adequately argued for without subsequent due attention.
— creativesoul

Is this a joke? Explain how ""linguistically mediated thought" is a prima facie example of anthropomorphism" — Janus

Mediation is not performed by language. Language is incapable of mediating. We mediate. Mediation is performed by us. We are creatures with agency. Language is the tool we use to do so. It serves as the medium. Mediating is what's being performed/enacted/done by a mediator. Mediators use language as a medium for successful mediation.

Language does not mediate. Language is not a mediator. Mediators mediate.

Are you saying that a primate community that uses specific vocalizations as a means to signal the presence of specific predators is not language use, albeit in basic, rudimentary, and/or simplistic form?

Such a denial requires some sort of justification for the denial. If that does not count as one of the simplest sorts of language use emerging into the universe, then what does? Where do you draw the line at a bare minimum over there on the left side of your spectrum?

You are making what I would consider a scope error. — Srap Tasmaner

It can't be me making the scope error, because it's your examples only, not mine. Am I making an interpretive scope error? Here's the example again:

(1) It is necessary that the book falls if and only if it is not possible that the book does not fall.

(2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall.

"Not" seems to be used in two ways, but it really isn't; under this scheme it is always a proposition-level operator, just like "possibly" and "necessarily". You build necessary this way:

(1) The book is falling.
(2) It is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(3) It is possible that (2), that it is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(4) It is not the case that (3), that it is possible that (2), that it is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(5) It is necessary that (1), the book is falling.

(5) is here just shorthand for (4). There is a single complete proposition (1), and three operators applied to that proposition, which we can abbreviate as a single operator.

This simplified usage of "not" avoids many confusions: you never predicate "not falling" of an object, you deny that it is falling; you never predicate "not possible" of a proposition, you deny that it is possible. By maintaining discipline in the treatment of "not", you avoid any possibility of confusing, say, "I know it's not Tuesday" and "I don't know it's Tuesday". We can be clear about the scope of the operators we apply to sentences, and we can be clear about the order in which we apply them, and we need not abide ambiguity. This is how we win. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you give me a simple explanation as to why you switch from talking about whether or not "the book falls" (future, or perhaps tenseless)), to "the book is falling" (present)?

The issue I pointed out with the dual use of "not" is that "it is not necessary that the book does not fall", the first (2), uses two senses of "not". "Does not fall" does not negate "fall", like "not necessary" negates "necessary". What "not" does in this case is stipulate that there is no real world activity of falling.

You assign a scope error to me, saying the following: "This simplified usage of "not" avoids many confusions: you never predicate "not falling" of an object, you deny that it is falling; you never predicate "not possible" of a proposition, you deny that it is possible." But it was you yourself who predicated "not" of "fall" in your statement: " (2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall."

It appears to me, like you have created an illusion, by changing the temporal scope of the example. In the explanation you've switched from whether or not the book falls (indefinite temporal scope), to whether or not the book is falling (present time). This allows you to talk about the book not falling without directly predicating "not falling" of the object. But in the other case, there is no temporal scope, so what is at issue is never falling, the possibility that it is impossible for the book to fall, and this requires the denied predication.

Notice that with the restricted scope (present only) it is possible to talk about whether or not the book is falling, without predicating "not falling" of the object. But in the original example we cannot get to the possibility that "the book does not fall" without predicating "not falling" of the object.

This is the meaning of "impossible" which I am trying to bring to your attention, which your schema excludes. "It is impossible that the book is falling", or more properly said, "it is necessary that the book is not falling".

What happens in your explanation, is that by refusing to predicate "not falling" of the object, you put "not falling" outside the scope of what you are talking about, so that you are only talking about the book falling. By doing this you exclude the possibility of "it is necessary that the book is not falling". In other words, you exclude the impossible from your schema. Then "not falling" becomes something completely distinct from "falling", rather than the opposite of it.

Not Necessarily Red is equivalent to Possibly Not Red. — Srap Tasmaner

What you're missing is that we only have Not Necessarily Red — so we know at least one marble is non-red — but we don't have Not Necessarily Not Red (i.e., Possibly Red), so it is entirely consistent for the set of marbles to be all non-red. — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks for taking the time to clarify. I understand now. I wrote this down to help get my head around it:

1. Necessary (▢): Necessarily Red = All are red
2. Possible Not (~▢): Not Necessarily Red = At least one is not red (not all are red)
3. Possible (~▢~): Not Necessarily Not Red = At least one is red (not none are red)
4. Impossible (▢~): Necessarily Not Red = None are red

I wasn't aware of the distinction between Possible Not and Possible when I asked my question earlier. It's more logically pedantic than what I had in mind. Possible Not and Possible both denote possibility, referring to "some" as opposed to "all" or "none". However, while I accept that Possible Not and Possible are technically different to each other, I think they can still be viewed as "opposed to" or distinct from Necessary and Impossible, respectively, each in the same (but inverse) way. Does logical negation constitute an opposite? Because, in the table above, 2 is the negation of 1 and 3 is the negation of 4.

Does logical negation constitute an opposite? — Luke

I think so, yes, at least for the simplest cases. There may be some subtleties to the linguistics I can't call to mind at the moment.

Can you give me a simple explanation as to why you switch from talking about whether or not "the book falls" (future, or perhaps tenseless)), to "the book is falling" (present)? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, because I was — perhaps inadvisedly — using an example of a temporal event but trying not to prejudice the interpretation of the modality, so talking about this temporal event tenselessly.

I never even checked to see if there are problems if you read the example with tense in mind. If that comes out badly, I apologize for the confusion. It's just an artifact.

The example I went through with @Luke ended up being much easier to write.

You say a lot of things I agree with, but apparently thinking that I don't, because there's still some confusion about the handling of "not." One point I think I clarified somewhere else is that in something like "The book is not red," we place the "not" before "red" purely as a matter of English convention, and because, with no other scope in play, there's no ambiguity. But that's still a proposition-level "not" and a more verbose way to say the same thing is "It is not the case that ball is red." It's sometimes convenient to pretend that "not red" is something we might predicate of an object, but it isn't really. "Not red" is not a syntactical element of the proposition at all, and therefore not a semantic unit either. "Red" is, as a predicate, and "not" is, as an operator on the entire proposition. "Not" doesn't apply to predicates or objects. As long as we keep in mind the logical form of what we're saying, I see no harm in using ordinary English, but I'll switch to "philosophical English" when there's ambiguity to be avoided.

I wasn't aware of the distinction between Possible Not and Possible when I asked my question earlier. It's more logically pedantic than what I had in mind. — Luke

I do think it's because they do often go together for the sorts of things we reason about. ("He might be on time, or he might not.")

Possible Not and Possible both denote possibility, referring to "some" as opposed to "all" or "none". However, while I accept that Possible Not and Possible are technically different to each other, I think they can still be viewed as "opposed to" or distinct from Necessary and Impossible, respectively, each in the same (but inverse) way. — Luke

That's quite reasonable, but relying on "opposite" to mean different things will just lead to trouble. In the old square of opposition different sorts of pairwise contrasts get different names.

That's quite reasonable, but relying on "opposite" to mean different things will just lead to trouble. — Srap Tasmaner

How have I used "opposite" to mean different things?

One point I think I clarified somewhere else is that in something like "The book is not red," we place the "not" before "red" purely as a matter of English convention, and because, with no other scope in play, there's no ambiguity. But that's still a proposition-level "not" and a more verbose way to say the same thing is "It is not the case that ball is red." It's sometimes convenient to pretend that "not red" is something we might predicate of an object, but it isn't really. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. It really is.

We need not pretend that it is not convention for all of us to say of a book that it is not red, even if it is convenient to admit the convention and then act like it's not something we 'really' do as a means for rationalizing or handwaving away our inability to take proper account of the fact that we do it.

Rhetorical drivel.

You say a lot of things I agree with, but apparently thinking that I don't, because there's still some confusion about the handling of "not." One point I think I clarified somewhere else is that in something like "The book is not red," we place the "not" before "red" purely as a matter of English convention, and because, with no other scope in play, there's no ambiguity. But that's still a proposition-level "not" and a more verbose way to say the same thing is "It is not the case that ball is red." It's sometimes convenient to pretend that "not red" is something we might predicate of an object, but it isn't really. "Not red" is not a syntactical element of the proposition at all, and therefore not a semantic unit either. "Red" is, as a predicate, and "not" is, as an operator on the entire proposition. "Not" doesn't apply to predicates or objects. As long as we keep in mind the logical form of what we're saying, I see no harm in using ordinary English, but I'll switch to "philosophical English" when there's ambiguity to be avoided. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, I think I follow this. Now let me tell you the issue I'm talking about, taking this simple example of "the book is not red". As it stands "not" is an operator which negates "the book is red". There is one necessity implied, i.e. it is impossible that the book is red. It is necessary that the book is not red.

Now, we want to move into a logical mode of possibility, and allow for a possibility that the book is red. So we relate "it is possible that the book is red", with "it is necessary that the book is red" in the ways that you describe. But what happens to the original, "the book is not red", or |
" it is impossible that the book is red" with this move? Because the new mode is the possibility that the book is red, we must exclude this option (it is impossible that the book is red), as not a possibility.

The question is whether it is a valid move to exclude the possibility that it is impossible that the book is red. Isn't this a real possibility which ought to be allowed for in discussing the possibility that the book is red? It is possible that it is impossible that the book is red. According to what you describe, it appears to me like the logical schema denies this possibility by saying that it opens a new category, the category of "not-red", and then we'd have to discuss the possibility of this. In this case "the book is not red" would mean "it is necessary that the book is not red", which would be an instance of predicating "not-red" of the book.

So the issue as I see it, is that I want to allow "it is impossible that the book is red" as a valid possibility, when we are talking about the possibility of whether or not the book is red. But the logical schema disallows this possibility. And, it is the logical schema which makes "not-red" into a distinct category of predication, thereby blocking this possibility. Therefore you cannot use that as an argument for why we ought to accept the logical schema, that if we allow "it is impossible that the book is red" as a valid possibility, it makes "not-red" into a category of its own, distinct from "red", rather than the negation of red, because that's just begging the question. From my perspective, that's just evidence that the logical schema is flawed. Instead of having "red" and "not-red" as the two extremes of one category, with all the possibilities lying between, it treats "red" and "not-red" as distinct categories of possibility, with no proper way of establishing a relationship between the possibility of each of these two.

How have I used "opposite" to mean different things? — Luke

One predicate is distinct from another if they don't have identical extensions, even if they overlap (as various cases of possibility and necessity do). One predicate is the opposite of another, usually, if one is the complement of the other, includes everything it doesn't and nothing it does. I'm not sure we have an everyday word for only being disjoint, that is, being a subset of the complement.

I'm not sure we have an everyday word for only being disjoint, that is, being a subset of the complement. — Srap Tasmaner

antonym — bongo fury

Antonym — bongo fury

antonym — bongo fury

antonym — bongo fury

antonym — bongo fury

1. Necessary (▢): Necessarily Red = All are red
2. Possible Not (~▢): Not Necessarily Red = At least one is not red (not all are red)
3. Possible (~▢~): Not Necessarily Not Red = At least one is red (not none are red)
4. Impossible (▢~): Necessarily Not Red = None are red — Luke

This way of looking at necessity seems wrong to me. When I think of necessity, I think of something like "all visible objects are spatiotemporal" which makes sense since it is impossible to imagine a non-spatiotemporal visual object.

It is not impossible to imagine any object being red or not being red. So even if all examples of a certain kind of object were red, it does not follow that a non-red object of that kind could not turn up. Even if (although we could never know it) all objects of a certain kind have been, are and will be red it does not seem to follow that it would be necessary that they were, are or will be red. That they were, are and will be all red could be a contingent matter, that is it just so happens that all of those kinds of objects have been, are and will be red.

Let's look at another example, so we have a comparison. (There are features of the first example that may be confusing.)

Consider playground balls, the ones kids play dodgeball and four-square with. Those are (classically) all red. Why? Because they're made from red rubber. We would say, it is impossible to make a non-red ball out of red rubber. That seems straightforward.

Do we mean something similar when we ask if this red ball 'might have been' a different color, or if it 'can be' a different color? Or if we ask, of some ball, the color of which we do not know, if it 'must be' red?

Is this ball *this ball* if it is a different color? Is redness essential to it? For comparison, if this ball is flat, we can inflate it, and we will not usually say that being flat is essential to what the ball is, just its temporary state.

But it is nevertheless true that if it is flat, it is not fully inflated, and that's just the law of noncontradiction. When we say this red ball cannot not be red, are we even saying anything about the ball? Or are we only saying that at this world, as at all others, the law of noncontradiction holds?

To say that there are no worlds at which this ball is both red and not red is to say almost nothing at all. There simply are no such worlds, no worlds at which any ball, this one or another, is both red and not red. If we deem the redness of this ball essential to it, there are no worlds at which this ball is not red, on pain of simply being a different object. If it is inessential that it is red, like being flat, then there are worlds at which it is blue, is green, is white, and so on. And that's what we mean when we say this ball 'might have been' some other color.

When talking about particulars, like this specific ball, we can't make modal claims, I think, without considering what is essential and what accidental about that particular.

We're in very different territory if there's a bin of red playground balls and you're grabbing one of those. In such a case, it's perfectly clear what we mean when we say you cannot pick a ball that is not red: there is no such a ball to pick. To say that you might get the one with "Zeppelin rules" scrawled on it in Sharpie, is to say there is a ball in the bin so adorned, and this inscription makes it unique; to say you might get one bearing those words, is to say this is a thing someone might have done, that it is possible someone has done it.

But how do we get necessity out of the law of noncontradiction? That if something is red, it cannot not be red? Since the law of noncontradiction holds at each world, restricting to worlds at which "The ball is red" is true automatically embodies the necessity we were looking for: for any world w in that set, the ball is red at every world accessible (under this restriction) from w. That's our definition of necessity. No world at which it is not red, or also not red, can sneak in.

It's because the domain of the quantifier is explicitly restricted to the marbles in this set.

It's because the domain of the quantifier is explicitly restricted to the marbles in this set. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, perhaps I missed something since I haven't closely read every post. So the four alternatives are specifying the characters of different sets of objects? The first the set of all red objects, the second with at least one non-red object, the third with at least one red object and the last with no red objects; and the four permutations of possibility and necessity are related to whether or not an object, either red or not red, must belong, or could not belong, to the four different sets?