What does this proposed drawing of a correlation add to the situation ? This sounds either mathematical (statistics) or thought-like or ?A child that has just been burned as a result of touching fire forms the belief that touching fire caused the pain solely by virtue of drawing a correlation between what they did(touch the fire) and the pain that ensued. We can know this much as a result of their absolute refusal to touch it again. — creativesoul
Correlations drawn between different things. <------that's what all human thought and belief amounts to. — creativesoul
In statistics, correlation or dependence is any statistical relationship, whether causal or not, between two random variables or bivariate data. Although in the broadest sense, "correlation" may indicate any type of association, in statistics it normally refers to the degree to which a pair of variables are linearly related. Familiar examples of dependent phenomena include the correlation between the height of parents and their offspring, and the correlation between the price of a good and the quantity the consumers are willing to purchase, as it is depicted in the so-called demand curve.
Correlations are useful because they can indicate a predictive relationship that can be exploited in practice.
This seems relevant too:The brain is an energy-expensive organ, so it had to evolve energy-conserving efficiencies. As a prediction machine, it must take shortcuts for pattern recognition as it processes the vast amounts of information received from the environment by its sense organ outgrowths. Beliefs allow the brain to distill complex information, enabling it to quickly categorize and evaluate information and to jump to conclusions. For example, beliefs are often concerned with understanding the causes of things: If ‘b’ closely followed ‘a’, then ‘a’ might be assumed to have been the cause of ‘b’.
These shortcuts to interpreting and predicting our world often involve connecting dots and filling in gaps, making extrapolations and assumptions based on incomplete information and based on similarity to previously recognized patterns. In jumping to conclusions, our brains have a preference for familiar conclusions over unfamiliar ones. Thus, our brains are prone to error, sometimes seeing patterns where there are none. This may or may not be subsequently identified and corrected by error-detection mechanisms. It’s a trade-off between efficiency and accuracy. — Psychology Today
https://iep.utm.edu/functism/Functionalism is the theory that mental states are more like mouse traps than they are like diamonds. That is, what makes something a mental state is more a matter of what it does, not what it is made of. This distinguishes functionalism from traditional mind-body dualism, such as that of René Descartes, according to which minds are made of a special kind of substance, the res cogitans (the thinking substance.) It also distinguishes functionalism from contemporary monisms such as J. J. C. Smart’s mind-brain identity theory. The identity theory says that mental states are particular kinds of biological states—namely, states of brains—and so presumably have to be made of certain kinds of stuff, namely, brain stuff. Mental states, according to the identity theory, are more like diamonds than like mouse traps. Functionalism is also distinguished from B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism because it accepts the reality of internal mental states, rather than simply attributing psychological states to the whole organism. According to behaviorism, which mental states a creature has depends just on how it behaves (or is disposed to behave) in response to stimuli. In contrast functionalists typically believe that internal and psychological states can be distinguished with a “finer grain” than behavior—that is, distinct internal or psychological states could result in the same behaviors. So functionalists think that it is what the internal states do that makes them mental states, not just what is done by the creature of which they are parts.
What Rouse is trying to do is show that our participation within normative practices is not simply a matter of conformity (or not) to pre-established norms, but a continual re-framing and re-configuration.
— Joshs
The situation might be described as an intergenerational dialectic, with science advancing one funeral at a time (if the old dogs refuse to learn new tricks.) Along with reason's autonomy and self-criticism comes endless dynamism, an endless revolution in the memes of seduction. — Pie
One has a timeworn conceptuality at one's disposal. It provides the fore-concept for the interpretation. The interpretedness of a 'time' is strictly determined by these structural factors and the variable forms of their realization. And it is precisely the unobtrusiveness of these factors --the fact that one is not aware of them -- which gives public interpretedness its taken-for-granted character. However, the 'fore'-character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been that jumps ahead, as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness. Guided by its interpretedness, expectant concern lives its own past.
— Heidegger
This part is key : the 'fore'-character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been that jumps ahead, as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness.
Or: I am my past in the mode of no longer being it — Pie
The dialectic begins the moment I interact with others, as a dialogic back and forth that reshapes the sense of both of our conceptions in subtle fashion in continually. — Joshs
You introduced me to this passage from Heidegger’s early work, for which I am grateful. I went on to incorporate it in a paper that makes the opposite argument from the one you think Heidegger is making concerning time. — Joshs
A present time pervaded by interpretedness is the vulgar time of public interpretedness, otherwise known as the average everydayness of Das Man. — Joshs
What Heidegger is pointing to here is not the fundamental nature of time for Dasein but ways of thinking about time that we fall into. We convince ourselves that the future that arrives is a duplicate of our past. — Joshs
The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative…. To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing. — Joshs
“Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”(Heidegger 2010) — Joshs
However, I see no reason to believe that bat experts have knowledge about how thought and belief emerged, simply because they are bat experts — creativesoul
A child that has just been burned as a result of touching fire forms the belief that touching fire caused the pain solely by virtue of drawing a correlation between what they did(touch the fire) and the pain that ensued. We can know this much as a result of their absolute refusal to touch it again.
— creativesoul
What does this proposed drawing of a correlation add to the situation? — Pie
You say you are right where all philosophers up till now are wrong...on an important issue. That's a strong claim, for which a strong case ought to be made. — Pie
:up:It adds the ability to explain how some meaning is not existentially dependent upon language use; how language is created; how naming and descriptive practices work; how rigid designators work; how reference works; how new meaning is formed; how meaningful language use transcends the individual speaker; how users of different languages can say much the same thing about the same things using remarkably different syntax and semantic structures. It's how meaningful language use(marks) becomes utterly meaningless and uninterpretable when all the users have long since perished; how the Rosetta stone became a translation device as a result of having enough shared meaning with at least one language still used; how all meaningful things become so; how symbolism works; etc. — creativesoul
“Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. — Joshs
The past leaps ahead for a project in the way it handles the present ? — Pie
I like the way Eugene Gendlin put it:
“…the past functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in”. — Joshs
What's your favorite Gendlin text? — Pie
I wonder to what degree exactly such an investigation can avoid attributing postulated linguistic beliefs — Pie
If such modelling is a part of psychology currently, perhaps there are more recent philosophers who have integrated this fact into their thinking? — Pie
It adds the ability to explain how some meaning is not existentially dependent upon language use; how language is created; how naming and descriptive practices work; how rigid designators work; how reference works; how new meaning is formed; how meaningful language use transcends the individual speaker; how users of different languages can say much the same thing about the same things using remarkably different syntax and semantic structures. It's how meaningful language use(marks) becomes utterly meaningless and uninterpretable when all the users have long since perished; how the Rosetta stone became a translation device as a result of having enough shared meaning with at least one language still used; how all meaningful things become so; how symbolism works; etc.
— creativesoul
:up:
All great issues. — Pie
Idealism is true ... to an extent! You really don't want to doubt the external reality of a a 3-ton boulder rolling down the hill, straight at you. — Agent Smith
doesn't look right. There are things which are the case regardless of what we believe or know. boagie mat be right that we only know what we know, but there is stuff we do not know. But then boagie's post is very hard to follow, since it seems to say contrary three things: that without consciousness the world ceases to be; that despite this, biology is real; and biology somehow creates the physical world. There appears to be a vicious circularity here in which we can't have consciousness without biology and yet we can'[t have biology without consciousness....there is no physical world in the absence of a conscious subject — boagie
Those with whom I have discussed this issue suppose that one infers the existence of other minds from one's experience. But then, if we can do that, why not infer the existence of three-tonne boulders on that same basis?What I don't understand is why all idealists are not also solipsist. — PhilosophyRunner
Those with whom I have discussed this issue suppose that one infers the existence of other minds from one's experience. But then, if we can do that, why not infer the existence of three-tonne boulders on that same basis? — Banno
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