.....it was a sensible approach. — Manuel

True enough. Nowadays we call it reification, in that mind per se isn’t reducible to substance, therefore thinking substance is moot.

Kant fixed all that....kinda sorta.....by calling mind or reason, and other similar abstracts, conditions for a particular kind of substance but not a physical constituency of it.

But do you think Descartes treated res cogitans as a principle, or an actual substance? In First Principles 1, 52 he defines substance, then in 1-53 qualifies the differences with the attributes each can have. The attribute of a thinking substance is thought, so....is he calling it out as the case, or a principle which grounds the case?

I just never thought of cogitans or extensa as principles. Maybe I should have....dunno.
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I happen to think that his dualism is often misunderstood. — Manuel

As do I. But what can ya do, huh?

True enough. Nowadays we call it reification, in that mind per se isn’t reducible to substance, therefore thinking substance is moot. — Mww

This depends on what you mean by "substance". I've been re-reading Locke again, and he raises this problem in very, very interesting ways. Actually, on one not-too-controversial interpretation, I think Locke's "substance" is similar to "things in themselves". There are differences of course, especially when primary qualities are listed as belonging to the thing in the material world.

As to the rest, he says it's "something I know not what", which we have to postulate to make sense of experience, unless one believes that objects are properties alone, which I think is unintelligible.

So on interpretation, thinking substance is possible, we just don't know how it could be so.

But do you think Descartes treated res cogitans as a principle, or an actual substance? In First Principles 1, 52 he defines substance, then in 1-53 qualifies the differences with the attributes each can have. The attribute of a thinking substance is thought, so....is he calling it out as the case, or a principle which grounds the case? — Mww

I may have not expressed myself as clearly as possible. I'm saying that he postulated res cogitans as a way to account for the things which could not be accounted for by res extensa. Yes, he did classify res cogitans as a substance, in this respect, being also a scientist, he was doing something rational, looking for a principle (in the scientific sense) to close the gap, as it were, his principle was to add another substance to the one he thought the world was made of.

He was as much a scientist and mathematician, if not more so in his time, than a philosopher, which is how we recognize him today.

He was as much a scientist and mathematician, if not more so..... — Manuel

True. Even both in “First Principles....” and “Meditations.....” he uses accurate anatomical terminology. In the 1600’s no less.

I'm saying that he postulated res cogitans as a way to account for the things which could not be accounted for by res extensa. — Manuel

Good enough for me. All he ever meant to prove was body, which we know, and mind, which we don’t, are nonetheless very different.

Substance is thought as that which 'stands under', as the basis of everything. Spinoza's notion of substance makes more sense:deus sative natura, 'God or Nature. Cogitans and extensa are just two of Nature's infinite attributes, as Spinoza thinks it.

Remember that for Aristotle every entity is a substance, but then each substance is thought as unique and different and more like essence.The idea of two fundamental substances seems fatally wrongheaded because of the problem of interaction, the problem which Spinoza dissolved.

Descartes’ cogito was never meant to indicate the source of all certainty. — Mww

Sure, but unfortunately that is how it is often regarded.

But your use of "certainty" is interesting. I use it as an attitude towards a proposition, and hence someone might be certain of something that is not true. So of course certainty is "inherently possible". But it seems odd to "ground truth" on certainty.

I must be misunderstanding you.

Spinoza's notion of substance makes more sense:deus sative natura, 'God or Nature. — Janus

Descartes said the same thing initially, but qualified it because we have no knowledge of God’s attributes and attributes are that by which substance is known. Everything under God, sure, but that doesn't help with the sense of substance as he wants it to be understood, that is, with respect to the differences in mind and body. Which would be, then, their respective attributes, and the interaction of those attributes, if not the substances themselves.

Not sure how Spinoza could have solved any problems by bringing in infinite stuff.....but I trust ya, so....good enough.

I didn't know that Descartes was a non-dualist at any point. Spinoza would say that we do know God's/ Nature's attributes; well two of them anyway, extensa and cogitans. It's never been clear to me whether by "infinte attributes" Spinoza means infintely many or attributes that are infinite or both.
The problem of interaction he dissolved, not by invoking the infinite, but by treating extensa and cogitans attributes of the one substance which show up for us when considered from their different perspectives.

someone might be certain of something that is not true. — Banno

But not at the same time, in the same subject, complete and proper rationality being given.

There is the thesis that certainty grounds truth from the notion that human cognition is in the form of logical syllogisms. If the major and the minor do not conflict, there is relational certainty, and if the conclusion does not conflict with the premises, there is truth relative to that certainty.

Metaphysics doesn’t care about empirical content, which involves that which one is certain about, only the method by which any content may or may not become intelligible to us, which involves certainty in our judgements.

treating extensa and cogitans attributes of the one substance which show up for us when considered from their different perspectives. — Janus

What substance can have both attributes?

But not at the same time, in the same subject, complete and proper rationality being given. — Mww

Think I need to clarify what you mean here.

On. a common, probably analytic, account, certainty is a "propositional attitude", in that it involves both people and a purported statement, and indicates a certain attitude of those folk towards that statement.

Now it follows that the folk who are certain of that statement hold it to be true.

But it does not follow that the statement is indeed true.

So flat-earth society members may be certain of their conviction. And they may well do so at the same time, in the subject, with what they take to be complete and proper rationality.

And they would still be in error.

You seem to have in mind a certainty that is dissimilar to this.

It's the phrase "certainty grounds truth" that I find puzzling. If P implies Q, and P is true, then Q is also true, so we might say that truth grounds truth. And perhaps if P implies Q, and P is certain, then Q is also certain, and we might say that certainty grounds certainty. But if P is certain, one cannot, given the considerations above, conclude that Q is true; since we may be certain of things which are not true.

Perhaps you using "certain" in a way of which I am unaware?

What substance can have both attributes? — Mww

On Spinoza's account Nature (God) has both attributes; extended nature and thinking nature, if you like.

I see less of a problem with thst than declaring those natures to be separate and yet somehow interacting substances or fundamentals. But then I'm no advocate of the notion of substance at all.

We know that humans have a tendency to think in dualistic terms, but I see no reason to think that says anything about anything beyond the nature of our thinking.

Does our language reflect the primordial nature of thinking itself or does our thinking reflect the dualistic character of language? Chicken or the egg?

*

Now it follows that the folk who are certain of that statement hold it to be true.

But it does not follow that the statement is indeed true. — Banno

You cannot be absolutely certain of anything, you can only be certain of anything within contexts that rely on assumptions that are themselves not certain.

On the other hand you can feel certain of anything at all.

I've tried to point out this distinction to you before to no avail.

(Redacted. I remember the argument, it was pointless.)

On the other hand you can feel certain of anything at all. — Janus

Is "feel" the keyword? Most perceptive if it is!

On. a common, probably analytic, account, certainty is a "propositional attitude", in that it involves both people and a purported statement, and indicates a certain attitude of those folk towards that statement. — Banno

I’m aware, and you’re correct in it. I, and indeed as well I think, are arguing from a purely metaphysical position, involving a person, and by association each and every individual person of congruent rational integrity, but without statements, based on the notion no meaningful statement is even possible without the means for its construction.

The common, probably analytic account....
.....assumes proper human rationality; I’m making sure of it.

.....describes truths as they are discovered by a fully functioning human intellect, I am describing how a proper human intellect discovers truth.

......relates this to that and from the relation something is true; I’m relating this human function to that human function from which truth is given.

......admits only the contingent conditions IN a statement (if this, then that, a non-fallacious post hoc ergo propter hoc logical proposition); I’m making necessary the conditions OF the person (when this, then that, a non-fallacious cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical condition) from which the statement follows.

Bottom line....on the one hand is an end, re: this is true if.....represented by symbols but without the method used to create them; on the other is an end, re: all truth must be....represented by conceptions reason then arbitrates insofar as it is the method.

All that being said, it nevertheless reduces to efficiency, a euphemism for dismissal of metanarrative theory. If we can arrive at truth with knowing how, what difference does knowing how really make. Maybe none, but it aids in the explanation as to why folks disagree. If disagreement arises merely from incompatible experience, experience being that which every logical system requires for the possibility of its proofs, that’s one thing and easily surmised. But with similar experiences, disagreement can only follow from dissimilar associations in the judgements of the participants, for which the analysis of propositions themselves have no power, insofar as stated propositions do not contain the reason of their own construction.

History supports the notion that vastly dissimilar human cultures nevertheless imbue congruent truths across them. Whether a supreme being, a undeniable-whatever-the-case may-be, it matters not. The distinction in culture manifests as distinctions in experiences of the members of such culture, from which follows the experiences ground the logic of each, generally. But every member of every culture is of the same kind of intelligence, from which follows their respective truths are all formed the same way, which is sufficient explanation for the congruency of them, regardless of the object which represents them.

The point being, of course, the propositions that are going to be necessarily different amongst different cultural dynamics, have no business being the determining factor in the foundation for truths inherent in all of them.
————

It's the phrase "certainty grounds truth" that I find puzzling. — Banno

You would, and you shouldn’t be faulted for it. Just as I, for holding a position no one cares about. But considering the dialectical medium in which this diatribe just sprouted, and the category by which it is known........I am at least the more consistent with it, methinks.

We know that humans have a tendency to think in dualistic terms, but I see no reason to think that says anything about anything beyond the nature of our thinking. — Janus

Agreed. How could it? Anthropomorphism on one hand, transcendental illusion on the other, both catastrophic no-no’s in their own way. The former attributes our dualistic nature to which it doesn’t belong, the latter attributes to our dualistic nature that which doesn’t belong to it.
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Does our language reflect the primordial nature of thinking itself or does our thinking reflect the dualistic character of language? Chicken or the egg? — Janus

What dualistic character does language have?

If one accepts his fundamental form of thought is image, then he holds language only reflects his thoughts. Or, perhaps more acutely, represents his thoughts. If our thoughts are internal, there is no need for the conveyance of them. It is impossible to convey images beyond oneself, hence the necessity for language, as a correspondence to those images, which can then be conveyed.

So....if we wish to convey our thoughts, we must have a language. If we do not wish to convey our thoughts, we have no need of language.

Want proof? Ever notice when what appears to be us talking to ourselves, which is the sole reason supporting the argument thinking reflects language, there is never, ever....not once....any personal pronoun used in it? But when we use language to convey our thinking, it is impossible, in a meaningful sense, without some form of it? Sufficient evidence that that appearance is not language use proper, but mere representation of what it would be.

There’s more....add a reasonably small number to another in your head. Betcha a million bucks you don’t use a formula....the language of mathematics....to do it. Construct a figure....the language of geometry. In your head you don’t use the word circle when enclosing a space with one curved line.

So, yes, from this armchair, language reflects thought rather than the other way around. Psychologists and anthropologists will not agree, but....ehhhh.....what do they know. (Winks at Issac)

What dualistic character does language have? — Mww

I agree we think in images prior to thinking words. The dualistic thinking I referred to probably starts with words: yes/no, is/ is not, being and nothingness, the one and zero of comuter language and so on.

Most people would agree that there are objects with a location in space and time and exist independently of conscious beings. This position is commonly called “materialism”. But for some reason, some people commonly called “idealists”, believe that there are no such objects. Instead, they claim that conscious beings and their experiences are the basis on which existence itself lies. — Hello Human

In my opinion the two are mutually dependent. What is a subject but an "object that observes" , and what is an object but the "subject of observation."
In that case there is a duality between materialism and idealism. They can cohabitate in that yes there is an objective truth/ a material reality outside of subjects (what scientific method explores and elucidates) but also subjects can never be removed fully from the observable objective reality because subjects can observe eachother.

Subject 1 can observe subject 2 as equally objective to the external environment (philosophical zombie/ mimics or solipsism - but people don't like the idea of being objectified as they see it as unethical, they would also like to exist as an agent) so subject 1 tends to observe subject 2 as both another subject and an object - something physical that has the same rights and protections from full objectification

-"What do you think ? Is materialism right ? Is idealism right ? Is it some mix of the two ? Can we even settle the question ? Is materialism a good explanation for patterns in different experiences "

-Both are Pseudo Philosophical worldviews design to ease people's existential and epistemic anxieties.
Both make unfalsifiable metaphysical claims based on Logical Fallacies (argument from ignorance).
The only justified true Philosophical woldview one can hold is that of Methodological Naturalism(MN).

MN is the only Philosophical world view ( The Natural world is currently all that we can verify. There is no reason to assume additional dimensions or entities and include them in our explanations until we are able to objectively verify them) capable to assist our Philosophy by expanding our Understanding through wise statements(knowledge based descriptions).
Now materialism or idealism do not offer any explanations. They only make unfalsifiable metaphysical claims. In order to evaluate those experiences we will need science, not a pseudo philosophical view.
If science fails to explain those experience too, then the answer would be "we don't current know the answer". Making up answer out of thin air is not a Philosophical practice!

I've always been attracted to the idea that things are not how they seem. I think it is possible that the material reality we observe is only one layer of 'information' that is somewhat akin to how a computer can only read code, but other kinds of information are invisible or unrecognisable to it. This doesn't deny material reality, but simply suggests the actual world is possibly unknowable to us given that any tool we build will be of stuff that we can interact with, and it with the same stuff. I find it possible there could be other kinds of stuff that is not 'meaningful' to the specie of matter that we interact with and as such perhaps see the actual world as an overlay of overlapping levels of noise that are only sound to themselves.

Hi there, is this the ...? Oops, sorry, wrong room! :blush:

Well, physics states that all is energy, only in our apparent reality is energy said to be manifest as object, so one need ask, how is object manifested, is it manifested only for conscious life forms but not in actuality? Does the conscious subject out of its own nature provide the actuality of forms/objects? Introbert---excellent!!

@boagie drew me back to this page.

I've read that through a couple of times and can't make sense of any argument it might contain.

I tried going back over the previous posts, but it didn't help. We started with a conversation about certainty. We have two uses, indubitable, and true. Philosophers, at least in the analytic tradition, tend to restrict themselves to using it to mean indubitable, while insists on using it to mean true. But I don't understand what you have added to this.

...the actual world is possibly unknowable to us... — introbert

If this were correct, there would be two worlds, the one that we live and act in every day, and which is described by physics, and another, what you call the actual world, about which we can know nothing.

Now if we can know nothing about this second world, in what sense might we consider ti to be the actual world? What role might this actual world play?

It does nothing, and so can be dropped out of our considerations without any loss.

We are left with the world we know.

...physics states that all is energy... — boagie

Does that in any way change the screen on which you are reading this? It's still a screen. You still interact with it, touch, see, and break it. Further, it's still an actual screen, not a prop or a toy.

, it's true that some times we are mistaken about what we are seeing. We can know that we are mistaken by comparing and contrasting those instances of delusion or illusion or error to our other experiences. We know that a movie is not real because of the characteristics is has - it happens on a screen in a particular space and so on. We know that we have dreams because of their characteristics - they happen in particular circumstances. We use our experiences to show that some of them are actual and some of them are not. It's an holistic exercise, if you like; we become aware that some experiences are illusions by contrasting them to those that are not illusions. In order to understand what an illusion is, we must also understand what is not an illusion. In order to understand what is not actual, we must understand what is actual.

If that's so, then how could it make sense to say that nothing is actual? If everything is an illusion, we could have no way of understanding what an illusion is.

So even though the screen on which you read this is somehow just congealed energy, it is still a screen.

Well,yes, I was just musing about how things could be not as they seem. That kind of comment goes over better in a group of stoners on weed than in a respectable forum such as this.

There is a world not external to anything nor internal to anything.

One must define what one means by illusion, as far as the screen goes you are the screen, for in your absence there is nothing subjectively speaking. Subject and object stand or fall together--Schop. As far as unmanifested energy goes we don't experience much of it and it is not manifested as objects. We know apparent reality by the alterations those energies/objects make on our bodies. There are no certainties that are not relative to the state of one's biology, alter the biology and you alter apparent reality. Sorry for the long delay, life's dramas tend to interfere with my play time. O' what is actual, I would say that what is experienced is considered actual for in order to be experienced it must alter one's biology in some way. Illusion like what we consider actuality to be is biological dependent, again, change the state of one's biology and you change that subject's apparent reality. So, knowing this, how do you wish to define illusion?

Is there a real external world, the answer has to be no. It is all energy and that energy plays biological consciousness as its instrument, and the melody is apparent reality. It is called apparent reality because it is a tune played on a limited instrument and the instrument can only know the world/ energies effects upon it, which is a melody only biological consciousness/ the instrument hears. Lonely, very very lonely!